Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit
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Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit McArdle v. Town of Dracut, No. 13-1044 (1st Cir., 10/9/13); http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=13-1044P.01A [enhanced lexis.com version]. 1250 hours is the requirement to qualify for FMLA leave, and he had only 615. In addition to not enough hours to qualify, the courts ruled:
Summary by the appellate court: Appellant Raymond McArdle ("McArdle") is a former teacher in the public schools of the town of Dracut, Massachusetts. He claims, among other things, that Dracut improperly handled his request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 ("FMLA") and forced him to resign in retaliation for seeking such leave. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing all of McArdle's claims, ruling that he had not worked enough to be eligible for FMLA leave, and otherwise finding his claims meritless. For the following reasons, we affirm. FLSA: meal breaks, automatic deductions, unrecorded time, failure to follow procedures, pay denied, certiorari denied Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit Sources:
Certiorari was denied in this case in which an emergency room nurse claimed she was denied pay for lunch breaks she worked through;
The Littler article discusses the case and the possible ground for denying certiorari. Background checks: state anti-hacking criminal statute – California Penal Code Section 502(c)(5), inaccurate job application information, misconduct Jurisdiction: California Resources:
The Shaw Valenza article explains this complex case very well, and the full decision is important reading on how lax requirements on background check and lack of diligence by an employer can result in major problems when failing to adequately deal with a sensitive and difficult employee. Basically, the employee lied on his application about prior convictions, follow-up was inadequate and ineffective, and the employee had seized total control of the network of the City and County of San Francisco. His assumption of significant control over a major part of the city's IT infrastructure, against the wishes of management, resulted in criminal prosecution and conviction. He claimed that the state anti-hacking statute did not apply to him because he had permission for access, but the appellate court disagreed: A jury convicted appellant Terry Childs of disrupting or denying computer services to an authorized user. (Pen. Code, 1 § 502, subd. (c)(5).) It also found true an enhancement allegation that damage caused by his offense exceeded $200,000. (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2).) He was sentenced to four years in state prison and ordered to pay more than $1.4 million in restitution. (§1202.4.) In two consolidated appeals from the conviction and the restitution order, he contends inter alia that subdivision (c)(5) of section 502 was not intended to apply to an employee. We affirm the conviction and the restitution order. The factual chronology provided by the appellate court details the history of the employee’s misconduct, and its legal analysis provides important information on the applicability of the state anti-hacking statute to an employee, and that could provide persuasive reasoning in other similar state and federal cases. Punitive Damages: ration – 1:125,000, award comparison, statutory upper limit Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit State of Arizona, et al., No. 11-17484 (9th Cir., 10/24/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/10/24/11-17484.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] The United States Supreme Court considered punitive damages in two cases, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559 (1996) [enhanced lexis.com version], and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U .S. 408, 419 (2003) [enhanced lexis.com version], that suggested various rations of comparison of the amount of the award to the amount of punitive damages. However, the issue is still alive, as demonstrated by this case. There are a number of factors and subfactors to be analyzed when considering punitive damages, and these are explained at length in the opinion. Summary by the appellate court: The panel vacated the district court’s award of punitive damages in a Title VI I sexual harassment suit where the jury awarded no compensatory damages and only one dollar in nominal damages. The panel held that although the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct supported a substantial punitive damages award, and the district court’s $300,000 award matched the Title VI I damages cap, the award was constitutionally excessive in light of the fact that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was 300,000 to 1. The panel held that the highest punitive award supportable under due process was $125,000 because it was the highest award that maintained the required “ reasonable relationship” between compensatory and punitive damages, and nonetheless was on the order of the damages cap in Title VI I and proportional to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. The panel ordered that on remand, the district court could order a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted a remittitur to $125,000. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Hurwitz agreed with the majority that the defendant’s conduct was reprehensible and warranted punitive damages. He also agreed with the majority that a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages was not constitutionally mandated. Judge Hurwitz wrote that he nonetheless would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety because the punitive damages award fell within the statutory cap on damages in Title VII. Nub of the decision: Our analysis of each subfactor reveals that the district court did not err in concluding that ASARCO’s conduct supports the imposition of a very large punitive award. Indeed, many other cases involving lengthy periods of harassment and discrimination have noted that similar conduct is highly reprehensible along these dimensions. Wage and Hour: meal breaks, deductions, payment, Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court Jurisdiction: California Resources:
Title VII: religion, clothing policy, hijab, accommodation – religious requirement – notice necessary, adverse employment action, summary judgment reversed Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No 11-5110 (10th Cir. 10/1/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-5110.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The applicant did not inform her prospective employer that she wore the hijab for religious reasons and needed accommodations to the employer’s clothing policy. The company had instructed its interviewers not to ask applicants about their religion. Summary by the appellate court: Abercrombie & Fitch (“Abercrombie”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie, on the EEOC’s claim that Abercrombie failed to provide a reasonable religious accommodation for a prospective employee, Samantha Elauf, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the EEOC. Abercrombie is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Ms. Elauf never informed Abercrombie prior to its hiring decision that she wore her headscarf or “hijab” for religious reasons and that she needed an accommodation for that practice, due to a conflict between the practice and Abercrombie’s clothing policy. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to vacate its judgment and enter judgment in favor of Abercrombie, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. * * * The interviewing process plays an important role in furthering Abercrombie’s objective of ensuring that employees adhere to its Look Policy. Managers assess applicants on appearance and style during the interview. They are supposed to inform applicants of various aspects of the job, including the Look Policy. New Models typically receive a copy of the policy in an employee handbook and sign an acknowledgment that they have received it, when they start work. Abercrombie instructs its store managers not to assume facts about prospective employees in job interviews and, significantly, not to ask applicants about their religion. If a question arises during the interview regarding application of the Look Policy, or if a prospective employee requests a deviation from the policy (for example, based on an inflexible religious practice), the store manager is instructed to contact Abercrombie’s corporate human resources department (“HR”), or his or her direct supervisor. HR managers may grant accommodations if doing so would not harm the brand. [Comment: This is a difficult situation pitting an “essential” appearance requirement against prohibiting inquiry about religion:
* One personal observation – Based on general conversations with my granddaughters as well as shopping them, I doubt that a clerk wearing would been an issue with them, no matter what store they were in; it would have been irrelevant to them, and most likely to most others of their generation. The same attitude seems to prevail at the large junior college where I teach. Well, over time this may be sorted out – perhaps even in the United States Supreme Court.] ADEA: state and local government actions, constitutional issues, appeal rejected, circuit split, Madigan v. Levin Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit Sources:
The issue in Madigan v. Levin was whether the ADEA was the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims brought by a former Illinois assistant attorney general against the state and against attorney general employees in their individual capacities. Arbitration: labor disputes, arbitration, FAA, U.S. Supreme Court ruling, California law Jurisdiction: California Sources:
Intricacies and interrelation of federal and California law are discussed at great length in the two sources provided above, and California practitioners need to study those. Attempting to brief all of that in this database might leave out important details. Disability:
Jurisdiction: New York Sources:
State and city law differ. New York’s highest court ruled that indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation under state human rights law, but indefinite leave might be a reasonable accommodation under city human rights law. Title VII: discrimination, hostile work environment, adverse employment action, retaliation, summary judgment dismissal, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a), Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, GSA Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Marquez v. Johnson, No. 13-1021 (10th Cir., 10/18/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1021.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: The district court provided a comprehensive discussion of the underlying facts so we discuss only those facts relevant to the issues presented for our review. Ms. Marquez is an employee of the GSA. Her Title VII claims are for retaliation and a retaliatory hostile work environment for protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity based on conduct by her supervisor, H. Jan Faulkner. On December 31, 2009, Ms. Marquez filed an EEO complaint asserting that Ms. Faulkner had retaliated against her for being listed as a witness in an EEO matter filed by a coworker, Jaime Hernandez. She claimed that shortly thereafter, in January 2010, Ms. Faulkner retaliated against her for filing her EEO complaint by compelling her to take a work assignment she did not want and by not promoting her. She also asserted that the compelled-work assignment and failure to promote, as well as Ms. Faulkner’s failure to accommodate her in a job reassignment, created a hostile work environment as retaliation for her EEO complaint. She sought EEO counseling on June 17, 2010, and filed another EEO complaint on August 5, 2010, based on the alleged hostile work environment. Ms. Marquez also brought claims under the Privacy Act asserting that Ms. Faulkner had improperly divulged her medical information and information about her EEO activity. The district court granted the GSA’s motion for summary judgment. On the Title VII retaliation claims, the court held that Ms. Marquez failed to administratively exhaust her compelled-work-assignment and failure-to-promote claims. The court further determined that the circumstances alleged did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment and that Ms. Faulkner had not known of Ms. Marquez’s involvement in the Hernandez EEO matter, so she could not have retaliated for it. The court also granted summary judgment to the GSA on the Privacy Act claims because Ms. Marquez had not satisfied the elements for such a claim. ADA, FMLA:
Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Owens v. Calhoun County School District, No. 12-60897 (5th Cir., 10/8/13, unpublished); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C12/12-60897.0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Adequate, timely, contemporaneous documentation by the employer resulted in a successful dismissal. The problem was employee’s failure to timely return from her FMLA leave. Her lack of proof necessary for her allegations and contentions contributed to the favorable judgment for the employer. Documentation is critical – hearing officers, judges and juries want sufficient proof of allegations. Making the effort to properly record events in question takes far less effort and expense than the litigation process. FMLA and ADA have different standards of proof:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Owens must prove that she: 1) suffers from a disability; 2) was qualified for the job; 3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and 4 ) was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees.” During her leave, evidence showed:
First Amendment – retaliation (edited for easier reading): To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) she suffered an adverse employment action; 2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; 3) her interest in commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting efficiency; and 4) her speech motivated the employer’s adverse action. * * * Whether speech is a matter of public concern is a question of law. The evidence showed that her free speech claim was based on her private concern for her son’s educational situation rather than a matter of public concern that would have been constitutionally protected. [Contrary First amendment Facebook decision in Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. No. 12-12968 (11th Cir. , 10/17/13); 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20961.] [enhanced lexis.com version] FLSA: wage and hour: litigation, statute of limitations – 29 U.S.C. § 255, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted – FRCP 12(b)(6) Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Chase v. Divine, et al., No. 13-5081 (10th Cir., 10/22/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-5081.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. She waited too long to assert her claim for compensation for hours invested into a deferred payment fund plan that never paid her. Fees: EEOC, unsubstantiated claim, alleged policy – criminal background checks, Title VII – race – disparate impact Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., No. 11-2582 (6th Cir., 10/ 7/13); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0291p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The appellate court ordered that the EEOC to pay the employer $750,000 for attorney fees covering the period from the time that the EEOC learned or should have learned that Peoplemark did not have the policy that the EEOC had alleged was in violation of Title VII. FLSA: “highly compensated executive”, extra hours, extra shifts, Subpart G of Title 29, Subtitle B, of C.F.R. §§ 541.600 through 541.606. Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit Anani v. CVS RX Services Inc., No. 11–2359–CV (2nd Cir., 9/20/21) [enhanced lexis.com version]; This case depends on unusual facts, so read the full decision if such a situation arises in your situation. Summary by the appellate court: Salah Anani appeals from Judge Spatt's grant of summary judgment dismissing Anani's complaint against CVS RX Services, Inc. (“CVS”). The district court held that appellant was exempt from the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act's (“FLSA”) time-and-a-half overtime requirement because of an exemption for highly-paid employees. We affirm. BACKGROUND Appellant was employed by CVS as a pharmacist from 2003 until his resignation in July, 2009. Appellant has stipulated to a two-year statute of limitations, limiting his claim to the period from December 18, 2007 to July 20, 2009. See Anani v. CVS RX Servs., Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 55, 58 (E.D.N.Y.2011). During the relevant period, appellant's base salary was based on a forty-four hour work week (paid bi-weekly). That base weekly salary exceeded $1250 at all pertinent times. As explained infra, his base salary was guaranteed, and CVS classified him as a salaried employee exempt from the time-and-a-half overtime requirement of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Appellant also received additional compensation because he invariably, or almost so, worked hours in addition to the base forty-four hours each week. Appellant's additional hours worked usually ranged from 16 to 36 hours per week, increasing his total compensation in each relevant year to over $100,000. Appellant worked these extra shifts voluntarily. Compensation for the extra work—in excess of forty-four hours—was paid according to an hourly “Compensation Rate” determined by dividing appellant's weekly guaranteed salary by forty-four, multiplying the number of hours worked over forty-four by the resultant amount and then adding “Premium Pay” of six dollars per hour. Privacy: drug testing, deputy sheriff, safety Jurisdiction: West Virginia Buracker v. Berkeley County Council, No. 12-1264 (WVSC, 9/3/13); http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/memo-decisions/fall2013/12-1264memo.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Safety concerns were held to be more important than privacy concerns. CFEHA: California Fair Employment and Housing Act punitive damages, exemplary damages, repeated complaints ignored Jurisdiction: California Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co., No. D062388 (Cal.Ct.App. 4,1, 10/8/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062388.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Punitive damages were ruled appropriate in which the repeated complaints of a female construction worker were ignored. Punitive ,or exemplary, damages can now be an issue of fact in similar cases of hostile work environment, in this case unsanitary toilets located miles from her work area. The project managers were found to be “managing agents” who participated in or ratified the discriminatory conduct. Summary by the appellate court: The trial court entered a judgment for plaintiff Lisa Davis after a jury found defendant Kiewit Pacific Co. (Kiewit) liable for gender discrimination, hostile work environment harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent harassment, gender discrimination, or retaliation. However, before trial, the trial court granted Kiewit's motion for summary adjudication on Davis's claim for punitive damages, concluding there were no triable issues of material fact whether a managing agent of Kiewit had engaged in or ratified any oppressive, malicious and/or fraudulent conduct against her. Davis appeals, contending the trial court erred by granting Kiewit 's motion for summary adjudication on her punitive damages claim because there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether a managing agent of Kiewit engaged in or ratified the wrongful conduct against her. As we discuss below, we conclude a triable issue of material fact exists for determination by a jury. FMLA: adverse employment action – termination of employment, issue of valid grounds - misconduct, retaliation Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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