File Title space weaponization good 2
International Community Hates Weapons
Download 1.17 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- There’s international support for banning weapons
- Impact Calc --- Probability
- Commercialization Checks Weaponization
- A2 Space Weapons Illegal
- Space wep doesn’t violate I law
International Community Hates WeaponsSpace weapons are ineffective and cause international and domestic oppositionWilkerson 8 – Don L. Wilkerson, Lieutenant Colonel of the United States Army, US Army War College, Master of Strategic Studies Degree, 2008, "Space Power Theory, Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space," www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300 The international political implications of placing weapons in space would generate opposition internationally and domestically. It is intuitive that once a nation state deploys weapons into space, other space-faring countries will attempt to do the same undoubtedly creating the next arms race in space. David Zeigler, a former mission21 specialist with NASA, (the author of the article “Safe Havens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary”) argues that placing weapons in space actually detracts from the security of states that pursue protection of space based assets. He also asserts that the weaponization of space may be more consistent with Cold War strategies but not necessarily appropriate for a post Cold War environment. Zeigler contends that the need for space sanctuary is greater now than ever with space weapons being economically unfeasible based on limited military funding and the fact that their operational need and capability concepts are grossly overrated. 47 There’s international support for banning weaponsKrepon 5 – Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Prior to co-founding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. 2005, "Space Security or Space Weapons?" www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson_Space_brief.pdf On August 12th 2003, 174 nations voted “Yes” on a UN resolution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Only four countries abstained: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Israel, and the United States. Impact Calc --- ProbabilityRisk of conflict in space is very high – uncertainty leads to a use it or lose it mentalityHardesty 5 – Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy, member of the faculty of theNaval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, "Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives," 2005, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521114&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed— leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to “use them or lose them.” The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing what is occurring in space. As the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization pointed out: Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phenomena. Space debris or solar activity can “explain” the loss of a space system and mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict. They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of responsive options. 10 This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks. That is, striking first is likely to mean inflicting disproportionate losses on the enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses oneself. Commercialization Checks WeaponizationSpace commercialization actually discourages weaponizationKrepon 4 – Michael Krepon, president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, November 2004, “Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#Lewis2 The prediction that warfare follows commerce and that the burgeoning of space-aided commerce will produce hostilities is also suspect.[7] To the contrary, most of the world’s strife takes place in poor regions. Space-aided commerce occurs primarily between nations with advanced commercial sectors, which generally have peaceful relations. Moreover, commercial space activities are often collaborative undertakings where risks and costs are shared. No nation that has invested heavily in space-aided commerce stands to gain if these orbital planes are endangered by space weapons debris or space mines. Any country that flight-tests, deploys, or uses space weapons threatens the activities of all other space-faring nations. A2 Space Weapons IllegalWe can freely militarize – there is no governing body Salin 1 - Patrick A., member of International Institute of Space Law, Internet Society, European Centre for Space Law, and ORBICOM, February “Privatization and militarization in the space business environment,” Space Policy, Volume 17, Issue 1, Page 19-26, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V52-42D2B34-6-1&_cdi=5774&_user=1458830&_pii=S0265964600000503&_origin=&_coverDate=02%2F28%2F2001&_sk=999829998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkWz&md5=15c519511820dd3536651fcf6e84a033&ie=/sdarticle.pdf The administrative status of global space operators, whether public or private, has no impact on their final liability (if any), but their actions may (and will) heavily impact on the global international community. Private corporations have a de facto equal status to that of public space agencies. The worrying factor in the development of outer space exploitation is that — so far — there has been little in the way of an effective international responsibility (or liability) for wrongful acts that are committed or that bear consequences in outer space. This is the consequence of the fact that no litigation has ever been pursued on the basis of the 1972 Liability Convention or of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, neither of which has yet been tested in terms of benefit sharing [10]. This means that, for practical purposes, the Liability Convention is unworkable. Large private corporations are on an equal footing with public bodies and behave as if they were enjoying a kind of ‘national’ immunity that is commensurate with the size of their project. A good illustration of that observation was provided in March 1997 with the licensing of Teledesic Corp. by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), after intense diplomatic pressure had been exercised by the US delegation during WARC-95.8 Contrary to its actions over much smaller projects, the FCC did not check any of Teledesic's technical or financial parameters, nor did it even impose an agenda for a project of the magnitude of close to 1000 satellites, according to its original plan, i.e. more than three times the total number of US civilian satellites that were in outer space at that time. Since then, this project has been scaled down two or three times and we are not even sure that it will ever be launched. So far, the fully licensed Teledesic project is nothing more than a huge ‘paper satellite’ system, while the competing SkyBridge project still awaits FCC authorization in order to be operated over North America as part of its global coverage of the Earth. That shows there is always a national state that backs up a satellite operator — public or private — that is active in Outer Space at a global scale. Here we have a paradox consisting in having ‘national’ regulators that license ‘global’ operators, thanks to technology. This paradox fully explains the difficulties that global operators are facing in their relationship with other national authorities [11]. This is inevitable as long as there is no such thing as a World Space Organization under which global satellite operators must be registered and to which they must be liable. The ITU does not provide such a commitment because it is only a technical organization; we may say that global satellite systems have no accountability towards the international community and, even worse, behave by taking into account the ITU's own weaknesses. 9 Reforms have been proposed in order to restructure the ITU organization [12, 13 and 14]. But others think it is better to keep things as they are, with outer space being exploited almost like a lawless ‘wild outer space’, with minimal supervision, under benevolent home state licensing and passive ITU registration. If this situation remains unchanged, no doubt such private operators will inevitably drag their licensing state to the forefront. Unfortunately, in outer space we won’t talk about oil spills, but we may in the future see satellite explosions, or satellites colliding with one another, or we may simply notice malfunctions causing a satellite to cease functioning properly, sometimes without being able to really identify the cause of the malfunction or of the incident [15]. 10 And what about a nuclear accident in outer space? Space wep doesn’t violate I lawO'Hanlon 11(senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy and budgeting, homeland security, Northeast Asian security, and humanitarian intervention. He is also adjunct professor at the public policy school of Columbia University, a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations."[1], Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space) No space-based missile defense or antisatellite weapons (with the possible exception of an isolated experimental launcher or two) were deployed during the Cold War. That did not, however, reflect any decision to keep space forever free from weaponry. Nor do existing arms control treaties ban such weapons. Instead, they ban the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in outer space, prevent colonization of heavenly bodies for military purposes, and protect the rights of countries to use space to verify arms control accords and to conduct peaceful activities.8 In addition, in 2000, the United States and Russia agreed to notify each other of most space launches and ballistic missile tests in advance.9 Most other matters are still unresolved. And the concept of space as a sanctuary will be more difficult to defend or justify as the advanced targeting and communications capabilities of space systems are increasingly used to help deliver lethal ordnance on target.10 Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
|