A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

Adenauer had grossly misjudged the whole political situation. In the early years of the Federal Republic, he had benefited enormously from allied anxieties about Germany. He had been the indispensable man. If he ever lost power in Bonn, who could tell how German policy would evolve? For the western powers, the goal was to make sure that Germany would remain more or less voluntarily in their bloc, and it was therefore vital that Adenauer remain at the helm. Adenauer fully agreed with this analysis, and indeed did what he could to make sure that the allies continued thinking along these lines. Only his strong and steady hand, he encouraged them to think, could keep his people from going off in the wrong direction. His policy was under attack from powerful forces within Germany. It would be a disaster, he argued in the early 1950s, if someone like Schumacher replaced him as chancellor. His ability to master the situation was by no means guaranteed. The allied governments therefore had to do everything they could to support him. They had to give him the concessions he needed to maintain his political position within Germany. And the allies gave him what he needed. Germany's international position was very different in 1955 from what it had been in 1949. To the German electorate, Adenauer was thus the man the western powers trusted, the man who, benefitting from that trust, had been able to transform Germany's international status so dramatically--the man who had brought Germany into the West and had won for the Federal Republic the protection and support of the western powers.

But allied support for Adenauer, as reflected in Dulles's extraordinary intervention in the 1953 German elections, led in the course of the 1950s to a fundamental change in the structure of German politics. The SPD, the main opposition party, came to the conclusion that it could not hope to gain power as long as the allies, and especially the Americans, were so strongly in Adenauer's camp--so long as the CDU/CSU was the party of the western alliance and the SPD was hostile to the NATO system.¹³⁸⁴

These political considerations provided the framework for a fundamental rethinking of SPD policy on alliance and strategic issues. By 1961, when the SPD fought the national elections with Willy Brandt as their chancellor-designate, the party had become perfectly acceptable to the Americans as an alternative to Adenauer. The policy of the Schumacher period was dead and buried. The SPD was now a moderate, pro-western party, committed to NATO and to the American alliance. Adenauer therefore could no longer tell the western countries that if he fell from power they would have to deal with someone like Schumacher. Indeed, from the U.S. point of view, the new SPD was in many ways better than Adenauer. It was pro-NATO, but a good deal more moderate than Adenauer and Strauss on the nuclear issue. It was thus more likely to fall in with the Kennedy policy on NATO and east-west questions. Adenauer was no longer the indispensable man, and among other things this weakened the chancellor's position vis-à-vis the other leaders of his own governing coalition.¹³⁸⁵

And in fact, quite apart from the question of his relations with the Americans, Adenauer's hold on the levers of power within Germany was weakening. The sense was growing that this old man had outlived his usefulness--that his policy was stale, out of touch with new political realities. The old "policy of strength" had not brought German reunification any closer. To many, the Berlin Wall symbolized the bankruptcy of the Adenauer policy. When West Berlin was sealed off in August 1961, the chancellor did not seem up to the occasion, and many Germans were put off by his partisan and indeed personal attacks on Brandt in that period just before the September 1961 elections. If the policy had failed, if the hard line had gotten Germany nowhere, wasn't the alternative policy worth considering? A policy of détente might eventually lead to something different, perhaps in the very long run to the reunification of their divided country. This was what the Americans had been preaching, even under Dulles.¹³⁸⁶ Now Kennedy was going to move ahead, with or without Germany. The Federal Republic had to be realistic. She could not afford to alienate her most powerful ally. If Adenauer did not understand all this, then maybe it was time for him to go.¹³⁸⁷

With this sort of thinking on the rise, there was little chance that the Adenauer policy could survive the kind of attack the U.S. government mounted in early 1963. If the Germans had to choose between France and America, that choice was relatively easy to make: the Federal Republic would follow the American lead.

For Kennedy, these events were of fundamental importance, but only half the problem had been solved. The other half had to do with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government still wanted a general understanding with the USSR. The goal was still the stabilization of the status quo in central Europe. The Soviet Union and the western powers could get along by "recognizing existing facts, of which there are three important elements--the existence of East Germany, West Germany and West Berlin." The U.S. government had made it clear that it would not move against the USSR in areas "where it has physical control," but by the same token the Soviets should not try to undermine the American position in West Berlin. If the Soviets accepted the "fact of our presence in West Berlin," just as the Americans accepted "the fact of theirs in East Germany and East Berlin," the two sides, Soviet officials were told, could live together in peace in central Europe.¹³⁸⁸

Thus the policy laid out in the March 1962 "Principles" document was still in effect--and the Soviets were in fact told that this was the case.¹³⁸⁹ The American aim, as Rusk explained to Khrushchev, was to bring about "more normal relations," not just between the two Germanies, but also between West Germany and what he now called (having been chided by Khrushchev on this point) the "socialist countries to the east."¹³⁹⁰ The United States, moreover, agreed with the USSR "that the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability."¹³⁹¹ If the two sides were to reach agreement on the basis of these principles, the German government would not be allowed to block it. U.S. policy was based on America's own vital interests. "The United States," Rusk said in October, was "no monkey on the stick manipulated by West Germany."¹³⁹²

The one thing the U.S. government asked in exchange was that the Soviets, for their part, also respect the status quo, and in particular that the USSR respect western rights in West Berlin. It was "almost a waste of time to go on," Rusk told Gromyko, "if this is not accepted."¹³⁹³ The ball was now in Russia's court. If the Soviets were serious about moving ahead toward a formal settlement, all they had to do was accept the status quo in West Berlin.

The Americans had thus laid out the terms on which they were ready to settle what everyone knew was the central problem of the Cold War, and there was a good deal in that American offer that the USSR found attractive. The German nuclear question, as Soviet officials often pointed out, was the USSR's "number one" problem.¹³⁹⁴ And the Americans were apparently still offering what by any reasonable standard was a quite acceptable solution. Even in 1961 and 1962 many high Soviet officials had disliked the Khrushchev policy, and now that it had failed so miserably the grumbling became more intense: Khrushchev should not have embarked upon such a provocative course of action, especially given that the Americans still had the upper hand in strategic terms. Perhaps they even felt that because of his ineptness and amateurishness, he might have squandered a major opportunity to solve the USSR's most important foreign policy problem.¹³⁹⁵

If nothing were done, the situation, from the Soviet point of view, might deteriorate very rapidly. The Germans, for example, might get a nuclear capability of their own, perhaps through the MLF. When the Soviets brought up this issue, which they often did, the standard American reply was that this simply could not happen, that the whole point of the MLF, in fact, was to absorb pressures for nuclear forces under national control and thus to prevent this from happening. But Soviet leaders were not convinced. As one Soviet diplomat remarked in March, his government was getting "rather tired" of these arguments about how the MLF would satisfy the Germans and thus head off a real German nuclear force. Similar assurances given in the past about the limits on German military power had turned out not to be worth much, and he took it for granted that if the Germans participated in the MLF and paid for the weapons, "they would of course in time demand greater control over them."¹³⁹⁶ This sort of argument was by no means viewed as unreasonable, even within the U.S. government.¹³⁹⁷ And the MLF, of course, was not the only way the Germans could get their hands on nuclear weapons. Now, after the Franco-German treaty, there was a good deal of talk about a continental bloc and especially about a German force being built in cooperation with France. The USSR, in fact, violently attacked the treaty, precisely because it raised the specter of Franco-German nuclear collaboration.¹³⁹⁸

A strong case could therefore be made within the Soviet leadership for moving ahead with the United States and working out a settlement on the basis of the American plan. After all, a deal with America might be the only way to solve the problem. The Americans had in effect won the great test of strength in October 1962: it was obvious that the hard line, based ultimately on the threat of war, was no longer viable. The USSR's growing conflict with China also underscored the importance of some sort of understanding with the United States. But Khrushchev was stubborn. He still would not give way on Berlin, not formally at any rate. Using another one of the anatomical metaphors of which he was so fond, he now told the Americans that the West had "corns" in Berlin, and that from time to time he would step on the president's foot "so he could realize he should cut off his corns."¹³⁹⁹ American leaders were not quite sure how to take this threat, but it was clear that the Soviet leader was not going to give the Americans what they wanted on Berlin. A formal settlement was therefore simply not in the cards.

But this did not mean that a more informal understanding could not be worked out: if the front door was locked, maybe the back door was still open. And, indeed, from Kennedy's point of view, there were certain advantages to dealing with these matters in a somewhat indirect way. Anything formal was bound to irritate the Germans. It would be like putting an official seal of approval on the division of Germany. And the Europeans in general would certainly resent the idea of America and Russia deciding the fate of their continent over their heads.

The nuclear question was fundamental, and here especially the Kennedy administration understood that it was not a good idea to focus too explicitly on West Germany. Wouldn't it be better to frame the formal arrangements in quite general terms, and support what was being done with the argument that the world as a whole had a vital interest in halting the spread of nuclear weapons? As Rusk once pointed out, it was precisely in order to avoid dealing with the issue in the context of the German question "that we proposed to take up non-proliferation in a wider framework."¹⁴⁰⁰ Even if the Germans knew what was going on--and some German officials certainly understood that the non-proliferation policy was in large measure directed at Germany--this general approach was still more palatable than one which singled out the Germans explicitly for discriminatory treatment.¹⁴⁰¹

The German nuclear question could thus be dealt with by means of a relatively broad arms control agreement. But this could be an element of a general settlement only if there were some link--perhaps simply a tacit or structural link--with the other parts of the German question, and in particular with the Berlin problem. Perhaps there could be no formal quid pro quo: the Soviets might not formally accept the status quo in Berlin in exchange for an American promise to keep West Germany non-nuclear. But the linkage could be established in other ways. It could be a by-product of the process which gave rise to the arms control agreement in the first place. And in this indirect way, the basic elements of a settlement could fall into place.

And that, in fact, was essentially what happened in 1963. In that year, a settlement of sorts took shape. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of July 1963 was the central event in this process, not because arms control was in itself a fundamental element of the system now coming into being, but rather because major political understandings could be reached in the guise of arms control agreements.¹⁴⁰²

It was because a test ban could play this central political role that that issue had become so important. Nuclear arms control, of course, had been on the international agenda since 1945, but under Eisenhower policy in this area had been largely an exercise in public relations. The U.S. government in the 1950s knew that its main arms control proposals were one-sided, that the USSR would never accept them, but that the western governments had to at least appear to make a certain effort because public opinion expected it. Thus it was understood that the Americans would "gain greatly" from the Open Skies plan that Eisenhower proposed at the Geneva summit conference in 1955, and would gain even more if the U.S. plan for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material were put into effect. The Open Skies arrangement would allow the United States to gather the target intelligence it needed to mount an effective attack, and would do little to solve the surprise attack problem, its ostensible goal. And a cut-off in the production of fissionable material would "freeze our superiority," and would thus be very much to the advantage of the United States. These proposals were in fact so one-sided that American officials understood that there was no chance the Soviets would accept them. But the U.S. government had to at least appear to be taking arms control seriously; it was important that the world not come to view America as a militaristic nation.¹⁴⁰³

But even at that time, there was one area of arms control which the U.S. government did take seriously. America and Russia, as Dulles told Gromyko in 1957, had a common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Neither country, he said, would use their weapons "irresponsibly," but smaller countries might behave differently. It was "frightening to think of a world "where anybody could have a bomb."¹⁴⁰⁴ This did not mean that the Eisenhower administration thought it could freeze the status quo and make sure that there were no new nuclear powers; indeed, for Eisenhower it was natural that the major allies would sooner or later have nuclear forces of their own. But the line obviously had to be drawn somewhere, and America and Russia might be able to cooperate in this area.

Under Kennedy, these concerns became more intense, and the idea that the two major powers had a common interest in preventing what was now coming to be called "nuclear proliferation" was brought up again and again in high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings during the Kennedy period. Rusk, for example, stressed that on the proliferation issue, the existing nuclear powers had "identical" interests, and that "it was almost in the nature of nuclear weapons that if someone had them, he did not want others to have them."¹⁴⁰⁵

The new administration thus tried hard to reach a test ban agreement with the Soviets, and this effort climaxed with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in mid-1963. The test ban was the centerpiece of the Kennedy administration's non-proliferation policy. A ban on testing would not have a major effect on the strategic balance one way or the other. As Kennedy told Khrushchev in June 1961, it would not reduce the American or the Soviet nuclear stockpile, nor would it affect the production of nuclear weapons. It would, however, make proliferation less likely. If there were no test ban agreement, then other countries besides the four who had already tested nuclear devices would "undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program," and "in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers."¹⁴⁰⁶ But even a limited test ban, the Soviets were later told, would be a "big step forward" toward non-proliferation, "since countries could not produce weapons without tests in the atmosphere."¹⁴⁰⁷

Non-proliferation, however, was not just a general goal that applied to all prospective nuclear powers in a more or less undifferentiated way. The policy was directed above all at two countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of China, and a fundamental aim of American policy on the test ban issue was to prevent both of them from developing nuclear forces of their own. The test ban treaty was thus not a mere arms control measure, only marginally related to the core issues that lay at the heart of international political life. It was important because it related directly to two great political issues: the German question and the problem of China.

Originally, the hope was that there could be some sort of arrangement dealing with both Germany and China. The Americans had by late 1962 become quite concerned with the China problem. The prospect of a Chinese nuclear force, Bundy wrote in November, was "the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years."¹⁴⁰⁸ Even small nuclear forces in the hands of people like the Chinese Communists, Kennedy thought, "could be very dangerous to us all," to Russia as well as to America; the assumption was that even a limited test ban might be an effective way to deal with this problem.¹⁴⁰⁹ The president in fact went so far as to say that the problem of China was "the whole reason for having a test ban."¹⁴¹⁰ The Soviets, on the other hand, were mainly interested in keeping nuclear weapons out of German hands. As Kennedy himself pointed out in June 1963, a non-nuclear Germany was one of the main things the Soviets could hope to get from a test ban treaty.¹⁴¹¹

But even if China was America's main concern and the Russians were concerned mainly with Germany, it was also true that both major powers wanted to prevent both China and Germany from going nuclear. It thus seemed possible that some sort of arrangement could be worked out: the United States would keep Germany non-nuclear, and in exchange the Soviets would make sure that China did not develop a nuclear capability. Rusk hinted at an understanding of this sort when he met with Mikoyan in November 1962. A non-proliferation arrangement, he pointed out, would have little meaning if countries who wanted to get into the nuclear club refused to sign the agreements: "For instance, we assume the Soviet Union would be greatly concerned if Germany refused to sign. On our part, we would be greatly concerned if China, or indeed any one of twenty other countries capable of developing atomic weapons, refused to sign."¹⁴¹²

And it was assumed that an arrangement of this sort--one which would prevent both Germany and China from becoming nuclear powers--might be worked out in the context of the test ban negotiations. A test ban, the Soviets would be told, would mean that "there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp."¹⁴¹³ The Russians, for their part, would prevent their allies from building nuclear forces. And these commitments would be linked: the United States would "take responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated."¹⁴¹⁴ This meant essentially that the Americans would keep West Germany non-nuclear, and that in return the Soviets would keep China from developing a nuclear capability. Germany and China were the real targets; the Kennedy administration's policy toward other incipient or potential "proliferators," especially France and Israel, was basically a good deal more liberal.¹⁴¹⁵

But could an arrangement of the sort the U.S. government had in mind actually be worked out? The Soviet Union, embroiled in an increasingly nasty conflict with China, might want to keep nuclear weapons away from that country, but did the Russians have it within their power to make the Chinese accept a non-nuclear status? There was, after all, a basic difference between Germany and China. Germany was far more dependent on America than China was on the USSR. There was a good chance that the Germans could be made to toe the line, but it would be much harder to make China sign the test ban agreement.

The Americans, however, had given some thought to the problem. If the Chinese insisted on pursuing their nuclear program, the problem might be dealt with by means of direct military action. The Chinese nuclear facilities could be attacked and destroyed--perhaps by the Americans themselves, perhaps by the Soviets, but in either case with the other's tacit or open support.¹⁴¹⁶ In November 1962, Bundy evidently raised the issue with Kennedy.¹⁴¹⁷ The military leadership at about this time was also beginning to think about how "military means can be brought to bear on Red China in the coming years to assure a behavior favorable to U.S. national objectives."¹⁴¹⁸ In February 1962, Nitze asked the Chiefs to outline their views on how China could be persuaded or compelled to accept a test ban agreement, and in April General LeMay listed a number of military actions which could be used to force the Chinese into line.¹⁴¹⁹ American officials had not excluded the possibility of direct Soviet military action against the Chinese nuclear facilities, "perhaps in the context of our assuming obligations to prevent West Germany's obtaining nuclear weapons."¹⁴²⁰ If the Chinese moved ahead with their nuclear program and the USSR "did nothing," Kennedy said on June 29, "it would be very hard for the United States to continue with a test-ban treaty."¹⁴²¹ And during the Moscow test ban negotiation in July, Kennedy personally instructed the U.S. representative to find out if Khrushchev was willing "either to take Soviet action or to accept U.S. action" aimed at "limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development."¹⁴²²

A test ban treaty, even one which China did not sign, would help the U.S. government achieve its goal of keeping China non-nuclear. The treaty would help bring a kind of non-proliferation regime into being. It would establish a sort of international norm that would provide a degree of legitimacy for military action of the sort the U.S. government had in mind. The more countries that signed it, the stronger the norm, and the firmer the basis for international action. This, incidentally, was one of the reasons why it was so important that France sign the treaty, and why the U.S. government went to such lengths to bring de Gaulle on board. If France came in, it would make China more of a pariah, more a legitimate target for military action.

But the project could only be implemented if the USSR agreed to cooperate. And although the Soviets were concerned with the prospect of China developing a nuclear capability within a year or two, they simply were not ready for the sort of policy the U.S. government had in mind. Military measures were considered too extreme. As a result, China in fact did proceed with her nuclear program, and nothing was done to prevent her from doing so.