Gulf War Air Power Survey
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- Table 19 Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations In
- Location Munition
- Figure 43 Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation Desert Shield
- MK-82 500-pounders are off loaded before they are armed (above); 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs are moved to newly constructed earthen berms (below).
- Table 20 Critical Munitions Status, 10 August 1990
- Table 21 Munitions Requirements Growth
- Amount Expended On Hand
Initial Stages Taskings, developed in support of the RDF for U.S. Air Forces, led to the deployment of 48,325 short tons of munitions in theater before Desert Shield. Approximately 11,993 short tons were stored at permanent explosives storage locations in Diego Garcia and Oman, and 36,322 short tons of munitions were located on three prepositioned ships [DELETED].432 These prepositioned stocks within the U.S. Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) arena were primarily iron bombs, unguided MK-82 (500-pound) and MK-84 (2,000-pound) bombs, Vietnam-era cluster bomb units (CBU-52/58/71s), and Vietnam-era antitank MK-20 Rockeyes.433 The initial stocks of munitions available for combat operations did not include the newer precision-guided munitions except for the GBU-27 ordnance the deploying F-117As ferried with them.434 Tactical forces were deployed to the AOR with air-to-air self-defense missiles (AIM-7s and 9s). The following table shows the items stored on the ground in Oman and aboard the prepositioned ships before Desert Shield. All numbers are in complete rounds. Locations____In'> Table 19 Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations In CENTAF Prior to Desert Shield435
These munitions and components had been maintained for several years by contractor and Air Force personnel. When Operation Desert Shield was initiated, the munitions were found to be fully serviceable and combat ready, having been inspected and renovated over the years of storage by CENTAF personnel and civilian contractors. Figure 43 shows the relative positions of munitions storage locations in Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships prior to Desert Shield. As the CENTAF forces were bedded down, prepositioned munitions had to be pushed forward to support those forces. Air Force personnel moved to the forefront of early munitions support operations as they began emptying the Omani depots. The first forward shipment took place on 10 August 1990 when 1,000 MK-82 bombs were sent by truck to Al Dhafra. Air Force personnel also assisted with downloading munitions from prepositioned ships at ports throughout Southwest Asia, an effort that began on 24 August 1990. They also participated in the early line-haul distribution of munitions assets to beddown locations for the tactical forces.436 Additional initial munitions for the AOR forces were to be provided through the standard air munitions packages (STAMP) and standard tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons packages (STRAPP) airlifted to tactical fighter locations. The STAMPs and STRAPPs were designed and built to move critical munitions components, bomb “bodies,” and supporting munitions handling gear rapidly to bare base fighter operational areas to support specific aircraft, such as the F-16 and F-15E. STAMP and STRAPP had been configured to fit within C-141 wartime cargo weight limits. By 11 August 1990, the Ammunition Control Point had identified 58 C-141 sorties to move the standard packages to the Gulf region.437 Problems arose when the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Deputy Commander for Operations allowed only peacetime cargo weight limits for Desert Shield operations. Peacetime cargo limits were used Figure 43 Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation Desert Shield 19 because in-flight air refueling was not available and there was concern with structural problems in the C-141 wing. This necessitated reconfiguration of pre-packed pallets before shipment.438 Munitions were also carried to the Gulf on Civilian Reserve Aircraft Fleet aircraft. When this occurred, all STAMP/STRAPP packages had to 20
500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs are moved to newly constructed earthen berms (below). 21
be torn down and reconfigured to comply with height and cube dimension requirements for the civilian aircraft.439 In addition to the forces going to the Arabian peninsula, Strategic Air Command (SAC) employed twenty B-52Gs to Diego Garcia, British Indian Territory, in early August for interdiction and point target missions.440 SAC was initially directed to load ten B-52Gs with M117R (retarded-fin configuration) 750-pound bombs and maintain a battlefield air interdiction role in CENTAF.441 The order created a major task for munitions logistics operations, since the Diego Garcia munitions organization initially reported only 2,870 M117R bombs available as of 15 August 1990.442 [DELETED] As Desert Shield progressed, the concern at Diego Garcia centered on having initial stocks of 750-pound bombs and CBUs to supply incoming forces. As a result of the conventional ordnance shortage at Diego Garcia, the initially deploying B-52s from Loring AFB, Maine each carried 45 M117R bombs on the 20-hour deployment mission.443 To further assist in getting more munitions to Diego Garcia, SAC ensured that bombers departing from Andersen AB in Guam were loaded with either CBUs or M117 bombs.444 As Desert Shield continued to unfold in late August, SAC asked USCENTAF to institute plans for using cluster bomb units, specifically CBU‑58s and CBU-89 Gator mines.445 CBU-58s were most effective against enemy personnel or light armor concentrations, whereas the CBU-89 could “disrupt, delay, or channel the movement of hostile forces.”446 SAC munitions supervisors advised that the B-52 could carry as many as fifty-one CBU-58s and up to thirty CBU-89s per aircraft. Obvious to both SAC and the Air Force Ammunition Control Point, the numbers of munitions capable of being carried on the B-52 had significant impact on getting large numbers of munitions into Southwest Asia. SAC's initiative became a precursor to significant air movement of critically required B-52 ordnance as additional B-52 forces received host nation beddown approval and were deployed from November 1990 through January 1991. As Desert Shield activities increased, concerns were voiced in Hq U.S. Air Force Battle Staff meetings with the Chief of Staff on the status of critically required munitions within the Gulf region. Table 20 displays those concerns, showing amounts and specific locations of munitions. The critical munitions, whose status was being monitored early in Operation Desert Shield, were of a defensive nature: they included air-to-air missiles, AGM-65A/B Maverick air-to-ground missiles, CBU-89 Gator antitank mines, and AGM-88 HARM antiradiation missiles. The only prepositioned “critical” munitions, either in fixed storage areas in Oman or aboard prepositioned ships, were the MK-20 Rockeye antitank weapons. The Air Force Ammunition Control Point set priorities for earliest available movement of munitions considered critical by CENTAF. However, the munitions were then placed in the transportation system where priorities were set by USCENTCOM. The munitions did not arrive in theater for up to six weeks after the requirements had been determined. While these initial actions were underway to provide immediate support to the forces, a major effort was underway to identify munitions required by the force so that they could be moved to and stored in the AOR. Munitions Requirements Munitions requirements are largely a function of the size of the force and the plan that estimates how that force will be used. As Desert Shield and Desert Storm progressed, force size and use changed and, as a result, munitions requirements changed. When Desert Shield began, an agreed-to plan had not been implemented, and the force structure was fluid and growing. Munitions planning factors were dictated by USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft). The plan was under final review in August 1990, even as the invasion of Kuwait took place. However, Time- Table 20 Critical Munitions Status, 10 August 1990447
Phased Force Deployment Data requirements had not been completed, or made available to the military Services. The lack of a final deployment plan and the need to deploy a large number of fighting units rapidly made developing a full munitions requirement list difficult.448 The size of the force went from the 700 aircraft originally planned to over 1,200 at the start of Desert Storm. The basic mission of the force went from defense to offense, and aircraft types not planned for were deployed to the theatere.g., F-15Es and F-117As. As discussed previously, munitions were prepositioned in the AOR and aboard three ships in the area. They were not the most current. In some cases, the only munitions the operational units had were what they carried with them as they deployed. The Ammunition Control Point estimated that the prepositioned munitions stocks in Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships could sustain limited air campaign operations only for less than ten days. This estimate was based on early information on units tasked to deploy to the Persian Gulf and on the concern that few air defense (self-protection) weapons were in theater. Munitions requirements were constantly debated throughout the crisis. While estimating requirements for the arriving forces was difficult, satisfying the requirements, whatever they were, was also difficult. CENTCOM was, very appropriately, establishing the priorities for moving items in the transportation system, and Air Force munitions were not the number one priority. The full burden of DOD activity in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm weighed heavily on the available transportation system and its capacity for moving munitions.449 The “full court press” established at all levels of the DOD demonstrated the complexity in determining priorities for deploying munitions to the Gulf. Competition for transportation was extraordinary, and priority systems exercised in the past were burdensome and ineffectual.450 Only two ports in the CONUS could load ships with munitions; similar situations existed in Europe, the Pacific, and in the AOR. The lack of appropriate loading ports created a bottleneck.451 The transportation system continued to be overtaxed as more forces were added to the AOR in November 1990.452 Once munitions were in the transportation system, there was little visibility on where they were and when they would arrive at the debarkation port. Because the management information system used to track the munitions did not work well,453 senior munitions managers did not have confidence in the inventory figures from the AOR. The requirement for munitions continued to escalate throughout Desert Shield and the early stages of Desert Storm, creating turmoil and uncertainty for senior munitions planners and managers in the Air Force Ammunition Control Point, Air Force Logistics Readiness Center (AF/LRC), and CENTAF Rear. Their reaction appears to have been to “push” as many munitions as possible into the Gulf region to ensure continuous support. Priorities were established by USCINCCENT. In August 1990, 48,000 short tons of munitions were prepositioned in the AOR. During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of munitions were expended. By the time of the cease fire, 350,000 short tons of munitions were either in the AOR or en route to the AOR in support of the U.S. Air Force. At the cease-fire, forty-eight major sea going vessels were either in the AOR or en route to the AOR with Air Force munitions. The specific requirements for each munition increased dramatically throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially, 48,000 short tons of munitions were stored in Oman and aboard the three ships in the area. On 16 August 1990, CENTAF Rear established a seven-day requirement for the AOR (see column 1, Table 21),454 which exceeded the prepositioned assets and the assets brought to the theater by deploying fighters (see Table 21 Munitions Requirements Growth
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