Protests Frontlines Update 4/11 Lack of economic justice makes new protests inevitable – tensions remain high
Keatley 3/13 [(Robert Keatley is a former editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong) “Encore: The Hong Kong Protests' Coming Revival” The National Interest 3/13/15] AT 4/11/15
Last year was anything but quiet in Hong Kong. Angered by Beijing’s refusal to let local politics take a more democratic turn, huge crowds—especially of students—clogged main streets and shut down the central business district for ten weeks. Assorted scuffles and police tear gas gave protests an occasional touch of violence though they ended peacefully, if inconclusively. The long-term economic damage was minimal. Yet an atmosphere of distrust and disillusion remains. So when the government’s Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying (CY Leung), issued his annual Lunar New Year statement not long ago, he turned to the Chinese zodiac in search of guidance for his discontented public. This is, according to the translation dominant in Hong Kong, the Year of the Sheep (though others say the relevant if ambiguous Chinese character yang (羊) really stands for a goat or ram). “Sheep are widely seen to be mild and gentle animals living peacefully in groups,” he advised. “In the coming year, I hope that all people in Hong Kong will take inspiration from the sheep’s character and pull together in an accommodating manner to work for Hong Kong’s future.” But the image of “Good Shepherd Leung” leading his flock to the political equivalent of ever greener pastures did not immediately spring to mind. Some Hong Kong residents instead interpreted the analogy as one in which lambs go to slaughter, so they dismissed Leung’s words as yet another political blunder by an unpopular leader seen as acting more dutifully toward Communist leaders in Beijing than toward individuals he nominally represents. It was a reminder that Hong Kong has deep divisions and is certain to face future unrest as Beijing inexorably moves to restrict some—though not all—of the civic freedoms that set it apart from the rest of China. This guarantees that the coming months will not be a time for placid sheep. Several divisive issues are at work but the most obvious one concerns the political future. Though Hong Kong came under Chinese sovereignty in 1997, it has been governed ever since by a special arrangement called “one country, two systems.” This gives Beijing authority over diplomatic and military matters but is supposed to allow—as the applicable law states—“Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” with a “high degree of autonomy.” This means, among other things, that the territory has been guaranteed, at least until 2047, continued press freedom, the right of assembly, an independent judicial system based on British common law, as well as a free market economy and financial standards. In addition, the political system inherited from the British is supposed to evolve gradually into a fully democratic one with local elections. None of this is allowed on the mainland. At present, the Chief Executive is chosen every five years by an election committee of twelve hundred people selected, for the most part, from interest groups aligned to Beijing; this method has produced three successive leaders with neither a public mandate nor much popular support. Because the top administrator cannot, by current law, represent any political party, there is an strange disconnect between the executive and legislative branches, giving Hong Kong a government that too often seems dysfunctional. Introducing elections by universal suffrage for major posts is supposed to help correct this. Hong Kong’s vocal pro-democracy politicians had expected popular voting for the top job to be allowed in 2007, but Beijing reneged on an implied promise. Last year, on August 31, however, Chinese leaders said it could be introduced for the next Chief Executive election in 2017—but with a catch. Only “two or three” candidates approved by a special committee under mainland influence can stand for the top office; this meant that pro-democracy candidates perceived by Beijing as unreliable supporters of Chinese Communist Party policies could not win a place on the ballot. Angry politicians called this a fake democracy that violated the terms of the “one country, two systems” arrangement, and in late September launched a public demonstration called “Occupy Central with Love and Peace.” It was meant to take over the central business district as a peaceful protest against Beijing’s decree and force political concessions. But things soon got out of hand. Unexpected crowds of students, motivated by their own social and economic grievances, overwhelmed the middle-class professionals who run Hong Kong’s small pro-democracy political parties and took control of the streets. Soon the movement had no clear leadership nor agreed set of demands. With Beijing’s strong support, the Hong Kong government simply out-waited the students and by the end of the year, the protest was over. But not forgotten. Those opposed to Beijing’s decision have promised new demonstrations unless election rules are amended to open up the process of selecting candidates. Or else, the protestors will reject the new plan. Just what they will do and when, or how disruptive new demonstrations may be, remains unknown. However, China—echoed by a supine Hong Kong government—insists no serious concessions will be forthcoming and a completely open nominating process is not possible anytime soon, if ever. Chief Executive Leung has warned that the city might descend into “anarchy” if more public protests ensue and promises to uphold his version of law and order firmly (his government is buying its first three water cannons for that purpose). Beijing voices are shriller. Some officials have denounced the demonstrations as an attempt to seek outright independence, which it is not, or claim the protests had an even more sinister purpose. Occupy Central—symbolized by yellow umbrellas—was “an orchestrated Hong Kong version of a color revolution,” according to General Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, implying a relation to the “Orange” and “Rose,” protests elsewhere. “Hostile forces have always attempted to make Hong Kong the bridgehead for subverting and infiltrating mainland China….under the instigation and support of external forces.” Others, including Leung, have echoed this claim but so far have refused to offer supporting evidence. A former U.S. government specialist in Asian policy dismisses this claim as “delusional” and notes that it is not certain that Beijing officials really believe what they say. But American officials agree that fear of political contagion is the main reason why Chinese rulers, who can detect conspiracies with a near paranoid consistency, are increasingly intolerant toward Hong Kong politicians. The territory’s relatively free society has long influenced attitudes in the heavily populated, neighboring Guangzhou Province, a leading Chinese export base where people have strong family ties to Hong Kong citizens. Allowing the territory to choose its own leaders strikes the mainland’s Communist Party as an extremely dangerous precedent for the rest of the nation, especially now that President Xi Jinping is cracking down on dissent with a fervor not seen since twenty years. In Xi’s oft-stated view, any opposition to Communist rule is treasonous. The next move is up to the Hong Kong government. It has just completed its second so-called “public consultation” about Hong Kong’s political future, wherein it goes through the motions of testing public opinion. By the end of April, it will forward final election-rule recommendations for Beijing’s approval. These will not differ much from those decreed by Beijing last August, but could include minor amendments. If results of the first consultation are a guide, the government report will tell Beijing what it wants to hear rather than honestly explain what many in Hong Kong would prefer. Once Chinese leaders accept the report, then Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) must approve it by a two-thirds majority before the territory can, in 2017, hold its first-ever popular election for its leader—under terms that omit candidates who lack the center’s prior approval. LegCo action remains uncertain. Pro-democracy figures have about a third of the total seats, enough to block action and scupper the Beijing plan. But that would keep the existing system in place indefinitely, with the next Chief Executive chosen by the same twelve hundred-person committee that picked the unpopular Leung. With no fallback plan available, the pro-democrats would have to decide between flawed electoral reform or none at all, with no prospect for serious change in sight. The Hong Kong government is trying to convince a few opposition members that something is better than nothing, and herd its plan safely through LegCo by this summer. So far, however, the pro-democrats claim they remain united against the Beijing plan, especially as modest proposals that could make it more acceptable have been rejected. The Occupy Central movement radicalized some in the pro-democracy camp, and energized student groups to an unprecedented degree. If the final law does not make the voting plan more palatable, new demonstrations seem inevitable, though they may not match the initial protests in magnitude. Other grievances could intensity protests. Many young people believe the Hong Kong business establishment has cast its lot with Beijing, with capitalists and Communists colluding to prevent local democracy. They are not incorrect. Local tycoons fear that a freely elected government might introduce populist welfare programs and raise taxes; they also believe they can protect their extensive commercial interests in China by backing the ruling party. President Xi, in fact, has met conspicuously with Hong Kong business leaders, saying that maintaining their prosperity is a key Communist Party policy. But many young Hong Kong people resent this focus on China. They complain that too many good jobs go to imported mainlanders, while local businesses fail to create enough new ones at home. They also contend that rich mainlanders have skewed the property market, raising home prices—up thirteen percent last year—beyond their reach. An acute and widening rich-poor divide feeds this resentment, and feeds an often antagonistic attitude toward mainland visitors. In fact, there have been angry protests near the mainland border against so-called “parallel goods traders”—visitors who empty shop shelves to cram suitcases with goods for resale at higher prices in China, where product safety is suspect. This has created, for example, a shortage of baby formula in Hong Kong. And to Beijing’s dismay, a growing share of young people call themselves Hong Kongers before they claim to be Chinese. This sense of separateness could lead to Chinese attempts to erode some of Hong Kong’s civic freedoms in coming months. Both the mainland and local governments have vowed to add “patriotic education” to the school system, which some consider to be mainland propaganda. There may be renewed efforts to pass security laws against “sedition,” a catchall term to constrain criticism (a 2003 effort to pass such laws brought out 500,000 protesters). Press freedom has diminished, largely because many media owners won’t risk antagonizing authorities. One leading distributor no longer handles books critical of mainland policies. Some Beijing bureaucrats have suggested the court system should help implement official policies rather than serve as an independent judiciary. So far, most of these potentially repressive policies remain abstract future threats rather than current dangers. But Hong Kong citizens clearly want to preserve the freedoms and lifestyle they already enjoy, while obtaining the power to achieve greater economic justice. If they believe that they are being squeezed and that these rights are endangered, new protests seem certain. What Beijing would do in that scenario is a great unknown. But as Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao remarked recently: “the really interesting part of the show is yet to come.”
Protests are back!
Ramzy 3/27 (Austin, Beijing Correspondent with Time since 2007, Six Months Later, Small Protest Camp Grows Again in Hong Kong, March 27, 2015,) JZ 4/11
After workers under police watch dismantled the main camp of Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters in the Admiralty district in December, a small number of holdouts vowed to fight on. They regrouped on the sidewalks near government buildings, a vastly diminished presence but a reminder that the end of the 79-day occupation of city streets was not an end to their campaign for greater citizen involvement in the selection of Hong Kong’s next leader. “At first, there weren’t many people, but it has grown,” said Kit Ku, a 23-year-old pastry chef wearing a black hoodie and clunky black glasses as he sat in a tent on Thursday. “I’m very happy. This is very meaningful for the Hong Kong people.” In the days leading up to the six-month anniversary of the Sept. 28 start of the Occupy Central protests, which also became known as the Umbrella Movement, the encampment around the government offices has slowly expanded. The site now has a garden, a study area, a library and solar-powered lights. As a cold rain fell Thursday night, two men sawed lumber to make benches and storage lockers. High-school students did homework under a tent, while two groups of about a dozen each discussed politics and strategy. An online tally said that as of Tuesday, there were 147 tents at the camp, nearly double the 78 that were counted on Dec. 16, after the mass sit-ins ended. The number is a sliver of the 1,817 tents present just before the protesters were removed from one of Hong Kong Island’s major thoroughfares, but the increase has prompted notice. In a speech on Wednesday to an investment conference, Leung Chun-ying, the Hong Kong chief executive, raised the possibility that the Occupy protests could return. “The Hong Kong government, as always, maintains its preparedness,” he said. “But I can say that the public, if Occupy happens again, will not be sympathetic.” At the protest site, Mr. Ku said he was not interested in trying to block major streets again. “If we take the streets again, some people are scared the police will beat us again,” he said. “We have other ways to do this without people getting hurt.” On Thursday evening, two police officers walked through the camp, counting tents. They inquired about a banner that had been hung from the side of a stairway that became known as the Lennon Wall during the protests after demonstrators covered it with notes expressing their hopes. Last year, the police arrested 955 occupy protesters, the government said this week.
These are more violent
Economist 3/21 [Aisles apart: Protests about mainland shoppers reveal graver problems. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21646794-protests-about-mainland-shoppers-reveal-graver-problems-aisles-apart] AJ
LATE last year thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators poured onto the streets of Hong Kong calling for the right to elect the city’s leader in 2017, free of interference by the central government in Beijing. In recent weeks protests have flared again; far smaller this time, but more violent and similarly fuelled by resentment of the mainland’s encroachment. At issue has been the hordes of mainland Chinese who visit Hong Kong to buy goods for black-market resale at home, a racket described locally as “parallel trading”. These new and nastier outbursts are about far more than shopping; they suggest that antagonism towards the mainland is deepening and spreading beyond the territory’s urban core. This is causing anxiety among officials on both sides of the border.
Tensions are rising
Coonan 3/23 [Hong Kong police step up security after Occupy Central protests. Clifford Connan. 3/23/15. Irish Times. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/hong-kong-police-step-up-security-after-occupy-central-protests-1.2149040. Accessed 4/11/15] AJ
The Hong Kong government is seeking to increase security after the Occupy Central pro-democracy protests in late 2014, which led to widespread unrest and disrupted traffic in the city, as well as a recent round of protests against mainland traders buying up cheap goods in the city. Outside the Happy Valley police station in the former Crown Colony, workmen have been removing the wooden frameworks from around large concrete blocks at the front of the building, while police officers were ordered to step up control of public gatherings in the territory. The officers have been ordered to implement more strictly an existing public order law from 1967, which was used to crack down on pro-Beijing leftist riots against British colonial rule. In recent years, the ordinance has mostly been used against organised criminals from triad gangs, but post- Occupy, officers have been ordered to break up any gathering deemed likely to cause any breach of the peace or threat to public safety.
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