Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
2NC – Solves CaseJapanese military build-up solves entrapment without breaking the allianceFatton 18 (Lionel P., assistant professor of Security Studies and Asian Area Studies at Webster University Geneva, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “A new spear in Asia: why is Japan moving toward autonomous defense?” published April 3rd, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/19/2/297/4959342, accessed 7/13/19, pages 305-306, JME.) The fear of being entrapped comes from the possibility that one would have to fight in support of its ally for the defense of interests it does not share (Snyder, 1997). The country anxious about entrapment values the preservation of the alliance more than it worries about the prospect of conflict, reason why it could be dragged into war for the respect of its security commitments (Benson, 2012). Entrapment anxiety is thus rooted in the loss of autonomy that accompanies the conclusion of alliances. In most cases countries respond to this fear by distancing themselves from their allies in order to keep out of the conflict trap (Snyder, 1997). This can be done by reducing one’s security commitments, enacting domestic regulations on the use of force at variance with alliance obligations, or threatening the ally to withhold support in case of war. Measures taken to prevent abandonment increase the risk of entrapment, and vice versa (Snyder, 1997; Cha, 1999). A country that gets closer to its ally runs a greater risk of being dragged into war. Not only is the country more tightly aligned with the ally, the latter is also more confident of receiving support and may act recklessly. Inversely, a country that takes its distance to avoid entrapment is more likely to be abandoned because its value as an ally declines. To maximize security, allied countries must strike the right balance between anti-abandonment and anti-entrapment policies depending on which risk dominates at a given period.5 When a country faces the concurrent prospects of entrapment and abandonment, however, this classic strategy of alliance management is counterproductive and even dangerous. The notion of simultaneity of risks has escaped scholars’ attention because of their focus on a configuration made of two allies facing a single opponent or a homogenous alliance. In the presence of two or more opponents, anti-abandonment measures taken in the face of what a country perceives as the most hostile opponent endanger its security, because they increase to an unacceptable level the risk of being dragged by the ally into war against another opponent not considered as a priority. Inversely, if measures are taken to preclude entrapment in a conflict of secondary importance, the alliance’s deterrent power against the country’s primary security concern weakens and invites aggression. In other words, a balance between anti-abandonment and anti-entrapment policies cannot be reached. Because it reduces vulnerability to both abandonment and entrapment, greater autonomy in national defense is the only way out of this ‘entrapment-abandonment dilemma’. Greater autonomy is here understood as the replacement, through one’s own means, of certain defense functions previously fulfilled by the ally. If it is assumed that countries seek to maximize their security, a more autonomous defense posture implies some sort of military buildup and may at times require an institutional reorganization of armed forces. Abandonment anxiety is about losing power relative to one’s opponent. If a country is more self-sufficient in terms of defense, abandonment is less of a concern because the relative power decline caused by its ally’s potential defection would be smaller and have fewer consequences on national security.6 A more autonomous country can also better resist entrapment. The failure to honor commitments, or the threat to do so, is less consequential as the main fallout is the weakening or collapse of an alliance now less important for national security. Moreover, greater autonomy makes entrapment less likely by increasing one’s bargaining power toward the ally. Because the country’s dependence on the alliance declines, and the ally’s dependence increases, the former can more easily restrain the latter and keep events under control in times of crisis. Moving toward a more autonomous defense posture does not necessarily mean that the alliance is discarded. Actually, countries often operate on both fronts. As Stephen Walt notes, ‘a state whose security position is threatened will probably attempt to increase its relative power (e.g., by spending more on defense) while simultaneously seeking an alliance with another state’ (Walt, 1987, 9). Military buildup and the move toward autonomy can thus occur alongside the perpetuation of the alliance. This is particularly the case when domestic factors impede the swift transition toward full-fledged autonomy. Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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