Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs



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Jurisdiction: Illinois (but the federal trial court’s reasoning might be considered persuasive by other courts)
Cadenas v. Butterfield Health Care IL, Inc., No. 12-C-07750 (N.D. Ill., 7/15/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16643495075545722508&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.

  • Franczek Radelet law firm article at http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-Pregnancy_Discrimination_Claim.html.

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16643495075545722508&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.

  • EEOC pregnancy guidelines at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm.

This is a developing area, so read the trial court order and the law firm articles.


The initial restrictions by her physician simply stated at 14 weeks no more than 20 pounds. Shortly thereafter it as restated to be effective at 20 weeks. Modified duty offered by the employer’s policy was limited to injured workers. Her employment was terminated.
The employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that her employment was terminated because of her inability to perform her essential job functions, not pregnancy. Motion denied because:

  • even though she could have lawfully been terminated when her restrictions took effect during week 20 of her pregnancy (unable to perform her essential job functions), and

  • the timing of her immediate termination in week 15 was suspicious because that was 5 weeks before her restrictions would take effect.

In addition, the employer never stated a legitimate business reason for terminating right before week 20, which might be sufficient factual basis for a reasonable jury to determine that the plaintiff was fired because of her pregnancy.
[Comment: Also consider the issue of how pregnancy Pregnancy Act cases have ruled that modified duty pools cannot be limited just to injuries.]
FLSA, OPLA, Wage and Hour: overtime wages, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) – 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act (“PLA”, Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 165.1 et seq., arbitration, selection of forum, fee shifting, waiving statutory rights
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma
Sanchez , et al., v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C., Nos. 12-7046 and 12-7057 (10th Cir., 8/8/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-7046.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
For human resources practitioners, only the wage issue is covered here.

Summary by the appellate court:
This appeal involves a dispute concerning the scope of an arbitration clause between Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. (“Nitro-Lift”), and three of its former employees, Miguel Sanchez, Shane Schneider, and Eddie Howard (collectively, “plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs filed suit against Nitro-Lift, claiming it failed to pay overtime wages in violation of both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act (“OPLA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 165.1 et seq. Nitro-Lift appeals from two district court orders denying its motions to dismiss and compel arbitration, or in the alternative to stay the proceeding pending arbitration, arguing plaintiffs’ wage disputes fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. We reverse.
Plaintiffs’ contention about wages:
In sworn affidavits, plaintiffs claim that when they were required to sign the contract, it was presented to them as an agreement specifically about confidentiality and competition. They contend Nitro-Lift did not explain the arbitration provision, did not allow them to read the document or the arbitration clause it contained, and did not allow them to ask questions or consult an attorney before signing the document. Plaintiffs allege they were never told that by signing the agreement, they would be waiving their right to a jury trial for claims of unpaid wages or that they would be required to arbitrate wage disputes. Finally, plaintiffs claim they never agreed to arbitrate any wage disputes with Nitro-Lift.
Litigators can study the other numerous novel issues by reading the entire opinion:
We decline to decide these issues for the first time on appeal. Because the district court found the arbitration agreement did not cover plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, it did not address any of these issues. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further consideration of these issues in light of this opinion.
Wage and Hour, Arbitration: enforcement, drafting defects
Jurisdiction: California
Rebolledo v. Tilly’s, Inc. et al., No. G048625 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist4.Div3., 8/6/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G048625.PDF.

  • Shaw Valenza law firm article at http://shawvalenza.blogspot.com/2014/08/court-of-appeal-two-new-arbitration.html.

Deficient drafting resulted in the arbitration agreement provision on wages and hours not being subject to arbitration.


Summary by the appellate court:
Tilly’s Inc. and World of Jeans & Tops, Inc. (hereafter collectively referred to in the singular as Employer) appeal from the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Maria Rebolledo’s putative class action regarding statutory wage claims. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly excluded statutory wage claims from the arbitration obligation. The order is affirmed.
Wage and Hour, Arbitration: enforcement, drafting defects
Jurisdiction: California
Galen v. Redfin Corporation, No. A138642 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist1.Div1., 7/21/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A138642.PDF.

  • Shaw Valenza law firm article at http://shawvalenza.blogspot.com/2014/08/court-of-appeal-two-new-arbitration.html.

Deficient drafting resulted in the arbitration agreement provision on wages and hours not being subject to arbitration.


Summary by the appellate court:
In this employment dispute, defendant Redfin Corporation appeals from the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted in plaintiff Scott Galen’s class action lawsuit. The court concluded plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged statutory violations and are therefore not encompassed by the parties’ contractual agreement. Additionally, the court found that even if the claims fall within the agreement, the agreement’s arbitration provision is unconscionable and therefore invalid. We now reverse.
NLRB: confidentiality agreement, NLRA § 7 rights – terms and conditions of employment
Jurisdiction: All
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB No. 8 (7/31/14):

  • http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581811068 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/2014/08/articles/nlra/nlrb-continues-to-criticize-employer-restrictions-on-employees-use-of-confidential-information/.

The Board found that the confidentiality rule included in an employer’s “Code of Business Conduct” was overly broad and restricted employees’ right to engage in concerted activities involving terms and conditions of employment. The specific provision focused on was the statement that the company has “an important duty to our customers and our employees to respect the information we hold about them and ensure it is protected and handled responsibly”, and in the list of specific “Do’s and Don’ts” – “Do . . . Keep customer and employee information secure. Information must be used fairly, lawfully and only for the purpose for which it was obtained.”


ERISA: denial of benefits – disability insurance, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, failed to prove disabled as defined by the policy, limitation of actions – statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit

Holmes v. Colorado Coalition for the Homeless Long Term Disability Plan, No. 13-1175 (8/12/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1175.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Abundant authority and reasoning explain why failure to comply with all requirements, time limits, etc., was fatal to her claim for multiple medical problems.
[Comment: Employers can avoid sad situations such as this with their employees by providing adequate training and warnings because:

  • it could avoid expensive litigation, even though the employer ultimately won, and

  • it just might be morally right and good for morale.]


From the appellate opinion:
Plaintiff Lucrecia Carpio Holmes appeals the district court’s ruling that her claim for disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
[P.2]

III. CONCLUSION


The plan document authorized the further appeal procedures described in the Denial Review Procedure and they are enforceable against Ms. Holmes. Union Security rendered a timely decision on Ms. Holmes’s first-level review and the SPD’s failure to describe the second-level review did not prejudice Ms. Holmes. As a result, Ms. Holmes was required to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing this action. The district court correctly determined that she failed to exhaust those remedies by not pursuing a second-level review.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision that Ms. Holmes’s claim under ERISA is barred.
[P.34]
FLSA: late payments – penalties: 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19

  • Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim – FRCP 12(b)(6)

  • Violation: “on time” payment

  • Requirement: defined workweek

  • Standard: exempt employees


Jurisdiction: All
Martin, et al., v. The United States, No. 13-834C (U.S.Ct.Claims, 7/31/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • https://ecf.cofc.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0834-38-0.

  • Fisher Phillips law firm article at http://www.wage-hour.net/post/2014/08/13/Late-Payment-Resulted-In-An-FLSA-Violation.aspx.

This case illustrates the importance of timely payments required under the FLAS and the consequent penalties, no matter what the cause for delay.


OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises from the fall 2013 budget impasse and resulting partial government shutdown. Plaintiffs are government workers who were required to work during the shutdown but were not timely paid minimum wages and overtime wages on their regularly scheduled paydays for the work performed. Plaintiffs allege that the late payment of their wages violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or the Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012), and for such violation they are entitled to statutory liquidated damages. Defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Counts One and Two is DENIED, and its motion as to Count Three is GRANTED.
Arbitration: agreement enforced, not unconscionable, not excessively costly, adverse employment action, Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Human Rights Act.
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Trigg v. Little Six Corp., No. E2013-01929-COA-R9-CV (TNCA, 7/28/14):

  • http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/triggdopn.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4921.

The employee claimed the arbitration clause in the company’s employment agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable because that process was “excessive” and the costs were “prohibitive”.


Summary by the appellate court:
The issue in this wrongful termination action is the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an agreement between the plaintiff employee and his former employer. Plaintiff executed an employment agreement in 2007. Employer terminated plaintiff without cause in April 2012. He brought this action alleging common law retaliatory discharge and violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Employer filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because it is unconscionable due to the “excessive” and “prohibitive” costs of arbitration. The trial court found that the agreement had been freely negotiated and was neither a contract of adhesion nor unconscionable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court enforcing the agreement and ordering arbitration.
Arbitration: Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) - Unfair Competition Act (UCA) – class claims – arbitrator decides
Jurisdiction: California
Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., No. B244412 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div7, 7/22/14):

http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B244412.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].

Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4919.





Introduction by the appellate court:
In this class action, plaintiff Timothy Sandquist purports to appeal from the trial court’s August 14, 2012 order granting defendants’ motion to compel him to arbitrate his individual claims, as well as defendants’ motion to dismiss all class claims without prejudice. Although this order is not appealable, we liberally construe Sandquist’s notice of appeal to include the trial court’s October 5, 2012 order dismissing his class claims with prejudice, which is appealable under the death knell doctrine. Limiting our review to Sandquist’s challenges to the order dismissing the class claims, we agree with Sandquist that the trial court erred by deciding the issue whether the parties agreed to class arbitration, and that the court should have submitted the issue to the arbitrator. Therefore, we reverse.
Wage and Hour: 20 minute meal breaks, unpaid – no waiver, collective bargaining agreement (CBA), statutory requirements – WIS. STAT. § 109.03(5) (2011-12) and § 274.02(3)
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Aguilar v. Husco International, Inc., No. 2008CV001395 (WICA.Dist., 5/20/14):

  • http://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=112663 [enhanced lexis.com version]

  • Krukowski & Costello, S.C. law firm article at http://www.krukowski.com/eNews/June2014v2enews.html.

The dispute was over unpaid 20-minute breaks covered under a CBA. That was ruled to violate state law, even though many hears had passed, because employees cannot contract away their Wisconsin wage and hour rights.


From the appellate opinion:
¶1 KESSLER, J. Mauricio Aguilar and multiple additional employees of Husco International, Inc. (“the employees”), Husco International, Inc. (“Husco”), and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District No. 10 (“District 10”) appeal from a circuit court order denying all of their respective motions for summary judgment. The parties all agree that none of the material facts necessary to resolve the legal issues presented in this case are in dispute. Consequently, all of the parties petitioned for permission to appeal the circuit court’s non-final order. We granted all of the petitions. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the employees and District 10. We also remand for an order denying Husco’s summary judgment motion and for any further action consistent with this opinion that may be appropriate.
BACKGROUND
¶2 This case arises out of a class action wage claim under WIS. STAT. § 109.03(5) (2011-12),1 which requires employers to pay employees all wages due. Under state law. Wages due include wages required by WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.02(3), which requires employers to pay for any break “where the employer does not provide at least 30 minutes free from work.” See id. The employees, represented by District 10, alleged that Husco failed to pay its employees for 20-minute breaks and that the failure resulted in unpaid wages.
¶3 From 1981 to the present, District 10 has been the collective bargaining representative for a bargaining unit of production and maintenance employees at Husco. In 1983, Husco and District 10 agreed to implement certain changes into the employees’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Husco. The agreement provided for a paid 10-minute break, an unpaid 20-minute break and paid wash-up periods totaling five minutes per eight-hour and 20- minute shift, so that employees would work a total of seven hours and 45 minutes for every eight hours of pay.
¶4 At the time the parties agreed to a contract provision providing unpaid 20-minute breaks, neither party was aware that the unpaid 20-minute breaks were unlawful under Department of Workforce Development regulations. Specifically, neither party was aware that pursuant to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD § 274.02(3),2 all breaks under 30 minutes must be paid.
NLRB: drug/alcohol testing, Weingarten rights – union representation, investigation, adverse employment action
Jurisdiction: All
Ralph’s Grocery Co., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (7/31/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581811068.

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/labor-relations-counsel/right-union-representation-applies-employer-referrals-drugalcohol-tests-nlrb.

“Weingarten rights”, among other things, allow a union employee to request union representation during an investigatory interview that could lead to an adverse employment action, which by implication includes referral for a workplace drug/alcohol test.


NLRB: quorum issues
This Krukowski & Costello law firm article and other similar articles remind practitioners that

The 2014 United States Supreme Court ruling in NLRB v. Noel Canning potentially affects about a thousand previous Board rulings: http://www.krukowski.com/eNews/July2014enews.html. This leaves many of those ruling subject to challenge.


Non-compete: geographic area, protect plaintiff’s business
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Beverage Sys. of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Beverage Repair, LLC, et al, No. COA 14-185 (August 5, 2014)

  • http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=31621 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • http://www.noncompetereport.com/files/2014/08/Beverage-Sys.-of-the-Carolinas-LLC-v.-Associated-Beverage-Repair-LLC-et-al.pdf.

  • Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.noncompetereport.com/2014/08/06/north-carolina-court-of-appeals-directs-trial-court-to-rewrite-non-compete-agreement/.

The court had express authority to modify the agreement.


Summary by the appellate court:
Plaintiff timely appeals from an order entered 3 October 2013 granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. After careful review, because the trial court had express authority to revise the restrictions of the non-compete agreement, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to revise the geographic area covered by the non-compete to include those areas necessary to reasonably protect plaintiff’s business interests. Furthermore, since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ludine Dotoli violated the revised non-compete, we reverse the order granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and remand for trial. Finally, because plaintiff presented evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for the remaining tort claims and request for injunctive relief, we reverse the order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remand for trial.
Unfair Competition: misclassified drivers, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. (UCL), 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1), Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Pub.L. No. 103-305 (Aug. 23, 1994) 108 Stat. 1569) (FAAAA)
Jurisdiction: California
P. ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., No. S194388 (CASC, 7/28/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S194388A.PDF.

  • Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4925.


Supreme court summary:
The narrow question presented is whether an action under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. (UCL)) that is based on a trucking company’s alleged violation of state labor and insurance laws is “related to a price, route or service” (49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1)) of the company and, therefore, preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Pub.L. No. 103-305 (Aug. 23, 1994) 108 Stat. 1569) (FAAAA). The FAAAA provides that a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” (49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1).) The People, on behalf of the State of California, filed this action against defendants Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas (Barajas) for misclassifying drivers as independent contractors and for other alleged violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws.

As we explain, we conclude that the FAAAA does not preempt the People’s UCL action against defendants. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.


NLRB: “micro-units” – Specialty Healthcare standard
Jurisdiction: All
Macy’s, Inc., et al., 361 NLRB No. 4 (7/22/14):

  • http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45817f7387 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Franczek Radelet law firm article at http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-NLRB_Macys.html.

  • Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4917.




  • However, see this Franczek Radelet article at http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-Micro-Unit_Shoe_Sales_Associates_Bergdorf.html explaining why a contrary result was reached for Bergdorf Goodman.

The small sales group of 41 employees in Macy’s cosmetics and fragrances department were designated as the bargaining group for only those employees; none of the other 120 employees of the Saugus, MA, store were included or would be represented.


The Board’s rationales were:

  • The selection of employees tracked the departmental dividing line that Macy’s had drawn.

  • Comparing the cosmetics and fragrances employees to other sales employees, it emphasized that they:

    • worked in separate departments,

    • reported to different supervisors,

    • worked in separate physical spaces, and

    • there was no significant contact between the employees.

  • It distinguished decisions cited by Macy’s on the grounds that , and stated that more recent NLRB decisions have “evolved away from the presumptions favoring storewide units.”

  • The majority dismissed as “speculative” Macy’s suggestion that the application of the Specialty Healthcare standard to the retail industry would substantially harm Macy’s and other retail stores.

FMLA: adverse employment action, interference, questionable physical condition, lying independent medical examination (IME), summary judgment dismissal


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