Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
!—BRI Good: China Soft Power
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
!—BRI Good: China Soft Power1NC – ! China Soft PowerTrump’s isolationism forces China to pursue global leadership via soft power – key to provide global public goods and avoid global instability.Monan ‘18 (Zhang Monan, a Senior Fellow and Professor at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, a fellow of the China Information Center, a fellow of the China Foundation for International Studies, and a researcher at the China Macroeconomic Research Platform, 2018 (“Why we must cross the Kindleberger trap,” China Watch, April 27th, http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/201804/27/WS5ae28ef1a310cc9200067d5f.html, Edited for gendered language) Undoubtedly, the globalization pendulum is now passing the equilibrium point. In recent years, with the relative decline in the overall strength of the United States and the increasing amount of global public goods consumption, the US has no intention or power to make an adequate unilateral contribution to the world, and it is even more reluctant to make concessions under the frameworks of multilateral agreements. In particular, the Trump administration withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, revising the North American Free Trade Agreement, proactively provoking a trade war and reducing the sharing of international responsibilities all clearly bear strong nativism, protectionism, isolationism and de-globalization. This is a major departure from the globalization advocated by the US after World War II. Therefore, the world is generally uneasy and worried about the global leadership vacuum exacerbating turbulence in the world order. In January 2017, Joseph Nye, a renowned scholar of international relations at Harvard University, published an article on Euronews titled "The Kindleberger Trap: What are Trump's challenges with China". In the article, he suggested that US President Donald Trump's China policy should avoid both the Thucydides trap and the Kindleberger trap. On one hand, it is necessary to prevent an established power (like the US) from becoming too fearful of a rising power (like China). Otherwise, a cataclysmic war may erupt. On the other, it is necessary to guard against the Kindleberger trap: That is, by showing weakness rather than showing strength, China may become a disruptive free rider, pushing the world into the Kindleberger trap. Where does the Kindleberger trap come from? Charles P. Kindleberger, the late Harvard University economic historian, believed that the stable operation of the world economic system requires a country to bear public costs. This view was later developed by Robert Gilpin into the hegemonic stability theory. This theory holds that only under the special condition when there is a hegemon can other countries cooperate. There is a causal relationship between the international hegemony system and the stability of the international order. A strong and hegemonic player is conducive to the stability of the international system and the realization of public welfare. Those hegemonic countries with absolute advantages in politics, economy, military affairs, and science and technology can provide the international community with global public goods such as a stable international financial system, a free trade system, a reliable security system and an effective international aid system to obtain the recognition of other countries for the international order established by the hegemonic countries, so as to achieve stability and prosperity within the system. However, after the US replaced the United Kingdom as a world power in the 1930s, it failed to take over the role of the UK as a provider of global public goods, eventually causing the global system to fall into recession, political turmoil and even WWII. History has repeatedly proved that the model of a single hegemonic country dominating the supply of global public goods not only fails to effectively safeguard the stability of the world economy and the economies of various countries, but may also lead to uneven distribution of benefits and risks globally. After WWII, the US paid high costs for global public goods, especially security products. A detailed breakdown of US military expenditure shows that in the 2016 fiscal year, the total US military defense budget exceeded $770 billion, not only consecutively being the highest in the world, but also surpassing the sum of defense budgets of many major powers in the world. The US has long provided its allies with high security defense spending that made it overwhelmed and exacerbated the federal government's debt. In 2017, the US federal debt totaled $20.6 trillion and the debt-to-GDP ratio was 104 percent. The high cost of global public goods has led the US into the hegemon's dilemma. In this predicament, the hegemon can choose between two routes to rebalance the system: One is to seek for an increase in resources, use more resources to maintain hegemonic status and assume hegemonic obligations; the other is to reduce the international obligations and responsibilities on its shoulder. Trump chose the second route. Of course, the US has never given up its willingness to lead the world, but its willingness to assume global responsibility for global public goods is declining. In particular, Trump's election as president further exacerbates this trend and fully reveals that the US has the slightest inclination to share the cost of global public goods. Therefore, the predicament of the Kindleberger trap is more acute than the Thucydides trap. In the area of economics and trade, the US has turned to "America First" in an all-around manner in an attempt to maximize its domestic revenue while reducing its commitment to global responsibility, showing more radical isolationism and protectionism. Currently, the Trump administration has opened a Pandora's box with a global trade war. If the US disregards the rules-based multilateral trading system and advances the mercantilist trade policy, and if other countries follow suit, the foundation of the global economy with the World Trade Organization as its core will be eroded and the global trading system established after WWII will be about to usher in the most dangerous moment. How do we cross the Kindleberger trap caused by the hegemon's dilemma? How do we avoid repeating the mistake? Is there a third way to cross this trap? Robert Keohane, the most important founder of neoliberal institutionalism, has proved in his book After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy through strong arguments that even without the existence of a hegemon, cooperation among countries can still be realized or even strengthened. Historical experience shows that hegemonic stability is not fundamental to maintaining a global order. Supplying global public goods beyond the nation's development stage and overall national strength can also lead to strategic overdraft risks. China will stick to the direction of taking up the responsibility within its capability in the long run. China will never follow the footsteps of the big powers that have sought hegemony once they grew strong. China will not take hegemony as a strategic goal, nor does it intend to seek the status of hegemon or dominant supplier of global public goods. As the world's largest developing country, China has proposed to the world a new concept of building a community with a shared future for [humanity] Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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