Gulf War Air Power Survey
SAC Bomber Deployments to the AOR
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- SAC Reconnaissance Deployments to the AOR
- Special Operations Force Unit Deployments
- Figure 25 28 CENTAF Buildup: MAC Aircraft
- Marine Component, Central Command (MARCENT) Deployments
- Figure 26 CENTAF Buildup: AFSOF Aircraft Figure 27 MARCENT Buildup: Fixed Wing Aircraft Figure 28
- 4 Intratheater Lift
- Figure 29 MAC
- Figure 30 Aerial and Sea Ports of Debarkation and Prepositioning Sites
SAC Bomber Deployments to the AOR On 8 August 1990, CENTCOM asked for twenty-eight B‑52Gs to perform conventional operations. Requested deployments to Diego Garcia were five aircraft by 16 August, fourteen more by 24 August, and nine more by 6 September. A day later, JCS ordered SAC to deploy nine aircraft by 24 August and five more by 6 September. Actual deployments were seven aircraft on 12 August, seven more on 13 August, and six more on 15 August. The final eight B‑52s requested by CENTCOM were not deployed because not enough additional ramp space was available at Diego Garcia and CENTCOM could not find an alternative beddown base within the theater. All aircraft deployed with forty-five M-117R general-purpose bombs.283 By 22 August, SAC had four spare B‑52Gs at Andersen AFB, Guam. This allowed Diego-based B‑52Gs to rotate regularly through Guam for corrosion control treatment at the intermediate level maintenance facility. To keep twenty combat-ready aircraft in place, an Andersen-based B‑52G landed at Diego before a Diego-based B‑52G took off for Guam. This regular rotation aided in the munitions resupply of Diego Garcia.284 Over the next several weeks, SAC strove to obtain a second forward operating location. The main base under consideration was [DELETED], because of its outstanding facilities and collocation with other SAC assets. On 23 August, the SAC Support Battle Staff (SBS) learned that [DELETED] military authorities had tentatively approved basing fourteen B‑52s at [DELETED]. Six days later, STRATFOR advised the SBS that the approval had been withdrawn. CENTCOM encouraged SAC to look toward RAF Fairford or Moron Air Base.285 On 2 October 1990, the Secretary of Defense halted efforts to find another B‑52 base in the AOR, stating that such efforts were not to resume unless hostilities broke out. Nevertheless, [DELETED] officials maintained contact with STRATFOR concerning [DELETED]. On 13 October, SAC learned that the host government had approved basing fourteen B‑52Gs [DELETED]. Once Desert Storm commenced, active operations began [DELETED]. By the cease-fire, the number of bombers on the ramp had grown to nineteen.286 On 9 January 1991, Spain formally approved basing B‑52s at Moron Air Base as long as there was no publicity and local authorities would receive advance notice of operations at the base. Initially, six B‑52s were stationed there. By 24 January there were ten, and in early February, there were twenty-two aircrafteighteen conducting strikes against Iraq and four undergoing intermediate level maintenance.287 On 1 February, SAC learned that the United Kingdom had approved basing B‑52s at RAF Fairford. On 4 February, eight aircraft were directed to deploy, and they began conducting operations from Fairford on 9 February.288 SAC Reconnaissance Deployments to the AOR Almost immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, SAC was tasked to design R‑135 reconnaissance tracks in Saudi Arabia. After receiving the necessary overflight clearances, the first Rivet Joint mission launched from Hellenikon, Greece, on 9 August and recovered at Riyadh. By 10 August, another RC‑135 from Hellenikon and one from Offutt AFB had relocated to Riyadh. By 11 August, these three aircraft were providing twenty-four- hour reconnaissance coverage from tracks within Saudi Arabia.289 Support personnel deployed on the RC‑135s. Support equipment and supplies deployed on two C‑141 sorties and one C‑5 sortie.290 Total RC-135s in the AOR grew to four at the end of August, seven in January, and nine in February.291 The 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB was notified of proposed U-2 movements on 4 August. Two U‑2s were supposed to arrive in the AOR on 13 August, but they were held at RAF Alconbury until ground support equipment had been airlifted into the AOR. The first U-2 arrived at [DELETED] on 17 August and the second arrived a day later. Reconnaissance missions began on 20 August.292 On 23 August, two TR‑1s from RAF Alconbury arrived at Taif. Their support equipment arrived aboard C‑5s on 27 August. TR-1 reconnaissance missions commenced on 29 August.293 Total U-2s in the AOR increased to three in mid-October, five in mid-January, and six in early February. Total TR-1s in the AOR increased to four in mid-January and six in late February.294 SAC Organic Airlift SAC OPLAN 1002-88 called for a Pacific Bridge, but it never materialized as planned. What ultimately became known as the Pacific Bridge was an organic airlift effort to supply the B-52 force at Diego Garcia.295 The effort began when SAC requested thirty-three C-141 sorties to move bare base equipment to Diego Garcia. The request was denied because of CENTCOM priorities, and SAC took action to help itself. On 15 August, cargo and passengers began moving across the Pacific Bridge. The first order of business was to move a Harvest Eagle kit aboard KC-10s. The rest of the operation settled into a daily routine. A KC-135A would fly from Castle AFB to Andersen AFB, where the cargo and passengers were transferred to either a KC-135R or a KC-10 for the longer leg from Guam to Diego Garcia. (After the Harvest Eagle kit delivery was completed, KC-10 participation in the Pacific Bridge was strictly limited.)296 Except for oversize or outsize cargo, SAC supplied most of its own airlift needs through the end of September. At the end of September, Pacific Bridge departures were reduced to three a week. MAC airlift support for SAC picked up in October, but SAC organic airlift still carried significant amounts into November.297 MAC Unit Deployments When Desert Shield began, MAC's first priority was managing the massive strategic airlift flow. Within a very short time, however, deploying a significant number of C-130s to the AOR became essential. In August 1990, CENTCOM established a Phase I requirement for ninety-six aircraftsix squadrons with sixteen aircraft each.298 The first two squadrons to deploy came from the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at Pope AFB. One squadron left Pope on 9 August and arrived at Masirah, Oman, on 11 August. The second squadron left Pope on 11 August and arrived in Thumrait, Oman, on 13 August. The third squadron to arrive in the AOR came from the 314th TAW at Little Rock AFB and arrived in Bateen, UAE, on 16 August.299 The first three squadrons deployed relatively quickly; some difficulty occurred with identifying and confirming beddown locations for the next three squadrons. On 16 August, a squadron from the 435th TAW left Rhein-Main for the AOR before all beddown issues had been resolved. After three aircraft landed at Thumrait, the COMALF turned back the remaining C-130s, and they landed at Cairo West or returned to Rhein-Main. After some negotiations, CENTAF and the UAE agreed upon Al Ain as a beddown site. The squadron closed at its new home on 28 August.300 The next unit to begin arriving in the AOR was the 94th Provisional Tactical Airlift Wing (PTAW), an AFRES unit with aircraft and crews from five different locations. The 94th PTAW arrived at RAF Alconbury on 18-19 August and was held there awaiting a decision on beddown. Sharjah, UAE, was finally selected, but due to ramp space limitations, the 94th PTAW's arrival was spread from 30 August to 11 September.301 The final Phase I deployment was the 130th PTAW, an ANG unit, also with aircraft and crews from five different locations. After waiting for some time at Lajes, it moved to Aviano on 5 September, and then to Al Ain on 7-9 September.302 Phase II saw thirty-two more C-130s deployed to the AOR in early January. Eight each went to Al Kharj and Al Ain; sixteen went to Thumrait. After Desert Storm commenced, sixteen more C-130s arrived in late January. Eight each went to Al Kharj and Thumrait.303 MAC C-130 units provided most of their own airlift, but they needed help to move headquarters and support personnel and equipment.304 Figure 25 depicts the CENTAF buildup of MAC aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Chapter 4 will provide more details on the MAC role in the AOR. Special Operations Force Unit Deployments Planning for deployment of Air Force special operations forces (SOF) began on C‑Day when Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) sent a liaison officer to Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).305 AFSOC representatives left Hurlburt Field, Florida, on 9 August to find a location to house AFSOC Central Command (AFSOCCENT) headquarters and an airfield for launching Air Force special operations missions. They settled on King Fahd International Airport, a nearly completed airfield just northwest of Dhahran.306 As of 11 August, Riyadh, not King Fahd, was the designated beddown location for AFSOC forces. The 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) at Hurlburt Field launched an ADVON team with two MH‑53 helicopters plus a command element, support equipment, and personnel. Carried by two C‑141s and one C‑5, the team arrived in Riyadh on 13 August. Within two hours after the first C‑141 landed, the team learned that their beddown location had been changed to Dhahranstill not King Fahd. Acting quickly, the ADVON team kept the other two aircraft from unloading, squeezed as much extra equipment on them as possible, and had the crews fly them to Dhahran.307 Figure 25 28
Two more MH‑53s were delivered to Dhahran by 15 August. However, AFSOC did not receive the support equipment because SOF airlift was preempted for higher priority moves. As a result, they had no guns, munitions, or spare parts. AFSOCCENT received guns and ammunition on 20 August, but spare parts were not fully stocked for another month.308 Also on 11 August, the 1st SOW launched four MC‑130s and four HC‑130s for the AOR. The aircraft were held at RAF Woodbridge when their airlift was preempted. Using opportune airlift, they managed to complete their moves to Dhahran between 20 and 23 August.309 In late August, the 1st SOW was directed to move to King Fahd. This location became the consolidated beddown site for all SOF air assets in the AOR.310 Figure 26 depicts the CENTAF buildup of AFSOF aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Total AFSOCCENT aircraft in the AOR peaked at just under forty in late February.311 Marine Component, Central Command (MARCENT) Deployments U.S. Marine Corps aviation deployed to the theater in three increments. The fly‑in echelon consisted of aircraft, initial spares and supplies, and support personnel. Elements brought in on prepositioned ships consisted of ordnance, support equipment, aviation fuel, and other items. Aviation logistics support ships provided maintenance and repair to sustain aircraft readiness.312 Figure 27 depicts the buildup of Marine fixed-wing aircraft during the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. TAC/DOXD had the responsibility to plan air refueling for Marine aircraft deployments but did not have the necessary information on flight parameters for Marine aircraft. Information was obtained directly from the Marines using secure voice communications.313 Other Force Deployments Figure 28 illustrates aircraft deployed to the AOR by other nations contributing to coalition air forces. Figure 26 CENTAF Buildup: AFSOF Aircraft Figure 27 MARCENT Buildup: Fixed Wing Aircraft Figure 28 Coalition Member Aircraft314 [DELETED] Assessment The deployment to the Persian Gulf was the fastest buildup of conventional air power in history, and it challenged all facets of our Nation's strategic mobility capability. The challenge was lessened somewhat because allies granted access to essential airspace and facilities en route to the Gulf and because host nations in the Gulf had good infrastructure and plentiful resources. U.S. forces also had time to overcome numerous difficulties associated with expanding CINCCENT's operational concept into a workable deployment plan. The most vexing problems were changing deployment priorities, poorly defined lift requirements, and automated planning systems that couldn't keep pace with actual events. Sea-based air power was first on the scene, followed shortly thereafter by land-based air power. Deployment of land-based airpower was impacted by availability of beddown locations, air refueling, and airlift. Availability of airlift appears to have been the pacing factor. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MAC C-5s and C‑141s flew at an unprecedented rate. Early in Desert Shield, a shortage of aircrews threatened to cripple the airlift system, but reserves were activated in time to limit disruption. Reserve participation was essential because the Air Reserve Components represent approximately half of MAC's military strategic airlift capability. MAC's military strategic airlift aircraft were augmented by CRAF Stages I and II plus volunteers from domestic and a few foreign commercial carriers. This commercial participation was likewise essential. From 7 August 1990 to 10 March 1991, commercial aircraft carried sixty-four percent of all passengers and twenty-seven percent of all cargo delivered by MAC strategic airlift. Additionally, MAC C-130s and SAC tankers made limited airlift contributions to the deployment effort. Deployment and sustainment efforts highlighted a number of problems in the airlift system, including command and control deficiencies, airfield congestion, equipment shortages, and units that weren't ready to move. Time allowed MAC to solveor work aroundmost of its problems. Time also allowed MAC to deliver the support needed to build air power in the Gulf from a thin line in the sand to an effective, sustainable fighting force. As a result of deployment-related lessons learned during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many problems have already been solved; some are being solved now, and others will be solved in the future. For the solutions to be of lasting value, they must be implemented with thoughtful consideration of two essential facts. First, the United States can never be certain exactly how long it will have to complete future deployments. Second, the Nation can always be certain that future deployments will not flow exactly as called for by any on-the-shelf plan. (The Gulf War was not the first conflict to surface these facts, but it certainly highlighted them.) Once a deployment is in progress, a theater commander will adjust deployment priorities as the evolving situation dictates. A plan will simply be a baseline from which to make changes. Flexibility and responsiveness must be the watchwords for future operation planning and execution processes as well as for future transportation resources. 4 Intratheater Lift Intratheater Movement The need for a capability to distribute personnel, supplies, and equipment was immediate and of immense proportions. In addition to 501,000 passengers, strategic airlift delivered into the area of responsibility (AOR) over 544,000 tons of cargo or about fifteen percent of the approximately 3.5 million tons of dry cargo delivered by all modes during the deployment phase of Desert Shield.315 The vast majority of the effort was delivered to four major aerial ports of debarkation APODs. From there, the cargo and passengers were forwarded throughout the AOR by intratheater airlift and surface transportation. Although prepositioning of Air Force assets saved over 3,500 strategic airlift sorties, arriving forces needed to have the assets moved to new positions as soon as possible.316 Supporting this enormous requirement for surface and air distribution within the AOR required many innovations and was crucial to the success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moving cargo and passengers from aerial and sea ports of debarkation and from prepositioning sites to base camps and initial operating bases was essential to achievement of combat capability. Intratheater movement was accomplished in two ways: intratheater airlift and land transportation. Draft Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 Figure 29 MAC Strategic Airlift Sorties by Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) August 1990- February 1991317 29
Figure 30 Aerial and Sea Ports of Debarkation and Prepositioning Sites 30
pallets arrived in theater because of poor in-transit cargo visibility provided by the information systems of the Services. To cope with the seemingly endless flow of equipment and personnel, the Services made the best use of HNS by renting thousands of heavy trucks, employing more than 2,000 civilian drivers, and creating an intratheater airlift channel system, which additionally serviced the strategic airlift “Desert Express” channel. Also, Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) created an organic line haul capability known as the “Blueball Express.”319 Intratheater Airlift Intratheater airlift helped establish a defensive posture from the very beginning of Desert Shield and then reforged that capability into an offensive force for Desert Storm. U.S. C-130s were among the first forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf. Concurrent with the deployment of troops from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the first squadron of sixteen C‑130s from the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at neighboring Pope AFB deployed to Masirah Island, Oman, on C+04 (11 August 1990). By C+23 (the 30th of August 1990), a total of ninety-six C-130s had arrived at locations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Figure 31 depicts a map of the beddown locations. Operating from the UAE and Oman, the C-130s immediately began flight operations. They were tasked initially by the CENTAF airlift control center (ALCC)320 to transport Harvest Falcon and Eagle equipment321 and munitions from prepositioned stocks to the beddown locations (initial operating bases of arriving forces). The C-130 force also interfaced with APODs, such as Riyadh and Dhahran, for the onward movement of cargo and passengers to final destination sites. In January and February 1991, another forty-eight C-130s plus five C-130s from the Republic of South Korea deployed to the AOR. The C-130 augmentation was necessary to support the increased force structure deployed into the theater before the air and ground campaigns began. Thus, a total of 149 C-130s were under CENTAF control during peak operating times. Table 11 shows the original and final beddown sites for the C-130 force. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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