Gulf War Air Power Survey
Download 5.55 Mb.
|
| The New York Times. See his “How Bad Is War? It Depends on the TV Pictures,” The New York Times, 5 Nov 1991, p C18.
1097 Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992). 1098 Ibid, p 468. 1099 Transcript of CENTCOM News Brfg Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, 27 Feb 1991 - 1:00 pm (EST). 1100 The Washington Post, 11 Mar 1991, p 1. 1101 Ibid. 1102 Ibid. 1103 Ibid. 1104 Ibid. 1105 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix O, pp O-32 to O-35. 1106 Joseph J. Mathews, Reporting the Wars, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957, p 180. Mathews’ book is regarded as the most authoritative scholarly treatment of the history of war correspondence through the Korean War period. 1107 From regulations for war correspondents accompanying Allied Expeditionary Forces in World War II, 1944. 1108 Mathews, p 192. 1109 Mathews, p 189. 1110 Robert Debs Heinel, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966, p 258. 1111 Ronald T. Farrar, ed, Elmer Davis, Report to the President, Austin, TX: Association for Education in Journalism, 1968, p 15. In an effort to halt “mounting (public) dissatisfaction with government information, and particularly the handling of news of military and naval operations,” President Roosevelt consolidated most of the news disseminating agencies of the federal government under a single Office of War Information. In 1942, the President appointed as head of the new OWI, Mr. Elmer Davis, a civilian and former radio commentator for CBS. From then until the end of the war Davis was in charge of approving all information about the war, including military information, that was released by the agencies including the Departments of State, War, and Navy. His personal report to the President, submitted at the conclusion of the war and his tenure at OWI, was classified until its release by Congress in 1963. 1112 Mathews, p 177. 1113 Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p 275. 1114 DOD Transcript, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Gen Colin Powell Press Conference, Pentagon, 8 Aug 1990. 1115 Woodward, p 279. 1116 Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, statement before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, 20 Feb 1991, reprinted in S. Hrg. 102-178, Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the Persian Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings. 1117 See for example, “Pentagon Pool Not Sent to Gulf,” New York Times, 9 Aug 1990, p A14. Paul Farhi and David Mills, “Media Shut Out at the Front Lines,” The Washington Post, 9 Aug 1990, p D1. 1118 The DOD National Media pool is a rotating group of reporters and cameramen representing U.S. national news organizations. A “typical” media pool consists of two wire service representatives, one reporter, one photographer, a television team of two or three, and DOD escorts. Membership is rotated among news organizations and networks. Although membership and composition of the pool varies with events, locations and available logistics the average size of the pool prior to Desert Shield consisted of twelve plus two military escorts. For an authoritative history of the DOD National Media Pool, see Gregory H. Hartung (LCDR, USN), Now Is The Time To Plan For Media Pools, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 3 Feb 1989. 1119 The DOD National Media Pool arrived in Dhahran on 13 Aug 1990 after stopping off at MacDill AFB, FL, at CENTCOM headquarters to receive briefings. 1120 Two Air Force captains were sent to Saudi Arabia as augmentees to the CENTCOM/PA staff; one from Tactical Air Command headquarters, the other from Military Airlift Command. Eventually they were joined by other augmentees from EUCOM and charged with responsibility for making preparations for the DOD National Media Pool. Intvw with Maj Tom LaRock, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Pentagon, 11 Dec 1992. 1121 Maj LaRock intvw. According to Maj LaRock, the initial public affairs support in Saudi Arabia was done without any preplanning from either CENTCOM or DOD and was completely “ad hoc” from their arrival on in the AOR until the CINC's own permanent public affairs staff arrived several weeks later and began setting up an organizational infrastructure to accommodate growing news media interest in Operation Desert Shield. Even after the arrival of the CENTCOM staff, it was apparent to Air Force public affairs officers already in theater that there was no public affairs plan to accommodate news media and no “concept of operations” for press operations there. 1122 There were approximately 1,200 reporters in Saudi Arabia_most of them in Dhahran_on 16 Jan 1991. By Feb when the ground campaign commenced, there were over 1,500 reporters, cameramen, and technicians. A total of over 3,500 news representatives traveled to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm between Aug 1990 and Mar 1991. Another 3,000 to 4,000 were awaiting approval of visas to enter the country by the time the war ended. See Pete Williams statement in Senate Hearing. 1123 An organization chart for public affairs and information policy during Desert Shield/Desert Storm is included as an appendix to this chapter. 1124 The pools were called Combat Correspondent Pools during Desert Storm. 1125 The requirement for public affairs support and deployment of Public Affairs Contingency Kits was laid out in the Public Affairs Annex F to CENTAF's OPLAN 90-1002. While TAC fighter units deployed generally well prepared for sustained operations in the desert, some MAC and SAC units did not. The CENTAF Forward Public Affairs staff deployed with no Public Affairs Contingency Kit or supplies of any kind and had to borrow typewriters and laptop computers until they could acquire their own. 1126 Intvw with MSgt Bobbie Shelton, USAF Fighter Weapons Center, Office of Public Affairs, Nellis AFB, NV, 15 Jan 1993. Sergeant Shelton was public affairs NCO for the 37th Fighter Wing (Deployed), supporting the F-117 unit in Saudi Arabia throughout Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 1127 Intvw, Brig Gen H. E. “Ed” Robertson, USAF, command director, NORAD Command Operations Staff, Cheyenne Mountain Complex AFB, CO, 5 Jan 1993. Gen Robertson was the director of public affairs for the Secretary of the Air Force during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 1128 Intvw with Maj Louis J. Tiedemann (USAF, Retired), 13 Jan 1993. Maj Tiedemann served as director of public affairs, CENTAF Forward, during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 1129 Maj Tiedemann intvw. 1130 Based on intvws with several unit public affairs officers, and post-Desert Storm public affairs “lessons learned” conferences, the issue of increased access and openness with the news media in theater was never forthcoming through the operational chain of command (JCS, CENTCOM, or CENTAF). 1131 SecDef (ASD/PA) Msg, 171916Z Jan 1991, subj: Operation Desert Storm Release Authority. SecDef (ASD/PA) Msg, 241812Z Aug 1990, subj: Operation Desert Shield Release Authority. DOD's intent was to preserve the “jointness” of the military’s efforts in the Persian Gulf, and a desire to dampen any efforts by the individual services to trumpet their own contribution to the effort at the expense of the other Services. This was one of the reasons cited by Secretary Cheney for his firing of Gen Mike Dugan for remarks the Secretary believed reflected Service parochialism. See DOD Transcript, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney press conference, 18 Sep 1990. 1132 Intvw with Lt Col Mike Gannon, 10 Dec 1992. Col Gannon was one of the team chiefs on the Air Force Press Desk’s “Storm Cell.” 1133 In post-Desert Storm intvws, the general consensus of most public affairs staff officers was that while these efforts aided many of the new second and third-string reporters assigned to the Pentagon for the first (and probably last) time to cover the Persian Gulf War, it made only a relatively minor contribution to the body of press coverage. Although no records were maintained that permit an objective, quantitative analysis of who made use of these services, most of the staff interviewed indicated that the most frequent callers were small news organizations and reporters from “outside the Beltway”too small to be able to afford sending their own reporter to Saudi Arabia and not important enough to get their calls returned by DOD. 1134 In theory, the number of slots was determined by the logistics and support that field commanders said was available to accommodate reporters. In practice, the numbers were arbitrarily determined by the Pentagon and CENTCOMhaving been apportioned equally among the component commands to ensure “equitable” news coverage. Initially, each component command got two pools of about fifteen reporters per pool. Two additional smaller “quick reaction” pools of reporters were formed for coverage of unexpected events. 1135 There were 132 reporters assigned to various “pools” covering combat units in the field at the start of Desert Storm. As the ground phase of Desert Storm approached, Washington bureau chiefs, network presidents, and Congress complained that there weren’t enough reporters in the combat correspondent pools. Using that criticism and Congressional interest as a wedge, Pete Williams was able to force CENTCOM to create more “slots,” and the pools grew to accommodate 60 additional reporters. By the time the ground war started, there were 192 reporters operating in pools. See “Media Policy,” Annex S to Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, Apr 1992, p 655. For a detailed description of the mechanics of the pool system, see John Fialka’s, Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991, esp. Chapter 4. 1136 See intvw, of Pete Williams by Larry Grossman in “Newshounds and the Dogs of War,” Government Executive, Sep 1991, pp 26. Also, see A Gulf War Media Review, Williams’ remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 14 Mar 1991. 1137 The ground rules and form signed by journalists agreeing to abide by them are included as an appendix to this chapter. 1138 “Security review” was a term adopted from the military’s peacetime practice of submitting all information intended for release to the public and the Congress to an administrative process of review and coordination for conformity to security guidelines and U.S. Government, DOD, and Department of the Air Force policy. This system, called “security and policy review,” is used only for information developed by the military for release, not by non-military writers, journalists, and reporters. However, because there was no longer any formal authority for the imposition of wartime field press censorship, “security review” was adopted as a ready and convenient mechanism for the review of reports prepared by combat correspondent pools. Although criticized by news organizations as “censorship” by another name, final authority for determining what was published or aired did not rest with the military reviewers, it rested with the editors and producers. See Williams’ testimony in Senate Hearings. 1139 Department of Defense Contingency Plan for Media Coverage of Hostilities, Operation Desert Shield, draft dated 13 Dec 1990. 1140 Col William L. Mulvey, a U.S. Army public affairs officer and veteran of the Vietnam War, was director of JIB-Dhahran. He recounts his experiences there in “Inside Media Relations: Observations from Desert Storm,” U.S. Army Public Affairs Monthly Update (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Army Office of Public Affairs), Aug 1991. 1141 Report from Nancy Traver, Washington Bureau, Time magazine, “ TV in the Gulf,” Desert Storm: The War in the Persian Gulf, compilation of Time magazine correspondent reports, eyewitness accounts, photographs, audio recordings, maps, charts, and documents gathered during the war by Time-Warner’s editorial staff and published on CD-ROM (Burbank, CA: Warner New Media, 1991). 1142 DOD Transcript, Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Press Conference, Pentagon, 8 Jan 1991. 1143 Gen Horner appeared in one press briefing conducted by the CINC on 18 Jan 1991. Gen Glosson appeared in one other briefing conducted by the CINC on 30 Jan 1991. No other senior CENTAF or Air Force officers appeared in any other significant briefings throughout the air campaign. 1144 USCENTCOM, General Order GO-1, Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving in the USCENTCOM AOR, 30 Aug 1990. 1145 Ltr, Chaplain Lt Col James T. Elwell, CENTAF Staff Chaplain, to USCENTAF/CC, subj: End of Tour Report, 24 Sep 1990, p 4. 1146 Ibid, note 2. 1147 Chaplain, Lt Col James T. Elwell, End of Tour Report, 24 Sep 1990. 1148 Ibid. 1149 History of HQ, USCENTAF/HC, Vol 1: 15 Aug - 31 Dec 1990, p 4. 1150 Chaplain, Lt Col Donald R. Bickers, USCENTAF, Rear, Battle Staff Operations Report, Mar 1992, p 9. 1151 Oral History Interview with Chaplain (Col) Gaylord E. Hatler, ARCENT Staff Chaplain during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 14 Jun 1991, interviewers Dr Henry O. Malone and Dr Susan Canedy. 1152 Ibid. 1153 Ibid. 1154 Information Paper, “Religious Support for Deployed Personnel During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (All Services),” Chaplain Jack Anderson, DAPE-HR-S; Geraldine Baum, “Baptism of Fire,” Los Angeles Times, 2 Jan 1991. 1155 Ltr, Robert M. Doane, Major, USAF, Director of MWR, CENTAF-FWD, to USCINCCENT CCJ1, subj: Deployment After Action Report, 20 Mar 1991, pp K-1 - K‑3. 1156 Ibid, pp D-1 - D-15. 1157 Maj Robert M. Doane, CENTAF-FWD Director of MWR, “Summary of Air Force MWR Involvement in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield,” undated, p 2. 1158 Ibid, pp A1 - A-5. 1159 Ibid, p I-1. 1160 Ibid, p J-1. 1161 Ibid, pp H-1 - H-2. 1162 Ibid, p A-3. 1163 Ibid, p G-1. 1164 Ibid, pp D-3, E-1. 1165 Ibid, p E-2. 1166 Ltr, Robert M. Doane, Major, USAF, Director of MWR, CENTAF-FWD, to USCINCCENT CCJ1, subj: Deployment After Action Report, 20 Mar 1991, pp D-1 - 3. 1167 Ibid. 1168 Maj Robert M. Doane, CENTAF-FWD Director of MWR, “Summary of Air Force MWR Involvement in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield,” undated, p 4. 1169 Ibid. 1170 Ibid. 1171 Ltr, John J. Nethery, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Systems, and Analysis, Financial Management, to SAF/OSG, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 24 Mar 1992. 1172 Ibid. 1173 Ltr, C. Ronald Hovell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management, to Distribution List, subj: Financial Management and Comptroller Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned Action Items, 13 Aug 1992. 1174 Ltr, John J. Nethery, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Systems, and Analysis, Financial Management, to SAF/OSG, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 24 Mar 1992. 1175 Mr Lee Franklin, SAF/FMPC Briefing, “Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned,” undated. 1176 Ltr, C. Ronald Hovell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management, to Distribution List, subj: Financial Management and Comptroller Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned Action Items, 13 Aug 1992. 1177 Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
|