A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

And they disliked what they saw as the arrogance of civilians, McNamara above all, who sought to impose policies rooted in abstract and academic theorizing, and who showed little regard for or understanding of operational realities. Here was this new Secretary of Defense, without any real background in strategic issues, simply telling the military professionals how to do their job, ordering them, for example, on March 1, 1961, to "prepare a 'doctrine' which, if accepted, would permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack"--without even consulting with them, before the instruction was issued, to see whether such a strategy was within reach from an operational point of view.¹⁰⁷⁹ McNamara had been briefed on a strategy of that sort on February 10--that is, very soon after taking office--and had adopted it at once.¹⁰⁸⁰ Military officers were appalled that amateurs like McNamara thought they could deal in this way with the most vital issues the nation might had to face.

Incidents of this sort simply confirmed military officers in their more general belief that the civilians had no right to tell the military how to conduct its affairs. Carl Kaysen, Bundy's deputy in the White House, remembers going out to SAC headquarters in the summer of 1961 and asking questions about the war plans, predelegation, and so on. The military attitude, as Kaysen recalled it, was "very unpleasant, very hostile. It was as though they were practically going to clap us in irons and never let us get out. We spent two days there and their whole attitude--you know, it was sort of, 'You bastards, it's none of your business.'"¹⁰⁸¹ Kennedy himself clashed directly with the top military commanders over these issues. In October 1961, Lemnitzer briefed the President on the SIOP, the Single Integrated Operational Plan, the nation's basic plan for general nuclear war. Under Eisenhower, briefings of this sort had become rather pat and formulaic, but Kennedy took these matters quite seriously and began asking Lemnitzer some basic questions. Why, he wanted to know, would the United States be "hitting all those targets in China?" They would be attacked, Lemnitzer replied, because they were "in the plan, Mr. President." This answer infuriated Kennedy. He took the JCS chairman aside after the briefing and made it clear to Lemnitzer that he was not going to have another briefing like that inflicted on him again.¹⁰⁸²

[Put Figure Ten about here]

Civil-military relations in general were thus not good at all, and the growing dispute with Norstad has to be seen in this context. This dispute was not just about Berlin policy, although the issue of how rapidly the United States should escalate the fighting if the crisis came to a head was certainly an important element in this conflict. Nor was it fundamentally about the other main issue where the two sides clashed, especially in 1962: the Kennedy administration opposed the deployment of land-based MRBMs in Europe, while Norstad continued to regard their deployment as essential. The more basic problem had to do with SACEUR's relationship with the American government, and ultimately with SACEUR's place in the whole western system.

SACEUR, as Norstad saw it, could not be a mere puppet of the American president. He represented the alliance in its entirety, and his independent authority was linked to his supra-national status. That authority had been rooted in the idea that SACEUR would exercise his discretion on the basis of essentially military considerations, and that he would in particular do whatever was necessary to protect NATO Europe. He might therefore have to act very quickly in an emergency and thus could not rely on external forces like SAC or the Polaris missile force. The external forces, as programmed, would not provide timely coverage of targets whose immediate destruction was vital to the defense of Europe.¹⁰⁸³ Norstad therefore insisted on the importance of a land-based MRBM force under the direct control of SACEUR: NATO needed a certain degree of autonomy, and the NATO commander therefore needed an adequate nuclear force of his own. Norstad's opposition to the Kennedy Berlin strategy in late 1961 had also been based partly on this kind of reasoning: SACEUR's ability to carry out his mission of defending Europe would, in Norstad's view, be compromised by the way his atomic strike force would be degraded during the phase of conventional fighting. The new administration, Norstad felt, did not understand the importance of military considerations of this sort, and it did not understand that the military authorities, and above all SACEUR himself, needed to play the leading role in shaping strategy in this area.¹⁰⁸⁴

And Norstad was determined not to bend to the will of the new political leadership in Washington, or at any rate not to give way without a struggle. On Berlin planning, he refused to accept as binding the fundamental policy document, NSAM 109, which the president had approved in October 1961. The American government, he said, was free to give him advice, but he was responsible to the alliance as a whole and could not "receive directives" from any one country.¹⁰⁸⁵ He also refused to toe the official line on the MRBM question. Here again Norstad was not going to take orders from the U.S. government, orders which he felt were based on a fundamentally misguided policy.

To the Kennedy administration, all this was simply unacceptable. Norstad, it was felt in Washington, was the senior U.S. commander in Europe and his job was to champion American policy.¹⁰⁸⁶ "How could Norstad," Rusk wondered, "have a policy that was a NATO policy? What is a NATO policy? In the end, he has to speak as an American. There is only one American policy."¹⁰⁸⁷ The issue came to a head in mid-1962. SACEUR's independence, the president and his chief advisors now felt, had to be curtailed: Norstad could not be allowed to pursue a policy of his own, a policy at odds with what the political leadership wanted. When the question was put to him in June 1962, Norstad insisted on his autonomy. He was summoned back to Washington in July. McNamara and Kennedy told him how much they regretted the fact that he was going to have to retire for reasons of health. He objected, but to no avail. When he returned to Paris, he told his friend General Pierre Gallois what had happened. "Pete," he said, "I've been fired."¹⁰⁸⁸

Soon Norstad was in fact retired. General Lemnitzer was sent over to replace him. General Maxwell Taylor, the president's military advisor, then replaced Lemnitzer as JCS chairman. SACEUR's wings had been clipped. He had been "racked back" essentially to the role of a field commander, and his orders would come directly from Washington. The whole concept of a strong and independent SACEUR, and the whole cluster of political ideas with which it had been linked, had finally been swept away--a point which did not go unnoticed in Europe.¹⁰⁸⁹
The Centralization of Control: America and the Allies

Kennedy and his chief advisors felt that they needed to play a very active role, not just within the U.S. government but within the western alliance as well. The power to make war, the power to control military operations, the power to set both military and foreign policy--all this was to be concentrated at the top political level in Washington.

The American government, in their view, had the right to become far more assertive with the allies and play this kind of role. There was no viable purely European solution to the problem of European security, so the United States was more or less forced to remain involved. But if America was to carry this burden--if the United States was to maintain a large and costly military force in Europe, and if the country was to put its own cities at risk as part of the policy of committing American power to the defense of Europe--then the Americans could legitimately ask for certain things in return. "We are bound to pay the price of leadership," Bundy wrote. "We may as well have some of its advantages." That meant that the United States should play the key role in setting policy. De Gaulle and Adenauer seemed to think that they could chart their own course politically, but that, no matter what they did, America would always be there to protect them. Such an attitude was simply unacceptable: the United States, as Rusk put it, was not a "gendarme" people like that could call on at will. America, Bundy said, was not going to allow herself to be "pushed around" by the Europeans. If the defense of Europe was going to rest so heavily on America power, the Europeans could not expect to set their own course politically. They could not have it both ways. "A Europe beyond our influence--yet counting on us--in which we should have to bear the burden of defense without the power to affect events"--this was what Kennedy now saw as intolerable.¹⁰⁹⁰

So the allies were now expected to follow the American lead. The British, for example, might hope that their "special relationship" with the United States would enable them to play a real role, but the Americans were not thinking in terms of genuine cooperation and compromise. They were willing to go through the motions and engage in consultations, as long as the British fell in behind the United States on really important matters. Bundy's attitude was typical. In April 1961, Macmillan was coming over to meet with Kennedy, and Bundy outlined the position he thought the president should take with the British leader. "We should of course be willing to look at any new schemes they may dream up," he said, "but in return we should press very hard for British firmness at the moment of truth."¹⁰⁹¹ As for the French, Rusk took it for granted, even in September 1961, that they would also have little choice but to fall in with American policy. If the United States and Britain were determined to go ahead with the Berlin negotiations, the French, he thought, would ultimately "have to toe the line."¹⁰⁹² The same point applied to Germany. "The West Germans," Rusk said in August 1961, "were going to have to swallow a lot of things that they had hitherto maintained were entirely unacceptable to them."¹⁰⁹³

On the Berlin issue in particular, the American government now intended to set policy for the West as a whole. Eisenhower had felt that the United States could not simply impose its views on the allies, and indeed had thought of America almost as a kind of broker, whose aim was to work out a common line of action acceptable both to the British and to Adenauer.¹⁰⁹⁴ But in 1961 the U.S. government became far more assertive. In August of that year, Kennedy approved a plan for negotiations on Berlin. He wrote Rusk that America should "make it plain to our three Allies [Britain, France and West Germany] that this is what we mean to do and that they must come along or stay behind."¹⁰⁹⁵ Acheson also thought the United States should simply set policy for the West as a whole. In June, for example, he had argued that the question "was essentially one of U.S. will, and we had to make up our minds and begin to act regardless of the opinions of our allies."¹⁰⁹⁶ And at a very important meeting on October 20 he took the same sort of line. The United States, he said, was wasting too much time consulting with the allies. America did not "need to coordinate with our allies. We need to tell them." It was U.S. policy that mattered, and the Europeans would be pulled along in America's wake.¹⁰⁹⁷ America, he thought--and this view was accepted by the administration as a whole--should become a kind of "executive agent" for the NATO alliance, responsible for managing the western side of a military crisis in Europe.¹⁰⁹⁸

On the NATO nuclear question, it was much the same story. Again the key concept was the centralization of control in American hands. This basic objective was in turn reflected in a whole series of specific U.S. policies: on French and British nuclear weapons, on the physical control of American nuclear weapons in Europe, on land-based MRBMs and on a sea-based multilateral MRBM force. The general policy of concentrating control in U.S. hands was also reflected in formal strategic doctrine: the goal of centralizing control was rationalized by a new strategy which held that the United States and NATO in general had to be prepared to fight a controlled nuclear war.

This new policy on NATO nuclear issues was adopted at the very start of the Kennedy administration. At the beginning of 1961, Acheson was asked to look into the whole complex of issues relating to NATO and nuclear weapons. The report he presented in March contained a whole series of specific policy recommendations. On April 21, after some minor changes, Kennedy approved the Policy Directive Acheson had proposed in the report. America's NATO policy was now set, and the U.S. government would continue along the course Acheson had laid out until the end of 1962.

The thrust of the new policy was hard to miss. National nuclear forces were to be avoided and control was to be concentrated in American hands. It was "most important to the U.S.," Acheson wrote, "that use of nuclear weapons by the forces of other powers in Europe should be subject to U.S. veto and control." The French attempt to develop an independent nuclear capability was to be opposed. Even the British should be encouraged to get out of the "nuclear deterrent business." Control over American nuclear weapons needed to be tightened up, and MRBMs were not to be deployed on European soil.¹⁰⁹⁹

These various policies had one fundamental objective: the ultimate aim was to prevent the Germans from acquiring a nuclear force under their own control. It was taken for granted that a German move to develop such a force would be very dangerous. The Soviets, as Rusk put it, had "an overriding fear that the Germans will somehow manage to obtain control of nuclear weapons which they can fire on their own decision."¹¹⁰⁰ They might take some kind of preventive action as soon as it was clear that Germany was moving in this direction. If Germany was about to acquire a strategic missile force under her own control, this, he thought, "might be considered casus belli by the Soviets."¹¹⁰¹ So a nuclear force under German national control had to be ruled out. Kennedy himself was personally "very anxious to prevent nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Germans." It was, in fact, a fixed and very basic tenet of American policy throughout the Kennedy period that a German nuclear force would have to be blocked.¹¹⁰²

The various components of America's new NATO policy were rooted in this fundamental concern. The Kennedy administration was not opposed to national nuclear forces as a matter of principle. Neither a British nor even a French nuclear force was a real problem in itself. It was only because of the effect on Germany that the British and French forces posed problems. If France developed a nuclear force, and especially if she did so with America's blessing, how could one prevent the Germans from following suit? The United States therefore had to oppose the French effort to build an independent nuclear force. The German factor was decisive. As Kennedy himself pointed out in mid-1962, "the chief argument against the French having nuclear information has been the effect it would have on the Germans, encouraging them to do the same." He made the same point in December. The United States, he said, "had not supported the French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with France. Rightly or wrongly they [the Americans] had taken this attitude because of Germany."¹¹⁰³

The problem was that the French were obviously determined to build a nuclear force of their own, regardless of what the Americans said. To oppose their aspirations would not only place a burden on American relations with them in general, but it might also lead them to turn to the Germans for help in the nuclear area, and this inevitably would bring the Germans closer to acquiring a nuclear capability. The "dilemma," as Acheson put it in April 1961, "was that, if we helped the French, the Germans would insist on equal treatment. If we did not and the French persisted, they could only succeed by calling in the Germans. This would lead to the Germans acquiring nuclear power."¹¹⁰⁴ Kennedy himself also wondered whether the policy of refusing to help the French would "encourage them to go to the Germans--thus making German possession more likely." Perhaps the opposite policy was worth considering. Maybe one could make an "arrangement with the French that would limit the Germans in their demands," or at least one that would prevent the French from cooperating with the Germans in the nuclear area.¹¹⁰⁵

Kennedy was in fact reluctant to rule out the possibility of some kind of deal with France. Relations with de Gaulle had deteriorated sharply in the course of 1961. The French president disliked Kennedy's Berlin policy as well as his policy on NATO nuclear issues. But in 1962 Kennedy did not think the gap was unbridgeable and he wanted to see if de Gaulle could be brought back on board. Perhaps a liberalization of America's policy on nuclear aid to France might help solve the problem. In March 1962, Kennedy seemed to be "casting about for areas of cooperation with France in the nuclear weapons field." He wanted to find "some mechanism for bringing France back into the community of western nations." These efforts were supported by the JCS and by the top civilian officials in the Defense Department, who thought that nuclear assistance would free up funds for the conventional buildup the civilians especially considered so important. McNamara even argued that "missile aid to France would be justified on balance of payments grounds alone."¹¹⁰⁶

But the effort failed. "Basic NATO policy," as outlined in the April 1961 Policy Directive, was reaffirmed. There would for the time being be no nuclear aid for France. In the final analysis, this decision turned on a judgment about de Gaulle. The general, it was thought, was probably unappeasable. He would take what was offered, but give nothing in return. He was not the type to cut a deal with the Americans. His policy derived from fundamental convictions and would not change significantly even if American policy on nuclear assistance became a good deal more liberal. Yet in Kennedy's mind this remained something of an open issue. The president was not opposed in principle to the idea of nuclear cooperation with France and thought the question needed to be dealt with pragmatically. The important thing was to make sure that whatever was done with France, the Germans did not come closer to acquiring a nuclear force under national control.¹¹⁰⁷

What was true of France was even more true of Britain. The official American policy in 1961 and 1962 was to get the British "out of the nuclear business," but this goal was purely derivative in nature. After the administration had turned so sharply against the idea of nuclear cooperation with France, how could it go on supporting the British nuclear program? "We must try to eliminate the privileged British status," one official wrote. This was essential if American views were to carry any weight with the French: "in matters nuclear, the road to Paris may well be through London."¹¹⁰⁸ The hope was that if the British gave up trying to maintain an independent nuclear force, then the French--perhaps after de Gaulle left the scene--might go the same route, and that it would then be easier to keep the Germans in line. Within the British government, some high officials, including certain Cabinet ministers, were in fact ready to cooperate with this policy and leave the "nuclear business" in American hands.¹¹⁰⁹ So the basic American objective here did not seem totally beyond reach.

The new U.S. policy in this area implied, first of all, that the American government would have to phase out the special nuclear relationship with the British which had developed during the late Eisenhower period. The original decision to enter into such a relationship was now regarded as a "mistake." That relationship had developed, as Bundy pointed out, "at a time when thinking on these matters was very different from what it is now." If the U.S. government "had it to do over again," it would not have helped the British with their nuclear effort. "The correct line of our policy now" was to move away gradually "from an intermittent partnership with the British and to use our own influence in the direction of a gradual phasing down of the British nuclear commitment." Rusk took essentially the same line.¹¹¹⁰

The general Kennedy administration view was that the arrangements with the British worked out during the Eisenhower period needed to be scaled back. The bomber-based deterrent was obsolescent, so the way to get the British out of the "nuclear business" was to keep them from acquiring ballistic missiles. The existing program of cooperation went back to a December 1957 Eisenhower-Macmillan agreement. This now involved "extensive and frequent interchange" of ballistic missile information, in spite of the fact that the British did not have an MRBM program and the United States did not now "wish them to start one."¹¹¹¹ Obviously, this had to change. In the American view, there was no real point to the British deterrent force. "We would much rather have British efforts go into conventional weapons," Bundy wrote Kennedy, "and have the British join with the rest of NATO in accepting a single U.S.-dominated force."¹¹¹²

Control over NATO nuclear weapons was thus to be concentrated in American hands. This implied, among other things, that the weapons now in Europe needed to be placed under effective American control. The present situation was clearly unsatisfactory. Acheson understood that under current arrangements U.S. "custody"--he placed the word in quotation marks--was often more theoretical than real. "Many of the European Allies," he pointed out in April, "were in fact holding nuclear weapons." "There was no way at present," he noted, "of guaranteeing that those Allies who held nuclear weapons would in fact get the President's agreement before using them."¹¹¹³ The Acheson Report therefore called for a study of how "nuclear weapons in NATO Europe could be made more secure against unauthorized use."¹¹¹⁴ This recommendation was accepted on April 6, and the administration soon took steps to place these weapons under effective American control.¹¹¹⁵

The most important of these measures was the introduction of the Permissive Action Link, a device which would secure the weapons against unauthorized use. In June 1962, it was decided that PALs would be put on all American-owned weapons in Europe. Weapons outside of Europe--those, for example, on American naval vessels--were not affected. The basic goal was to make sure that the European allies could not use those American weapons on their own. But the weapons assigned to the American forces in Europe were also to be fitted with PALs. This was in part because Norstad had warned about the "allied reaction if U.S. and [European] NATO nuclear weapons were to be treated differently." But it also to a certain extent reflected the administration's interest in limiting SACEUR's autonomy and downgrading the NATO command as a whole.¹¹¹⁶

American policy on the MRBM issue was cut from the same cloth. Once again, the aim was to avoid the development of European nuclear forces under national control, and to keep the war-making power fully in American hands. In October 1959, NATO headquarters had called for the deployment in Europe of a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1500 miles. Norstad wanted 300 such missiles, with yields of up to a single megaton, to be deployed by 1963.¹¹¹⁷ And he wanted land-based missiles, which were more accurate, thus making it possible to use warheads with smaller yields, thereby limiting collateral damage. Land-based missiles were also easier to control than seaborne weapons and had a shorter reaction time.¹¹¹⁸ And although Norstad insisted that the land-based MRBMS were needed for these and other military reasons, he also had certain political objectives in mind. An MRBM force under the direct control of SACEUR could have a powerful deterrent effect, over and above the effect produced by the external forces under American national control. With such a force, NATO in his view could become a "fourth nuclear power."¹¹¹⁹