Yes Entrapment Entanglement comes with the alliance.
Lanoszka ‘17 (Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations @ City University of London, "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War," Taylor & Francis Online, 12-18-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102, Date Accessed: 7-18-2019, SB).
Entrapment risks may be a function of the commitment that the defender supplies to its ally. As Snyder (1997, p. 44) argues, if the defender offers too strong of a commitment, then the benefiting ally might become so confident of its support as to pursue a much more aggressive than it otherwise would. Strong alliance commitments entail a moral hazard problem insofar as they might shield the ally from the true costs of its actions, thus making it more reckless (Benson, 2012, pp. 43–70; see also Benson, Bentley, & Ray, 2013). One exemplary case is arguably Germany’s blank check to Austria in July 1914 during the latter’s crisis with Serbia. By failing to condition its military support, Berlin might have encouraged Vienna to behave more aggressively towards Serbia than it would have otherwise. Some argue that German leaders subsequently found themselves entrapped by Austria since they did not wish to fight a major power war at that time (North, 1967, p. 107; for an alternative view, see Fischer, 1974). Institutionalist explanations of entrapment, therefore, imply that entrapment fears should not exist if the arrangements undergirding the military alliance are loose and flexible. Entrapment is far less likely with informal, unwritten alliances because the defender can always disclaim responsibility for its ally.
Alliances create a false sense of protection that encourages moral hazard.
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