***Pakistan***
US influence is critical to thwart insurgency in Pakistan – Curtis ’10
(Lisa, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, “Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration must be Clear and Firm” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Taliban-Reconciliation-Obama-Administration-Must-Be-Clear-and-Firm, March 2010, Accessed June 28, 2010) DM
If the U.S. seeks to prevent Afghanistan from turning back into a safe haven for terrorists that want to attack the U.S., it must convince Pakistani officials to crack down on Taliban leaders who find sanctuary in their country. Pakistani public opinion is beginning to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. If the U.S. tries to find a quick exit from Afghanistan, however, these gains in Pakistan will be squandered and the Taliban's ideology will regain legitimacy throughout the region.
The U.S. should support Afghan reconciliation efforts on the ground in Afghanistan diplomatically and financially, and at the same time militarily squeeze the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan that is still closely linked to al-Qaeda. These actions should occur simultaneously so that the local Taliban fighters view the U.S., NATO, and Afghan authorities as being on the winning side, and simultaneously see a process through which they can switch sides without punishment. But U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan would likely undermine efforts to coax local fighters into the political mainstream, thus jeopardizing General McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and prolonging instability throughout the region.
***Allied Prolif*** Allied Proliferation Module
Hegemony prevents Japanese and German proliferation.
Ashley Tellis, et al, “Sources of Conflict in Asia,” Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy, ed Khalilzad and Lesser, 1998, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap5.pdf, accessed 8/10/02
The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies— critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase—to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up, especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.
The impact is multiple nuclear wars.
Millot 1994 (Marc Dean Millot, Defense Analyst at RAND, Washington Quarterly, Summer)
The outcome of this refusal to face the emerging reality of regional nuclear adversaries is that the United States is not preparing seriously for the possibility of having to fight in a regional nuclear war. If it continues down this path, it will be unable to cope with the potential threat of nuclear aggression against its allies. If it cannot assure the security of its allies against this threat, the result is likely to be further proliferation among these allies, highly unstable regional military situations, a severe reduction of the United States' international influence, and a growing probability of regional nuclear wars involving U.S. forces.
Hegemony key to maintain Alliances
LOWER U.S. ARSENAL ENCOURAGES ALLIES TO ARM THEMSELVES; WIDESPREAD PROLIF
Feith and Shulsky 09
(Douglas J. Abram N. , 8/3/2009. Former under secretary of defense for policy and senior fellow @ the Hudson Institute; and former Defense Department official who dealt with arms control issues, and senior fellow @ the Hudson Institute. “Why Revive the Cold War?” Wall Street Journal,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574328430978849134.html. GM)
There is an important connection between proliferation risks and modernization. But the Obama administration seems to have it backwards. If the U.S. fails to ensure the continuing safety and reliability of its arsenal, it could cause the collapse of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and others might decide that their security requires them to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, rather than rely indefinitely on the U.S. The world could reach a tipping point, with cascading nuclear proliferation, as the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission warned in its May 2009 report. The Obama administration's nuclear weapons policies—including its treaty talks with Russia—affect the way America's friends and potential adversaries view the integrity of the U.S. deterrent. The wrong policies can endanger the U.S. directly. They can also cause other states to lose confidence in the American nuclear umbrella and to seek security in national nuclear capabilities. If that happens, the dangers of a nuclear war somewhere in the world would go up substantially. It would not be the first time a U.S. government helped bring about the opposite of its intended result—but it might be one of the costliest mistakes ever.
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