Narratives of EU non-proliferation become justifications for nuclear development to protect against perceived Soviet threats

Narratives of EU non-proliferation become justifications for nuclear development to protect against perceived Soviet threats

It remains to be seen whether Sarkozy will depart from the route taken by his predecessor. Yet, there is little evidence of a far-reaching renunciation of the guidelines developed under Chirac. Instead, we seem to be witnessing the continued appreciation of nuclear weapons within France’s military doctrine (Tertrais, 2008). The country’s 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security points in that direction: Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. . . . Given the diver- sity of situations to which France might be confronted in an age of globalisation, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President with an auton- omous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options (Présidence de la République, 2008: 7). Emphasizing the utility of nuclear weapons in a ‘diversity of situations’, not least as a protection against threats to ‘our identity’, serves as a justification for their persistence. Within French society and its political elite, there is a virtual lack of contestation of nuclear weapons. Instead, a vivid nuclear con- sensus prevails that is tightly linked to a conception of France’s role in the world and that dates back to the time of Charles de Gaulle, who laid the grounds for the so-called ‘monarchie nucléaire’: the incommensurable shap- ing power of the French president in nuclear issues (Wisotzki, 2005). Hence, the French nuclear discourse developed in a rather streamlined and, as Larsen (1997: 120) describes it, almost ‘mythical’ fashion. This is reflected in two key concepts: l’arme de la paix (weapon of peace) and dissuasion du faible au fort (deterrence of the strong by the weak). The l’arme de la paix understanding severely downplays the devastating effects of nuclear weapons by euphemis- tically suggesting that they bring about a beneficial result: peace. Dissuasion du faible au fort ascribes an exclusively defensive character to the nuclear forc- es. The metaphor of the ‘small’ suggests that vulnerable France has only one measure with which to defend itself against the Soviet threat. The possession of nuclear weapons has thus long been legitimized as a means of last resort against a superior enemy – an image that persists, even though the scenarios of nuclear weapons’ use have changed significantly. This predominant view of the assumed legitimacy and necessity of atomic weapons has long pre- vented the rise of any nuclear-critical voices. Unsurprisingly, France’s 2006 nuclear doctrine barely attracted attention, let alone fundamental criticism. A close look at the case of the UK shows, however, that France’s stance toward nuclear (non-)disarmament is far from unique. There are indeed many commonalities in the nuclear policies of Europe’s two nuclear states.