Gulf War Air Power Survey



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Initial Stages
Taskings, developed in support of the RDF for U.S. Air Forces, led to the deployment of 48,325 short tons of munitions in theater before Desert Shield. Approximately 11,993 short tons were stored at perma­nent explo­sives storage locations in Diego Garcia and Oman, and 36,322 short tons of munitions were located on three prepositioned ships [DELETED].432
These prepositioned stocks within the U.S. Air Force, Central Com­mand (CENTAF) arena were primarily iron bombs, unguided MK-82 (500-pound) and MK-84 (2,000-pound) bombs, Vietnam-era cluster bomb units (CBU-52/58/71s), and Vietnam-era antitank MK-20 Rockeyes.433 The initial stocks of munitions available for combat operations did not include the newer precision-guided munitions except for the GBU-27 ordnance the deploying F-117As ferried with them.434 Tactical forces were deployed to the AOR with air-to-air self-defense missiles (AIM-7s and 9s).
The following table shows the items stored on the ground in Oman and aboard the prepositioned ships before Desert Shield. All numbers are in complete rounds.
Locations____In'> Table 19

Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations

In CENTAF Prior to Desert Shield435





Location

Munition










Afloat

MK-82 General Purpose

6,372

2,520

6,000

27,000

MK-84 General Purpose

500

360

900

5,302

GBU-12 PaveWay II

630










GBU-10 PaveWay II

500










M117










12,090

MK-20 Rockeye

400

800

1,000

1,237

SUU-30 (CBU 52/58/71)

1,299

730

1,200

12,830

MJU-2










24,412

RR-170 Chaff




100K

46K

500K

MJU-7 Flare







4,000




30 mm CPX




100K

500K




20 mm HEI




100K

415K

2.5M

Durandal

780










These munitions and components had been maintained for several years by contractor and Air Force personnel. When Operation Desert Shield was initiated, the munitions were found to be fully serviceable and com­bat ready, having been inspected and renovated over the years of stor­age by CENTAF personnel and civilian contractors.
Figure 43 shows the relative positions of munitions storage loca­tions in Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships prior to Desert Shield.
As the CENTAF forces were bedded down, prepositioned muni­tions had to be pushed forward to support those forces. Air Force per­sonnel moved to the forefront of early munitions support operations as they began emp­tying the Omani depots. The first forward shipment took place on 10 August 1990 when 1,000 MK-82 bombs were sent by truck to Al Dhafra. Air Force personnel also assisted with downloading muni­tions from prepo­sitioned ships at ports throughout Southwest Asia, an effort that began on 24 August 1990. They also participated in the early line-haul distribution of munitions assets to beddown locations for the tactical forces.436
Additional initial munitions for the AOR forces were to be provid­ed through the standard air munitions packages (STAMP) and standard tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons packages (STRAPP) airlifted to tactical fighter locations. The STAMPs and STRAPPs were designed and built to move critical munitions components, bomb “bodies,” and supporting munitions handling gear rapidly to bare base fighter operational areas to support specific aircraft, such as the F-16 and F-15E.
STAMP and STRAPP had been configured to fit within C-141 war­time cargo weight limits. By 11 August 1990, the Ammunition Con­trol Point had identified 58 C-141 sorties to move the standard pack­ages to the Gulf region.437 Problems arose when the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Deputy Commander for Operations allowed only peace­time cargo weight limits for Desert Shield operations. Peace­time cargo limits were used

Figure 43

Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation Desert Shield

19

because in-flight air refueling was not avail­able and there was concern with structural problems in the C-141 wing. This necessitated reconfigu­ration of pre-packed pallets before shipment.438


Munitions were also carried to the Gulf on Civilian Re­serve Aircraft Fleet aircraft. When this occurred, all STAMP/STRAPP packages had to

20

MK-82 500-pounders are off loaded before they are armed (above);



500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs are moved to newly constructed earthen berms (below).

21


be torn down and reconfigured to comply with height and cube dimen­sion requirements for the civilian aircraft.439
In addition to the forces going to the Arabian peninsula, Strate­gic Air Command (SAC) employed twenty B-52Gs to Diego Garcia, British Indian Territory, in early August for interdiction and point target mis­sions.440 SAC was initially directed to load ten B-52Gs with M117R (retarded-fin configura­tion) 750-pound bombs and maintain a battlefield air interdiction role in CENTAF.441 The order created a major task for munitions logistics operations, since the Diego Garcia munitions organiza­tion initially report­ed only 2,870 M117R bombs available as of 15 August 1990.442 [DELETED] As Desert Shield progressed, the concern at Diego Garcia cen­tered on having initial stocks of 750-pound bombs and CBUs to supply incom­ing forces. As a result of the conven­tional ord­nance shortage at Diego Garcia, the initially deploying B-52s from Loring AFB, Maine each car­ried 45 M117R bombs on the 20-hour deploy­ment mission.443 To further assist in getting more munitions to Diego Garcia, SAC ensured that bomb­ers departing from Andersen AB in Guam were loaded with either CBUs or M117 bombs.444
As Desert Shield continued to unfold in late August, SAC asked USCENTAF to institute plans for using cluster bomb units, specifically CBU‑58s and CBU-89 Gator mines.445 CBU-58s were most effective against enemy person­nel or light armor concentrations, whereas the CBU-89 could “dis­rupt, delay, or channel the movement of hostile forces.”446 SAC muni­tions supervisors advised that the B-52 could carry as many as fifty-one CBU-58s and up to thirty CBU-89s per aircraft. Obvious to both SAC and the Air Force Ammuni­tion Control Point, the numbers of munitions capable of being carried on the B-52 had significant impact on getting large numbers of munitions into Southwest Asia. SAC's initiative be­came a precursor to significant air move­ment of critically required B-52 ord­nance as addi­tional B-52 forces received host nation beddown approv­al and were de­ployed from November 1990 through January 1991.
As Desert Shield activities increased, concerns were voiced in Hq U.S. Air Force Battle Staff meetings with the Chief of Staff on the status of critically required munitions within the Gulf region. Table 20 dis­plays those concerns, showing amounts and specific locations of muni­tions.
The critical munitions, whose status was being monitored early in Operation Desert Shield, were of a defensive nature: they included air-to-air missiles, AGM-65A/B Maverick air-to-ground missiles, CBU-89 Gator antitank mines, and AGM-88 HARM antiradiation missiles. The only pre­positioned “critical” munitions, either in fixed storage areas in Oman or aboard prepositioned ships, were the MK-20 Rockeye antitank weap­ons. The Air Force Ammunition Control Point set priorities for earliest avail­able movement of munitions considered critical by CENTAF. Howev­er, the munitions were then placed in the transportation system where priori­ties were set by USCENTCOM. The munitions did not arrive in theater for up to six weeks after the requirements had been determined. While these initial actions were underway to provide immediate support to the forces, a major effort was underway to identify munitions required by the force so that they could be moved to and stored in the AOR.
Munitions Requirements
Munitions requirements are largely a function of the size of the force and the plan that estimates how that force will be used. As Desert Shield and Desert Storm progressed, force size and use changed and, as a result, munitions requirements changed. When Desert Shield began, an agreed-to plan had not been implemented, and the force structure was fluid and growing. Munitions planning factors were dictated by USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft). The plan was under final review in August 1990, even as the invasion of Kuwait took place. However, Time-

Table 20

 Critical Munitions Status, 10 August 1990447


Type

Positioned

in Saudi


Oman


Prepo

Saudi

FMS


Europe


Pacific

STAMP

 STRAPP



AGM 65A/B

0

0

0

2,527

10,409

1,496

3,016

AIM 9L/M

180

0

0

1,177

4,527

2,906

0

AIM 7F/M

180

0

0

909

1,666

1,772

0

MK 20

0

1,800

2,961

0

16,019

8,607

360

CBU 89

0

0

0

0

0

0

288

AGM 88
10 August 90

0

0

0

0

2,445

849

0


Phased Force Deployment Data requirements had not been complet­ed, or made available to the military Services. The lack of a final de­ployment plan and the need to deploy a large number of fight­ing units rapidly made developing a full munitions requirement list diffi­cult.448 The size of the force went from the 700 aircraft originally planned to over 1,200 at the start of Desert Storm. The basic mission of the force went from defense to offense, and aircraft types not planned for were deployed to the the­atere.g., F-15Es and F-117As.
As discussed previously, munitions were prepositioned in the AOR and aboard three ships in the area. They were not the most current. In some cases, the only munitions the operational units had were what they carried with them as they deployed.
The Ammunition Control Point estimated that the prepositioned munitions stocks in Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships could sustain limited air campaign operations only for less than ten days. This estimate was based on early information on units tasked to deploy to the Persian Gulf and on the concern that few air defense (self-protection) weapons were in theater. Munitions requirements were constantly debat­ed throughout the crisis.
While estimating requirements for the arriving forces was diffi­cult, satisfying the requirements, whatever they were, was also difficult. CENTCOM was, very appropriately, establishing the priorities for moving items in the transportation system, and Air Force munitions were not the number one priority. The full burden of DOD activity in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm weighed heavily on the avail­able transportation system and its capacity for moving munitions.449 The “full court press” established at all levels of the DOD demonstrated the complexity in determining priorities for deploying munitions to the Gulf. Competition for transportation was extraordinary, and priority systems exercised in the past were burdensome and ineffectual.450
Only two ports in the CONUS could load ships with munitions; similar situations existed in Europe, the Pacific, and in the AOR. The lack of appropriate loading ports created a bottleneck.451 The transportation system continued to be overtaxed as more forces were added to the AOR in November 1990.452
Once munitions were in the transportation system, there was little visibility on where they were and when they would arrive at the debarka­tion port. Because the management information system used to track the munitions did not work well,453 senior munitions managers did not have confidence in the inventory figures from the AOR.
The requirement for munitions continued to escalate throughout Desert Shield and the early stages of Desert Storm, creating turmoil and uncertainty for senior munitions planners and managers in the Air Force Ammunition Control Point, Air Force Logistics Readiness Center (AF/LRC), and CENTAF Rear. Their reaction appears to have been to “push” as many munitions as possible into the Gulf region to ensure continuous support. Priorities were established by USCINCCENT. In August 1990, 48,000 short tons of munitions were prepositioned in the AOR. During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of munitions were expend­ed. By the time of the cease fire, 350,000 short tons of munitions were either in the AOR or en route to the AOR in support of the U.S. Air Force. At the cease-fire, forty-eight major sea going vessels were either in the AOR or en route to the AOR with Air Force munitions.
The specific requirements for each munition increased dramatical­ly throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially, 48,000 short tons of munitions were stored in Oman and aboard the three ships in the area. On 16 August 1990, CENTAF Rear established a seven-day requirement for the AOR (see column 1, Table 21),454 which exceeded the preposi­tioned assets and the assets brought to the theater by deploying fight­ers (see

Table 21

Munitions Requirements Growth



Item

Require­ment

On Hand

30 Days*

60 Days**

On Hand*

90 Days

120 Days

Amount

Ex­pend­ed

On

Hand

AIM-7

358

358

2,826

1,536

450

1,980

1,980

67

1,755

AIM-9

348

384

5,326

2,268

748

2,612

2,612

48

2,840

.50 cal
















1,538.8K

1,688.8K

21,568 Rounds

3,16­4K

20mm

400,000

690,000

1.260K

2.575M

~674K

2,875.0K

3,075.0K

61,000 Rounds

4.6M

30mm

1,100,000

0

3.1M

7.71M

~206K

9,250.0K

10,375.0K

982,000 Rounds

1.2M

MK-82 Air

4,710

1,500

25,900

52,924

3,000

28,800

33,800

51,932

19,820

MK-82R










29,700




78,200

88,200

7,952

7,645

MK-84 Air

900

570

5,775

33,650

562

16,940

118,940

7,856

6,176

MK-84R










10,900










2,611

2,857

M117










72,220

6,928

98,380

132,220

43,435

11,973

UK-1000







500







500

500

288




CBU-52/58/71

1,250

755

2,800

69,275

400

168.58K

224.58K

21,696

47,767

CBU-87

3,630

384

5,950

13,000

47

40,600

42,600

10,035

8,154

CBU-89

3,630

288

5,950

8,410

0

11,010

13,010

1,105

2,746

MK20

2,400

944

3,150

7,550

0

21,150

22,150

5,345

6,003

GBU-10

190

0

340

2,090

108

4,490

4,990

2,002

637


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