Economy Advantage-Congestion Internals

Economy Advantage-A2: Fed Solves

I think Free Exchange has effectively handled the speed issue, i.e. the assertion that infrastructure spending cannot hit the economy as fast as tax cuts, so let me turn to the assertion about monetary policy dominating fiscal policy generally, and dominating spending on infrastructure in particular. Yes, monetary policy can be implemented rapidly, but remember how monetary policy works. It lowers the interest rate or reduces credit market imperfections stimulating investment in new plants and equipment, investment in new homes, that sort of thing. It takes considerable time to plan and build a new factory or to refurbish an old one. People don't build and buy houses over night (usually), that takes time too, since it's only new houses that contribute to GDP. Thus, while monetary policy can be put into place overnight if necessary, it can be quite some time before it impacts the economy. Stepping away from infrastructure spending for a moment and looking at fiscal policy generally, the usual view on monetary versus fiscal policy lags is that monetary policy can be implemented quickly, but the effects take considerable time to be realized - the peak effect can be as long as a year and a half away and drawn out over a three year period according to many estimates. Fiscal policy takes longer to implement due to factors cited above, but once in place, the effects are realized fairly quickly (though it does take longer for infrastructure that must be planned and built from the ground up).

Economy Advantage-2AC War Impact

First, economic decline kills democratic cooperation and spurs protectionism and a power vacuum as US influence wanes. Their historical evidence doesn’t assume the withdrawal of a unipolar hegemon, threats of transnational terrorism or authoritarian wars of distraction—that’s the 1NC Friedberg evidence.
Second, economic decline undermines the key foundations of peace. Prefer our evidence about the current international security climate

Mandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 105-8)

It is the dominance of peace, democracy, and free markets, supplemented and bolstered by the reassurance that the United States supplies, that have made the twenty-first century a peaceful period—so far. But their domination, and the global peace they underpin, are not necessarily destined to last forever; and the recent turmoil in the global economy does raise the possibility that their era of dominance will turn out to be a short one. The severe global economic downturn that the financial collapse of September 15, 2008, catalyzed threatens not only the American role in helping to maintain peace in the world but also the foundations of the stable twenty-first-century global security itself. The international economic and security systems are not, after all, hermetically sealed off one from the other. To the contrary, each affects the other, and in the 1930s economics had a profound—and profoundly malignant—effect on politics. The crisis of the global economy led to the outbreak of the bloodiest episode in the history of international security, World War II, by bringing to power in Germany and Japan the brutal governments that started that dreadful conflict. In the 1930s the financial crash and the high unemployment that followed all over the world discredited the shaky democratic governments in place in Germany and Japan, which fell from power. The fascist regimes that replaced them proclaimed themselves models of governance for the rest of the world and did win admirers and imitators in other countries. These regimes disdained democratic politics and practices extensive (although not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, total) government control of economic affairs. Far from believing in peace, the two enthusiastically embraced aggressive war for the purpose of expanding the territories under their sway and subjugating—even, in some cases, attempting to exterminate—the people living there. Japan launched a brutal campaign of conquest in China in 1931; in 1939 Germany embarked on the murderous acquisition of an Eastern European empire and in the process conquered much of Western Europe as well. The two countries forged a nominal alliance that included fascist Italy as well. During World War II they were known as the Axis powers. Japan subdued much of Asia and Germany because the master of most of Europe before the two were finally beaten, at great cost in blood and treasure, in 1945. Could anything like the ghastly experience of the 1930s and 1940s occur in the twenty-first century? The precipitating event did, after all, repeat itself after a fashion: the economic slump that began in 2008 became, by most accounts the most severe since the 1930s. And while Germany and Japan have long since become firmly democratic in their politics and quasi-pacifist in their foreign policies, two other countries could conceivably play the roles that the fascist powers assumed in the interwar period. Those two countries are China and Russia. Each was, as the first decade of the new century ended, a large and military formidable country that had the potential to upset existing political and economic arrangements in East Asia and Europe, respectively. For much of the second half of the twentieth century the two had been governed by communist regimes that aspired to spread their form of government, by force when necessary.
Third, the risk is a function of our internal links—if we win a big one, then there would be a war

Mandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 111-2)

The unlikelihood of a full recurrence of all the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s does not, however, mean that the global security order is certain to remain entirely free from threats of war in the years ahead. Avoiding the worst of all possible futures does not guarantee the best of them. Even if China and Russia do not unleash murderous campaigns of conquest, this does not mean that each will settle comfortably into a twenty-first-century routine as a staunch supporter of the post-Cold War security and economic orders. Each has grievances, actual and potential, against the existing order of things. The extent to which either or both choose to act on these grievances will matter a great deal. Those choices, in turn, will depend in part on the strength of the American position in their respective regions, East Asia and Europe; and the economic constraints on the United States will weaken that position in both places.

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