Gulf War Air Power Survey
Supply Support Targets Versus Actual Performance
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- Summary of Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities
- Petroleum Products Support
- Table 23 Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities
- Table 23 (Continued) Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities Support Area
Supply Support Targets Versus Actual Performance During Desert Storm, less than four percent of aircraft in the AOR were not operational because of a lack of spares.552 By contrast, the de facto standard for peacetime supply performance has been to maintain that percentage below five percent, and the standard for war allows up to twenty-five percent of committed aircraft to be out of commission at the end of thirty days of wartime activity for lack of spares.553 While the performance statistics far exceed the wartime planning targets, they reflect that support came from a resource base designed to support a much more demanding “war and a half” scenario. The resource base was intended to support intense wartime activities with resupply interruptions. While those planned activity levels were in many cases matched or exceeded during Desert Storm, especially in terms of flying hours, resupply was continuous; most requirements, nearly all of which were designated as high priority, were satisfied initially within two weeks, and after November 1990, within three or four days. The impact of having dedicated air transportation available to move high priority assets as implemented with Desert Express, and later with European Express, was significant. Desert Express began operating between Charleston AFB and the AOR on 30 October 1990. European Express began operating between Rhein Main AB and the AOR on 7 December 1990. With these priority airlift capabilities, combined with aggressive spares sourcing and a nominal 72-hour delivery time to the AOR, “ . . . grounding MICAPs decreased from over 500 for 750 aircraft on 1 October 1990, to 219 for 1229 aircraft on 17 January 1991, the day Operation Desert Storm began, and a Not Mission Capable Supply Rate of four percent. This was an unprecedented achievement.”554 The impact of Desert Express and European Express was impressive in terms of the above reduction in numbers of spares on order, a corresponding reduction of two percent in the number of aircraft down for spares, and a similar increase in mission-capable rates. It should be noted, however, that at the time the Expresses were initiated, aggregate out-of-commission-for-spares rates were stable at around six percent, and mission-capable rates exceeded ninety percent. A second large increment of spares had been moved to the AOR in support of the Tactical Air Command units, and high-priority replenishment of deployed spares packages was continuing. In effect, a spares-rich environment had been created; all resupply requirements for the AOR were being intensively managed and were being afforded the highest possible priorities. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Project Code 9AU was used to identify spares needed to fix out-of-commission aircraft authorized transit by Desert Express and European Express; the spares were needed to repair out-of-commission aircraft. JCS Project Code 9BU was used for all other requirements supporting the AOR. The use of the project codes served to establish absolute priority over any other worldwide requirements, including for example, a grounded F-15 in Korea. Summary of Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities With the notable exception of strategic airlift, supply operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm were not conducted as planned. Further, multiple supply support concepts evolved, largely along major command lines. By the end of the conflict, CENTAF has put some standardized procedures into place, but full base support capabilities were never put into place and standard requisitioning and resupply procedures and priority rules were never used. Common themes could be discerned from retrospective analysis of the various supply support concepts that evolved just before and during the conflict. Some of the themes emerged repeatedly during various interviews; others emerged during analysis of the volumes of data assembled and reviewed. The themes were: Deployment and employment supply activities were largely ad hoc. Established plans were not followed, and new ways of doing business were established on the fly. The most significant of these new concepts was the CENTAF Supply Support Activity. From all accounts, spares in the system were sufficient to support all mission requirements. This was universally attributed to the full funding in the 1980s of requirements based on a “war and a half” threat. However, the fact that many of the spares needed, were in depots awaiting repair raises repair funding and prioritization issues. Despite high levels of spares availability, the extraordinary supply support provided to mission forces was due in large part to individual aggressiveness and ingenuity. The early lack of adequate communications was a problem for all. Dedicated air resupply for “show stoppers” (items keeping combat essential equipment out of commission) was perceived as a primary contributor to the high mission-capable rates experienced, but the documented mission-capable rates over time suggest that deployed normal air resupply of spares packages was in fact working very well even before Desert Express was started. The more significant reduction was in the numbers of open MICAP incidents.555 The combat supply system computer and tactical support shelter systems did not meet the needs of the supply system. Some of the problems were technical, others were management related. A lack of adequate procedures, compounded by a lack of attention to detail, resulted in inadequate consumable spares in the various spares packages. A lack of adequate policies, procedures, and automated support tools resulted in inefficient implementation of the follow-on spares kit concept. With few exceptions, inadequate or conflicting guidance regarding the retrograde of reparables resulted in delays in getting reparable spares to the appropriate repair facilities. Central visibility of spares deployed to the AOR was initially lost when deployment began and was not regained until the CENTAF Supply Support Activity approached full operation five months later. Once established, the central visibility of AOR on hand spares and requirements was extremely valuable in managing supply support for such a large force operating out of over twenty locations. Table 23 summarizes planned versus actual supply activities during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The items presented are grouped by subject area. The list is not intended to be all inclusive, but focuses instead on the subset of supply activities most closely associated with supporting aircraft units in a deployed operating environment. With a view toward the future need to establish and maintain a capability for deploying robust expeditionary forces into areas not having a U.S. presence or accessible logistics infrastructure, the Desert Shield and Desert Storm experience can be used as a benchmark for making necessary adjustments to supply support concepts. The next time, we may not have a willing enemy and six months to sort things out. Petroleum Products Support Providing fuels to U.S. and Coalition aircraft during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was an enormous undertaking; 1.88 billion gallons of petroleum products were consumed during those operations.556 At the Table 23 Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities
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