Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Connecticut
- Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: California Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc., No. B248143 (Cal.Ct.App., 5/9/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Defendant car wash companies Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (doing business as Millennium Car Wash), and Silver Wash, Inc. (doing business as Santa Monica Car Wash and Detailing), appeal from the trial court’s order denying their petition to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs Esteban H. Carmona, Marcial H. Carmona, Pedro Cruz, and Yoel Isail Matute Casco are or were employed by the car wash companies and filed a putative class action against them for wage and hour violations. The trial court held the arbitration agreement at issue was unconscionable and refused to enforce it. We find no error and affirm. Public Sector: constitutional rights, Attendance Order, punishment
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Fields v. City of Tulsa, et al., No. 12-5218 (10th Cir., 5/22/14) [enhanced version]; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-5218.pdf. Summary by the appellate court [second paragraph reformatted for ease of reading]: Paul Fields, a captain in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, police department, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Tulsa; Charles Jordan, the Chief of Police; and Alvin Daryl Webster, the Deputy Chief of Police (collectively, Defendants). The suit challenged his punishment for objecting to an order requiring him either to attend or to order subordinates to attend a law-enforcement appreciation event hosted by the Islamic Society of Tulsa. (We refer to this order as the “Attendance Order.”) He claimed that the punishment violated the First Amendment prohibitions against impairing the rights of free exercise of religion and of association as well as the prohibition against the establishment of religion. He also raised an equal-protection claim. He later sought to amend his complain t to add a claim that his freedom of speech was violated when he suffered retaliation for bringing this lawsuit and a claim that he was denied rights protected by the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act (ORFA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied leave to amend and ultimately granted summary judgment for Defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm . First, the Attendance Order did not burden Fields’s religious rights because it did not require him to violate his personal religious beliefs by attending the event; he could have obeyed the order by ordering others to attend, and he has not contended on appeal that he had informed his supervisors that doing so would have violated his religious beliefs. Second, the order did not violate the Establishment Clause because no informed, reasonable observer would have perceived the order or the event as a government endorsement of Islam. \ Third, the order did not burden Fields’s right of association because it did not interfere with his right to decide what organizations to join as a member. Fourth, Fields’s equal-protection claim duplicates his free-exercise claim and fails for the same reason. And fifth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fields’s motion to amend the complaint to add ORFA and free-speech retaliation claims because the amendment would have been futile. He has provided no reason why his ORFA claim could succeed when his religion claims under the First Amendment do not. And his retaliation claim would fail because the interests of the Tulsa Police Department (TPD) as an employer outweighed Fields’s free-speech interests in filing his suit.
Summary by the appellate court: David L. Darr appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“the Commission”) denying him unemployment benefits. The question presented is whether, in refusing to sign a proffered non-compete agreement which was required as a condition of continued employment, Mr. Darr left work voluntarily, but with good cause attributable to his employer, Roberts Marketing Group, LLC (“Employer”). We reverse and remand. Reasoning:
[Comment: Courts generally require non-compete agreements to balance:
See http://business-law.freeadvice.com/business-law/trade_regulation/covenant_not.htm.] Title VII: discrimination, adverse employment action, common purpose to retaliate, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Davis v. Unified School District 500, et al., No. 13-3224 (10th Cir., 5/5/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3224.pdf [enhanced version]. This is a good review of the theory of “a common purpose to retaliate”. Concerning the reasons for not being hired for higher positions, possibly the incident of having been discovered sunbathing naked on the roof of an elementary school might have made him unattractive in his future attempts at other employment in the school district. He dropped his FSLA claim on appeal. Summary by the appellate court: Charles Davis has been employed as a custodian with Unified School District No. 500 (“USD 500”) since 1991. In 2007, the school board considered a recommendation to terminate his employment when he was found lying naked on his stomach, sunbathing on the roof of the elementary school where he worked. Instead, the Board decided upon a suspension without pay for thirty days and demoted him from his position as head custodian. From 2008 to 2012, Davis applied for head custodian positions at seven different schools within USD 500, but was not hired for any of them. In 2008, 2010, and 2011, he filed claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), originally alleging racial discrimination and later both discrimination and retaliation for filing EEOC claims. In January 2012, Davis filed suit against USD 500 and Stephen Vaughn, the Director of Human Resources for the district, claiming: (1) retaliation by Vaughn in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) retaliation by USD 500 in violation of Title VII and § 1981; (3) delayed payment of overtime compensation by USD 500 in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of USD 500 and Vaughn. This appeal followed. In a nutshell the key issue is whether a common purpose to retaliate against Davis must be inferred from the sheer volume of his promotion denials; we think not when seven independent and informed decision makers are involved. We affirm. Wage and Hour: FLSA, state law, commuting time, federal preemption, Portal-to-Portal Act Jurisdiction: Connecticut Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc., No. SC 18877 (CTSC, 4/29/14) http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR311/311CR87.pdf [enhanced version]. Using federal standards rather than state law standards, the court ruled that the employee was not entitled to compensation for time spent commuting to and from job sites and his home while driving a company vehicle and carrying company tools. The lengthy and detailed analysis of the opinion might provide persuasive authority to apply in other jurisdictions. ERISA: long-term disability benefits – denial, arbitrary or capricious, inherent conflict of interest, substantial evidence, judgment upheld Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Rall v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, No. 13-1213 (10th Cir., 5/6/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1213.pdf [enhanced version]. Conclusion of the appellate court: Considering the evidence in the record as a whole, see Caldwell, 287 F.3d at 1282, we conclude that Aetna’s decision to deny LTD benefits to Mr. Rall was not arbitrary or capricious. Instead, Aetna based its decision on a reasonable basis and therefore it must be upheld. See Hancock , 590 F.3d at 1155. Public Sector: First Amendment – free speech, public concerns – official duties Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Hogan v. Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure, et al. Nos. 13-4069 & 13-4073 (10th Cir., 5/6/14) [enhanced version] Public sector employees are protected by the United States Constitution [and state employees in many instances by their state constitution], one protection being freedom of expression. However, this case affirms that the speech must relate to matters of public concern, not internal matters of the governmental agency relating to the scope of the employee’s official duties. Key determining excerpt from the appellate opinion: The Supreme Court has indeed explained that the First Amendment does not protect public employees or contractors from the consequences of what they say in the course of their official duties. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 684 (1996). This court has also explained that it takes a rather “broad view of the meaning of speech that is pursuant to an employee’s official duties.” Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 713 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, though, the question isn’t even close. Mr. Hogan’s complaints were clearly made within the scope of his official duties, just as the district court held. FCRA: Florida Civil Rights Act, pregnancy discrimination – prohibited, unlawful employment practice, disparate treatment, adverse employment action, liberal statutory construction Jurisdiction: Florida Delva v. The Continental Group, No. SC12-2315 (FLSC, 4/17/14):
Resolving appellate court divisions, the Florida Supreme Court stated that pregnancy is a "natural condition and primary characteristic unique to the female sex”, and now pregnancy discrimination is prohibited. Summary by its Supreme court: The issue in this case is whether discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is prohibited by the provision in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), section 760.10, Florida Statutes, that makes it “ an unlawful employment practice ” for an employer to discriminate based on an individual’s “sex.” § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). In Delva v. Continental Group, Inc., 96 So. 3d 956, 957-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), the Third District Court of Appeal held that Florida law does not prohibit pregnancy discrimination in employment practices, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, in which she alleges that her former employer took adverse employment actions against her, such as conducting heightened scrutiny of her work and refusing to allow her to change shifts in violation of company policy, after she revealed that she was pregnant. The Third District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, 995 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which held that the prohibition in the FCRA against sex discrimination in employment practices includes a prohibition on discrimination based on pregnancy. Delva, 96 So. 3d at 957- 58. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we determine that the statutory phrase making it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate . . . because of . . . sex, ” as used in the FCRA , includes discrimination based on pregnancy, which is a natural condition and primary characteristic unique to the female sex . § 760.10 (1)(a), Fla. Stat. We conclude that this construction of the statute is consistent with legislative intent, as expressed in the FCRA itself, that the FCRA “shall be liberally construed.” § 760.01(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). Accordingly, we quash the Third District’s decision in Delva, approve the result of the Fourth District’s decision in Carsillo consistent with the analysis we adopt in this opinion, and remand this case with directions that the trial court reinstate the plaintiff’s complaint. NLRA: company policy - discussing wage information with outsiders – restrictions, “substantial evidence” Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C. v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 12-60752 (5th Cir., 3/24/14);
Ruling: The NLRB was correct that the employer’s confidentiality policy violated the NLRA because it could be interpreted to restrict employees from disclosing information about their wages and other terms and conditions of employment to individuals outside the company. Summary by the appellate court: Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C. and Silver Eagle Logistics, L. L.C. (collectively, “ Flex Frac ” ) petition for review of an order by the Nation al Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) holding that Flex Frac’s employee confidentiality policy is an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The NLRB cross-petitions for enforcement of the order. We DENY Flex Frac’s petition for review and ENFORCE the NLRB’s order. FLSA: executive exemption – eligibility, insufficient proof – DOL standards – hire and fire, attorney fees Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit Madden v. Lumber One Home Center, No: 13-2214 (8th Cir., 03/17/14); http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/14/03/132214P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Requisite proof of executive authority:
The jury would have had to guess or speculate on those issues.
Summary by the appellate court: In August 2010, three former employees of Lumber One Home Center, Inc., a lumberyard in Mayflower, Arkansas, filed suit against the company. The employees claimed Lumber One incorrectly classified them as executive employees who were exempt from overtime pay regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (requiring pay of at least one and one-half times the regular rate for time worked in excess of forty hours per week). After a two-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Lumber One. The jury found that all three plaintiff- employees worked in an executive capacity and were therefore not entitled to recover overtime wages. Following trial, the plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted. After overturning the jury verdict, the district court awarded the plaintiffs overtime pay and attorneys' fees. Lumber One appealed. We affirm the district court's judgment as to two employees, reverse as to one employee, and remand for a recalculation of attorneys' fees in light of our holdings. Civil Rights: Title VII - 42 U.S.C. § 2000e – 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race – African-American, contract – implied-in-fact, McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Dyer v. Lane, et al., No. 13-3190 (10th Cir., 4/25/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3190.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Here is a good review of similarity of proof among discrimination statutes and of the requisite evidence to prove indirect discrimination. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff Mozella Dyer appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, the Kansas City Unified School District No. 500 (KCUSD), and two of its administrators, on her discrimination and breach-of-implied contract claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. BACKGROUND The district court’s order thoroughly sets out the factual background in its detailed thirty-five page decision. Thus, we only summarize the salient facts. Reading the appellate opinion will provide an instruction guide for human resources practitioners and litigators. Some pertinent quotes from the opinion (review from time to time can be helpful):
Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. In determining whether the proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision, not the plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of the situation. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs. ADA: reasonable accommodation – telecommuting, irritable bowel syndrome, team interaction, adverse employment action, summary judgment dismissal reversed Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit EEOC v. Ford Motor Company, No. 12-2484 (6th Cir., 4/22/14):
Because issues of material fact were involved, the summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded [returned] for trial. Read the facts and reasoning in this opinion for new perspectives on how modern technology in the workplace might require reconsidering past assumptions about essential functions and where work can be performed. To some extent, this allows a judge or jury to override an employer’s business judgment about what is essential. Considering the testimony and evidence set forth in the opinion, it seems that the appellate court might have been overreaching by second-guessing the employer. Summary by the appellate court: At issue in this case is whether a telecommuting arrangement could be a reasonable accommodation for an employee suffering from a debilitating disability. Charging party Jane Harris was terminated from her position as a resale steel buyer at Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”) after she asked to telecommute several days per week in an attempt to control the symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) argues that Ford discriminated against Harris on the basis of her disability and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. Because we find evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute as to whether Harris was qualified to work as a resale buyer and whether she was terminated in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FLSA: overtime, successor liability – business predecessor, “class and collective action”, continuity of operation, notice of violations, predecessor’s ability to pay, dismissal – F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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