2nc – Moral Hazard Good – Deterrence Their models are flawed – there is no impact to moral hazard.
Benson et al. ‘14 (Brett V. Benson; Adam Meirowitz; Kristopher W. Ramsay, Department of Political Science @ Nashville University; Department of Politics @ Princeton University; Department of Politics @ Princeton University, "Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts on JSTOR," Sage Journals accessed through JSTOR, 3-2014, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24545640, Date Accessed: 7-20-2019, SB).
While many scholars have highlighted the dangers of moral hazards in commitments and intervention, scholarship has pointed out that intervention can be calibrated to balance the costs of moral hazard with the benefit of increased security (Wagner 2005). In this vein, Snyder (1997) argues that flexibility and ambiguity in alliances often reflect the intention of one or more countries to restrain an alliance partner because of fears of entrapment. Zagare and Kilgour (2003, 2006) create a formal model to capture the deterrence-versus-restraint phenomenon in alliances, finding a pooling equilibrium in mixed strategies in which an ally creates some uncertainty about whether it will intervene on the behalf of its alliance partner in a conflict. The authors interpret this equilibrium behavior as a kind of ambiguous alliance designed to restrain overly aggressive behavior, although they do not model the alliance formation stage. And in her model of third-party intervention with moral hazard, Yuen (2009) shows that alliances not only can strike a balance between deterrence and an ally's overaggression but, when the ally's costs for fighting are sufficiently high, the alliance can actually induce the ally to make small concessions to the challenger to avoid conflict. These models, however do not capture the potential benefits of moral hazard. For example, Zagare and Kilgour (2006) do not include contracting over the terms of the alliance prior to the initial moves by the protégé or the challenger. In their model, the defender decides whether to support the protégé after the protégé decides whether to concede to a demand. They show that in equilibrium randomization by the defender can emerge when there is learning about the types of the other players. This illustrates that randomization or "ambiguity" can mitigate the costs of emboldening. But these approaches are silent on the possibility of structuring alliances in a manner that uses emboldenment (or moral hazard) as a means to deter aggression by challengers and thus avoid the costs of supporting a protégé.
No impact to moral hazard – empirics.
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