Jurisdiction: Third Circuit
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, No. 12-3828 (3rd Cir., 4/3/14);
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03828/pdf/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03828-0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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Fisher & Phillips law firm article at http://www.wage-hour.net/post/2013/04/03/Asset-Purchaser-Also-Buys-FLSA-Liability.aspx.
Based on the analysis of Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, No. 12-2440 (7th Cir., 4/3/13); http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2013/D03-26/C:12-2440:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1106464:S:0, briefed previously in this database, the employer was held liable for unpaid overtime [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
In this case we consider the efforts of plaintiff Patricia Thompson to hold her former employers responsible for alleged overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) , 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 219 , and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J. STAT. ANN . §§ 34:11-56a – 34:11-56a38. Thompson appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted the motion of defendant s to dismiss each of Thompson’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, we will vacate and remand.
Factors in Thompson:
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whether there is a continuity of operations and workforce from one entity to the next,
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whether the alleged successor has notice of possible FLSA violations; and
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whether the predecessor is able to satisfy an award of FLSA damages.
Factors in Teed:
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Did the successor company have notice of the pending lawsuit?
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Could it have been able to provide the relief sought in the lawsuit before the sale?
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Could it have provided relief after the sale?
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Can it provide the relief sought?
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Was there continuity between the operation and work force of the predecessor and the successor?
FTA: Federal Tort Claims Act, litigation, chemical exposure – nerve gas, limitation of actions – statute of limitations – tolling factors
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Bayless v. United States of America, et al., No. 12-4120 (10th Cir., 4/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-4120.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Federal Tort Claims Act cases don’t often apply to employment law, but there are times when the reasoning of this case might be persuasive in other situations. Rather than pass over this it, practitioners and litigators might benefit from reviewing it for reasoning that might be important in hazardous substance situations in which an employee is unaware of the implications of such exposure (e.g., see some of the facts in the Muller case below). Perhaps it also is somewhat similar in its equitable tone to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
Sixteen years ago Carolyn Bayless began to suffer from a mysterious debilitating illness. As her condition deteriorated over the years that followed, she doggedly sought to learn what caused (and how to treat) her illness. Finally, in 2008, convinced that she was the victim of exposure to nerve gas emitted by an Army testing facility, she filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. When this lawsuit followed in 2009, the Army responded that she knew of her claim by at least 2005 and had waited too long to assert it. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment dismissing the case. We conclude that under the unusual circumstances presented here, the period of limitation did not accrue until February 2007. Therefore, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.
Retaliation, Defamation: racial discrimination, contracts, failure of proof – dismissal – F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6)
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Muller v. Islands at Rio Rancho Homeowners Association, et al., No. 13-2188 (10th Cir., 4/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2188.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
This case is based on an 1870 civil rights law that increasingly is pled in addition to the typical antidiscrimination laws (http://www.elinfonet.com/workipedia/Section-1981).:
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no statutory cap on attorney fees,
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longer statute of limitations, and
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agency screening requirements.
As noted elsewhere in this database, the proof of discrimination for the 1870 law is the same as for the modern laws [Dyer v. Lane, et al., No. 13-3190 (10th Cir., 4/25/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3190.pdf].
Summary by the appellate court:
Miloslav Muller, proceeding pro se, appeals from a magistrate judge’s order dismissing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) his claim of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and his claim of defamation under New Mexico state law. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291, we affirm.
* * *
In April 2009, Muller reported to the New Mexico Department of Agriculture an incident of hazardous environmental exposure to an Africa n-American employee of Shamrock Landscaping (“Shamrock ”), a company that was performing landscaping work at the Islands. According to Muller, Shamrock used an “unsuspecting” African-American employee to apply toxic pesticides without any training or knowledge. Muller claimed that as a result of this report, the HOA and Islands management personnel retaliated against him in April 2010. He asserted that they intentionally declined to provide certain information to a plumbing company performing emergency work at Muller’s residence, resulting in flood damage to his home.
* * *
We agree with the district court that Muller’s complaint failed to allege the violation of another person’ s contract-related right and that such violation was race-based. The complaint does not, as it must, identify “an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’” Domino’s Pizza, 540 U.S. at 476, or even allege a contractual relationship between the African-American employee and defendants.
FAA: adverse employment action, Federal Aviation Act, federal preemption, safety, state claim – retaliation, medical fitness
Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit
Ventress v. Japan Air Lines, No. 12-15066 (9th Cir., 3/28/14):
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http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/03/28/12-15066.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5821
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Ford Harrison law firm article at http://www.fordharrison.com/airline-industry-legal-alert-ninth-circuit-finds-faa-preempts-safety-related-wrongful-termination-claim-1.
Safety considerations preempted the state claim. This is a complex case, and the law firm article explains and discusses in detail why preemption operated under the facts of the case.
Summary by the appellate court:
Preemption / Federal Aviation Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Japan Airlines based on the Federal Aviation Act’s preemption of the pro se plaintiff’s state claims.
Plaintiff, a former flight engineer, alleged that Japan Airlines retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns and constructively terminated him for reasons related to his medical and mental fitness.
The panel held that plaintiff’s California state law claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act because they required the factfinder to intrude upon the federally occupied field of aviation safety by deciding questions of pilot medical standards and qualifications. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Judge Bea concurred in part because he believes that plaintiff only appealed the district court’s decision denying his motion for reconsideration, and therefore he only joined that part of the majority’s opinion. Judge Bea does not believe that the court needed to address the district court’s conclusion concerning federal preemption.
FMLA: leave, involuntary designation – forced leave, no interference, summary judgment dismissal
Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit
Walker v. Trinity Marine Products, Inc., et al., No. 12-2468 (8th Cir; 7/19/14);
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/13/07/122468P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
She objected to involuntary designation of FMLA leave.
Summary by the appellate court:
Tracy Walker sued Trinity Marine Products, Inc. (“Trinity”), her former employer, alleging that Trinity had interfered with rights provided to her by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”). 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The district court granted Trinity’s motion to dismiss the case, and we affirm.
From page 3:
Walker sued Trinity on May 27, 2011, alleging that Trinity interfered with her rights under the FMLA by placing her involuntarily on FMLA leave while she was healthy, and by refusing to permit her to return to work. She also asserted that Trinity unlawfully terminated her because she attempted to exercise her right to return to the position that she held prior to taking leave. Trinity responded that Walker failed to state a claim because she never suffered a serious health condition that entitled her to FMLA leave in the first place. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
The district court determined that Walker had failed to allege actionable interference with any FMLA benefit to which she was entitled. On her claim of unlawful termination, the court ruled that Walker could not show that she had engaged in any activity protected by the statute. The court dismissed the complaint, and we review that decision de novo .
On the issue of forced leave:
In our view, if forced leave can amount to interference with a right provided under the FMLA, it can do so only if the employer’s action prevents the employee from using benefits to which she is entitled under the Act. The statute entitled Walker to a certain amount of leave. Trinity did not interfere with that entitlement. The district court correctly dismissed this claim.
Credit and Background Checks: EEOC – agency policy and practice, disparate impact, valid justification, summary judgment dismissal
Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit
EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp., No 13-3408 (6th Cir., 4/9/14):
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/14a0071p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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Littler Mendelson law firm detailed explanatory article, Sixth Circuit Upholds Dismissal of EEOC Suit Against Employer Screening Applicants Based on Credit History Information, at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/sixth-circuit-upholds-dismissal-eeoc-suit-against-employer-screening-a.
Background checks have been a controversial matter because of possible disparate impact on applicants. The EEOC has been suing on this legal theory, and thus the lead paragraph of the appellate opinion is significant:
In this case the EEOC sued the defendants for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses. The EEOC’s personnel handbook recites that “[o]verdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations.” Because of that concern, the EEOC runs credit checks on applicants for 84 of the agency’s 97 positions. The defendants (collectively, “Kaplan”) have the same concern; and thus Kaplan runs credit checks on applicants for positions that provide access to students’ financial-loan information, among other positions. For that practice, the EEOC sued Kaplan.
The law firm article provides an excellent discussion of this area of employment law.
ADA: state immunity – Eleventh Amendment – 11th, judgment on the pleadings – Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), confidential discovery, no retaliation
Barrett v. University of New Mexico Board of Regents, et al., No. 13-2139
(10th Cir., 4/21/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2139.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Her claims failed both on allegations against the board collectively and against individual members, pp. 2-5.
Summary by the appellate court:
Sherri R. Barrett appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). She also attempts to appeal from an interim order denying the parties’ stipulation for confidential discovery. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND
Barrett was employed by the University of New Mexico (UNM) until November 2010, when she was discharged. She sued the UNM Board of Regents (Board) and its individual members, in their official capacities, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She claimed she was denied raises and promotions, subjected to additional scrutiny, retaliated against, and discharged under the guise of a reduction in force due to her disabilities. Since the Board is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the district court entered a judgment on the pleadings as to it. Finding Barrett’s allegations insufficient to satisfy an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, judgment was also entered in favor of the individual board members. The judge concluded Barrett’s attempt to amend her complaint would be futile and denied as moot her challenge to a magistrate judge’s order denying a stipulated confidential discovery motion. In this appeal she challenges all of those decisions.
Title VII, State Tort: gender discrimination, sex, disparate treatment, pretext – genuine issue of fact; tort – discriminatory and wrongful termination – same issues as federal
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Evidence: three-step McDonnell Douglas test
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Failure to pay – commissions – vacation , liquidated damages
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Attorney fees: offer of judgment
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma
Potter v. Synerlink Corporation, f/k/a Preferred Reps, Inc.; Preferred Sales Agency, Ltd., Nos. 11-5092 & 12-5117 (10th Cir., 4/21/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/opinions/daily [enhanced lexis.com version].
This is a case of mixed claims and issues. The employer showed a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, but her discrimination claim will be tried because she showed there is a genuine issue of material fact of pretext.
Summary by the appellate court:
Stacey Potter, a top sales producer for her employer, Preferred Sales Agency, Ltd. (“PSA”), a part of Synerlink Corporation (“Synerlink”), was fired for not being a team player. She sued Synerlink in federal court, alleging (1) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, (2) the state law tort of discriminatory and wrongful discharge (Burk claim), and (3) a state law claim for failure to pay commissions and vacation pay after her termination.
The district court granted summary judgment to Synerlink on the federal and state discrimination claims because it concluded Ms. Potter failed to show Synerlink’s stated reason for termination was pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment to Ms. Potter on her vacation pay claim and sent her commissions claim to trial. A jury found for Ms. Potter on her commission claims, but found Synerlink was not obligated to pay liquidated damages because there was a bona fide dispute over the commissions owed. The district court granted Ms. Potter’s motion for attorney fees and costs but offset and reduced the award based on Synerlink’s pretrial offer of judgment. Ms. Potter appeals, challenging the grant of summary judgment on her discrimination claims, the submission of liquidated damages to the jury , and the court’s determination of the date her prejudgment damages accrued (Appeal No . 11-5092). In a separate appeal, Ms. Potter disputes the district court’s offset of attorney fees (Appeal No. 12-5117). Exercising jurisdiction over both appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Restrictive Covenant: preliminary injunction, “look-back” rule,
Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit, North Carolina law
Superior Performers, Inc. v. Meaike, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50302 (M.D.N.C., 4/11/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]; excellent detailed article from Littler Mendelson’s Unfair Competition & Trade Secrets Counsel newsletter, Federal Court's Practical Approach to Enforcement of a Restrictive Covenant Provides Business-Friendly Decision, discussing this persuasive federal court decision at http://www.littler.com/unfair-competition-trade-secrets-counsel/federal-courts-practical-approach-enforcement-restrictive-c#sthash.3Zz2BPel.dpuf.
Topic titles of the four factors are explored in detail:
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Providing Contact Information for Potential Customers Constituted Sufficient Consideration for the Restrictive Covenant.
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The Court Rejected an Illogical Approach to the Look-Back Rule Adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals In Prof. Liab. Consultants, Inc. v. Todd
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The Court “Blue-Penciled” Words, Mid-sentence, to Render the Restriction Enforceable
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The Court Considered the Scope of the Defendants’ New Restrictive Covenants in its “Balance of the Equities”.
Title VII, ADEA: race, gender, failure to promote, adverse employment action, performance-related employment deficiencies, failure of proof
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Livingston v. Sodexo, Inc., et al., No. 13-3170 (10th Cir., 4/22/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3170.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
From the appellate opinion:
The district court concluded Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case to support her discrimination and retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Its dismissal was affirmed for the reasons stated in the district court’s Order on IFP Status at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ksd-5_11-cv-04162/pdf/USCOURTS-ksd-5_11-cv-04162-0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII, FMLA, ADA: gender, no reasonable accommodation – public safety, hostile work environment, failure of proof, summary judgment dismissal affirmed
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Untisz v. City of Greenwood Village, No. 13-1253 (10th Cir., 4/11/14):
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Appellate court: http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1253.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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Trial court: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/colorado/codce/1:2011cv03232/130005/29.
When she returned from FMLA leave she was unable to pass the return-to-duty tests, and there was no reasonable accommodation available.
From the trial court order granting summary judgment:
The decision that Ms. Untisz was unable to perform the duties of a police officer was a
reasonable one, recognizing the importance to public safety of the work of officers and the
demands of service.
The plaintiff sought other employment but failed to show that a position was available.
The plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that she sustained any sex discrimination
that created an abusive work environment during her career.
FMLA, ADA: deafness – accommodation, workplace behavior, adverse employment action – retaliation, protected activity – causal connection, no pretext
Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit
Pearlman v. Pritzker, No. 13-1563 (4th Cir., 4/3/14, unpublished):
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http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Unpublished/131563.U.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/2014/04/articles/ada/employees-speculation-related-to-basis-of-his-firing-is-insufficient-to-support-a-claim-of-retaliation/.
The deaf employee complained about the quality of translation provided for him and alleged that was the reason for terminating his employment. However, the valid business reason was reports that he was “abrupt and demanding,” and engaged in “intimidating, disrespectful, or personally offensive” interactions with co-workers.
Proof of a retaliation claim requires proof:
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the employee engaged in a “protected activity” under an anti-discrimination statute and
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subsequently suffered an adverse employment action, plus
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showing that the protected activity was “causally connected” to the employer’s adverse employment action.
Summary by the appellate court:
PER CURIAM: Michael Pearlman sued Penny Pritzker, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce, for violations of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Pearlman alleged that his former employer, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), discriminated against him on the basis of his deafness by terminating his employment in retaliation for his complaints about the inadequacy of NOAA’s interpreter services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pritzker, concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Pearlman was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual reason. Pearlman appeals the district court’s judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
[Note: “Per Curium” means the entire panel of judges agreed in the decision.]
FMLA: fitness for work, questionable certification, second opinion
Jurisdiction: California
White v. County of Los Angeles, et al., B243471 c/w B244798 (Cal.App.Ct.2ndDiv.3rdDist, 4/15/14); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B243471.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Though this is a state court case, the reasoning might provide persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.
Summary by the appellate court:
When an employee takes leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.), the employee is entitled to be restored to employment upon certification from the employee’s health care provider that the employee is able to resume work. The employer is not permitted to seek a second opinion regarding the employee’s fitness for work prior to restoring the employee to employment. The question presented by the instant case is whether, if the employer is not satisfied with the employee’s health care provider’s certification, the employer may restore the employee to work, but then seek its own evaluation of the employee’s fitness for duty at its own expense. We conclude that it may. We therefore reverse the judgment in favor of the employee in the instant matter.
See pp. 7-8 for why the employer sought clarification, and pp. 15-24 for the court’s reasoning on why a second opinion might be justified.
FEHA, Title VII: sex, same gender, harassment, retaliation, summary judgments – cross motions
Jurisdiction: California
Lewis v. City of Benicia, No. A134078 (Cal.Ct.App., Mar. 26, 2014); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A134078.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Male-to-male misconduct and unwelcome advances by supervisor and two others on a heterosexual intern, such as:
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gifts,
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lunches,
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sexual jokes and
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displaying computer pornography.
Summary by the appellate court:
Plaintiff Brian Lewis, a heterosexual man, sued his former employer, the City of Benicia (City), and two former supervisors, Steve Hickman and Rick Lantrip, asserting claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) for sexual harassment and (as to City) retaliation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hickman and Lantrip, and judgment on the pleadings for City as to the sexual harassment claims. City prevailed at trial on the retaliation claim. On appeal, Lewis challenges the grants of summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, and argues evidentiary and other errors require reversal as to retaliation. We reverse the summary judgment as to Hickman, affirm summary judgment as to Lantrip, and reverse the judgment on the pleadings for City. As to retaliation, we conclude the court prejudicially erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, and we reverse the judgment for City on the retaliation claim.
Drug Testing: Act 59, hair samples, urine testing, additional testing
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