Law 309 Evidence Introduction 5


Character Evidence of Third Parties



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Character Evidence of Third Parties





  • With third parties there is no longer presumption of innocence concerns w/ wrongful conviction (liberty of other witness not at stake) - so general purpose of why do not admit Character E is no longer present

  • Thus, evidence of bad character is admissible whenever it is relevant to an issue at trial

    • But PV v PP always in background as residual discretion


General rule: if evidence of the bad character of the third party is relevant to some issue at trial it is admissible.

  • Therefore, since there is no presumption of exclusion our primary concern is relevance.

Self-Defence


The defence may bring up bad character of 3rd party when an accused asserts affirmative defence - i.e. self-defence: defence turns on bad conduct of another person which may put 3rd person’s character on table

  • Distinguish though where accused knows of prior bad acts - apprehension that an assault was happening; question of whether the accused acted reasonably (prior acts admissible to support reasonableness of accused’s apprehension)

  • Versus scenario where accused wants to introduce prior bad acts that they did not know about (not evidence about apprehension, rather evidence on 3rd party’s character)

Sexual Assault


Old law: could admit evidence of past history to show the character of the complainant. Supported the twin myths that a woman who was sexually experienced was:

  • more likely to consent

  • less likely to tell the truth


1982: introduced s.276 - no evidence of past sexual history could be introduced
1991: Seaboyer - s.276 violated s. 7 and s. 11(d)

  • S.276 went too far to protect equality (women)

After Seaboyer, Parliament changed s.276 again



  • Evidence of past sexual history cannot be used to support one of the twin myths

  • Evidence can be allowed if it is relevant and significant (s.276(2) and(3))


2000: s.276 confirmed as striking the right balance

Seaboyer, R v. (1992) (S.C.C.)


  • Facts: Seaboyer accused of sexual assault of a friend visiting his school. He wanted to put forward evidence that she routinely came to the school to engage sexually with him and others, but s.276 (the original “rape shield provision”) didn’t allow it.

  • Issue: Does s. 276 violate s. 7 or s. 11(d) of the Charter?

  • Decision:

    • s.276 found unconstitutional, because:

      • The limitation was too narrow

      • It may exclude evidence which is relevant to a defence of mistake (concerning consent) and the probative value of which is not substantially outweighed by potential prejudice to the trial process (the price of potentially convicting innocent people outweighs the risk of the jury drawing illegitimate inferences from such evidence)


S.C.C. suggested broader circumstances in which sexual activity evidence might be admissible:

  • Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct tending to prove that a person other than the accused caused the physical consequences of the rape alleged by prosecution.

  • Evidence of sexual conduct tending to prove bias or motive to fabricate on the part of the complainant.

  • Evidence of prior sexual conduct known to the accused at time of the act charged, tending to prove that the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the act charged.

  • Evidence of prior sexual conduct which meets requirements for the reception of similar act evidence, bearing in mind that such evidence cannot be used illegitimately merely to show that complainant consented or is unreliable witness.

  • Evidence tending to rebut proof introduced by prosecution regarding complainants sexual conduct.


In response to Seaboyer, the Criminal Code was amended.
S.276 was repealed and replaced:
S.276(1) applies to list of sex related offences:

  • Evidence cannot be admitted just to show one of the “twin myths”: that previous sexual activity of complainant, or previous activity with accused, makes complainant more likely to have consented this time (s.276(1)(a)) or is less believable (s.276(1)(b))

For other purposes (i.e. not to pursue the twin myths), evidence relating to sexual history can be admissible e.g. to show MR not present due to mistaken belief in consent, and judge has discretion whether to allow in evidence s.276(2) but it must:



  • Be relevant to current case (s.276(2)(b)) – this replaces the limit to 3 circumstances found unconstitutional in Seaboyer

  • It must have significant probative value (can it help to prove anything), and must not be substantially outweighed by potential prejudice (s.276(2)(c))


Factors for judge to consider when determining whether or not to admit are laid out in s. 276(3), of which perhaps (c) alone would have been sufficient

  1. Interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make full answer and defence

  2. Society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences

  3. Whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination

  4. Need to remove from fact-finding any discriminatory belief or bias

  5. Risk that evidence my unduly raise sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury

  6. Potential prejudice to complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy

  7. Right to personal security and full protection and benefit of the law

  8. Any other factor that the judge considers relevant


Changed when an how an accused could raise the defence of mistaken belief – modified common law position

  • s.273.2(b) for the defence of mistaken belief in consent, requires that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain if consent was being given i.e. objective element added by Parliament

Imposes on an accused who is attempting to raise the defence of consent a duty to demonstrate that they took “reasonable” steps objective due diligence standard



  • Could still be mistake as to consent, but will only allow mistake if reasonable steps were nonetheless taken


However, s. 277 was left intact:

  • 277. In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273, evidence of sexual reputation, whether general or specific, is not admissible for the purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant

Darrach (2000) (SCC)


  • The current s.276 strikes the right balance.

  • Leaves the door open just a crack so that sexual evidence can be admitted if absolutely necessary.

  • It addresses the myths of women’s sexuality.

  • It will be rare that evidence of prior sexual history will be admissible


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