Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs


Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit



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Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit
Sun Capital Partners III, L.P. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Ind. Pension Fund, No. 12-2312 (1st Cir., 7/24/13); http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/12-2312P-01A.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The management company affiliated with the two investing private equity funds engaged in active management of the contributing employer:

  • the investing fund was more than a mere passive investor and

  • was engaged in a trade or business.

Summary by the appellate court:


LYNCH, Chief Judge. This case presents important issues of first impression as to withdrawal liability for the pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a multiemployer pension fund of a bankrupt company, here, Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI). See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. This litigation considers the imposition of liability as to three groups: two private equity funds, which assert that they are mere passive investors that had indirectly controlled and tried to turn around SBI, a struggling portfolio company; the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund (TPF), to which the bankrupt company had withdrawal pension obligations and which seeks to impose those obligations on the equity funds; and, ultimately, if the TPF becomes insolvent, the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which insures multiemployer pension plans such as the one involved here. If the TPF becomes insolvent, then the benefits to the SBI workers are reduced to a PBGC guaranteed level. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322a, 1426, 1431. According to the PBGC's brief, at present, that level is about $12,870 for employees with 30 years of service.
The plaintiffs are the two private equity funds, which sought a declaratory judgment against the TPF. The TPF, which brought into the suit other entities related to the equity funds, has counterclaimed and sought payment of the withdrawal liability at issue. The TPF is supported on appeal by the PBGC, as amicus.
We conclude that at least one of the private equity funds which operated SBI, through layers of fund-related entities, was not merely a "passive" investor, but sufficiently operated, managed, and was advantaged by its relationship with its portfolio company, the now bankrupt SBI. We also conclude that further factual development is necessary as to the other equity fund. We decide that the district court erred in ending the potential claims against the equity funds by entering summary judgment for them under the "trades or businesses" aspect of the two-part "control group" test under 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). See Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 116-18, 124 (D. Mass. 2012).
As a result, we remand for further factual development and for further proceedings under the second part of the "control group" test, that of "common control," in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). The district court was, however, correct to enter summary judgment in favor of the private equity funds on the TPF's claim of liability on the ground that the funds had engaged in a transaction to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c); Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 123-24.
ERISA: “surviving spouse” benefit, same-sex spouse, U.S. v. Windsor
Jurisdiction: 3rd Circuit
Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, No. 2:11-cv-00045 (E.D. Pa., 7/29/13); The Civil Rights Clearinghouse: http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12578 [enhanced lexis.com version].
A federal trial court in Philadelphia ruled that a surviving same-sex spouse is entitled to her deceased spouse’s ERISA retirement plan benefits, citing U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Employment agreement:

  • employment: selling financial products, failed to meet minimum production requirements, resignation

  • theories: oral representations, promissory estoppel, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation; no reasonable reliance

  • procedure: summary judgment dismissal


Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit, Utah
Rohr v. Allstate Financial Services, No. 12-4175 (10th Cir., 7/18/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-4175.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
John Rohr appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate Financial Services, LLC (“Allstate”). After resigning his position as an Exclusive Financial Specialist selling financial products for Allstate because he, Rohr asserts claims of promissory estoppel, fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation.. His claims are all based on oral representations allegedly made by Allstate employee Mark Anderson that Rohr would earn $100,000 annually in commissions. The district court concluded that Rohr could not have reasonably relied on Anderson’s oral representations. We agree. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
FMLA: lupus

  • reasonable accommodation, interactive process, good faith communication, employee quit

  • summary judgment, issues for jury


Jurisdiction: USDC Eastern Michigan District
Eagle v. Hurley Medical Center, No. 4:12-cv-13704 (U.S.D.C.E.D.MI, 6/27/13)

  • Littler Healthcare Employment Counsel article at http://www.healthcareemploymentcounsel.com/2013/07/18/michigan-hospital-worker-who-walked-off-job-allowed-to-pursue-fmla-and-ada-claims/ [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Business Management Daily Managing Employee Disabilities: Accommodate … Don’t Dictate article at http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/36133/managing-employee-disabilities-accommodate-dont-dictate.

Evidence indicated the hospital offered accommodation, but there were fact questions for a jury to determine about the sufficiency of the process by the parties. Read the informative articles for details and suggestions.


DFEH, FEHA:

  • Continuing violation, limitation of actions, statute of limitations, untimely filing

  • Department of Fair Employment and Housing, racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, disability, failure to accommodate, workers compensation


Jurisdiction: California
Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., D060064 (Cal.App,4th,1st, 6/19/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D060064.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
This employee waited too long to act on her right-to-sue authorization notices and her claims were barred. As the appellate court noted, practitioners need to read the full opinion:
The nature of the appellate issues require that we set forth the alleged facts in some detail. Because we are reviewing a judgment after a demurrer, we assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations of Acuna's first amended complaint and the facts implied from those allegations. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
Independent contractor:

  • litigation: agency law interpretation: public policy, freedom of contract, changed conditions

  • civil procedure: re-litigation, collateral estoppel


Jurisdiction: California
Happy Nails & Spa of Fashion, L.P., et al., v. Julie A. Su, as Labor Commissioner, etc., D060621 ( Cal.App. 4th,1st, 7/19/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D060621.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
There are two aspects to this case, (1) litigation and (2) employment law and governmental agency interpretation. Litigators can read about the litigation, but for practitioners of all kinds, the agency law aspect is interesting and instructive. At one time, the cosmetologists were classified as employees, but later that changed to independent contractor, and the issue was whether that change was authorized under California law:
The law[] does not require private parties to share the Commissioner's "once an employee, always an employee" mindset. Rather, private parties are free to change the nature of their business relationship in accordance with the "long-standing established public policy in California which respects and promotes the freedom of private parties to contract" (Brisbane Lodging, L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1262) and which allows them "the widest latitude in this regard" (Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 86, 89). Our adoption of the position advocated by the Commissioner's counsel at oral argument would effectively nullify the Board's determination and would impermissibly deny Happy Nails and the cosmetologists "their freedom to contract as they please" (Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1080), which they exercised by restructuring their business relationship.
Discrimination: “association” discrimination, spouse, medical problems

  • employment: discrimination, adverse employment action, termination of employment

litigation: civil, motion to dismiss

  • statute: construction

  • common law legal theories: libel and slander, actionable tort


Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Flagg v. Alimed, Inc., SJC-11182 (MA.Sup.J.Ct., 7/19/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • Official citation: http://weblinks.westlaw.com/result/default.aspx?action=Search&cnt=DOC&db=MA-ORSLIP&eq=search&fmqv=c&fn=_top&method=TNC&mt=Westlaw&n=3&origin=Search&query=TO%28ALLSCT+ALLSCTRS+ALLSCTOJ%29&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT53723254711237&rltdb=CLID_DB11505254711237&rlti=1&rp=%2Fsearch%2Fdefault.wl&rs=MAOR1.0&service=Search&sp=MassOF-1001&srch=TRUE&ss=CNT&sskey=CLID_SSSA34521254711237&sv=Split&vr=1.0

  • Universal hub citation: http://www.universalhub.com/2013/marc-flagg-vs-alimed-inc.

Held: The Commonwealth’s antidiscrimination statute (six or more employees) bars employment discrimination based on handicap, and it has been interpreted to prohibit employers from discriminating against an employee based on the handicap of a person associated with the employee:


The Commonwealth's antidiscrimination statute, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16), bars employment discrimination on the basis of handicap. This case presents the question whether the statute bars an employer from discriminating against its employee based on the handicap of a person with whom the employee associates. We answer that in the circumstances of this case, it does.
[The phrase “in the circumstances of this case” indicates the decison needs to be read for details.]
FLSA: “administrative exemption” to overtime pay

  • mortgage loan officers, overtime, not exempt

  • administrative law, Administrative Procedure Act (APA) -- 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, agency rule, definitive interpretation, amended rule, significant revision, notice and comment required


Jurisdiction: D.C. Circuit
Mortgage Bankers Association v. Seth D. Harris, No. 12-5246 (D.C. Cir., 7/2/13); http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/FAC3D9E1l235DEC2185257B9C004F3742/$file/12-5246-1444670.pdf; http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1637225.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
This case has two parts:

  • The appellate court ruled in favor of the Mortgage Bankers Association and vacated a 2010 DOL Administrative Interpretation declaring that mortgage loan officers did not qualify under the FLSA “administrative exemption” to overtime pay.

  • The D.C. Circuit widely is considered as second only to the United States Supreme Court. Though a decision may not necessarily carry the controlling authority of the USSC, its decision may provide persuasive authority in similar situations.


Background:

  • During the Bush administration, the Department of Labor (DOL) in 2006 issued an Administrative Interpretation finding that the typical job duties of mortgage loan officers fell within the “administrative exemption” to the FLSA’s overtime requirements.

  • Subsequently, under the Obama administration, the DOL in 2010 reversed its position and declared that mortgage loan officers are not exempt under the FLSA.


Litigation:

  • The Mortgage Bankers Association sued the DOL on the contention based upon established precedent that “When an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish [under the APA] without notice and comment.”

  • At trial, the D.C. District Court denied the Mortgage Bankers Association’s motion for summary judgment.

  • On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court, but did not comment on the validity of the DOL’s revised interpretation and the question of compliance with the APA, and it specifically left open the possibility of the DOL conducting the required notice and comment rulemaking to implement the change.

Thus, a significant general implication of this case is that an important federal court has recognized restrictions on the ability of the DOL to change its established Administrative Interpretations without engaging in the proper rulemaking process, and the appellate court noted that the FLSA is “an old law DOL must adapt to new circumstances”:


Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., an old law DOL must adapt to new circumstances, employers are generally required to pay overtime wages to employees who work longer than 40 hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The Act provides several exceptions to this rule. Those “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity [,] ․ or in the capacity of outside salesman,” for example, are exempt from the statute's minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Whether mortgage loan officers qualify for this “administrative exemption” is a difficult and at times contentious question. So difficult, in fact, DOL has found itself on both sides of the debate. In 2006, the agency issued an opinion letter concluding on the facts presented that mortgage loan officers with archetypal job duties fell within the administrative exemption. Just four years later, in 2010, Deputy Administrator Nancy J. Leppink issued an “Administrator's Interpretation” declaring that “employees who perform the typical job duties” of the hypothetical mortgage loan officer “do not qualify as bona fide administrative employees.” J.A. 259. The 2010 pronouncement “explicitly withdrew the 2006 Opinion Letter.” Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864 F.Supp.2d at 201.
Unions: picketing, injunctions, California trespassing statutes
Jurisdiction: California
Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 8, 55 Cal.4th 1083 (2012); USSC No. 11-80; http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-880.htm [enhanced lexis.com version].
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected review of union trespass in California. The California Supreme Court had upheld two state statutes restricting the availability of injunctions against picketing by labor unions on private property.
Background:

  • Ralphs and several trade associations sought U.S. Supreme Court review of the California decision on the grounds that:

    1. the state laws at issue are discriminatory because they sanction trespassing on private property by labor unions to engage in expressive activities such as picketing, but not by any other organizations, and

    2. the state laws violate constitutional property rights.

  • The USSC denial was not a decision on the merits of these arguments, so for the time being, the effect of the denial is that labor unions, but not other organizations, will have the right to engage in picketing and other expressive activities on an employer's private property. Bear in mind, however, the dissent in the Ralphs case noted that the decision "places California on a collision course with the federal courts

NLRA:


  • nursing homes, registered nurses, authority for adverse employment action, supervisors

  • Noel Canning, recess appointment issue


Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit
GGNSC Springfield, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 12-1529/1628 (6th Cir., 7/2/13); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0170p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The panel divided on this case, the majority holding that nursing home registered nurses are supervisors under the NLRA and are not entitled to unionize.
Background:

  • The Golden Living Center (Center) in Springfield, Tennessee, is a short-term and long-term care center for approximately 120 residents. It employs twelve RNs, ten LPNs and forty-six CNAs. The director of nursing and two assistant directors of nursing oversee patient care at the Center, and the RNs report directly to the director of nursing.

  • October 2011 – union organizing activity began, and the controversy arose about the status of the RNs, resulting in considerable activity and controversy and refusal to bargain.


Appeal:

  • Initially, the appellate court rejected the Center’s argument that the NLRB’s order as void on its face because the Board lacked jurisdiction (see Noel Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 20130).

  • But dealing with the merits of the appeal, the appellate court’s holding depended on whether the RNs have the authority to “discipline” CNAs as contemplated by the NLRA, and the majority found that they do because:

    • The Center’s progressive discipline policy required that CNAs must receive four written warnings before they are terminated, RNs have authority to issue written memoranda in response to CNA misconduct, and each written memorandum leads automatically results in a written warning as “step” in the chain of progressive discipline.

    • RNs do not recommend disciplinary action or ultimately make the decision whether to terminate, but the majority found that the memoranda constitute “discipline” because:

      • they “’lay a foundation’ for future adverse employment action”, and “where an employer maintains a defined progressive discipline policy, and cited violations of company policy count toward the number of missteps permitted before termination, those with independent authority to issue the citations are supervisors”, and

      • RNs exercise independent judgment when issuing discipline, as they “can either do nothing, provide verbal counseling, decide whether to document the counseling, or draw up a written memorandum.”

FLSA: personal liability, president, CEO, employer, active involvement


Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit
Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, No. 11-4035-cv (2nd Cir., 7/9/13); http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c280c641-67bf-4b75-8b96-67b7f235101b/1/doc/11-4035_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c280c641-67bf-4b75-8b96-67b7f235101b/1/hilite/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
Under the FSLA, the president and CEO of the grocery store chain was held personally liable for violations in this class action/collective action case because there was “no question that [the CEO] had functional control over the operation as a whole.” For example:

  • regular, weekly contacts with individual stores, vendors, employees, and customers,

  • occasional (though maybe not frequent) involvement in merchandising at the store level,

  • involved with customer complaints, and

  • involved in the promotion of key employees.

Remember, the 2nd circuit is an influential one for persuasive authority, so bear in mind the reasoning of this decision and how it might be cited in other jurisdictions.


NLRA: Franczek Radelet P.C., 7/17/13, article
NLRB Decisions Point to Potentially Weaker Beck Rights for Employee Objectors at http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-NLRB_Beck_Rights_Employee_Objectors.html.
FLSA: wage and hours, class action/collective action, overtime, gap-time, hours worked, off-the-clock issues, damages
Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit
Nakahata v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, Nos. 11-0734, 11-0710, 11-0713, 11-0728 (2nd Cir., 7/11/13); http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8e3a583e-318a-4015-9b57-dfa170438afe/1/doc/11-734_11-710_11-713_11-728_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8e3a583e-318a-4015-9b57-dfa170438afe/1/hilite/; http://www.wageandhourcounsel.com/uploads/file/NakahataVsNewYorkPresbyterian.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Considering the numerous complex legal and procedural issues and details, attempting to provide an accurate brief decision might omit important information, so the full decision needs to be studied. The 2nd circuit is respected for its keen analysis and legal reasoning, and thus this case likely contains persuasive authority for other jurisdictions. These are the key points involved:

  • FLSA – applies only when wages either fall below the statutory minimum or hours rise above the overtime threshold – the Act “simply does not contemplate a claim for wages other than minimum or overtime wages.”

  • Claims – unpaid for:

    • work performed during meal breaks,

    • before and after scheduled shifts, and

    • during required training sessions.

Summary by the appellate court:


Plaintiff s - Appellants in four related cases appeal from a single order of the United States District Court for the 2 Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) dismissing their claims that Defendants-Appellees violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, New York Labor Law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and New York common law. For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part , and remanded.
* * *
This is an appeal from an order by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing the complaint in each of four cases: Nakahata v. New York-12 Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2661; Yarus v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., No. 10 Civ. 2662; Megginson v. Westchester Medical Center, No. Civ. 2683; and Alamu v. The Bronx-- Lebanon Hospital Center, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 16 3247. Nakahata v. New York - Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 17 2011 WL 321186 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011) (“Nakahata I”). Plaintiffs — current and former healthcare employees — allege that the Defendants — healthcare systems, hospitals, corporate heads, and affiliated entities — violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and New York common law by failing to compensate Plaintiffs for work performed during meal breaks, before and after scheduled shifts, and during required training sessions. The District Court dismissed the four complaints in their entirety for failing to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 12(b)(6). We affirm in part the District Court’s decision and remand in part. We affirm the dismissal, with prejudice, of the FLSA gap-time, RICO, and certain common law claims . We also affirm the dismissal of the FLSA and NYLL overtime claims, but we remand these claims with leave to replead. We reserve judgment on the dismissal of the NYLL gap-time claim s and remand for reconsideration. Finally, we vacate the dismissal of certain common law claims and remand with leave to replead.
Title VII, Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD)

  • pro se appeal

  • Failures to exhaust administrative remedies -- jurisdiction– failure to exhaust administrative remedy – no subject matter jurisdiction

  • Insufficient proof:

    • evidence – no causal connection – no prima facie proof

    • retaliation, wrongful termination – race, hostile work environment


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