Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights


Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species



Download 1.43 Mb.
Page100/133
Date16.08.2017
Size1.43 Mb.
#33284
1   ...   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   ...   133

Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species


BIODIVERSITY LOSS CAUSES EXTINCTION

John Tuxill and Chris Bight, research associates at the Worldwatch Institute, 1998, THE STATE OF THE WORLD, p. 41-42


The loss of species touches everyone, for no matter where or how we live, biodiversity is the basis for our existence. Earth's endowment of species provides humanity with food, fiber, and many other products and "natural services" for which there simply is no substitute. Biodiversity underpins our health care systems: some 25 percent of drugs prescribed in the United States include chemical compounds derived from wild organisms, and billions of people worldwide rely on plant- and animal- based traditional medicine for their primary health care. Biodiversity provides a wealth of genes essential for maintaining the vigor of our crops and livestock.
PLACING THE INTERESTS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OVER NON-ENDANGERED SPECIES VIOLATES PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION

Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 116-7



We violate the principle of equal consideration of individuals when we give members of endangered species greater moral consideration than members of highly populous species. An individual is fully entitled to rights whatever the size of their group. Their importance (or unimportance) to other beings and to ecosystems shouldn’t affect their rights. A kangaroo is just as entitled to basic rights as a giant panda. To see group size as relevant to individual rights is to regard individuals as mere species representatives. That’s a utilitarian, not a rights, view of other animals. It’s speciest. In fact, it’s old speciesist.
ADVOCATING RIGHTS BASED ON THE LEVEL OF EXTINCTION THREAT FOR THE GROUP IS SPECIESIST

Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 117

Many judges do value members of endangered species more than other nonhumans. However, such judges could note that laws aimed at preserving species already exist. They also could recommend increased efforts to breed nonhuman great apes. Genetically manipulating nonhumans violates their rights. To have any solidity and integrity, individual rights must be independent of population size.

Claiming exigency based on the threat of extinction displays the same speciesism as the Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act. Why shouldn’t the threatened use of a chimpanzee in vivisection suffice to show exigency? And why isn’t the threatened rat equally pressing? If individuals truly receive equal consideration, population size neither reduces nor increases the urgency when they’re threatened with harm.
ANIMAL RIGHTS VIEW AT ODDS WITH SPECIES PRESERVATION GOALS

Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for Animal Rights, p. xxxviii-xxxix

The rights view restricts inherent value and rights to individuals. Because species are not individuals, “the rights view does not recognize the rights of species to anything, including survival” (359). Moreover, the inherent value and rights of individuals do not wax or wane depending on how plentiful or rare are the species to which they belong. Beavers are not less valuable because they are more plentiful than bison. East African black rhinos are not more valuable than rabbits because their numbers are declining. “On the rights view,” I write, “the same principles apply the moral assessment of rare and endangered animals as apply to the moral assessment of rare or endangered animals as apply to those that are plentiful, and the same principles apply whether the animals in question are wild or domesticated” (361). How, then, can the rights view address our obligation to preserve endangered species?

Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species



HOLISTIC THINKING JUSTIFIES MORALITY OF ZOOS INSOFAR AS THEY CONTRIBUTE TO SPECIES PRESERVATION

Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 457



Holism’s position regarding the ethics of zoos in particular is analogous to its position regarding the ethics of our other interactions with wildlife in general. There is nothing wrong with keeping wild animals in permanent confinement if doing so is good for the larger life community. But it is wrong to do this if the effects on the community are detrimental. Moreover, because one of the indices of what is harmful to the life community is a reduction in the diversity of forms of life within the community, holism will recognize a strong prima facie duty to preserve rare or endangered species. To the extent that the best zoos contribute to this effort, holists will applaud their efforts, even if keeping individual animals who belong to threatened species in captivity is not in the best interests of those particular animals. In that and other respects (for example the moral relevance of the educational and research functions of zoos), the implications of holism are very much at odds with those of the rights view and much closer to those of utilitarianism.
ANIMAL RIGHTS POSITION THAT SACRIFICING THE LIBERTY OF INDIVIDUALS TO PROTECT THE OVERALL SPECIES IS WRONG – DENIES ABILITY OF ANIMALS TO ACT ALTRUISTICALLY

Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 477

Although for their benefit, confining wild animals to a captive environment may be said to harm them (Jamieson, 1985, 1995). At this point, the concept of animal altruism is invoked, to wit, the wild animal taken captive sacrifices its freedom and sometimes its life for the good of its kind. By analogy, the soldier who gives his life for his country goes into the breech willingly so that others might live and is regarded as a hero. A difficulty with this analogy is the absence of volunteerism on the part of animals taken into captivity. Lacking the capacity to evaluate and to decide for themselves, their sacrifice on behalf of an abstract principle is without their consent. However, as noted by Norton (1995), an ethic that bases all moral decisions on a single criterion such as Regan’s subject-as-a-life is “likely to conclude that sacrifice of individuals for species survival is always wrong because the individuals cannot fulfill the key requirement of voluntary acceptance of risk.” This, he points out, is to define altruism in anthropomorphic terms, thereby disqualifying animals from ever acting altruistically in a cause implicit in their struggle to perpetuate their genes.




Download 1.43 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   ...   133




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page