AT: Surveillance – No Solve—Public Data
Landsats don’t give the US an intel advantage—UN requires international information-sharing
Slonecker et al 98 (E. Terrence, representative for the EPA, Denice M. Shaw, and Thomas M. Lillesand, American Society for Photogrammetry, June, http://www.geog.ubc.ca/courses/geob373/lectures/Handouts/PERS_Remote_Sensing_Ethics.pdf, accessed 7-6-11, CH)
Further, there is a noteworthy and surprising lack of comprehensive policy development with respect to high-resolution remote sensing technology. Major unaddressed concerns still exist relating to such fundamental issues as national security, military intelligence, and terrorist activity (Bingaman, 1995). And while the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (LRSPA) establishes comprehensive data and regulatory policies for Landsat and follow-on systems, the Act's basic assertion that private space-based systems are not currently viable has been challenged by the licensing of several commercial vendors, creating the possibility of large commercial remote sensing markets that were not envisioned, or covered, by this particular law (Gabroynowicz, 1993). Further, as pointed out by Gabrynowicz (1996), the next generation of Unpiloted Aerial Vehicles is likely to operate at altitudes that were not envisioned or addressed in the LRSPA. The United Nations has issued general guidance titled "Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space," which promotes international cooperation and data sharing between countries, but does not directly address issues of privacy or data misuse at the level of the individual. The coming advances in remote sensing technology, coupled with the corresponding changes in commercial restructuring and global information distribution, will, within the next decade, drastically change the nature and utilization of imagery and will result in the flow of data and information products outside of traditional jurisdictional and national boundaries that once regulated access, distribution, and appropriate use.
Commercial firms provide surveillance intel—undermines US advantage
Bruggeman 9 (David, researcher for Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable of the National Academies , GWU, 10/20, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/spacemil11.html, accessed 7-6-11, CH)
Today, Taiwan, China, Japan, North and South Korea are clearly aware of the possible advantages of high-resolution remote sensing, for commercial, civil, and military applications. However, none of these nations yet have an indigenous capability, though Japan and China are fairly close to achieving it. Until the Asian nations develop their own capabilities, they will continue on depend on commercial firms to meet some of their imagery needs. Doing business with US firms implies the necessity of abiding by significant restrictions. As these restrictions have not been fully tested, there is still uncertainty about how much the US government will exploit its control over the commercial sector in order to achieve US foreign policy objectives. Thus, the degree to which the Pacific Rim nations, especially China and North Korea, can rely on access to commercial remote sensing firms to pursue their own foreign policy objectives is still unclear. Commercial remote sensing firms will face risks in doing business in the East Asian countries, particularly in times of conflict. In times of conflict, diplomatic pressures regarding shutter control could become intense, and firms will be faced with a decision about where they draw the line between free commerce and government pressure. Commercial space assets or space assets of a non-participating government may be casualties of regional conflict. As remote sensing grows and becomes more commercial in nature, the industry is likely to face significant challenges. Since satellite remote sensing inherently serves both civil and national security applications, commercial remote sensing firms will be faced with issues beyond those that face other international businesses. Political and security concerns, as well as business plans, will shape the remote sensing industry. Nowhere is this as clear as in the Asia-Pacific, a region increasingly prepared to use remote sensing data, whether both commercially procured or indigenous, as a tool for peace or a weapon of war.
AT: Surveillance – Impact N/U—Space Race Now
Space race now—China developing new capabilities and US racing to counter
Reid 7 (Tim, staff, the Times, 1/19, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1294519.ece, accessed 7-7-11, CH)
Washington’s concerns over the threat to its satellites as China embarks on its “Star Wars” programme triggered an aggressive revision of its national space policy in October that asserted America’s right to deny access to space to anyone hostile to its interests. In a speech about the policy last month, Robert Joseph, the State Department’s chief arms control and international security official, said that other nations and possibly terrorist groups were “acquiring capabilities to counter, attack and defeat US space systems”. He added: “No nation, no non-state actor, should be under the illusion that the United States will tolerate a denial of our right to the use of space for peaceful purposes.” China insists that its military policy is purely defensive, but its repetitions appear intended to allay fears among its neighbours that it is developing an increasingly formidable array of weaponry. Less than two weeks ago, military manufacturers unveiled China’s home-made fighter jet, the Jian-10. China has just released its first defence White Paper in two years that sets out ambitious goals for the People’s Liberation Army. The paper focused heavily on the need for technological modernisation. The US has been researching “satellite-killing” technology of its own, experimenting with lasers on the ground that could disable and destroy spacecraft.
Space build-up and loss of US space primacy inevitable—challengers and tech diffusion
Eberhart 9 (Dave, editor, Newsmax, 1/6, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/china-threatens-US-space/2009/01/06/id/327493, accessed 7-7-11, CH)
Ambitious nations, and China in particular, are challenging U.S. space supremacy with research programs that have led to their first deployments in space — and eventually could station deadly military prowess miles above Earth. “Perhaps the ultimate asymmetrical strategy against the United States lies in the possibility of a nuclear detonation at an altitude between 40 and 400 kilometers designed both to disable and destroy U.S. satellites and to have devastating EMP effects against infrastructure on Earth,” warn study authors. “The Space and U.S. Security Net Assessment (January 2009)” surveyed the status of U.S. space activities and drew comparisons with other countries that have developed space programs in recent decades. “The growing commercialization of space will create a more level playing field as additional actors gain greater access to the products and services of the commercial space sector and to the enabling technologies as well,” says the report, which the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis just published. Most ominous, however, is what the capture of these technologies by old and new enemies may mean to U.S. security in the 21st century. Given present trends, several important conclusions emerge from the net assessment, conclude the authors: There is substantial agreement that the United States can avoid the “weaponization” of space by restricting its future space-related national security programs, including foregoing deployment of space-based missile defense. The ability to destroy or disable satellites from Earth, which the Chinese demonstrated in 2007, eventually will be available to others as a result of proliferating rocket and other technologies.
Space inevitable
Pena 2 (Charles, senior defense policy analyst, Cato Institute, 7/1, “U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE PROGRAMS:
FUTURE PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY”, accessed 7-7-11, CH)
Control of space is at the crux of the debate about the future of U.S. military space policy. It is important to point out that the issue is not whether the United States should militarize space. The militarization of space has already occurred and will continue. Space assets are currently used to great effect to support terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military operations. The more immediate issue is whether the United States should weaponize space, at least in the near- or mid-term, and more important, whether military uses and requirements in space should be the driving force behind how we think about space and space policy. Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military policy for space argue that the United States is more reliant on the use of space than is any other nation, that space systems are vulnerable to attack, and that U.S. space systems are thus an attractive candidate for a “space Pearl Harbor.” Critics of such a policy shift are concerned that weaponizing space could trigger a dangerous arms race. They are quick to point out that no country currently has an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon that threatens U.S. satellites or weapons in space and that a U.S. move to deploy weapons (either offensive or defensive) would only provide unneeded impetus for other countries to follow suit.
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