Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files
AC Frontline: Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage 272
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2AC Frontline: Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage 2721) No Internal Link: Their uniqueness evidence is about current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but their impact evidence is from 1999. If peace talks have failed for the last decade, why haven’t the impacts happened? There is no risk of escalation because other countries have given up hope for the peace process negotiations. 2) Non-Unique: Obama is trying to get out of the Middle East, and is not focused on leading in the peace process. THE NATIONAL, 13 [Michael Young, “US influence in the region is dwindling under Obama,” 6/13, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-influence-in-the-region-is-dwindling-under-obama/] Washington has behaved ambiguously towards Saudi priorities. The administration is not particularly happy with the Saudi-endorsed policy in Bahrain, but has done nothing to prevent it. On Iran and its nuclear programme, the US has imposed sanctions, but continues to avoid any resort to war. Mr Obama has shown little interest in the region, so the Saudis see a president upon whom they feel they cannot rely. This has handicapped America's ability to enrol the Saudis in its diplomatic ventures, above all peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. Mr Obama's initial willingness to depend on an alternative country, Turkey, to help advance American regional interests has failed, as Turkish limitations in the Syrian conflict have become evident. The notion that America can lead from behind is a fantasy. Without America in the vanguard imposing a common agenda, there will be only cacophony as America's allies pursue separate aims. Nowhere has this been more obvious than in Syria, with Qatar and Turkey supporting some rebel factions, and the Saudis backing their rivals. Gone are the days of the 1990s when the US held all the reins in the Middle East. Then, the regional architecture was built on the combination of a friendly Egypt that played a vital role in bolstering American regional diplomacy, Saudi Arabia, which steadied the energy markets, and Israel, which was America's foremost military arm in the region, and whose conflict with the Arabs was supposed to be resolved through an American-sponsored peace process. 3) Case Outweighs: Our Harms scenarios have larger impacts than their Disadvantage. By solving for our Harms, we are stopping global war. Even if they win their impact, it is only a regional war that has never escalated because every country in the Middle East is deterred from attacking the others. 2AC Frontline: Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage 2734) Turn: Winners Win. Other countries are already backlashing against Obama. The plan provides a foreign policy victory that will create new energy and focus going forward. WALT, 09 [Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; “Nibbled to death by ducks?,” 7/27, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled_to_death_by_ducks] Obama took office with energy, a new vision, an experienced team, and lengthy "to-do" list. But one can already sense the forward motion slowing, which will encourage opponents to dig their heels in deeper and throw more obstacles in his path. If the administration keeps trying to do everything at once, there is a real danger that their actual foreign policy achievements will be quite modest. The sooner they decide which goals they think they can actually bring off, and focus their energies there, the more likely they are to succeed. And a few tangible successes now might actually make the other items on their agenda easier to accomplish later on. 5) No Internal Link: Every Middle Eastern country is overly focused on domestic issues and won’t work for peace. AMERICAN INTEREST, 13 [Chuck Freilich; Senior Fellow, International Security Program at Harvard, “Proceed With Caution,” 1/02, http://the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1395] Moreover, American influence in the region is at a decades-long nadir and the United States is preoccupied with formidable domestic challenges. Europe is in even worse shape, and the newest iteration of the historic Arab Awakening continues to rock the region. As important as Israeli-Palestinian peace is, the pressing issues in 2013 are the events in the Arab countries and Iran. The mantra, that Israeli-Palestinian peace is essential to address the region's other ills, which never held more than a kernel of truth, sounds even more off key today. Egypt is in the midst of an ongoing revolution that will probably lead, at best, to a severe deterioration in relations with the United States and Israel, and possibly to the end of the March 1979 peace treaty. Syria is likely to become a radical Islamist state, if it even remains unified, and its violent final hours will overshadow any peace process diplomacy. Iran’s nuclear program is the primary issue in the region, along with Sunni-Shi‘a antagonisms that are now being militarized in and around Syria. Jordan is unlikely to remain the only Arab country at peace with Israel if Egypt abrogates its peace treaty. Almost all countries of the “Arab world”, a misnomer if there ever was one, face grave domestic crises so that their interest and ability to play a moderating influence over the Palestinians is even more insignificant than in the past. 2AC Frontline: Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage 2746) Non-Unique: Overall foreign assistance to every region is declining because of structural reasons that make further declines inevitable. Obama will have to make cuts in Middle East support inevitably. HOPKINS, 2000 [Raymond, Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore; “POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN AID,” http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/rhopkin1/research/PolEconFA.pdf] The decline in foreign aid occurred for six reasons. First, the end of the cold war made it less important. Second, globalisation attenuated aid tied to colonial interests. Third, growing budget pressures squeezed donor resources. Fourth, disappointment with the effectiveness of aid weakened popular support. Fifth, donor country special interest coalitions supporting aid unravelled. Finally, neo-liberal philosophies challenged some of the intellectual foundations of aid. A brief elaboration of these reasons follows. 7) No Link: There is no trade-off in pressing for more issues. Adding democracy and human rights issues to Obama’s agenda will make other security issues more successful. CALINGAERT, 12 [Daniel, Executive Vice President for Freedom House; “Rethinking U.S. Relations With Dictators,” 10/10, http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/rethinking-us-relations-dictators] U.S. relations with authoritarian regimes often focus on a trade-off between security and economic interests on the one hand and human rights and democracy on the other. By accepting this bargain, which dictators often proffer, U.S. policymakers tend to miss opportunities to raise human rights issues and thereby contribute to both the expansion of democracy and U.S. interests in the long term. A group of 22 leading human rights organizations and experts, including Freedom House, have urged the next U.S. president to look past the false choice between values and interests and review U.S. relationships with governments that violate human rights. We believe that the United States should stop underestimating, or refusing to use, its power and moral capital to keep human rights on the agenda. Recent history amply demonstrates how the United States can raise human rights concerns while pursuing security interests at the same time. In the 1980s, U.S. pressure at critical moments on allied governments in the Philippines, Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea assisted their transitions from dictatorship to democracy. The United States also kept human rights on the agenda in its negotiations with the Soviet Union and still made progress in nuclear arms reductions. U.S. opposition to totalitarian ideology and support for dissidents contributed to the fall of communism. These lessons of history seem to have been lost in the Middle East and elsewhere. Decades of cozy relations with Arab dictators blinded U.S. policymakers to the groundswell of disaffection that eventually launched the 2011 Arab uprisings, and did lasting damage to U.S. credibility in the eyes of Arab revolutionaries. By clinging to the mistaken belief that soft-peddling on human rights was the price to pay for influence and stability in the region, the United States ultimately obtained neither. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2011 2011 -> Voices of the Old Sea Norman Lewis 2011 -> Malevil Robert Merle 2011 -> The Elephant Keeper’s Children Peter Hoeg 2011 -> Jv packet •Mars Colonization Affirmative •Mars Colonization Negative 2011 -> Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) omb no. 1024-0018 2011 -> All America Looks Up to Virginia;” Virginia and the Declaration of Independence 2011 -> Rao bulletin 2011 -> Christopher Columbus was born between 25 August and 31 October 1451 in 2011 -> The Battle of Frenchtown (1855), Washington Territory: the Political and Demographic Context rev 9/4/11 2011 -> Seti aff •seti neg •Asteroids Aff Download 3.16 Mb. Share with your friends:
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