Table 3. Growth and poverty in developing countries

_pa measures the total lag in the form of an income elasticity. Table 3 gives the measures for these ratios for Groups A and B as shown in table 3a.

	1960	1975	2000
Theil index	0.57	0.67	0.77
Proportion due to variation among countries (%)	32	37	50

where G_pa is the growth of income of the poorest 40 percent in Group A, G_a is the growth of Group A, G is the growth of all developing countries and

Fig. 4. Poverty profile (Group A countries only): 1960-2000.

In overall terms the number of absolute poor in all developing countries (except for the centrally planned economics) would be on the order of 600 million people in the year 2000 when allowance is made for countries omitted from our sample. This Figure defines the magnitude of the problem to be addressed in devising policies that will lead to a more rapid reduction in poverty. Although in relative terms these projections represent impressive progress in reducing poverty from about 50 percent of the population of developing countries in 1960 to 16 percent in 2000 they fall considerably short of the results that might be achieved with more effective policies.

3.3. Variation in country experience

Although we have usable time series data for only twelve countries, they include a considerable variety of experience with both growth and distri­bution. Table 4 contains the statistical data underlying the graphical analysis of these countries in fig. 1. This table also shows the growth rate of per capita income of the lower 60 percent and its relation to the country average (_p).

The countries in table 4 have been classified into three groups on the basis of two criteria, the income share of the lower 60 percent in the latest year and the share of the increase in income going to this group over the period. The five countries in Group (I) have a terminal share ranging from 28 to 39 percent and incremental shares above 30 percent. At the other extreme, the three countries in Group (III) have terminal shares in the range of 18 to 21 percent and incremental shares of only 16 to 18 percent. Distribution in the former group is considerably better than (he Kuznets curve in fig. 1 and in the latter group considerably worse. The four countries in Group (II) are close to the average relation.

In order to determine the scope for improvement in distributional perfor­mance, it is useful to focus on the experience of Group (I). Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Korea have maintained relatively good distribution along with rapid growth over the period indicated. They have in common a relatively equal distribution of assets at the beginning of the period observed, largely as a result of political changes following World War II. The Taiwan Korea development strategy included substantial initial land reforms, great emphasis on education, and on overall strategy favoring labor-intensive expansion in the non-agricultural sectors, especially labor-intensive manufac­tured exports.²³ In Yugoslavia, the socialization of the means of production combined with large transfers of income from richer to poorer regions have been the principal factors favoring egalitarian growth.²⁴ These three count­ries have provided the largest absolute increases to the income of the poor, with incremental shares accruing to the lower 60 percent ranging between 0.31 and 0.40.

By contrast, Sri Lanka provides an example of a sustained policy of improving distribution through income transfers, without the parallel achievement of high growth.²⁵ The incremental share of the lower group in Sri Lanka exceeded 50 percent, but there was also a reduction in resources available for investment which contributed to lower growth and rising unemployment.

In summary, this range of country experience suggests the following conclusions that provide a background for our projections.

1. 
   Differences in distributional policies have been at least as important to poverty alleviation as differences in aggregate growth rates.
   

(c) Substantial improvements in income distribution have taken place under a variety of policies. The market mechanism has been the principal instrument in Taiwan, which was not impeded by highly unequal distributions of land and other assets to start with. Income transfers for investment or consumption have been important in Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka.

(d) The time series evidence supports the cross-section results as far as the worsening phase of inequality is concerned. There is no documented case of a country that has avoided the initial worsening in income distri­bution that is implied by uneven sectoral growth; Taiwan has come the closest to maintaining the relatively equal shares that are typical of the poorest countries.²⁷

(e) Although there is little time series evidence for developing countries at higher income levels, the theoretical case for improvement due to the automatic working of economic forces is not strong. Mexico and Brazil illustrate the likelihood of continued worsening of income distribution well above the level of 1000 ICP dollars in the absence of effective policies to counteract this tendency.²⁸

The prospects for the year 2000 described by the Base Case can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory either by the countries concerned or by the world community. They are a far cry from targets such as abolishing absolute poverty by the end of this century. In this section we shall examine a realistic range of possibilities for further reducing poverty through a combination of accelerating GNP growth, improving the distribution of income and reducing population growth.

The first step is to establish what improvements in performance are feasible in each of these dimensions on the basis of country experience.²⁹ We then examine the impact that such improvements might have on global poverty by the year 2000. The effects of each type of policy will be simulated separately and then in various combinations.

Higher levels of concessional assistance and improvements in international markets would make possible higher growth rates for these countries. To establish an optimistic range for this improvement, we assume that the growth rates for the countries in Group A could be increased by one percentage point for the period 1980 to 2000. This increase corresponds to the optimistic alternative used in current World Bank projections (1979).

An increase in growth in the poor countries from 4.7 to 5.7 percent will require an increase in foreign exchange availability of about the same magnitude. The international policies required to achieve such an increase include substantial trade liberalization, particularly in (he products that can be exported by the poorer countries, and an increase of some 20 percent in concessional lending to the poor countries. Although this increase would imply a rise in the share of GNP devoted to official development assistance (ODA) by the OECD countries from the present level of 0.35 percent, it would be substantially less than the international target of 0.70 percent if it could be concentrated in the poorest countries.³⁰

Improving distribution. The experience with policies affecting income distri­bution has been discussed in the previous section. The best results were obtained by Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and Korea, in which between 30 percent and 40 percent of the increment in income went to the bottom 60 percent of the population and rapid growth was sustained. These countries now have distributions that compare favorably to the industrialized countries [Ahluwalia (1976)].

To estimate an upper limit to the possibility for redistributing income without substantially disrupting growth from this experience, we assume that 45 percent of the increment of GNP will go to the bottom 60 percent. This is higher than the incremental share observed in any developing country except Sri Lanka, where growth was substantially reduced. It corresponds to an incremental share of about 25 percent to the lowest 40 percent, which is as high as the average share in almost any country [Ahluwalia (1976)]. Although this assumption may be technically feasible for any country, it is barely conceivable for all developing countries.

The requirements of such a strategy have been extensively discussed both in general terms and for particular countries.³¹ While many elements of distributional policies remain untested and speculative, there is substantial agreement that the benefits of growth accruing to the poor can be increased through policies that (a) increase 'linkage' of the poor to the faster-growing segments of the economy so as lo increase the flow of indirect benefits, and (b) provide much greater direct support to productive activities upon which the poor are heavily dependent and which have a potential for efficient expansion.

Some of the elements of such a strategy serve both to increase GNP and to improve its distribution Policies aimed at removing incentives for excessive use of capital in individual sectors and thus helping to increase employment are obvious examples. But, there are also policies which may have adverse effects on GNP growth, at least in the short run. Diversion of investment resources into activities aimed at improving the productivity of the poor may involve such costs in the initial stages. In many countries an adequate flow of the benefits of growth to the poor can only be ensured if steps are also taken to correct the highly skewed distribution of productive assets, especially agricultural land.

We conclude that on both theoretical and empirical grounds some loss of growth can be anticipated if a target of distributing 45 percent of the increment of GNP to the lowest 60 percent is achieved. The most familiar argument for the growth loss is the decline in savings that is likely if income is shifted from the rich to the poor, since private saving, which in done mainly by upper income groups, is likely to fall. There are also adverse effects upon incentives to domestic private investors arising from the adoption of radical distributional policies. To allow for these adverse effects we have assumed a growth loss arising from the implementation of the distributional objective. Specifically, we postulate that the rate of growth of GNP will fall in proportion to the decline in the income share of the richest decile compared with its share in the Base Case.³²

Reducing population growth. The third element affecting the scale of global poverty is the rate of growth of population. The scope for further improvements in this area over the next two decades above what is assumed in the Base Case should not be exaggerated. There arc a number of factors making for rapid population growth in developing countries, not least the decline in mortality initially generated by the control of communicable diseases, which can be expected to continue in the future with a sustained rise in living standards. An offsetting decline in fertility has begun in many countries, the rate being determined by a large number of socioeconomic changes. While population control programs can facilitate this process when other con­ditions are favorable, they have not been shown to accelerate it io any great degree.

For the present analysis, we assume that the feasible scope for reducing population growth in each country is given by the difference in growth rates between (he Medium Variant in the United Nations (1975) population projections and the Low Variant, modified for more recent information on fertility. We have accordingly reduced the population growth rates of the Base Case³³ in the same proportion. The results for groups of developing countries are shown below. ‘Reduced Population Growth’ implies roughly a 10 percent decline in the rate of increase in each group of countries to the year 2000. This limited decline reflects the substantial lead time required for population control policies to lake effect.

Alternative population assumptions
	Country group	Base Case	Reduced population Case growth
A.	Low	2.13	1.85
B.	Middle	2.41	2.22
C.	High	2.27	2.06
	All LDCs	2.21	1.97

The effectiveness of these three kinds of policies in alleviating poverty will be demonstrated by simulating their effects to the year 2000 and comparing them to the Base Case. The analysis is designed to bring out the relative effectiveness of each approach for the main groups of countries and to define feasible objectives for international action.