No entrapment in the Korean peninsula – treat conditions check.
Kim ‘11 (TongFi Kim, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy @ Griffith University, "Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States," Security Studies through Taylor & Francis, 8-25-2011, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201?needAccess=true, Date Accessed: 7-13-2019, SB).
Fully aware of the danger of entrapment by Rhee, the United States imposed conditions on its alliance obligations. Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty reads as follows: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.30 By this clause, the United States limited its commitment to only the defense of South Korea, and it also avoided automatic involvement, unlike in alliances such as NATO. 31 Without leaving ambiguity, the United States clearly limited its defensive commitment to the status quo and avoided a situation where it had to defend the result of a revisionist move by South Korea. Furthermore, the alliance put the South Korean troops under the operational control of the US commander in Korea, thereby directly controlling the client state’s military action.32 Granted, by forming an alliance, the United States incurred the risk of entanglement or entrapment, but this also led to a reduced risk of military involvement on the Korean Peninsula because the alliance improved deterrence against North Korea and imposed a control on risky behavior by South Korea. Thus, the US-ROK alliance was not simply a “weapon of power” but also a “tool of management and control,”33 and the United States provided South Korea with security in exchange for its control on the latter’s autonomy.34 The control hasarguably been quite effective, considering that South Koreans have not been allowed to retaliate for various small-scale operations by North Korean special forces.35 With respect to the cost of possible entanglement or entrapment, the treaty does not make the United States do much more than it would do without a formal alliance. The United States was not allied with the newly born South Korean state, but it intervened in the Korean War anyway. Since the United States could not afford to ignore a renewed offensive by the Communist bloc, regardless of its formal tie with South Korea, it actually bore very little additional risk by forming an alliance with the Republic of Korea.
