Gulf War Air Power Survey



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The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, “The Contributions of the Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf War,” Jun 1992, p 48.

995 Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Presidential Declaration of Partial Mobilization, 222245Z Jan 1991.

996 JCS-J1 Operation Desert Storm Manpower & Mobilization Report, 171800Z Mar 91.

997 HQ ARPC/RC, “JULLS Long Report Number 52447-93900 (00039),” 12 Feb 1991, p 72.

998 Global war scenarios (Base Case) were the major planning assumptions behind mobilization planning since JCS began exercising Mobilization in NIFTY NUGGET 78.

999 Rep. Les Aspin, Rep. Beverly Byron, and Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Struc­ture, 15 Oct 1990, pp 5-7.

1000 HQ ARPC/RC, “JULLS Long Report, 52130-73600 (00006),” 12 Feb 1991, p 10.

1001 Operation Desert Shield Problems Encountered by Activated Reservists, “Report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,” United States General Ac­counting Office, Sep 1991 (GAO/NSIAD-91-290), p 1.

1002 Ibid, p 2.

1003 The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, “Employer Support,” Jun 1992, p 53.

1004 Ibid, p 56.

1005 Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Execution of Demobilization, 080100Z Mar 1991.

1006 Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Execution of Demobilization, 080100Z Mar 1991

1007 Ltr, Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management & Personnel; Stephan M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to: Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Policy Guidance Regarding the Separation Processing of Members of the Ready Reserve being released from Active Duty in Support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 18 Apr 1991.

1008 The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, “A Brief History of the American Citizen Soldier,” Jun 1992, p 1.

1009 HQ ARPC/RC, “JULLS Long Report Number 52434-57600 (00028),” 12 Feb 1991, p 55.

1010 JCS/J-1 Manpower Mobilization and Accession Status Report, 171800Z Mar 1991.

1011 USAF/XOOCR Jul 1990 SORTS Report for Flying and Non-flying units. Note: Reserve units were activated by UTC. SORTS data represent the entire unit.

1012 Defense Almanac 90, OASD/FM&P, Nov/Dec 1990, p 34.

1013 FY 1990 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mar 1991, p 68.

1014 Ibid, p 82.

1015 Defense Almanac 90, p 34.

1016 Air Combat Command History of William Tell and Gunsmoke, ACC/HO.

1017 Ltr, Lt Col Jerry W. Crowe, Chief Personnel Readiness Division, HQ TAC/DPXX, to Col Henry L. Cyr Jr., Chief Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAF/DPXC, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 2 Mar 1992

1018 AFWMPRT, “JULLS Long Report Number 51540-06748 (00002),” 17 Oct 1991, p 2.

1019 The Inspector General of the Air Force Report, Functional Management Review of the Combat Personnel Control System (CPCS) II, 17 Jun 1992, pp 1-3.

1020 Ltr, James H. Ermis, Chief Readiness and Mobilization Division Air Force Military Personnel Center, to: HQ USAF/DPXC, Lt Col Kenneth Roy, subj: PERSCO Demographics From the Persian Gulf War, 17 Aug 1992.

1021 AFMPC/DPM, GWAPS After Action Input, “PERSCO Operations,” 29 Apr 1992, unnumbered.

1022 Ibid.

1023 Memo, Maj Delores Street, Chief, Officer Retirements and Separations Policy, HQ USAF/DPXO, to Col Henry L. Cyr, Jr., Chief, Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAF/DPXC, subj: 1991 History, 5 May 1992.

1024 Ibid.

1025 Maj David E. Edwards, AFMPC/DPMARS, Position Paper on Expansion of Stop-Loss, 21 Feb 1991.

1026 It was difficult to determine how many people were actually prevented from leaving the Air Force. While numbers are not available, many Air Force members whose separation date was affected by stop-loss would have reenlisted any way.

1027 Ibid, Note 53.

1028 See note 53.

1029 Ibid. Note: Force reduction programs implemented prior to and during the war were enlisted date of separation rollback, officer voluntary early release program, lowered high year of tenure separations, and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBS). Those under consideration were officer and enlisted RIFs, and additional SERBS. All these were part of the DOD-wide drawdown. It would appear counter-productive to implement Stop-Loss and drawdown at the same time. However, the pressures to meet end-strengths after the (assumed to be of short duration) war was over were not going to go away. The Air Force did, however, later receive end strength relief for FY 91.

1030 DMDC statistics as of Mar 1991.

1031 9.6% of Army, 4.4% of Navy, and 1.5% of Marine Corps deployed were female.

1032 Ibid.

1033 Ibid.

1034 DOD After Action Report, Operation Yellow Ribbon Desert Storm POW Repatria­tion, p 28.

1035 AFMPC/DPM, GWAPS After Action Input, “Dependent Care Responsibilities Pro­gram,” 29 Apr 1992, unnumbered.

1036 Briefing, undated, “Air Force Non-deployability, Presidential Commission Task­ing,” HQ USAF/DPXOA.

1037 HQ USAF/DPP, GWAPS After Action Input, “Family Support Activities,” 29 Apr 1992, unnumbered.

1038 Data Analysis of United States Air Force (HQ USAF/DPPH), Desert Shield Survey for Family Support Centers, 4 Mar 1991, pp 1-11-7.

1039 Ibid.

1040 Ltr, Roger L. Schermerhorn, Acting Chief, Requirements and Applications Divi­sion, Directorate of Civilian Personnel, HQ USAF, to Colonel Henry L. Cyr, Jr., Chief Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAF/DPXC, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 9 Mar 1992.

1041 At the 388th TFW(P) the six members of the Air Force Engineering and Technical Service Team had a combined military and civilian maintenance experience of almost 200 years.

1042 Fighter in Country, Vol 2, Number 14, “Old Guys Play Vital Part in 388th,” Sgt Gary J. Kunich, 388th TFW(P), Public Affairs, 10 Feb 1991.

1043 Ltr, Dick Speakman, Chief Engineering and Technical Services Division, HQ Air Combat Command, to Mr. Ted Beck, Research Analyst, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 26 Oct 1992.

1044 Wall Street Journal, “Tech Reps Taste Battle in Desert Storm, Civilians Make House Calls to Repair High-Tech Military Gear,” Rick Wartzman, 15 Mar 1991, p A5A.

1045 HQ USAF/DPCR, “JULLS Long Report Number 32066-19312 (00001),” 4 Feb 1991, p 1.

1046 Ibid.

1047 Washington, D.C., Seven Locks Press, 1992.

1048 Washington, D.C., The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991.

1049 New York, A Birch Lane Press Book, published by Carol Publishing group, 1991.

1050 Manchester, England, Manchester University Press, 1992.

1051 New York, Hill and Wang, 1992.

1052 Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992.

1053 The Gallup Poll Monthly, Jan 1991, p 21.

1054 It should be noted that there are no newspapers which can rival national television news (broadcast and cable) as vehicles to reach a mass, national audience. The Post and The Times are used here because of the elite nature of their readership, not its size.

1055 The Washington Post, 18 Jan 1991, p 1.

1056 The Washington Post, 19 Jan 1991, p 1.

1057 Ibid, p 1.

1058 See, for example, Eliot Marshall, “Patriot's Scud Busting Record Is Challenged,” Science, 3 May 1991; Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Patriot Experience,” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/1992); Eliot Marshall, “Patriot's Effectiveness Challenged,” Science, 8 Nov 1991; Barbara Opall, “Patriot Debate Re­sumes,” Defense News, 18 Nov 1991; Reuven Pedatzur and Theodore Postol, “The Patriot Is No Success Story,” Defense News, 2 Dec 1991; Charles Zraket, “Patriot Gives Stellar Gulf Performance,” Defense News, 9 Dec 1991; and correspondence by Robert M. Stein and Theodore A. Postol in the Summer 1992 issue of International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1.

1059 Interesting, authoritative, and eloquent on this subject is two-time NBC News president Reuven Frank. See especially his Out of Thin Air (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

1060 15 Feb 1991, as cited in Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1992), p 212.

1061 Michael Kramer, “Deadline: Jan 15,” Time, 10 Dec 1990, p 35.

1062 The Washington Post, 17 Jan 1991, p A26.

1063 The Gallup Poll Monthly, Feb 1991, p 18. In the 18-19 Oct 1990, and the 10-11 Jan 1991, polls, the question began, “If the U.S. takes military action . . . .”

1064 Everette E. Dennis et al, The Media At War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991), p 42.

1065 Media Monitor, Volume V, Number 4, Apr 1991, pp 5-6.

1066 Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Data taken from Public Opinion Online service. Survey was taken for The Washington Post.

1067 As reported in John Mueller, “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Trends and Historical Comparisons,” prepared for presentation at the conference on The Political Consequences of War, in Washington, D.C. on 28 Feb 1992, Table 52C, p 69. The initial question asked in the poll used 500 American troops; poll takers were instructed to accept “considers no American troops died as a success” as a volunteered response.

1068 John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p 60.

1069 See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978) and Philip D. Zelikow, “Force Without War, 1975-1982,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Mar 1984, pp 29-54.

1070 Edward S. Loomis and Paul S. Phillips, “Selected Elite Newspapers and Coverage of the Persian Gulf War,” paper prepared for a graduate-level journalism class at Marshall University, 18 Nov 1991.

1071 Ibid, Table 19. Seven topics were more frequently included in front-page stories in descending order of frequency: unit/soldier/equipment performance, U.S./allied diplomacy, purpose of U.S. involvement, civilian casualties, congressional debate, Iraqi commentary, and military readiness.

1072 Ibid, Table 25. In this case, only four topics appeared more frequentlyagain in descending order of frequency: unit/soldier/equipment performance, Soviet/Iraqi diploma­cy, U.S./military strategy, and Iraqi commentary.

1073 According to Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p 189.

1074 Ibid.

1075 Defense Dialog, 14 Feb 1991, p 2.

1076 See Current News, Early Bird editions of 14-16 Feb 1991.

1077 The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991, p A25.

1078 14 Feb 1991, p 17.

1079 The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991, p A29.

1080 The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991, p A29.

1081 Ibid.

1082 All of these issues can be found in TV coverage and in articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times during 14-16 Feb 1991.

1083 The Washington Post, 16 Feb 1991, p A19.

1084 The question was, “Iraq says hundreds of civilians were killed when the United States bombed an air raid shelter in Baghdad on Wednesday. The United States says the site was being used as a military command bunker. Do you think the site was a legiti­mate military target or not?” The Washington Post, 16 Feb 1991, p A19.

1085 As reported in Mueller, “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War,” Table 68, p 96.

1086 Ibid.

1087 Please see Chapters 5 and 8 in the GWAPS Operations report.

1088 The Gallup Poll Monthly, Feb 1991, p 10.

1089 The Washington Post, 16 Feb 1991, p A19.

1090 The Use of ForceShowdown in the Gulf 1990, Americans Talk Security Survey #14, p 40.

1091 Lloyd N. Cutler, “Foreign Policy on Deadline,” Foreign Policy, Number 56, Fall 1984, pp 113-128.

1092 Ibid, p 114.

1093 Ibid, p 113.

1094 Ibid, p 121.

1095 Haas listed: 1.) policymaking before 2 Aug 1990; 2.) the decision to resist after the 2 Aug invasion; 3.) the key decisions in the fall of 1990 (to double U.S. forces and to get a United Nations resolution to support use of military force; 4.) the decision in Jan and Feb 1991 to seek a Congressional vote, as well as the Congressional debate and vote itself; 5.) the mid-Jan decision to initiate the air war; 6.) the U.S. decisions on Israeli participation in the war after the Scud attacks; 7.) the late-Feb 1991 decision to initiate the ground phase of the war; and 8.) the late-Feb decision to end offensive operations.

Wolfowitz listed decisions: 1.) to confront aggression; 2.) on the size of the force to deploy; 3.) to develop a ground offensive option; 4.) as to whether force would be necessary if sanctions didn't work; 5.) on war aims; 6.) on an extended air campaign; 7.) to try to keep Israel out of the war; 8.) to end the war; and 9.) regarding the Kurds in the north, after the end of offensive operations by the Coalition.

1096 Author's notes, taken at the conference, are the source for this section of the chapter. Author's notes, impressions, and conclusions are quite consistent with those of Walter Good­man of

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