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**Deterrence** Nuclear Deterrence Fails- Human Perception
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**Deterrence**Nuclear Deterrence Fails- Human Perceptiona) Unreliable- Relies on human perceptionGray 99- Colin S. Gray, author and professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading, The Second Nuclear Age Chapter 1: To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies 1999Deterrence is never reliable, and this general truth applies with particular force today in the second nuclear age. In the most vigorous and rigorous assault to date on the smellier orthodoxies of both expert and popular beliefs about deterrence, Keith B. Payne offers an uncompromising view of the pertinent realities. In the second nuclear age, several factors are combining to change the strategic environment of effective deterrence policies: the apparent increase in threats posed by rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, China, and North Korea; the retraction of US forward-based armed forces; and the proliferation of WMD. Given these features of the second nuclear age, in comparison with the cold war, US deterrence goals will have to be expanded: the list of players to be deterred has to be expanded, as do the types of behavior to be prevented.26 Why is it that deterrence, even nuclear deterrence, is unreliable? Sir Michael Quinlan penetrates to the heart of the matter when he writes: ‘[d]eterrence is a concept for operating upon the thinking of others. It therefore entails some basic presuppositions about that thinking’.27 Deterrence, therefore, is a relational variable; it is an effect upon, or influence over, behaviour, achieved and achievable only with the co-operation of the intended deteree. Deterrence is structurally unreliable for precisely the same leading reason why friction in war cannot be eliminated by wonderful new technologies:28 specifically, there are human beings in the loop for deterrence and for the conduct of strategy in war. An individual policy-maker, or a group of policy-makers, may decide not to be deterred. Literally, there can be no such thing as ‘the deterrent’, nuclear or otherwise.Whether or not a nuclear arsenal deters is a matter for decision by the recipients of would-be deterrent menaces, not by the owners of the putative deterrent. Deterrence Fails- Unreliableb) Detterence neglects key factors in decision makingGray 99- Colin S. Gray, author and professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading, The Second Nuclear Age Chapter 1: To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies 1999 Nothing, repeat nothing, can render intended deterrent effect entirely reliable. Prudent and sensibly fearful policy-makers certainly should be appalled to the point of co-operation by some not-totally-incredible prospect of suffering damage utterly disproportionate to the prospective gains from an adventurous policy. But ‘should’ is not ‘will’, and even if policymakers genuinely are appalled by the risks that they believe they are running, they might decide to run those risks anyway. Western scholars who place confidence in the practice of the theory of stable deterrence are wont to neglect to factor in the political dimension of strength of motivation for inimical behaviour.33 The key problem is that even if every roguish regime in the world is deterrable over every issue concerning which they are contemplating bold moves, there is no way that an American would-be deterrer can be certain that they would know the specific requirements of deterrence for all those cases. Deterrence Fails- ChinaDeterrence against china fails- no reliable trustGray 99- Colin S. Gray, author and professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading, The Second Nuclear Age Chapter 1: To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies 1999 A United States that, for example, wishes to achieve such deterrent effect in Beijing as may be necessary is entirely uncertain over how much, and over some questions even whether, deterrence is needed. To a significant degree the deterrence needs of the United States vis-á-vis China currently are unknowable. Some readers may be discomforted by such an open-ended argument regarding China, but that open-endedness is the very core of the difficulty that one must recognize. A China hugely in a condition of domestic turmoil is distinctly possible for the next several decades. How the desperately insecure leaders of such a China could be deterred from taking action—in a bid for national unity—over Taiwan, we cannot know reliably, and even those insecure Chinese leaders themselves cannot know reliably. Ultimately, deterrence is like that. Deterrence- Turn- Info. OverloadSharing and increase information reduces deterrence- reduces interopabilityLitvaitis 8- Arturas Litvaitis, graduate of the Joint Command and General Staff Course 2007/2008 of the Baltic Defence College, Challenges of Implementation of the Network Centric Warfare Tenets in Coalition Environment Baltic Security & Defence Review Volume 10, 2008 Aldo Borgu raises a number of conceivable issues related to the practical implementation of Network Centric Warfare. For instance, it would be a challenge to establish a single network across different services and nations. In his opinion, it most probably will be difficult to integrate “network of networks”. Extensive sharing of information has potential danger of information overload and decreased speed of command. On the other hand, access to the same, even high quality, information doesn’t automatically mean that different people will come to similar conclusions. In reverse of a Network Centric Warfare proposition of decentralisation of decision making, there is a great deal of probability that availability of low tactical level information for the highest levels of command may lead to even greater centralization (micro-management). He also points out that different nations have different view and different approach to the network related military concepts, which automatically implies problems with operational and procedural interoperability. Fast technical U.S. advance will even deepen capability gap between the United States and its allies, so Network Centric Operations in coalition may have no common technical basis (Borgu, 2003). Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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