Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files


AC Frontline: Topicality – Mexico Security 433



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2AC Frontline: Topicality – Mexico Security 433



1) We Meet: The plan is assistance designed to improve Mexico’s economy by cracking down on corruption and drug violence. Our advantages don’t have to be topical, only the plan, and on face we are economic assistance.
2) Counter-Interpretation: Economic engagement is economic assistance that helps with security goals, and cannot be military aid.
TARNOFF AND NOWELS, 04

[Curt, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and National Defense; Larry, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and National Defense for Congressional Research Service;” Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” 4/15, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-916.pdf]


There are five major categories of foreign assistance: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid. Due largely to the recent implementation two new foreign aid initiatives — the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Global AIDS Initiative — bilateral development assistance has become the largest category of U.S. aid.
3) Counter Standards:

a) Affirmative ground: Their interpretation forces the affirmative to only read economy advantages all year. These debates would get stale, and the Negative would be overly prepared to outweigh us with security-based disadvantages. The only way for the Affirmative to win, and for learning to continue all year, is to have a diversity of Harms scenarios to argue.
b) Education: The topic is about foreign engagement with multiple countries. If the only arguments every round were generic economy arguments, we would not learn anything about Mexico, Cuba, or Venezuela.

2AC Frontline: Topicality – Mexico Security 434



4) No abuse: Our solvency evidence proves the plan is implemented by USAID, and all of their programs are economic assistance and not classified as security programs.
TARNOFF AND NOWELS, 04

[Curt, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and National Defense; Larry, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and National Defense for Congressional Research Service;” Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” 4/15, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-916.pdf]


The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manages the bulk of bilateral economic assistance; the Treasury Department handles most multilateral aid; and the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department administer military and other security-related programs. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a new foreign aid agency created in 2004. The House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have primary congressional responsibility for authorizing foreign aid programs while the House and Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittees manage bills appropriating most foreign assistance funds.
5) Mixing burdens: They require you to look at our Harms and Solvency before determining if we are topical. Look at the plan text alone: if the plan gives financial assistance to one of the three topical countries, then the Affirmative must be Topical.
6) Default to reasonability: it’s impossible for the Affirmative to win the round on topicality, so we should only need to provide a good interpretation rather than the best one. If both sides have ground and arguments, you should resolve the debate on substantive issues instead of topicality.

2AC Frontline: Topicality – Venezuela Democracy 435



1) We Meet: Our 1AC proves that Venezuela will accept the aid and meet the conditions, meaning the plan results in assistance transferring to Venezuela. If the plan results in foreign aid, then there is no abuse and no reason to intervene on the policy debate to throw our case out on topicality grounds.
2) Counter-Interpretation: Engagement requires conditioning aid on fulfilling certain requirements before the assistance is received.
TZIVELIS, 06

[Vassiliki, Masters student of European Studies at College of Europe in Brussels; “The European Union’s Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It is Time to Tie the Knot,” http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf]


The common position has expressed the policy of “constructive engagement” and it has been the backbone of EU-Cuba relations since 1996. According to the New England International and Comparative Law Annual, “constructive engagement” is defined by “active trade and extensive diplomatic relations in hope that eventually the un-democratic country will have to accede to the concerns of the international community.” 8 The EU has 4 in fact maintained an active dialogue with Cuba while the Member States engaged in trade and investment with the island. This approach implies a conditionality by which Cuba is denied the formalization of its already extensive relations with the EU until certain prerequisites have been fulfilled. The definition of “constructive engagement” implies a certain reluctance on behalf of the EU to play an active role in the facilitation of a transition in Cuba. Even though the objective is to achieve democratization and respect of human rights, the European Union does not commit to a framework in which it will aid the country to reach these objectives. Ad hoc development aid has been the main European effort to achieve these goals, but the lack of an institutionalization of this aid, with clear long-term goals and projects presents an obstacle to effective results. Some authors have argued that the newly established policy of “constructive engagement” reduced the EU’s commitment to provide Cuba with development aid, by pointing at the dramatic reduction in Community aid, from 30 million ecus in 1995 to 8 million ecus in 1997, 9 coinciding with the adoption of the Common Position. An EU official confirmed that “the dramatic reduction of aid was a clear political move.” 10 Instead of committing to a cooperation, which would favor progress in the political and economic situation in Cuba, the EU imposes conditionality on the granting of a formalized framework of cooperation. Eduardo Perera differentiates between two different types of conditionality. The first one is mutually agreed to by two parties, during the establishment and definition of their cooperation. The second type of conditionality is unilaterally imposed and is not subject to an agreement. 11 One could say that the conditionality implied in Cotonou or in a cooperation agreement signed by the European Union with any third country qualifies as the first type of conditionality, whereas the conditionality applied to Cuba through the Common Position would qualify in the second category, as it implies the establishment of certain preconditions, which once fulfilled, will result in certain benefits for the receiving country. This type of conditionality is directed towards freezing the process of negotiation until the country has fulfilled certain criteria, unlike the first where the donor country helps the recipient reach the agreed-upon goals.



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