I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
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- Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (p. 209)
- Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said
- "A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.
Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286) Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of November. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the content of various number of these messages after the attack and there was considerable information about movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p.313) Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio. (p. 15) Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKay of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelligence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46) Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that 478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work alone. (p 208‑9) Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic in the so‑called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their apprehending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan. (p. 209) Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (p. 209) Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephone communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan. (p. 209) Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said: "26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after? "A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack. "27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack? "A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source." (p. 218) Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not recall the details of this. (p. 218) Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001). He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that CincPac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he said. Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercepting the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not intercepting Japanese cable messages, and the so‑called "purple" messages were usually sent by cable (pages 1037‑38). Admiral Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding "purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accomplished in Washington (page 1106). (3) Surveillance of consulate Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in effect before this does not appear. C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS Captain McCollum, who was Officer‑in‑Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East, including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op‑20‑G. However, by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan had swept U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 479 measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by Opnav on 24 November (GCT) to Commander‑in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26 November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa‑southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one carrier division with, the force in the Mandates, white ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation. (p. 13‑14) Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15‑16) Captain McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17) Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19) Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic; rather than from the decryption of Jap messages. (p. 73‑74) Other sources of information during the period 26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attaché, Shanghai, and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty‑four to forty‑eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in the Kure‑Sasebo area. (p. 75‑76) Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means,. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non‑existent. He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms. (p.63) Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395) 480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent, since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 398) Admiral Smith said that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the, remainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said: (p. 363) "Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me. "Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral? "Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes. "Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic? "Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.' " Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (p. 365) A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies, and equipment were pouring into Indo‑China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo‑China was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo‑China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo‑China, and roughly the same number on Hainan Island. Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo‑China and Formosan ports. Movements to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be sub-divided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the groups. Each constituted a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc. The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleship were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandate (pages 72‑3).
Admiral Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information, on Japanese ships. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew about it. Captain Smith‑Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would involve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him (page 1079). Ambassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier force towards Pearl Harbor (page 1064). Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent to CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107‑8). Captain Layton Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of 24, November 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that the dispatch from Com14 dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261381, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch 260110. (Page 190‑191) Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized the intelligence available to Com14, 16, CinCAF. and CinCPac, concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191) Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 281331, that it could not confirm the supposition by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191) Captain Layton considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets, two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five (RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet; and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets. Therefore, Captain Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261831 stating that its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure‑Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191‑192) (also see Page 248‑250) said that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home 482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knows now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to ship movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated war he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916), Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was indicated. Admiral DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the ONI Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines, but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87). Admiral McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls (page 899). Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particularly those for the period 27 November‑5 December 1941 (Exhibit 22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and though, he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented be Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained in those summaries (pages 310‑311). He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimmel appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries (Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton.(p. 310‑311). He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen, the ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December 1941 prepared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it improbable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December 1941 (p. 311‑312). Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he had believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and after 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and stated, with reference to the believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 313). Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the information on which his estimate as to the location, of the Jap carriers was based, and that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief (p. 313). Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa: 24 November: A statement that on the 3rd there were a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet. 25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were present in the Mandates. 26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers. 27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet. PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 483 28 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Communication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information concerning the Third Fleet, but he dad not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314). 29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not to any involving the carriers. 30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air Force. 1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315). 2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. 3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 3i6). 4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 318‑317). 5 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 3i7). 6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317). After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and sortie possible associations with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p. 320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Admiral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321). He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319). Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the information available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the carriers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321). General Sort testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese movements east of Guam (p. 265). Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of a Japanese attack (p. 327). 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