Golfballs on the Moor: Building the Fylingdales Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
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The Satellite Tracking RoleIn February 1961 the Americans proposed another use for Fylingdales: for tracking satellites and other space objects. The proposal was to use Fylingdales’ standby computer for space tracking purposes: ‘Prepared information will be fed into the second computer from the US National Space Surveillance Control Centre on the tracks of known satellites, which it will compare with radar plots passed to it by the other computer; if the radar and satellites information correlate, the former is used to bring the latter up to date; if not, the tracker follows the new object and if it still looks like a satellite it is recorded as a new satellite. The revised and the new satellite data are passed back over the BMEWS rearward communication system.’ 77 There was some concern that this role would detract from the BMEWS function. ‘The snag to the proposal is that it takes 15 seconds to run the BMEWS programme into the standby computer, before it can revert to its ballistic missile function, and there are some losses of information on transfer. However, precautions are taken to revert the second computer from space track to standby BMEWS at the first sign of BMEWS activity, or of indifferent behaviour on the part of the on-line computer, in order to be ready for an immediate transfer in the event of trouble.’ 78 The RAF view was that our ‘answer to the Americans seems to hinge solely on whether the degradation of the BMEWS function is tolerable.’ Normal operation of the BMEWS system involved two computers ‘employed in a duplex mode in which the off-line computer performs simultaneously the same functions and possesses the same data as the one in use except that its output is suppressed; the answers given by the two computers were continuously compared and if there were discrepancies the standby computer was to be switched into service virtually instantaneously if the routine checking mechanism indicated that it was functioning the better.’ The proposed system had ‘the disadvantage, in the event of a failure at a critical moment, of having to wait 15 seconds for the BMEWS programme to be run into the standby computer and a further equal delay in building up again some stored information which cannot be held in the second computer and is therefore lost.’ In general, however, this was a minimal concern ‘because there would be an automatic changeover from the space track to the BMEWS standby mode in the event of threatening activity building up in the on-line computer, this disruption could only arise in the remote event of the on-line computer failing at the critical moment when a raid first penetrated the cover.’ Given that normal operation involved two hours every day without standby due to servicing, the few seconds delay hardly representated a significant reduction in BMEWS capability.79 With these doubts assuaged, the Air Staff became increasingly enthusiastic about the satellite tracking role and in 1963 put forward proposals for a UK Satellite Information Centre to be based at Fylingdales, leading to the promulgation of Air Staff Requirement No OR 1453. The original idea for ‘simply the extraction of the satellite data which is generated by Fylingdales’ evolved into a much more comprehensive function: It seems now, for instance, that it could have special value in connection with our participation in the early trials of the US Defence Communications Satellite Programme (MARS). To get maximum benefit from our part in these trials we must be capable of engaging in system control exercises. We shall therefore need a source of up-to-date orbital data, and the Centre which produces such data will, indeed, be a likely location for the system control function. Apart from this we shall be able to give substantial help to the Ministry of Aviation in the tracking and control of their satellites, if their current proposal for a Small Satellite Launcher is approved. More widely, there is general support for our proposal from the civil/scientific community. You will recall that this was expressed to us recently by the Royal Society’s British National Committee for Space Research. In short, a focus for satellite orbital information will undoubtedly meet a variety of requirements, no one of which, perhaps, could by itself provide a complete justification but which, collectively, make a very strong case.80 One motivating factor was also the perceived benefits of closer ties to the US: ‘The Air Staff believe that there is now little doubt that the close operational link with the SPADATS headquarters at Colorado Springs could be established, which is necessary if the UK Centre is to be fully effective. This would be a material contribution to UK/US interdependence in military space.’81 The first step was to give ‘RCA(GB) authority to carry out signature analysis work within the resources already available to them and subject to the existing priorities. The next step will be to establish three or four extra personnel at Fylingdales specifically for the new task (one or two RCA(GB) plus one or two RAF). This, and the purchase of some small items of recording equipment, will give us an operational capability. We shall then be in a stable position in which we can produce information useful to UK intelligence branches and to SPADATS, and the experience we shall gain will show whether the effort needs to be increased and, if so, in what way.’ 82 Work was also to be done at RRE with its 45 ft S-band tracking radar and ‘information on techniques will be exchanged between Fylingdales and Malvern’ and ‘whenever possible, the two stations shall co-operate actively by recording radar data on the same satellite simultaneously. Such work has not previously been done at these frequencies either in this country or in the USA.’ 83 Indeed, the UK proposals seem to have been welcomed in the US: All these items were discussed informally with USAF during the recent joint RAF/RRE visit, and our proposals were warmly welcomed both in the Pentagon and at NORAD. Indeed USAF had been hoping that the UK would be able to make some such contribution, because they were anxious to get some observations of this kind on Russian satellites, and we are particularly well placed geographically for looking at them in the first few orbits.84 It was concluded that ‘the work we are proposing will: a. Have operational advantages for Fylingdales in its BMEWS role, by enabling the performance efficiency of the station to be assessed more accurately than is possible at present. b. Provide new information on radar techniques, with possible application to ABM studies as well as to space. In this aspect it is in a real sense a joint MOD/MOA venture. c. Give data on Russian satellites, of interest to Intelligence both here and in the USA. d. Represent a significant step towards UK/US collaboration in space surveillance, thereby encouraging the flow of information from the US, in both technical and operational channels.’85 Low demand for the BMEWS function may also have added to the enthusiasm for a space tracking role for Fylingdales. In normal operations BMEWS did not do very much. It simply waited for an attack that hopefully would not come. The BMEWS function was not only very passive in nature, but also was seen as somewhat less useful with the advent of Polaris. Unless augmented in some way, it would be possible to argue that the BMEWS contribution alone did not justify the expenditure on Fylingdales. Thus is was argued that in ‘order to maintain the viability of BMEWS it is becoming increasingly important for the UK to develop its own capacity in the sphere of space surveillance activities and the development of a counter satellite capability. The capability to detect and determine the position of satellites is an essential first step in active satellite counter-measures operations. It is considered that this capability can best be developed through constant observation of potentially hostile space vehicles, and by basic research into space defence techniques. The immediate aims must be to get the maximum contribution from existing equipment, personnel and communications, and to develop the links which have been established on the BMEWS operational net between HQFC and NORAD/ADC of the USAF.’ 86 By mid-1964 there was, therefore, a strong case being made for a major expansion of the space tracking role at Fylingdales: ‘A recent review of the possibilities of using the Fylingdales radar for these purposes, and of achieving a closer relationship with the USAF on the ready exchange of space information generally, has shown that HQFC could immediately take on work in the following area: a. Controlling and directing the us of Fylingdales radars for the acquisition of satellite data for UK purposes through the media of Special Tracking requests. b. Disseminating to authorised UK users the output of Fylingdales SIP programmes. c. Updating UK agencies with Spacetrack information on request, subject to any restrictions deemed necessary by US-UK security regulations. d. Co-ordination of the activities of UK sensors contributing to US Spacetrack via BMEWS communications. e. Investigating and exploiting the capabilities of the Fylingdales radars in the sphere of satellite radar signature analysis and controlling the activities of the O&M Contractor in this field. f. Co-operating with RRE, Malvern, in the development of radar signature analysis techniques by direct liaison, exchange of information, co-ordination of simultaneous special tracking by Malvern and Fylingdales radars and by the training and use of HQFC Detachment personnel at Malvern in the operation of the RRE special tracking radar. g. Compiling, analysing and disseminating to approved UK and US sources the results of Fylingdales radar signature analysis studies. h. Investigating and recommending methods of improving and extending the space surveillance capabilities of Fylingdales equipment without prejudice to the primary BMEWS role. j. Maintaining a direct liaison with NORAD and ADC Spacetrack authorities on military space surveillance activities. k. Co-ordinating with the UK member of the Joint Working Panel FM13 (The UK-US-Canadian Working Panel on the detection classification and cataloguing of artificial earth satellites).’87 The value of the satellite tracking role was brought to the fore by need to renew the Anglo-American Fylingdales agreement in 1967 (see below). It was strongly argued that Fylingdales’ space tracking potential was vital not only for the information that it would provide to the UK, but also because this information would then facilitate better access to US information: ‘Although not primarily designed to track objects in space orbit, Fylingdales is currently capable of observing, detecting and identifying between 35% and 45% of the space population. … Space information is essential to our intelligence and scientific studies and to proposed satellite communication activities. In addition, Fylingdales will be one of the primary sensors supplying “real time” space information to the United Kingdom Scientific and Technical Current Intelligence Centre now being set up. There could be no guarantee that essential access to US space data, particularly classified data, would be so readily available should the United Kingdom cease to participate actively in the exploitation and enhancement of the space track potential of Fylingdales.’88 By 1968 it was clear that satellite tracking was becoming a central role for BMEWS: ‘Because, however, the BMEWS system radars – and this is particularly true of Fylingdales by virtue both of its geographical position and of its possession of three FPS-49 tracking radars – also have a substantial satellite tracking capability, we should expect to see a marked expansion of this role. Technically this is quite feasible (largely by computer program changes) without significantly derogating the ballistic missile capability. Indeed progressive changes to this end have been steadily introduced at all three BMEWS sites over the past 4-5 years, and increased emphasis placed on this progression will equally and directly benefit our own national space monitoring programme centred on the STCIC. Overall this surely represents a better utilisation of the BMEWS system and a thoroughly logical line of development.’89 Directory: esrc-files -> outputs outputs -> Hunter, Helper, Leader, Thief? Unemployed Youth in the Indian Himalayas a report on some preliminary fieldwork findings Jane Dyson and Craig Jeffrey, 7 Download 134.75 Kb. Share with your friends:
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