NATO 9 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO publishes new policy to combat weapons of mass destruction proliferation,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_57234.htm?selectedLocale=en) MJ
The North Atlantic Council decided on 31 August 2009 to make public a new strategic policy for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The document, which stems from the Bucharest Summit in 2008, was endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 and constitutes a new basis for NATO’s efforts in the field of WMD. “The document is comprehensive in scope,” said Ambassador Jacek Bylica, Head of NATO’s WMD Centre. “It is guided by a clear vision: that the Alliance – its populations, territory and forces – will be secure from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and related materials. It provides high-level political guidance for our future activities in support of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes, as well as for military planning and capacity-building for defending against the threats posed by these weapons.” The new document highlights “strategic enablers” that will allow the Alliance to prevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against a WMD attack, and recover should an attack take place. These enablers consist of intelligence and information sharing, international outreach and partner activities, as well as public diplomacy and strategic communication. “In implementing this policy, NATO will foster cooperation with partners, and international and regional organizations in order to develop a common understanding of the WMD threat,” Ambassador Bylica said. “It will encourage participation in and compliance with international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.” At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, the spread of WMD and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them were identified as the main threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years
Proliferation leads to extinction
Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, “Survival”, p.87-90) In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclearweapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the AmericanWild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
NATO Won’t Collapse
There’s no identity crisis- many backgrounds allows NATO to stay together
Osborn 10 (Dan, poli sci UC Berkley, Marin Forum, The Role of Identity in Security Organizations, http://marin-forum.com/)BAF
A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present.The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct. The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the organization will weaken over the long term.
NATO is a permanent alliance- flawed cooperation is better than none
Sloan 10 (Stanely, Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, NATO a Permanent Alliance: Outlook for the Future, June 16, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-permanent-alliance-outlook-future)
Chances are, if the United States and the European allies continue to see transatlantic security cooperation as in their interest, they will find ways to compromise on difficult issues and to move ahead, using ad hoc coalition approaches when absolutely necessary to get around opposition to making an operation a formal NATO mission. Respect for the sovereign decisions of member states has, of course, been the underlying problem with NATO’s operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s effectiveness was handicapped by the fact that some countries were unwilling to allow their troops to operate in parts of Afghanistan and in circumstances that would put them at greater risk. It is well understood that political realities and historical experiences have determined the approaches that nations have taken to this issue. The eventual evaluation of NATO’s performance in Afghanistan will undoubtedly reflect such problems, even if the long run produces a relatively successful outcome. Assessing the mission’s effectiveness will become part of the process of adapting the alliance to future security challenges. Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship. The bottom line, therefore, is that the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early twenty-first century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure. The bargain will survive in part because the security of the member states cannot be ensured through national measures alone. It will survive because the member states will continue to recognize that imperfect cooperation serves their interests better than no cooperation at all. NATO will be adapted to meet new challenges. And the value foundation of the transatlantic bargain will persist, in spite of differences over specific issues and shifting patterns of member state interests. It will survive in part because the bargain is not just NATO. In fact, recent trends suggest that there is much more creative thought and political momentum behind enhancing transatlantic cooperation rather than diminishing it. As Lawrence S. Kaplan has observed, “The transatlantic bargain still resonates in the twenty-first century.” As a result, this bargain in the hearts and minds of the member states has become as close as one could imagine to being a “permanent alliance.”