India cp 1NC


Aff – Ballistic Missile Prolif DA



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Aff – Ballistic Missile Prolif DA



The CP provides the pretext for Indian ballistic missile prolif, and Indias space program fails.


Rohde ’04- New York Times Correspondent (1/24/04, David Rohde, The New York Times, “India's Lofty Ambitions in Space Meet Earthly Realities”, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/24/world/india-s-lofty-ambitions-in-space-meet-earthly-realities.html?ref=spaceprogram&pagewanted=1)

The euphoria over the space program is by no means universal. In the last five years, Indian rockets have successfully launched two German, one South Korean and one Belgian satellite in orbit. But with the commercial space market flooded with heavy lift rockets from the United States, Europe and particularly Russia, the Indian program, whose rockets remain smaller, has not attracted droves of customers and has not proved the moneymaker originally promised. And privately, Indian officials concede that they remain dependent on foreign components. While India's satellites are assembled in India, a majority of electronic components for India's satellites continue to come from the United States, Europe and elsewhere, they said. Some Indian space analysts say the moon probe, which is expected to cost $84 million, is the first sign that the space program is moving away from its practical roots and becoming politicized. Reports in recent months of plans for expensive manned missions have only deepened concern. Despite an economy that is expected to grow by 8 percent this year, India is home to the world's largest concentration of poor. Three hundred million of India's one billion people live in poverty. Gopal Raj, a journalist and the author of a history of the Indian space program, ''Reach for the Stars,'' questioned the scientific value of the moon probe. The satellite will spend two years making a three-dimensional map of the moon's surface and surveying its soil for minerals. ''Frankly, I think this has more to do with prestige than anything,'' Mr. Raj said. ''I am not convinced about anything else.'' American space experts warn of problems as well. They accuse Indian managers of not spending the money they should on projects and leaving unnecessary debris in space. There are also questions about whether India is planning to mount a military effort in space. After China launched a man into orbit last fall, the head of the Indian Air Force was quoted as saying that India was developing space-based weapons. Within days the country's civilian leaders forced him to retract the statement. For many years, in fact, the United States viewed the Indian program as a proliferation and security risk, despite its civilian oversight. Remote sensing satellites that can track erosion and crop yields can also act as spy satellites. Indians vehemently deny the charge, but American analysts say rocket technology produced by the civilian space program, as well as some of its top engineers, have ended up in the military's ballistic missile program. They include even the country's president, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. ''A space program and a missile program tend to go hand in hand,'' Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, said in a telephone interview. ''The technologies are the same. A rocket is a rocket is a rocket.''

Guarantees South Asia escalation.

CRS, 2003


[Congressional Research Service, “Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,” 10-17, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf]

Central to an analysis of the meaning of missile proliferation in South Asia are two key questions: First, is a strategic arms race between India and Pakistan underway? And, second, does progress in the development of missile and nuclear capabilities promote or degrade regional stability? Indian and Pakistani government officials express a desire to avoid engaging in a costly and potentially disastrous arms race, while also asserting that no such race is afoot.23 Yet a 2001 Defense Department review of proliferation threats indicated that, “Indian and Pakistani strategic programs continue to be driven by the perception of the other’s effort,” and that the two countries “are in a period of accelerated nuclear weapons and missile development” that may be termed a “slow-speed” arms race.24 In 2002, Director of Central Intelligence Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that, Both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing fissile material, and increasing their nuclear stockpiles. ... Both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a landattack capability.25 Apparent tit-for-tat ballistic missile tests in April 1999 and again in March 2003 have been viewed as evidence that an action-reaction dynamic is indeed at work.26 Many analysts argue that overt nuclear weaponization by either side — most especially of their ballistic missiles — could be highly destabilizing, especially if significant nuclear missile forces are deployed in the absence of secure command and control structures. If these forces are perceived as being vulnerable to attack, one or both sides might adopt a launch-on-warning status, making conflict escalation even more difficult to govern.27 Ever since the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, it has appeared that India’s strategic decision-making is a key factor in shaping regional stability. According to the Pentagon, “India’s development of [medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)] ... is motivated by its desire to be recognized as a great power and strategic competitor with China.”28 China seems content with its existing deterrent against India, and Pakistan’s limited resources appear to constrain its ability to initiate an Indo-Pakistani arms race.29 Thus, a key variable in the future evolution of South Asian nuclear proliferation is India’s strategic intention in relation to China. One of the more dangerous scenarios is one in which India actively seeks to gain nuclear parity with China by building a larger nuclear arsenal and long-range delivery force. In the middle-term, the deployment of Agni missiles capable of striking China’s eastern population centers could spur Beijing to re-target more nuclear forces to the south and likewise move Islamabad to seek some form of parity in this arena, thus potentially setting in motion a full-blown arms race on the Asian Subcontinent.30 Moreover, some observers suggest that U.S. sales of theater missile defense systems in Asia — or the deployment of a national system covering U.S. territory — could spur further ballistic missile proliferation in South Asia (see below).31
India-China goes nuclear.

Kahn ‘9 (Jeremy, Newsweek, “Why India Fears China”, 10-19, 154:16, L/N)

On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.



So does Indo-Pak.

Fai, 2001


[Ghulam, PhD, Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council, Business Recorder, “The Most Dangerous Place,” Washington Times, July 8, Lexis]

The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.


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