Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: 3 rd Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 4 th Circuit trial court
- Jurisdiction: 10 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 2 nd Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 6 th circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
- Jurisdiction: New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: 7 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
- Jurisdiction: 7 th Circuit (joining 2 nd , 3 rd and 9 th )
Jurisdiction: California Purton v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. D060475 (Cal. App.4th,1st, 7/31/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D060475.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Drinking too much at a company appreciation party might result in liability of the employer.
How much supervision, surveillance and control might be necessary – which was ruled to be a jury question. In this case, an employee consumed alcoholic beverages at an employer hosted party and became intoxicated. The employee arrived home safely, but then left to drive a coworker home. During that drive, the employee struck another car, killing its driver. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground the employer's potential liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior ended when the employee arrived home. We hold that an employer may be found liable for its employee's torts as long as the proximate cause of the injury (here, alcohol consumption) occurred within the scope of employment. It is irrelevant that foreseeable effects of the employee's negligent conduct (here, the car accident) occurred at a time the employee was no longer acting within the scope of his or her employment. We also hold that no legal justification exists for terminating the employer's liability as a matter of law simply because the employee arrived home safely from the employer hosted party. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of the employer. Title VII: race, refusal to complete application process Jurisdiction: 3rd Circuit Murray v. Beverage Distribution Center, 3d Cir., No. 11-1938, unpublished, July 29, 2013 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Here is notice of this unpublished case that might be helpful. However, be very cautious because it involves specific facts and circumstances and could be dangerous to depend on without advice and counsel of a competent, experienced employment law attorney. Briefly, Murray submitted his résumé through a third-party entity, whose recruiter then contacted Murray to discuss the position and complete the necessary assessment of him. Murray told the recruiter that he would continue only is he were reassured that a particular person at the prospective employer would not be involved – Murray believed that person had previously discriminated against him. That resulted in an adverse employment action, litigation by Murray, and dismissal of it by summary judgment. As we know though, life isn’t always simple. Adequate investigation in such situations would be prudent:
Title VII: background checks
Jurisdiction: 4th Circuit trial court EEOC v. Freeman, No. 09-cv-02573 (D. Md.) (slip opinion); http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/EEEOC%20v.%20Freeman%20%5B09cv2573%5D%20_Memo%20Op.%20and%20Order%20Granting%20MTD_%20_04.26.10.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The Littler law firm’s detailed article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/federal-court-dismisses-eeoc-title-vii-disparate-impact-suit-over-alle provides an excellent discussion of this controversial area of the law and the EEOC’s activities. Litigation: discrimination, bankruptcy, claim barred Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Nyanjom v. Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., No. 13-3113 (10th Cir., 8/13/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3113.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Paraphrase of the appellate court summary:
FLSA: class-action, collective action, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, No. 12-304-cv (2nd Cir., 8/9/13);
The Amex decision of the United States Supreme court is controlling law. Thus, in this case the employee is compelled to arbitrate claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) on an individual basis because she signed a confidentiality agreement agreeing to resolve covered disputes that barred both civil lawsuits and any class or collective proceedings in arbitration. Summary by the appellate court: PERCURIAM: The question presented in this appeal is whether an employee can invalidate a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removes the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §201,et seq. In light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), we answer that question in the negative, and reverse the contrary decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York * * *. FMLA: attendance, call-in policy, non-compliance, adverse employment action, summary judgment Jurisdiction: 6th circuit Srouder, et al. v. Dana Light Axle Mfg, LLC, No. 12-5835 (6th Cir., 8/7/13); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0211p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. FMLA regulations for notice, leave request, and medical certification were expanded in 2009 for both employers and employees. This case provides an opportunity to learn the interrelationship of FMLA requirements before and after the change in 2009, so this Jackson Lewis article is recommended for study and implementation: http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4579. Srouder failed to comply with his employer’s call-in requirements under its attendance policy or provide an appropriate medical certification supporting his need for FMLA leave. The federal district court dismissed his claim on summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed that order and judgment. FLSA: unpaid overtime, employment agreement, filing requirement, limitation of action, statute of limitations Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit Boaz v. FedEx Customer Information Services, Inc., No. 12-5319 (6th Cir., 8/6/13); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0209p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] An employment agreement cannot shorten the time for filing a claim. Summary by the appellate court: KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The Supreme Court held decades ago that an employee is not free to waive her claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 201 et seq. Here, Margaret Boaz is a FedEx employee who sued FedEx under both the FLSA and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Although Boaz’s claims were timely under the multi-year limitations periods in those Acts, her claims were untimely under the six-month limitations period in her employment agreement. On that ground, the district court held that Boaz’s claims were time-barred. We hold that, as applied here, the limitations provision in Boaz’s employment agreement operated as a waiver of her claims under the FLSA and the Equal Pay Act. We therefore reverse FEHA: sexual harassment, desire not required, Kelley v. Conoco Companies, § 12940, legislative reversal, SB 292 Jurisdiction: California Legislatively reversing Kelley v. Conoco Companies, California Senate Bill 292 amends the FEHA § 12940 so that sexual desire is no longer a required element of proof in sexual harassment cases. URL link: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0251-0300/sb_292_bill_20130802_enrolled.pdf. Professional licensing: Uniform Licensing Act, revocation, due process, meeting, failure to notify Jurisdiction: New Mexico Avalos v. New Mexico Counseling and Therapy Practice Board, No. 33,579 (NMSC unreported opinion – see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on citing unpublished decisions, 8/1/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSCUnreported/2013/SC33579.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. DANIELS, Justice: {1} In this case we address the due process considerations in professional disciplinary proceedings under the New Mexico Uniform Licensing Act (ULA), NMSA 1978, Sections 61-1-1 to -33 (1957) (as amended through 2003). Petitioner appeals a licensing board order revoking his professional counseling license because, among other things, he argues he was denied constitutionally protected due process when the licensing board failed to give him personal notice about the meeting where the board considered the case against him and decided to revoke his license. Because New Mexico precedent already sufficiently addresses the due process requirements applicable in administrative adjudications, we issue this nonprecedential Decision pursuant to Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA reversing the Court of Appeals, vacating the board’s final order, and remanding to the board for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. HIPPA: 9/25/13 update deadline Jurisdiction: All Fisher & Philips, LLP, article: Deadline To Update HIPAA Materials Is September 23, 2013, http://www.laborlawyers.com/deadline-to-update-hipaa-materials-is-september-23-2013. Title VII: discrimination, retaliation, mediation, angry misconduct, adverse employment action, employment terminated, no liability Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd., No. 13-1166 (7th Cir., 7/26/13); http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2013/D07-26/C:13-1166:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:1175491:S:0 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Retaliation must to be avoided, and often it can be a liability trap even if the discrimination claim fails. However, this employee was fired after aggressively verbally attacking company representatives during mediation of the discrimination issue. His retaliation claim failed because that kind of behavior was determined to be not retaliatory, i.e. not the type of action likely to keep reasonable individuals from filing discrimination claims. Read the case for details of the employee’s misconduct during mediation because it might well happen in your company or agency. Arbitration: policy change, class waiver, timing
Jurisdiction: California Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings Inc., (Cal.App.4th,3rd, 7/23/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G046202.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case would be a good instruction book for practitioners in any jurisdiction:
Summary by the appellate court Defendants and appellants appeal from an order denying their motions to compel plaintiffs and respondents to individually arbitrate the wage and hour claims they allege in this class action. Integrated relies on an arbitration policy contained in an employee handbook issued by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet), the previous owner of the four hospitals where Plaintiffs work, and a revised arbitration policy Integrated issued as part of a new employee handbook. Integrated contends Plaintiffs agreed to the arbitration policy by signing various documents acknowledging and agreeing to the policy. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying Integrated’s motions because Integrated failed to establish Plaintiffs agreed to the specific arbitration agreement Integrated submitted to the trial court. Initially, we conclude Integrated is limited to the arbitration policy contained in the employee handbook issued by the prior owner of the hospitals because Integrated issued the revised employee handbook and arbitration policy after Plaintiffs’ claims accrued and the original class action complaint was filed. Rehabilitation Act: § 504
Public Sector: free speech: Garcetti-Pickering analysis, insufficient proof Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit: Duvall v. The Putnam City School District, Independent School District No. 1 of Oklahoma County, et al., No. 11-6250 (10th Cir., 8/5/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-6250.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Basically, she failed on her burdens of proof under the Rehabilitation Act. She also failed on her free speech proof under the “Garcetti/Pickering analysis”:
Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff-Appellant Louise M. Duvall appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Putnam City Independent School District No. 1 (the “District”), and Ms. Duvall’s former supervisors, Principal Lee Roland and Assistant Principal Marjorie Iven (collectively, “Defendants”). Ms. Duvall brought claims against Defendants asserting, inter alia , that Defendants’ adverse employment actions violated her rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the First Amendment. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims and the district court granted their motion. Ms. Duvall asserts two issues on appeal. First, she contends that “Defendants retaliated against her in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Aplt. Supp. Opening Br. at 21. Second, she claims that “Defendants retaliated against [her] for exercising her clearly-established First Amendment rights.” Id. at 27 (capitalization altered). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. NMHRA: New Mexico Human Right Act, age discrimination
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., No. 31,087, (5/20/13, certiorari not applied for); 2013-NMCA-073, 52 SBB 32 at 27; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-073.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case involves an age discrimination case brought by a woman who complained an employee younger than her replaced her. Summary by the New Mexico Court of Appeals: {1} Diane Slusser (Plaintiff) appeals the district court’s order of summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and Plaintiff’s failure to meet her burden of persuasion for an age discrimination claim. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not have commenced until she knew or should have known that a younger person had replaced her as an employee of Vantage Builders, Inc. (Defendant). In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that the statute should have been equitably tolled until she knew or should have known she was replaced by a younger person because Defendant misled her regarding the reason for her termination. We conclude that the statute began to run upon Plaintiff’s termination, the circumstances of this case did not require the district court to equitably toll the statute, and Defendant’s actions were not grounds for applying equitable estoppel. Because the district court properly concluded that the statute of limitations expired on Plaintiff’s claim, we affirm. [Note: As an unrelated observation by some New Mexico practitioners, under the NMHRA, § Section 28-1-7 et seq., it could be argued that there is no upper or lower age limit stated in the Act, and thus age discrimination in and of itself might be sufficient to support a claim, though that approach has yet to be tried.] Workers’ Compensation: undocumented alien, coverage, benefits Jurisdiction: New Mexico Gonzalez v. Performance Painting, Inc., et al., No. 32,844 (NMSC, 5/30/13); 2013-NMSC-021, http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2013/13sc-021.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Seldom are workers’ compensation cases included here because that is a complicated area of the law best covered elsewhere. However, occasionally a case arises that needs to be mentioned so that practitioners can seek advice and counsel from an attorney specializing in that area of NM law, and this is one of those cases. BOSSON, Justice: {1} Undocumented workers injured on the job present a special challenge under the Workers’ Compensation Act. All workers are encouraged to return to work when medically feasible, yet federal law may preclude some employers from extending rehire offers to undocumented workers once they learn of their status. Federal law also requires employers to hire in good faith and demand documentation of prospective employees showing their lawful status. Because an offer to rehire must be a legitimate offer, we hold that employers who cannot demonstrate such good faith compliance with federal law in the hiring process cannot use their workers’ undocumented status as a defense to continued payment of modifier benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court of Appeals having decided to the contrary, we reverse. Class Action: litigation, arbitration agreements, state decision reversed, FAA rigorous enforcement arbitration policy Jurisdiction: Massachusetts Feeney v. Dell, Inc., SJC-11133 (SJC, 8/1/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]. This is an alert to Massachusetts litigators that the Supreme Judicial Court reversed itself after the United State Supreme Court issued its 6/20/13 opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant as explained below. RESCRIPT: Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (Concepcion ), we held in Feeney v. Dell Inc., 465 Mass. 470, 472 (2013) (Feeney II ), that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.(2006), does not foreclose a court "from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver where a plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she effectively cannot pursue a claim against [a] defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of the agreement, thus rendering his or her claim nonremediable." Having concluded that the plaintiffs in Feeney II had indeed made such a demonstration, we affirmed the ruling of a judge in the Superior Court invalidating a class action waiver in the parties' arbitration agreement. Feeney II, supra. Just eight days after the release of our decision in Feeney II, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (Amex), holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA even if a plaintiff proves that the class waiver, combined with other onerous terms of the agreement, effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his or her Federal statutory rights. Following the release of Amex, the defendants in Feeney II filed a petition for rehearing on the grounds that Amex abrogated Feeney II. We stayed the issuance of the rescript in Feeney II and invited the plaintiffs to submit a response, which they did. We conclude that following Amex, our analysis in Feeney II no longer comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA. FLSA: interstate school bus drivers, overtime Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit (joining 2nd, 3rd and 9th) Almy v. Kickert School Bus Line, No. 13-1273 (7th Cir., 7/16/13); http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1638924.html [enhanced lexis.com version]. PER CURIAM*: Robert Almy, a school bus driver, appeals the grant of summary judgment for his former employer in this action for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219. Congress, however, has exempted a range of employees from the act’s overtime provisions, including interstate drivers whose maxi m um hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 2 9 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). The district court concluded that Almy, as an interstate school bus driver, falls within this “motor-carrier exemption.” We affirm. [* A “per curiam” decision is one delivered in the name of the court rather than of a specific judge or judges, i.e., the court writes as one author.] ERISA: private equity partnerships, "trades or businesses", withdrawal liability, active management, "control group" – "common control", summary judgment Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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