Dr. Constantinos Filis Dimopoulos Dimosthenis, Karagiannopoulos Petros-Damianos



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Eurasian Union orientation


Russia unwilling to “lose” Ukraine to European Union, for all the reasons mentioned above, launched a series of substantial trade sanctions against Ukraine in July and August 2013. What Russia wants is Ukraine to reject the European bid and join its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

In June 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin surprised everybody by stating that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would enter the WTO as a customs union. These three countries agreed to unify their customs tariff s. In 2010, the Customs Union came into existence, with the implementation of a common customs tariff and joint Customs Code. In January 2012, border controls were abolished. A joint secretariat, the Eurasian Economic Commission, was set up in Moscow with a staff of more than 1,000 people. The Eurasian Development Bank in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and an arbitration court in Minsk were also established. [15]

The final step of the transformation of the customs union into a transnational constitution was made when in 29.05.2014 was sealed the Eurasian Union's creation by 1.1.2015 by the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in Kazakhstan's capital, Astana. This timing is related to the current Ukraine crisis; Russian President made it clear that Ukraine would not participate in the Eurasian Economic Union, because of its signing of the Association Agreement. [16]

Although the signing of the agreement on the Ukrainian side has not completely close the door to any future friendly Russo-Ukrainian relations, Putin’s choice to rush on the creation of the Eurasian Union is puts additional pressure to Ukrainian government. Russia is trying to capitalize any possibility of aggravated social unrest because of the country’s economic instability; by showing Ukrainians that there is another way that this crisis could be resolved: by abandoning the European perspective in order to enter the Eurasian Union.

Except than the fact that Russia offers relief from the greatest part of current Ukraine’s economic pressure Russia themselves are putting, ending their trade sanctions against Ukraine, the only clear option that provides to Ukrainian people is the end of the armed conflict pro-Russians have started in eastern provinces. Even if Ukraine cancels every agreement recently signed with the EU, Russia is not going to let Crimea go.

Although it will take time in order Ukrainian people to forget Russia’s annexation of Crimea, there is a high possibility than many of them could set their differences aside for a while, and since Ukraine’s economic situation is continuously aggravating and the only international actor could immensely relieve the Ukrainian economic burden is Russia.

The possibility of a Russian orientation choice for Ukraine might not seem viable for the time being. Although nobody could refuse that if the internal situation keeps worsening, Ukraine’s policy could make a mid-term major swift towards this direction. It does not look to be in Moscow’s interest the major political and constitutional reforms in Ukraine, like the ones EU is proposing, although if Ukraine applies to be a member of the Eurasian Union in lieu of the EU, Moscow would surely seek the reduction of corruption in order the future viability of the country’s to be preserved.

The neutrality option


While someone carefully considers EU’s policy about Ukraine and the current situation in the country, could easily understand that if EU’s political agenda was in fact selfless would prefer a neutral Ukraine, in order to de-climax the crisis and let Russia relieve the pressure, by making Moscow feel less threatened by the West. In contrary if the EU keeps pursuing solutions being interested firstly about their own benefits, by absorbing Ukraine into the western system – EU and NATO – would probably cause Russia to at least persist on the Ukrainian economy’s complete destruction, as it would be more thoroughly explained later.

Then follows the question whether Ukraine has got a middle option; the option of neutrality. Such an option could copy Finland’s example during the Cold War, when both Russia and the West agreed to keep Finland out of the fight. The word “Finlandisation” in this context refers to the agreement in the late 1940s between the US, the UK and the USSR to keep Finland out of the Cold War, which was gathering in intensity at the time.

Rather than absorb Finland back into Mother Russia or convert it into a client, communist state as in Poland, Stalin agreed to accept Finland’s neutrality status. This status quo lasted for forty years. Finland could neither tilt to the Soviet Union nor to the Western powers. [17]

The Finland status not only abated the possibility of an armed conflict in Europe or but also helped the internal policy makers to construct a very well-functioning market and an exemplary democratic regime. It is not clear if the majority of Ukrainian people has taken this thought under consideration, but probably would be a very tempting offer, because it could not even put an end to the current circle of violence but could upgrade every economic and commercial capability of the country in short notice. Despite all these, only Western allies and Russia together could make a final decision towards this approach, in contrary with the two previously described options.



“Finlandisation” does not mean that the EU appeases Moscow. But they need to realize that taking harsh actions against Russia could only make sense if its members carry a collective big stick of European warfare capabilities, along with active development of a more coherent energy policy that reduces massive overdependence of Germany and its Eastern European neighbors on Russian sources, or even have NATO provide them with a large military power projection.

On the other hand, Russia itself seems to need as well, a “Finland option” for Ukraine. Despite having to reduce the potential capabilities of the newborn Eurasian Union, it is probable that Ukrainian national self-assertion is already fortifying many ex-Soviet countries of central Asia, notably Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to stiffen resistance to Moscow’s continuing effort to absorb them totally inside its sphere of influence, depriving them of sovereignty. [18]

A “good will” shown from Russia could resolve many future crises before they are even born. The Western powers, however, need to comprehend that threatening Russia’s security is not a viable option and could only lead in more similar future crises, especially when both EU and NATO have lost a great deal of credibility of deterrence.

Taking into consideration the fact that all three directly implicated sides, Europe, Ukraine and Russia into today’s crisis all share part of the blame for creating the current conflict it is, though, of their interest to defuse tensions and seek a way out before it threatens the well-being of all involved.




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