2. Act, Omission, Status or Circumstances 4 Consequences and Causation 8 Introduction to Mens Rea and Intent 10 Levels of Fault 11



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Self-Defence


  • Law of self defence aims to balance claims of self-defence by accused (subjective) against holding the accused to a reasonable standard (objective)

  • EXAM: Look at reasonable but mistaken belief! This tricks people on exams. Also, on a fact pattern, apply new law but draw meaning from old.



OLD LAWS


Notes on old laws

  • Main criticism: too complex/confusing

  • Primary means of differentiating them = what type of harm? Death, BGH, or less?

Pawliuk (2001, BCCA)

  • s. 34.(2) applies when accused reasonably apprehended death/GBH (i.e. serious)

  • s. 34(1) applies where anything less (i.e. accused perceived less than death/GBH)

  • Facts: Typical bar fight, accused about to be hit in the face so he punches guy in self-defence, guy falls, hits head, dies. Can claim 34(1) b/c his intention wasn’t to kill or seriously injure the victim (even tho that was the result).

s. 34(1): Self-defence against unprovoked assault

  • Harm to self only (not in defence of others) against an unprovoked assault

  • Focus is on the intention, not the result (i.e. even if someone died or was hurt)

  • Four elements:

  1. Unlawful assault (or reasonable but mistaken belief) that the individual is being or is about to be the subject of an unlawful assault;

  2. Not provoked;

  3. Force must not be intended to cause death/GBH (even if that is the result, as long as it wasn’t intended);

  4. Force used must be no more than is necessary.

Proportionality in the 4th element requires a tolerant approach (per Kong) – mistake re: amount of force necessary is okay, as long as the mistake is reasonable in the circs.

s. 34(2): Extent of justification

  • Person who is under reasonable apprehension of death/bodily harm is justified in causing death or GBH as long as he believes he can’t preserve himself otherwise.

  • 3 (possibly 4) elements:

  1. Unlawful assault (or reasonable but mistaken belief);

  2. Person must be under reasonable apprehension of death or GBH;

  3. Acc’d must believe on reasonable grounds he has no other choice.

  4. (Possible 4th requirement) – when death is actually caused.

Cinous (2002, SCC)

  • Each of the first three elements in ss. 34(2) had subjective/objective components

  • Must be an air of reality to all 3 of the core elements (here, met for 1/2 but not 3)

  • Facts: Acc’d suspicious that deceased and 3P intended to kill him. Suspicious victim had stole his revolver. 3 days later, they planned another crime together – he feared an attack on his life & shot him in the back of the head

  • Held: SCC accepted he may have honestly believed his life was in danger, but no evidence that his belief that he had no alternate course of action was reasonable

  • Thus no air of reality to the third element under s. 34(2) – 1st yes (reasonably believed an unlawful assault), 2nd yes (feared a deadly attack – but not 3rd (no evidence that he believed he had no other way of preserving himself)

  • Must objectively be shown no other reasonable alternatives (not just his subjective testimony that he believed he couldn’t do anything else)

  • I.e. why didn’t he wait, flee, etc? Binnie – allowing SD here would be antithetical to public order

  • Courts haven’t been sympathetic to criminal organizations – but have been to inmates facing incidences of violence in prison settings (see R v McConnellEXAM – also an excellent novel fact pattern! P. 973)

  • EXAM: Good set of facts to analogize to for applying the new law!

McConnell (1996, SCC)

  • Compared “prison environment syndrome” as analogous to battered wife syndrome

  • Convict’s code cannot replace Canadian law – however, judge instructed the jury to consider the general prison environment - endorsed contextual approach

  • Imminence not req’d, as long as victim had “present ability” to carry out the threat

s. 35: Self-defence in case of aggression

  • Where accused is initial aggressor

  • Long-held belief that ss. 34(1) and 34(2) were only available to innocent, but reading in McIntosh held words “without having provoked the assault” were only in s. 34(1) and should not be read into s. 34(2)

  • Basically rendered this provision useless

s. 37(1): Preventing assault

  • To protect oneself, or anyone under one’s protection from assault

  • Essential elements:

  1. Acc’d must reasonably believe self, or others, is subject to an unlawful assault;

  2. Force can be no more than is necessary to prevent assault (or its repetition);

  3. Wilful infliction of hurt/mischief cannot be excessive.

  • Imp. b/c allowed defence of others (not available in ss. 34/35)

  • Anyone “under one’s protection” been given very BROAD meaning (Webber – anyone who requires protection which acc’d may be able to provide – parent child, prison guard inmate, etc)

  • “Gap-filling” provision used for where ss. 34/35 can’t apply

s. 37(2): Extent of justification

  • Can’t justify excessive hurt/mischief

Retreat

  • Is there any requirement to retreat before acting in SD?

  • This answer varied quite a bit under old laws

  • s. 35 – retreat as far as feasibly possible (but nothing in ss. 34/37)

  • Lavalee: Nobody has an obligation to flee from one’s home before relying on SD

  • Possibility of retreat might be a factor to be considered in whether acc’d reasonably believed he/she could not otherwise preserve him/herself – no obligation, but goes to reasonableness (Malott, Druken)

  • Cinous: That acc’d did NOT flee determined air of reality on 3rd element not met

  • Thus: not imperative, but certainly relevant

Intoxication

  • Remember: the reasonable person is sober, so the objective assessment of reasonableness presumes without factor of intoxication

  • Doesn’t mean that your belief may not be reasonable simply b/c you are intoxicated, but something to remember

  • Thus, the accused’s intoxication is irrelevant in deciding whether is belief was reasonable

  • Reilly is the authority here

Mental Impairment

  • Unlike intoxication, it IS relevant

  • Nelson (Ont. CA): Court held diminished intelligence of acc’d should be considered

  • Lavallee: Acc’d said it would be unfair to measure her apprehension/belief against that of an ordinary person (since she was a battered spouse)

  • Kagan: Court held acc’ds Aspergers syndrome should have been considered

Co-occurrence

  • Thus: intoxication not relevant, mental impairment relevant.

  • What about new reality of co-occurring substance abuse and mental disorder?

  • This is the NEXT FRONTIER!

Excessive Force

  • ss. 34(1) and 37 both say “no more force than is necessary” = proportionality req

  • Assessed objectively but with consideration to context

  • Consider force used by attacker to determine force required to repel that attack

  • Contextualized somewhat (relative strength of parties, options available)

  • But not purely subjective – must still determine what a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances would have done

If there is a mistake at play (EXAM), objective standard will be based on accused’s mistaken perception of the circumstances – as long as they are reasonable (Kong)


  • ss. 34(2) and 35 – broader allowance to degree of force that could be used, less stringent than ss. 34(1) and 37 (Baxter)

  • If degree of force is excessive, accused will be criminally liable under s. 26 for that part of the force which is excessive

  • No partial defence here (like provocation) – if excessive force results in death, then accused who started out acting in SD may end up facing a murder charge

  • Depends on intent: unless killing was accompanied by intent in s. 212 (intent to kill or cause GBH likely to cause death) then it remains killing without intent, i.e. manslaughter – so s. 34(2) = murder if excessive force, and s. 34(1) manslaughter?


NEW LAWS – CIF March 2013


s. 34(1)

a) Defence of one’s self and of others, where they believe on REASONABLE grounds that force is being used or threated;

b) The act that constitutes the offence (not assault – broadens the scope) is committed for that purpose (i.e. of defending self or other - subjective);



c) The act is reasonable in the circumstances - look to factors in 34(2)

s. 34(2)

Non-exhaustive list of factors to assess reasonableness

Changes from old to new (Roach)

  1. New law is a unified provision – includes both SD & defence of others

  • No more confusing distinctions between which provision, provoked or unprovoked, intend to cause death/BGH, etc

  • A single standard of reasonableness governs all cases

  1. New law is expanded

  • Before, had to be threat of some kind of assault – now, just “offence”

  • Could apply to things other than assault – B&E, mischief, theft, etc

  1. No more reference to justification (supports broadening of the defence?)

  • Law seems to be taking a more contextual approach

  • Question remains: what would happen in a situation of co-occurrence?

Interpretation of new s. 34

Three requirements under s. 34(1):

  • 34(1)(a): Belief on reasonable grounds that force/threat of force is being used

    1. Subjective/objective assessment brought in from the old law

    2. Accused must have had a belief which is reasonable - accused's subjective belief, measuring it against an objective standard

    3. Looking to the old subjective/objective assessments under old law

    4. So what do we expect will happen in relation to things like retreat, intoxication, mental impairment? We believe the old law will be applied.

  • 34(1)(b): A subjective purpose for defending one's self or others

    1. Adds a new requirement - that the accused committed this act for this purpose

    2. Defence of force cannot be available for what is actually a guise for revenge. Any other purpose falls outside the bounds of defensive action, and the person stands to be convicted for it

    3. This was likely an unstated assumption under the old law. Not controversial. Was really there already.

  • 34(1)(c): Reasonable in the circumstances

    1. Gone is the "no more than is necessary" proportionality requirement - but, in our assessment of what is reasonable in the circumstances, we must look at 34(2) factors, which include proportionality, amongst others

  • NB: a) looks mixed objective/subjective, b) looks subjective and c) looks objective. But in an exam, just remember that we don't know how these will actually be applied - so we would say, arguably this is the test, etc

  • Contextualization allows objective standard to reflect acc’ds circs and history

  • This defence now open to “defence of others” (not just limited to someone under the accused’s “protection”) – now could apply to unrelated 3Ps

  • New provision still doesn’t recognize a partial defence for an accused who engages in excessive/unreasonable self-defence

  • Summary: New laws less structured/predictable than old provisions, but still retains basic elements (subjectively perceive a threat, respond for the purpose of defending self/others, must be reasonable basis for this response)

  • Trend towards a more contextual application

Requirement under s. 34(2):

  1. 34(2): Reasonableness is the theme

    1. Lots of unstructured discretion here. Clearly informed by the old law, but much more discretion than old law

    2. (b): other means available - i.e. was retreat available?

    3. (e): size, age, gender

    4. (f): history of relationship - inspired by Lavallee

    5. (g): proportionality requirement - complemented by (a) - the nature of force/threat, imminency in (b)

    6. However, proportionality will not be applied the way it was under the old law. It will simply be one factor.

    7. You are still liable for use of excessive force

  2. Evans (2015, BCCA): Good application of this new law

  3. Williams (2013, BCSC): Important for the transition phase

  4. Remember - these are lower court decisions. No general statement yet about how the old and the new will work together. This is frontier territory.

Big questions

  • If historically intoxication hasn’t been relevant, but mental impairment has, what happens if they are both at play?

  • If we are prepared to give some understanding to the psychology of inmates, people in long abusive relationships, then what about the drug addicts on the streets? A person struggling with psychosis and using drugs to moderate? How do we use "reasonableness" to be properly sympathetic to their life and their reality? Do we use the objective sober person test, or something else?

  • Last year's exam - fact pattern for self-defence - the accused had PTSD



Self-Defence & Relationship Violence





  • Controversial, politically charged area – lots of work being done, lots left to do

  • Be careful about statistics & don’t forget about presumption of innocence

  • “Young prosecutors’ syndrome”: Rushing, not using discretion, particularly in intimate partner scenarios

  • Focus on the battered woman – how should we respond when a victim kills her abuser? Is self-defence available here?




Case

Notes

Lavallee (1990, SCC)

  • Facts: 22 years old, subject to repeated physical assaults over 3-4 years. They were having a party, she was afraid of being beaten & hid in the closet, he finds her, slaps her a few times and says “If you don’t kill me first, I’ll kill you.” He said he was going to kill her after everyone left the party. He gave her a loaded handgun and taunted her. She shot him in the back of the head as he walked away (said she aimed higher, but whatever.)

  • Sequence: Trial judge acquitted based on expert testimony re: battered wife syndrome, CA overturned, SCC restored acquittal

  • Issue: How does evidence of battered spouse syndrome affect use of SD?

  • Held: Acquittal.

  • Court allowed expert evidence on psychology of abuse – first understanding/accommodation at law of battered spouse syndrome

  • SD under s. 34(2)

  • Expert evidence necessary for jury, in order to understand whether accused’s beliefs were reasonable in the circumstances

  • “Whether she had a reasonable apprehension of death in the circumstances, given the heightened sensitivity of a battered wife…” – thus not what an outsider would perceive, but what she would perceive in the circumstances

  • VITAL evidence to why she felt she had to kill him and couldn’t just leave

  • Jury cannot pass judgment on why she decided to stay – this doesn’t mean she forfeited her right to self-defence for having done so

  • Learned helplessness: she felt trapped, tyrannized, psychological barrier to prevent her from leaving – a victim mentality where she couldn’t see herself in any other situation. This evidence is clearly both relevant and necessary

  • Most dangerous time in this situation is right after leaving the spouse – so a pre-emptive act of killing might be self-defence

  • So court told the jury it had to decide whether her act was reasonable by considering the history, circumstances and perceptions of the appellant – her belief that she couldn’t preserve herself unless she killed him first

  • Ratio: Jury must ask itself whether, given the history, circumstances and perceptions of the appellant, her belief that she could not preserve herself except by killing him first was reasonable.

Petel (1994, SCC)

  • Facts: Accused was living with Edsell (who beat her daughter, forced her to weigh cocaine, threatened to kill her/her family). She shot him, then perceived Raymond jumping at her, and shot him

  • Held: Court applied Lavallee – a contextual approach in assessing reasonableness

  • There is still a required objective element, but the range of factors to be considered is expanded (language in the new provision is informed by this)

  • Thus the issue isn’t just what an outsider would reasonably have perceived, but what the accused reasonably perceived, given her situation/experience

  • Ratio: confirms Lavallee, that previous threats are relevant to reasonableness, confirms subjective-objective approach to 3 elements of SD in s. 34(2)

Malott (1998, SCC) (principles of defence per Lavallee – what must the jury be told once an accused claims battered spouse relationship


  • Facts: Deceased abused M over 19 years; she had gone to cops, who then told deceased, which led to more violence. Separated. On a drug-trade errand, M killed deceased, then went to his new lover’s house and shot/stabbed her (but she survives). She raised 3 defences: SD, drug-induced intox., & provocation

  • What must the jury be told once an acc’d claims battered spouse relationship?

  • Para 20: Once the defence is raised, jury ought to be made aware of the principles of the defence per Lavallee. Should be informed how expert evidence may be used to understand:

  1. Why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship (retreat, options, alternatives other than killing) - expert evidence can both explain reasons and dispel misconceptions here

  2. The nature and extent of the violence that may exist in a battering relationship (if accused has killed her partner, jury must know of the violence that existed in the relationship, and its impact on the accused - needn't be proved by an expert - can be proved by the accused's own testimony)

  3. The accused's ability to perceive danger from her abuser (not what an outsider would perceive, but what the accused perceived given her situation)

  4. That the accused believed on reasonable grounds that she could not otherwise preserve herself (expert testimony may be relevant here)

  • L’Heureux-Dube: Comment on the importance of expert evidence re: BWS (legal recognition that these women have been treated unfairly)

  • Relevance of this kind of evidence is not limited to SD

  • Perspectives of women, who have historically been ignored, must now equally inform the “objective” standard related to SD – the “reasonable woman” must not be forgotten in the analysis

  • NB: Applied under old law, but could help inform new.

Concerns post-Lavallee

  • Lavallee was applauded by feminist scholars (said to erode gender bias in self-defence law), but still some concerns:

  1. Syndrome or social problem?

  • The new law treats the battered woman as abnormal for not leaving a battering relationship - it demands explanation for this

  • This approach obscures the problem of male violence against women

  • Shifts focus from the socialization of men/women in a male-dominated society to the pathology of the battered woman

  • The law endorses or conceives of the experience of battered women as a syndrome - obscures the real problem of male initiated violence in intimate partner relationships

  1. Why didn’t she leave?

  • Inaccurately assumes leaving is safe or possible, ignores complexity

  • Most dangerous point is just after leaving – many who do are killed after

  • Lack of support (income, housing) to help this

  1. The “reasonable” battered woman: The idea that the battered woman is weak, helpless, passive - may result if women who do not meet this meek stereotype have their claims of a battered relationship being unfairly decided. What about the strong, active, capable woman? Would she have more difficulty making out this defence? These women may have difficulty in getting the court to accept their claims of self-defence.

  2. Failure to recognize social factors like income, housing, child care - door isn't shut on these, but weren't taken up in these cases - how these factors can limit the ability to leave

 However, many of these concerns addressed in Malott, CP p. 970-973 (EXAM)

What happened post-Lavallee?

  1. The Ratushney Review

    • Women in jail who may not have been convicted if their trials had proceeded after Lavallee (didn’t have the benefit of this “new” law/sensitivity towards battered women)

    • Liberal govt initiated a review under Lynn Ratushney

    • Of 100 cases for review, 7 were for the royal prerogative of mercy – some she recommended acquittal, others to reduce sentence from murder to manslaughter (per provocation)

    • They only accepted half – those whose sentences were complete!

    • No political appetite for the royal prerogative of mercy – COURTS must address this instead, with a full remedy (charter remedy?)

    • What about people convicted under Mr. Big operations?

2) The idea of imminence


    • In s. 34(2), despite no express wording, the court had read in an imminency requirement (per Whynot)

    • Problematic for people in battered spouse scenarios (clearly Lavallee would not have met an imminency requirement)

    • In new provision, imminency is a factor in assessing reasonableness, but is no longer a REQUIREMENT/determinative

    • “Accused need not wait until the knife is at her throat or the gun pointed at them until they are entitled in law to respond” -Lavalee

    • Petel: Expanded on this (that Lavallee rejected the imminent rule) – nowhere in the Code – is simply an assumption that arises when two people are of equal strength

    • McConnell: Accused in penitentiary, believed deceased (prison enforcer) was going to kill him, accused attacked him from behind. Court held this kind of pre-emptive strike was not precluded in s. 34(2)

 Take what we learned in Lavallee & be able to apply it to new circumstances (e.g. the experience of inmates, considering both subjective and objective elements, must contextualize it and understand it from their circumstances)

 How will this play out in new law? Will it be better or worse? Time will tell.







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