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Japanese counterstrike capability solves deterrence

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• If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s favor, Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment
• Japan may find

Japanese counterstrike capability solves deterrence Yoshihara 14 (Toshi, John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the US Naval War College, American Enterprise Institute, “Japanese Hard Power: Rising to the Challenge,” published August 2014, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/-japanese-hard-power-rising-to-the-challenge_152508260874.pdf, accessed 7/18/19, page 9, JME.) If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s favor, Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment, which could entail inflicting unacceptable levels of pain on China should the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ever attack Japan and Japanese forces. To retaliate directly against China with such force, Japan would have to develop offensive strike capabilities designed to hold at risk a range of assets, especially those on the mainland that Beijing highly values. In theory, Tokyo’s ability to impose prohibitive costs on China would deter the Chinese military from acting in the first place. Japanese debates about the constitutionality of attacking enemy territory, dating back to the 1950s, suggest that a decision to pursue deterrence by punishment is not farfetched. While an offensive posture would no doubt stoke political controversy, serious debates about acquiring land-attack cruise missiles have surfaced in Japan from time to time since at least 2005. 25 The discourse has centered primarily on the legalities of Tokyo’s hypothetical decision to attack North Korean missile bases in the event of a crisis. But it can be assumed that Japan would not limit the missile’s use to Pyongyang if Japan ever acquired such a weapon system. In 2009, the subcommittee of the defense policymaking council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) submitted a proposal endorsing the acquisition of offensive missiles. The committee called on Japan to “maintain the capability to attack enemy missile sites” and recommended developing cruise and ballistic missiles and the space-based systems to support missile operations. 26 The LDP’s electoral defeat in September 2009 ended further discussions on this issue. Nevertheless, the report represented a significant milestone in postwar Japanese thinking about defense and helped legitimize the notion of going on the offense. Prime Minister Abe’s electoral victory has resurrected the debate. In reference to the North Korean missile threat, the latest NDPG and the MTDP obliquely hint at revisiting a counterstrike capability. The NDPG states: Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary. 27 In other words, all options are back on the table. What would a conventional missile option look like? Tokyo would almost certainly limit itself to counterforce strikes aimed exclusively at enemy military units. This would require Japan to plan for counteroffensive operations against Chinese military forces, including those deployed on the mainland. Equipping Japanese forces with conventional longrange precision-strike weapons, such as the venerable Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, would not only be relatively affordable but also technically feasible. In particular, Japanese destroyers, submarines, and aircraft armed with Tomahawks or their equivalents could strike large fixed targets, such as the over-the-horizon radars, essential for conducting Chinese antiaccess operations. As Chinese dependence on land-based sensors to effectively employ its theater-strike systems increases, Japan may find the strategic dividends of a counterstrike capability operationally attractive and, thus, politically persuasive. Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends: