Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
No alliance --- Chinese statements, interests, experts
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
No alliance --- Chinese statements, interests, expertsRM 6/14 (RM, citing over 50 experts’ opinions on the China-Russia military alliance, 6-14-2019, "Expert Round-Up: How Likely Is a China-Russia Military Alliance?," Russia Matters, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/expert-round-how-likely-china-russia-military-alliance) ank Ethan Meick, Policy Analyst, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Chinese participation shows they are “cooperating in all areas.” However, the Chinese Defense Ministry stated [that] the exercise [was] “enhancing both sides’ capabilities to jointly respond to various security threats” and was not directed at any particular third party. Chinese security analysts have been quick to clarify that participation in Vostok-2018 does not herald a new Sino-Russian military alliance. (The National Interest, 09.02.18) [W]hile both states may oppose American hegemony, they pursue fundamentally different objectives for which neither would sacrifice itself to aid the other: Moscow is preoccupied with maintaining its dominion over neighboring buffer states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while Beijing is looking to cement de facto control over the South China Sea. … China is also seeking to expand its influence into Central Asia, particularly by building an economic corridor through its New Silk Road initiative—a move which could threaten Russia’s long historic influence over these former Soviet client states. Moscow also happens to be [a] major arms supplier for India, which Beijing sees as a strategic rival. These differences won’t necessarily lead to war, but they do highlight that though China and Russia may both hold grievance with U.S. hegemony in common today, they lack deeper shared interests. (The National Interest, 09.02.18) Eugene Rumer, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Russia’s relations with China have undergone a complete transformation in the past quarter century and have developed into a genuine strategic partnership. Although the Kremlin no doubt is aware of its junior partner status vis-à-vis Beijing, this relationship is truly without an alternative for Russia’s leaders. Russian foreign policy is controlled exclusively by a narrow circle of the country’s elite, whose chief preoccupation is with preserving domestic stability and the security of the ruling regime. The West’s insistence on domestic change in Russia makes it an incompatible partner for the Kremlin. Beijing, by contrast, does not confront Moscow with such demands and, moreover, partners with it to oppose the West’s pursuit of democratic change worldwide. These domestic considerations largely offset potential sources of friction in relations with China. (National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2017) Simon Saradzhyan, Founding Director of Russia Matters; and Ali Wyne, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation Today we see many shared interests between the two in the areas of economy, security and geopolitics. China has an impact on most of Russia’s vital interests, making constructive relations with Beijing a priority for Moscow. Russia’s effect on China’s interests may be smaller, but is far from negligible. Some Western policies are also nudging the two deeper into each other’s arms—notably, sanctions against Russia and Washington’s new policy of lumping China and Russia into a collective adversary. (Russia Matters, 06.07.18) But … the convergence of Russian and Chinese interests is far from absolute. Moreover, growing disparities between the two countries—in their economies and demographics in particular—will probably make a strong, formal alliance unlikely, unless two conditions emerge. The first is that Russia would agree to settle for an unequivocally junior role in the partnership with China—something it is not currently willing to do. Yet Moscow may have to accept such a position if it grows too weak to act as an independent pole of power in the emerging multi-polar world and estrangement from the West continues to preclude any rapprochement with the U.S. and Europe. The second condition is that China would have to change its current position that such alliances should not be entered into. (Russia Matters, 06.07.18) Simon Saradzhyan, Founding Director of Russia Matters The fact that the Russian leadership has come around to supporting OBOR even though it will not necessarily be conducive to some of Russia’s vital interests signals Moscow’s readiness to pursue even closer ties with Beijing. This, in turn, could eventually culminate in the establishment of an official military-political alliance between the two countries if tensions between the West and Russia continue. … In addition to the Ukraine crisis, there are at least five sets of longer-term factors that lend themselves to closer ties between Russia and China… The first factor is trade. … Second, both countries have a vested interest in stability in Central Asia to prevent the rise of militant Islamism there. Third, the two also want to preserve their rights as veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Fourth, they share a number of serious grievances vis-à-vis the Western world. … Finally, Russian leaders have come to believe that the U.S. and its Western partners are in long-term decline, while China is a rising power and engaging it would pay off for Russia. (Russia Matters, 05.12.17) There are, of course, factors that hinder the emergence of a Sino-Russian alliance. These include Russia’s reservations about demographic, economic and conventional military disparities in areas straddling the Russian-Chinese border that may come to threaten Moscow’s control of the Russian Far East. … Another damper on closer Russian-Chinese ties is Moscow’s arms trade and robust relations with such regional opponents of China’s rise as Vietnam and India. China’s expanding foot print in Central Asia, where it has displaced Russia as the dominant economic power, has also caused frictions between Moscow and Beijing. These factors make the formation of a de jure Sino-Russian military-political alliance unlikely in the short term. However, the longer Russia remains in a state of Cold War with the West, the less Russian leaders will factor in these friction points as they decide whether to seek such an alliance as a counterweight. (Russia Matters, 05.12.17) Shi Jiangtao, Former Diplomat, China Reporter at South China Morning Post During his visit to Russia this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping and “best friend” and counterpart Vladimir Putin ushered in a new era for bilateral ties between the two countries… According to former diplomats and analysts, the “bromance” between the two leaders that has been splashed across both countries’ state-controlled media is not just a show of resentment at Trump’s big-stick diplomacy, but of the geostrategic implications on the shifting global political and economic order. (South China Morning Post, 06.08.19) But despite their stronger ties, few analysts believed China and Russia would be able to forge a meaningful alliance against the U.S. Fraser Cameron, a former British diplomat and European Commission adviser and director of the EU-Asia Centre, described it as “a marriage of convenience.” (South China Morning Post, 06.08.19) Shi Ze, Former Chinese Diplomat in Moscow, Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies (a think tank affiliated with China’s Foreign Ministry) China and Russia have different attitudes. Russia wants to break the current international order… Russia thinks it is the victim of the current international system, in which its economy and its society do not develop. But China benefits from the current international system. We want to improve and modify it, not to break it. (Wall Street Journal, 02.01.19) Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Defense Minister [Speaking to visiting Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe:] Thanks to the efforts of our countries’ leaders, ties between Russia and China today are entering a new, unprecedentedly high level and are becoming an important factor in ensuring peace and international security. … It is a joy that you are making your first foreign visit in your new position to Russia. (TASS, 04.03.18) Dimitri K. Simes, President and CEO, Center for the National Interest In private, Chinese and Russian officials and experts express scant confidence that their two countries can build a lasting alliance. Russians who claim on domestic television that Moscow and Beijing have already established such a relationship in all but name will admit sotto voce that China’s investment in Russia has been disappointing, that Chinese banks fear exposing themselves to U.S. sanctions by working in Russia and that Russian officials are leery of a settlement of their country’s territorial dispute with Japan (over the Kuril Islands) because any cession of Russian-held lands could encourage new Chinese claims. (The National Interest, 12.16.18) At the same time, Moscow’s discomfort with China and, for that matter, Russia’s generally Western cultural orientation, matter much less now than they might otherwise. If Russian officials do not see acceptable and feasible changes in their policies that could facilitate a better relationship with the United States and its allies, they may believe that they have few options other than closer relations with Beijing to protect Moscow’s security, sovereignty, political order and great power ambitions. … Well-connected, prominent Russian experts go even further; on a recent episode of The Great Game, a program on Russia’s Channel One, each of the four Russian politicians and specialists participating in the discussion spoke of a Chinese-Russian alliance as an emerging reality. While discounting prospects for a formal treaty, they saw a broad partnership unquestionably directed against the West and, first and foremost, the United States. (The National Interest, 12.16.18) Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu left little to the imagination: “There’s no question that international tensions have contributed to the tightening of Russian-Chinese bonds.” More ominous are growing Russian military sales to China… Russia has seemingly acquiesced to China’s proclivity for reverse-engineering Russia’s military technology. (The National Interest, 12.16.18) China and Russia may well build a united front to confront the United States and its allies. Even if such an alignment doesn’t last, it could have dangerous consequences. … How far the Chinese government is willing to go to support Russia in a potential confrontation with the United States is unclear and obviously depends to a significant extent on China’s evaluation of its relationship with America. Should Washington and Moscow indeed confront one another, China would have to consider hopes that its relationship with the United States could still improve as well as fears that becoming too involved with Russia might permanently damage these relations. Even today, however, the very possibility of a Sino-Russian alliance of convenience emboldens Moscow in facing American pressure and makes Russia more willing to target U.S. interests worldwide if the relationship further deteriorates. (The National Interest, 12.16.18) Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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