Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz
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Prolonging Transition Causes WarProlonging transition makes war inevitableLayne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6 (Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy. Try or die – the longer the transition, the more dangerous the declineLarison, American Conservative contributing editor, 9 [Daniel Larison has a PhD in Byzantine history and is a contributing editor at the American Conservative and a columnist for The Week online. 12-12-9, “Six questions for Daniel Larison,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/12/six_questions_for_daniel_laris. DIA: Do you think Barack Obama's conciliatory gestures to the rest of the world represent an abandonment of American hegemony, or are they an effort to make the world more comfortable with it? Mr Larison: Most of his conciliatory gestures have been nothing more than just that, gestures. I find this preferable to riding roughshod over allies and rivals, but it is undeniably a matter of adopting a different tone and style rather than changing the nature of America's relations with other nations. Mr Obama has no interest in abandoning American hegemony or, as he would prefer to call it, American leadership, but he is attempting to exercise it under straitened conditions. To that end he has made a number of speeches, and these have naturally been misunderstood and distorted as "apologies". In reality, Mr Obama has not once apologised for anything America has done in the past, but he is ridiculed this way because he does not engage in boastful triumphalism. In the zero-sum reckoning of his extremely insecure domestic critics, any rhetorical or symbolic concession, no matter how minor, is a defeat and an embarrassment for America. Even on those policies where he has made a great show of changing course, such as engaging with Iran or "resetting" relations with Russia, the substance of the policies has not changed much at all. DIA: You are not a hegemonist. Is that a result of the way America has conducted itself abroad, or do you think unipolarity is inherently bad? Mr Larison: Unipolarity is abnormal and it is unsustainable, so I think it unwise to organize American foreign policy around the preservation of something that is going to disappear sooner or later. Because unipolarity never lasts, the chief means for preserving it is military power, and this leads a government to entangle itself in a number of unnecessary, costly and ultimately ruinous wars to keep hold of something that will slip away from it in any case. Indeed, the strenuous effort to hold on to preeminence usually hastens an even steeper decline than would have happened otherwise. The paradox is that it is the hegemonists who have done more to undermine American hegemony than anything their opponents could have hoped to achieve, while their opponents have called for husbanding America's resources responsibly and carefully rather than frittering them away. Certainly, the frequent recourse to military force over the last 20 years has deepened my antipathy to the constant and unnecessary projection of American power around the world. The goal of maintaining hegemony seems to me a foolish one, but it is the means employed to that end that I find indefensible and outrageous. Heg causes instabilityLayne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6 (Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) Although at first the conclusion may appear counterintuitive, states that seek hegemony invariably end up being less, not more, secure. Being powerful is good in international politics, but being too powerful is not. The reasoning behind this axiom is straightforward as well as the geopolitical counterpart to the law of physics that holds that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Simply put, the response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing power. Because international politics is indeed a competitive, "self-help" system, when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one state, others invariably fear for their own security. Each state fears that a hegemon will use its overwhelming power to aggrandize itself at that state's expense and will act defensively to offset hegemonic power. Thus, one of hegemony's paradoxes is that it contains the seeds of its own destruction. Risk is linear – costs to maintaining heg will only escalateLayne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006, The Peace of Illusions, p 190, Accessed 6/27/12, THW) Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in a great power Eurasian wars. Prolonging hegemony ensures backlash and conflictLayne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 3 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush school of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire”, October 6 2003, http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html, accessed 6/27/12, THW) These are not compelling arguments. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there are no such animals. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them. Others dread both the over-concentration of geopolitical weight in America’s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. Washington’s (purportedly) benevolent intentions are ephemeral, but the hard fist of American power is tangible—and others worry that if U.S. intentions change, they might get smacked. As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan. Causes EntanglementsHegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts, increasing the risk of nuclear warLayne, Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 6 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 169, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments. Causes ConflictUS invented the nuclear weapon—further international leadership leads to warBacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 9 [Andrew, April 30, 2009, Salon, “Fairwell to the American Century” http://www.salon.com/writer/andrew_bacevich/. Accessed 7-7-13 BLE] What flag-wavers tend to leave out of their account of the American Century is not only the contributions of others, but the various missteps perpetrated by the United States — missteps, it should be noted, that spawned many of the problems bedeviling us today. The instances of folly and criminality bearing the label “made in Washington” may not rank up there with the Armenian genocide, the Bolshevik Revolution, the appeasement of Adolf Hitler, or the Holocaust, but they sure don’t qualify as small change. To give them their due is necessarily to render the standard account of the American Century untenable. Here are several examples, each one familiar, even if its implications for the problems we face today are studiously ignored: Cuba. In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain for the proclaimed purpose of liberating the so-called Pearl of the Antilles. When that brief war ended, Washington reneged on its promise. If there actually has been an American Century, it begins here, with the U.S. government breaking a solemn commitment, while baldly insisting otherwise. By converting Cuba into a protectorate, the United States set in motion a long train of events leading eventually to the rise of Fidel Castro, the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even today’s Guantánamo Bay prison camp. The line connecting these various developments may not be a straight one, given the many twists and turns along the way, but the dots do connect. The Bomb. Nuclear weapons imperil our existence. Used on a large scale, they could destroy civilization itself. Even now, the prospect of a lesser power like North Korea or Iran acquiring nukes sends jitters around the world. American presidents — Barack Obama is only the latest in a long line — declare the abolition of these weapons to be an imperative. What they are less inclined to acknowledge is the role the United States played in afflicting humankind with this scourge. The United States invented the bomb. The United States — alone among members of the nuclear club — actually employed it as a weapon of war. The U.S. led the way in defining nuclear-strike capacity as the benchmark of power in the postwar world, leaving other powers like the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China scrambling to catch up. Today, the U.S. still maintains an enormous nuclear arsenal at the ready and adamantly refuses to commit itself to a no-first-use policy, even as it professes its horror at the prospect of some other nation doing as the United States itself has done. Iran. Extending his hand to Tehran, President Obama has invited those who govern the Islamic republic to “unclench their fists.” Yet to a considerable degree, those clenched fists are of our own making. For most Americans, the discovery of Iran dates from the time of the notorious hostage crisis of 1979-1981 when Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, detained several dozen U.S. diplomats and military officers and subjected the administration of Jimmy Carter to a 444-day-long lesson in abject humiliation. Causes TerrorismUS hegemony triggers backlash, fostering terrorismLayne, Texas A&M George Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 7 [Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, “Why do they hate us?” his question missed the key point, however. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do “hate” the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And, for sure, notwithstanding American neoconservatives’ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the War on Terrorism inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations.” Still, this isn’t—and should not be allowed to become—a replay of the Crusades. As Scheuer says, “one of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S. leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.” The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it’s hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself as violently as it did on 9/11. Experts on terrorism understand the political motives that drive the actions of groups like al Qaeda. In his important recent study of suicide terrorists, Robert A. Pape found that what “nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.” Pape found that “even al Qaeda fits this pattern: although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, a principal objective of Osama bin Laden is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region.” This finding is seconded by Scheuer, who describes bin Laden’s objectives as: “the end of U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that state; the removal of U.S. and Western forces from the Arabian Peninsula; the removal of U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands; the end of U.S. support for oppression of Muslims by Russia, China, and India; the end of U.S. protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and the conservation of the Muslim world’s energy resources and their sale at higher prices.” Simply put, it is American primacy, and the policies that flow from it, that have made the United States a lightning rod for Islamic anger. US hegemony pursuit makes terrorist attacks more likelyLayne, professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 07 [Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, pg. 67-68, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Terrorism: When Over There Becomes Over Here 9/11was not a random act of violence visited upon the United States. The United States was the target of al Qaeda's terrorist strikes because that group harbored specific political grievances against the United States. If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. AsMichael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osamabin Laden andal Qaeda,put it, "In the context of ideas bin Laden shares withhis brethren, the military actions of al Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, notterrorism...meant to advance bin Laden's clear, focused, limited, and widelypopular foreign policy goals..." Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.' As Clausewitz himself observed, "war is not anact of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object ?'" Terrorism really is a form of asymmetric warfare waged against the United States by groups that lack the military wherewithal to slug it out with the United Statest oe-to-toe. 9/11 was a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical—andcultural—primacy. As Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 For-eign Affairsarticle, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would behatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the UnitedStates had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah ofIran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault onIslam." U.S. primacy fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world roles"As long as the United States uses its global primacy to impose its imperial sway on regions like the Persian Gulf, it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups likeal Qaeda. A world of US hegemony is more susceptible to terrorismButko, University of Alberta international relations professor, 5 [Thomas, Professor of International Relations, teaches about terrorism at the University of Alberta, Ph.D at University of Alberta, Researches Terrorism as counter-hegemonic violence and Middle East Politics. “TERRORISM REDEFINED: TERRORISM AS “COUNTER-HEGEMONIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE,” Published As a Paper in the Canadian Political Science Association in 2005, page 13, no specific date provided, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Butko.pdf, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] In this section, a historical analysis will assist in linking the phenomenon of “terrorism” with the broader concept of hegemony. Throughout the modern historical age, commencing with the first contemporary usage of “terrorism” during the French Revolution, the term has been solely applied to those states, groups, organizations, or individuals who have refused to consent to the “common sense” views or hegemony of the dominant powers within the international system. Perhaps Beril Dedeoglu is most succinct in creating this link when he states: “In other words, actors capable of defining the international system rules can define certain facts that seem in opposition to their way of existence as manifestations of ‘terror’ and thus identify them as ‘other’.”36 It is through this hegemony that the principal powers have been able to designate as “terrorists” their specific enemies or opponents within the international system. Once more, Dedeoglu argues: As each state’s ‘terror criminal’ (its enemy) is different, its perception of crime or enemy is also different. This difference is based on the various interests of the states in the international system.”37 Of course, it is only when a particular power is dominant and hegemonic, such as the United States, that such a classification can be internationalized and accepted, either coercively or consensually, by all the constituent parts of the system (i.e., the weaker powers). Historically, while these variously deemed “terrorist” groups have sought to challenge the Western dominance or hegemony of the international system or, perhaps more accurately, have been perceived to be the primary threat to the contemporary entrenched status quo powers, such challenges have exhibited a number of distinct, but similar, characteristics. Causes China ConflictUS hegemony leads to conflict with China and resource competitionShor, historian at Wayne State University, 12 [Francis Shor, 1-1-2012, BRILL, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?” 7-6-13, JZ] While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world’s largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world’s copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, “the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises.” [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China’s rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite’s ideological commitment to national security. At the same time, China is now the world’s largest consumer of essential metals (copper, zinc, platinum) and one of the most voracious importers of hydrocarbons. Essential investment and trade by China in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela, plus engagement with a host of Central Asian countries, indicates China’s growing need for oil and natural gas, as well as its growing challenge to U.S. geostrategic interests in these aforementioned countries and regions. [7] With China’s energy consumption approaching 20% of the world’s total, it may well overtake the U.S. as the largest hydrocarbon consumer in the next decade or so. It is already the number one producer of greenhouse gasses although the U.S. is still the per capita leader. Nonetheless, as Michael Klare points out, the scramble for more oil will lead to extracting what he calls “tough oil,” resulting in more expensive and environmentally destructive production. [8] Compounding the energy strains and resource competition are additional environmental catastrophes in the form of global warming and desertification. As one skeptical analysis of China’s rise warns: “By impinging on the very process of world-systemic reproduction itself, the mutually interpenetrating character of energy resource bottlenecks and extreme climate perturbations should make an already unlikely transition in world-systemic leadership between a declining U.S. and a rising China even more inconceivable – especially considering these bottlenecks and perturbations will both compound China’s well-documented explosion of peasant and worker protests and hamstring the capacity of the Chinese state to respond to myriad crises.” [9] Beyond the internal and external environmental crises facing China and the United States, the resource competition between these two powers will invariably lead to geostrategic conflicts. The U.S. obsession over the growing Chinese economic and geopolitical threats deliberately obfuscates those factors that have led to a declining global hegemony. James Petras captures the global contradictions that flow from these differing geostrategic postures in the world: Causes Russian-Chinese AllianceUS hegemonic stance causes Russia-China counter-balancingCohen & Tigay, writers for the Heritage Foundation, 13 [Ariel & Benjamin, March 1, 2013, “Mr. Xi Goes to Moscow: For China’s Leader, It’s Russia First”, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/01/mr-xi-goes-to-moscow-for-chinas-leader-its-russia-first/, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] China’s new president, Xi Jinping, will make his first official foreign visit to Russia this month. Xi’s decision to make his first visit abroad to Russia suggests an effort to improve relations and cement their strategic partnership. Washington should pay attention to the growing ties between Moscow and Beijing. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian and Chinese bilateral relations have vastly improved. Currently, both countries would like to displace U.S. “hegemony,” especially along their borders. Russia repeatedly demanded that the U.S. pull out of the air force base in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, while China would like to keep the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific in check. Russia’s anti-American foreign policy, often with shrill propaganda overtones, seeks to establish a Russian “pole” in the global world order. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that Xi’s “upcoming visit is expected to add new impetus to the further development of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.” The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Moscow and Beijing founded, aims to fight “the three evils”: separatism, extremism, and terrorism. However, Sino–Russian cooperation is not just geopolitical but also ideological. Russia and China want to halt the spread of democracy and keep the U.S. out of their internal affairs, as well as of regimes friendly to them. They believe that any government has a right to crack down on internal dissent or censure the press, including the Internet. With these principles in mind, they have worked in concert to check U.S. efforts in the Middle East and protect its own interests, such as legitimizing authoritarian regimes. They vetoed and stifled sanctions and internationally supported peace plans for Syria. They enabled Iran to continue its nuclear program by refusing to tighten sanctions. China, which is the principal supporter of North Korea, condemns even the possibility of military action against Pyongyang—and so does Russia. They increasingly present an alternative to Western-style democracy and are two stalwarts of the broad front against the U.S. Russia and China are moving to publicize their economic ties. The two countries have already moved to trade with each other using their own currencies—and excluding the dollar. The two countries have promised to increase trade dramatically over the next decade, and they are working on finalizing a deal on the most important sector of their bilateral trade: energy. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich is conducting negotiations in China on a natural gas deal, saying that a “significant breakthrough” had been made over the past few months. This gas pipeline will connect Russia’s abundant gas reserves with China’s ever-growing need for energy. However, China’s rapid economic rise and desire for an enhanced global position could spell trouble for the relationship down the road. Russia’s economy is lagging behind China, and Moscow can become subservient to Beijing economically, turning into the natural resource appendage of China’s continued growth. As China continues to expand its sphere of influence through military, economic, smart, and soft power, Russia may become its junior partner in international affairs. For now, mutual geopolitical and economic interests are drawing Russia and China together. Xi’s first visit sends the clear message that China seeks to cement closer ties with its anti-American northern neighbors—and not with the U.S. US hegemony provokes Russian and Chinese military alliance—risks nuclear exchangeRoberts, American economist and a columnist for Creators Syndicate, 7 [Paul Craig, August 12, 2007, “U.S. Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance “, http://www.creators.com/opinion/paul-craig-roberts/u-s-hegemony-spawns-russian-chinese-military-alliance.html, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about U.S. hegemony. Neocons believe that the United States is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the United States must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the United States has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite five years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, U.S. administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The United States gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin.
Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the United States, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. Causes Iran ConflictAmerican hegemonic pursuits in Middle East makes conflict with Iran inevitableLayne, at Texas A&MGeorge Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 7 [Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at leastthe one that has grabbed thelion'sshare of the headlines—is Tehran's evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington's policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is"intolerable."Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq's recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on thebrink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Ira-nian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America's ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in currentU.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. TheBush Doctrine's three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor ofpreventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radicalshake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S.dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration's policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democ-ratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay theadministration's pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. Thekey question today is whether these assumptions are correct. Causes Middle East InstabilityUS hegemony causes Middle East instabilityYale Global 4 [“Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/gulf-security-globalizing-world-going-beyond-us-hegemony, June 29, 2004, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US “friends and allies” on one side, and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, and this decision would be based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those “rogue” states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a “regime conversion” or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as “bad” in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counter-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states’ security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran. The hegemonic strategy does not deviate from US policies in previous periods and thus risks more policy failure. Bilateral ties, by themselves, will neither solve outstanding political conflicts nor prevent new conflicts from arising among the Gulf states. Moreover, continued dependence on the United States would only increase domestic pressures against current Arab regimes. Causes Oil DependenceUS hegemony requires energy imperialism – dependence on oil highFoster, University of Oregon sociology professor, 5 (John Bellamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-5, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism, accessed 7/7/13, AR) The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies. 1 Beginning in 1998 a series of strategic energy initiatives were launched in national security circles in the United States in response to: (1) the crossing of the 50 percent threshold in U.S. importation of foreign oil; (2) the disappearance of spare world oil production capacity; (3) concentration of an increasing percentage of all remaining conventional oil resources in the Persian Gulf; and (4) looming fears of peak oil. The response of the vested interests to this world oil supply crisis was to construct what Michael Klare in Blood and Oil has called a global “strategy of maximum extraction.”2 This required that the United States as the hegemonic power, with the backing of the other leading capitalist states, seek to extend its control over world oil reserves with the object of boosting production. Seen in this light, the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (the geopolitical doorway to Western access to Caspian Sea Basin oil and natural gas) following the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the rapid expansion of U.S. military activities in the Gulf of Guinea in Africa (where Washington sees itself as in competition with Beijing), and the increased threats now directed at Iran and Venezuela—all signal the rise of a dangerous new era of energy imperialism. Oil dependence leads to superpower conflict with ChinaLuft, LA Times writer, 4 (Gal, Analysis of Global Security, 2/2/4 “U.S., China Are on Collision Course Over Oil” http://www.iags.org/la020204.htm, accessed 7/9/13, AR) Sixty-seven years ago, oil-starved Japan embarked on an aggressive expansionary policy designed to secure its growing energy needs, which eventually led the nation into a world war. Today, another Asian power thirsts for oil: China. While the U.S. is absorbed in fighting the war on terror, the seeds of what could be the next world war are quietly germinating. With 1.3 billion people and an economy growing at a phenomenal 8% to 10% a year, China, already a net oil importer, is growing increasingly dependent on imported oil. Last year, its auto sales grew 70% and its oil imports were up 30% from the previous year, making it the world's No. 2 petroleum user after the U.S. By 2030, China is expected to have more cars than the U.S. and import as much oil as the U.S. does today. Dependence on oil means dependence on the Middle East, home to 70% of the world's proven reserves. With 60% of its oil imports coming from the Middle East, China can no longer afford to sit on the sidelines of the tumultuous region. Its way of forming a footprint in the Middle East has been through providing technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to unsavory regimes in places such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. A report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a group created by Congress to monitor U.S.-China relations, warned in 2002 that "this arms trafficking to these regimes presents an increasing threat to U.S. security interests in the Middle East." The report concludes: "A key driver in China's relations with terrorist-sponsoring governments is its dependence on foreign oil to fuel its economic development. This dependency is expected to increase over the coming decade." Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist while competing over scarce resources. The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relations with Saudi Arabia, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi-financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclear weapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices in the U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy — and perhaps even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on the U.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they might find China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence in the Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectives and priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China from becoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., a superpower collision is in the cards. The good news is that we are still in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency. Hurts India-US RelationsUS unilateralism causes a decline in Indian relations – resentmentMehta, Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University professor, 3 (Pratap Bhanu, 7-1-3, Foreign Policy, “Grading the President: A View From South Asia, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/07/01/grading_the_president_a_view_from_south_asia, accessed 7/7/13, AR) But overall, the perception of Bush remains directly related to the perception of the United States itself. Many people, Hindu nationalists in particular, who think of India as a great power, are genuinely ambivalent about the president’s demeanor. On the one hand, there is a sneaking admiration for his unilateralism, his single-minded ability to do whatever it takes to advance U.S. power—even if it means relying on military force and disregarding world opinion. On the other hand, because India is, to put it mildly, in no position to act like the United States, the country resents the president when he does not fully acknowledge India’s interests. In both India and Pakistan, Bush benefits from the natural esteem many have for U.S. power, but he does little to assuage those who see that power as a provocation. Causes ProliferationHeg causes prolif and terrorismLayne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 7 (Christopher, Holder of the Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professorship of International Affairs at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. 8/2/7, “America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived,” Paper Prepared for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 29 August-2 September 2007, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/9/7/pages210973/p210973-1.php, Accessed 7/7/13, AR) In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non- traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Hurts CooperationAmerican withdrawal would create avenues for international cooperation for multiple issues, but now is keyKupchan, writer for Political Science Quarterly, 3 [Charles, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier, accessed 7-9-13 BLE] As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[*] Decline Good – CounterbalancingPulling back solves counterbalancing and forces our allies to bear some of the burden of their own defense.Walt, Belfer Professor of IR at Harvard, 2013 (Stephen, 1/2/2013, “More or Less: The Debate on US Grand Strategy”, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy, accessed 7/9/13, DVO) Fourth, B, I, & W largely ignore the issue of opportunity cost. Advocates of restraint like Posen (and myself) are not saying that the United States cannot afford to intervene in lots of overseas venues, they are saying that the United States would be better off with a smaller set of commitments and a more equitable division of labor between itself and its principal allies. If the United States were not spending more than more of the world combined on "deep engagement," it could invest more in infrastructure here at home, lower taxes, balance budgets more easily, provide more generous health or welfare benefits, or do whatever combination of the above the public embraced. Fifth, B, I, & W argue that deep engagement works because hardly anybody is actively trying to balance American power. In their view, most of the world likes this strategy, and is eager for Washington to continue along the same path. On the one hand, this isn't that surprising: why shouldn't NATO countries or Japan prefer a world where they can spend 1-2% of GDP on defense while Uncle Sucker shoulders the main burden? More importantly, advocates of restraint believe doing somewhat less would encourage present allies to bear a fairer share of the burden, and also discourage some of them from adventurist behavior encouraged by excessive confidence in U.S. protection (which Posen terms "reckless driving"). If the U.S. played hard-to-get on occasion, it would discover that some of its allies would do more both to secure their own interests and to remain eligible for future U.S. help. Instead of bending over backwards to convince the rest of the world that the United States is 100 percent reliable, U.S. leaders should be encouraging other states to bend over backwards to convince us that they are worth supporting. Moreover, even if most of the world isn't balancing U.S. power, the parts that are remain troublesome. For instance, "deep engagement" in the Middle East has produced some pretty vigorous balancing behavior, in the form of Iraq and Iran's nuclear programs, Tehran's support for groups such as Hezbollah, and the virulent anti-Americanism of Al Qaeda. Indeed, the more deeply engaged we became in the region (especially with the onset of "dual containment" following the first Gulf War), the more local resistance we faced. Ditto our "deep engagement" in Iraq and Afghanistan. And given that those two wars may have cost upwards of $3 trillion, it seems clear that at least a few people have "balanced" against the United States with a certain amount of success.
Retrenchment Good – On BalanceBenefits of retrenchment outweigh the harmsMacdonald and Parent, Wellesley College and University of Miami Political Science Assistant Professors, 11 (Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, November/December 2011, Foreign Affairs, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Vol. 90 Issue 6, p32-47, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall. Hurts the EconomyOverseas influence causes economic decline—empirically provenEland, Independent Institute Center on Peace and Liberty Senior Fellow and Director, 9 [Ivan, 5-11-9, The Independent Institute, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer. Hegemony hurts America’s fiscal healthDrezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13 [Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).”, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] There are two significant caveats to this body of evidence, however. The first reservation is that in all of these theories—hegemonic stability, power transition, long cycle—eventually the cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the sole superpower. Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right now, are allowing China to outgrow [End Page 72] the United States.95 The absence of burden sharing is particularly acute on the military side of the public goods equation. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press argue that the costs of a forward military presence outweigh the gains accruing to the United States from global stability.96 Nuno Monteiro observes that the United States has been at war in thirteen of the twenty-two post–Cold War years—a marked contrast to pre-1989 levels.97 These military operations might have prevented wider wars from breaking out, but the United States continues to pay the price in blood and treasure. The costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have exacted a significant toll on America’s fiscal health—more than $3 trillion to date, with an estimated $4 trillion to $6 trillion total projected for both conflicts.98 Attempts to bolster the economy through hegemony, allow other countries to undermine hegemony.Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13 [Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).”, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] The other hypothesized voluntary benefit comes from geopolitical favoritism, wherein other sovereign jurisdictions provide voluntary economic concessions to the dominant security actor. Primacy allows the hegemon to use its military power as a form of extended deterrence to protect multiple strategic partners. In return, these allies and partners can confer economic benefits, helping to underwrite military hegemony.41 If these countries give preferential treatment to the hegemon’s investors, support its currency as the world’s reserve currency, buy hegemon-issued debt as a way to finance defense spending, or subsidize the hegemon’s power projection through basing fees, arms purchases, or other transfers, then the relationship between military power and pecuniary benefits comes into greater focus. More generally, those actors who rely on the hegemon’s security umbrella are less likely to question or subvert its economic [End Page 62] order. As Norrlof explains, “The United States is obligated by treaty to defend roughly fifty countries. These interventions, whether to push back aggressors, or for humanitarian reasons, have purchased goodwill and provided Great Powers with an interest in preserving an American-centered world order.”42 Retrenchment Good – EconomyUS economy will benefit from retrenchmentVerschoor-Kirss, Williams College, 12 (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, April 23, 2012, International Policy Digest, “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) In modern foreign policy the United States faces a complicated irony: in a bid to ensure national security and maintain global primacy the U.S. spends a large quantity of blood and treasure on interventionist policies that may actually compromise national security and the future of American hegemony. The culmination of these exercises in grandiose foreign policy has been the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, at the combined cost of between three and four trillion dollars. While it is possible to argue that the invasions have been successful in preventing further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, such a counterfactual proposition is difficult to prove. What is clear, however, is that such expenditures are unsustainable given a national debt of over $15 trillion. As the country debates the potential for military action in the Middle East in both Syria and Iran the necessity of a levelheaded understanding of the costs of such interventions, and their potentially fatal consequences for American standing in the world, cannot be overstated. Given the costs of large-scale foreign interventions, and the disproportionate share of the funding of organizations such as NATO and the United Nations that the United States carries, it is readily apparent that an isolationist foreign policy would present a prudent fiscal alternative to the current state of affairs. Given the historical and ideological connotations associated with the term “isolationism” it is important to clarify its intended meaning here. By “isolationism” I am advocating for a steady devolvement from foreign commitments and military involvements while maintaining economic and diplomatic ties, as well as overall U.S. military might, in order to preserve the long-term future of American hegemony. Here it might be argued that the concepts of isolationism and hegemony are antithetical. It would appear impossible to be both isolationist and hegemonic. At the same time, however, nothing could be further from the case. Download 1.85 Mb. Share with your friends:
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