Non-prolif better for cohesion – allows the EU to securitize and demonstrate its coordination

Non-prolif better for cohesion – allows the EU to securitize and demonstrate its coordination

However, given that EU’s non-proliferation policy is based on the ‘lowest common denominator’ among states with diverging attitudes towards nucle- ar weapons, it sidelines the issue of nuclear disarmament: While the text of the NPT recognizes the link between disarmament and non-proliferation, the EU has hardly addressed the question of ‘its own’ disarmament in its declara- tions and action plans – even though pro-disarmament states such as Ireland and Sweden continuously lobby for the goals of the New Agenda Coalition.19 Hence, EU discourse reveals a dramatic misfit: When Europe talks about arms control and non-proliferation, it is rarely concerned with its own member- states, but with the enforcement of disarmament among ‘the others’. In EU rhetoric, the omission of disarmament questions is made possible through several means. First, the Union ascribes itself a distinctive role in the field: ‘The EU wants to act before the threat materializes, we want to “pre- vent”’ (Gianella, 2008a: 4). Second, the EU looks upon non-proliferation as a domain in which it can demonstrate its capacity for internal coordination and external visibility, circumventing the question of the efficacy of its policies by remaining ‘self-centred’: ‘within the UN system, the EU is now identified as the major sponsor of the multilateral treaty system’ (Gianella, 2008a: 6); the fact that the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana received a mandate from the USA, Russia and China in the negotiations with Iran constituted ‘a recognition of the EU’s growing role on the international scene’ (Gianella, 2008b: 7). The Lisbon Treaty provides the High Representative ‘with the instruments to ensure a stronger coordi- nation’ between activities framed in the supranational and intergovernmen- tal realms of the EU (Gianella, 2008a: 11). These references suggest that EU action is not primarily evaluated in terms of the contribution it makes to the advancement of non-proliferation and disarmament goals; rather, it functions as a vehicle for self-representation and increased European unity.