WE ONLY HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO OTHER HUMANS
Dr. Thomas Dorman, author and editor of an alternative medicine news letter, “Species are Distinct”, Paracelsus corporation, November 1999 volume 4 issue 11, http://paracelsusclinic.com/articles/display.asp?ID=139
To a careful observer, it is evident that all species have distinct characteristics, the most familiar of which is often expressed by the unique behavior and postures we observe, for instance, in our domestic cats; but virtually any species has a sentinel character. Many artists have been able to convey these unique features. That has usually been dismissed as mere art; but is it? I would propose that there is a universal characteristic of creatures which defines them distinctly and separates them from others. What is the distinct characteristic of Human Beings? People have a rational mind. Now, it is true that many other characteristics are unique to our species. Readers will know that I have personally conducted serious research on the role of the human pelvis as a unique transducer of the forces of locomotion in walking.4 It is not conceivable that the mechanism in the human pelvis, which regulates walking, could have derived its origins from a quadriped creature. This alone puts a kibosh in Darwin's theory of the mechanism of evolution. Once one started investigating this matter, one found hundreds nay thousands of serious thinkers who have drawn the same conclusion from a broader perspective with deep analysis covering all aspects of morphogenetics, of evolution, of the relevant biochemistry, and it is evident, as I have mentioned before (and I propose to devote a newsletter to this subject alone in the future, i.e., to morphogenetics), the anatomical and probably the personality characteristics of species cannot be explained mechanistically. We have to think in terms such as God, universal hologram, an astral presence and as Walter Elsassar has pointed out, based on a reductionist analysis of the mechanistic options, it is quite clear that the biochemical, or reductionist, tool will not suffice to explain these commonplace observations.5,6,7 I draw from this the conclusion that animals are not on a par with humans. None of this stops us loving them or pampering our pets. We need, however, to reaffirm our philosophical position that we as a species are different and have a responsibility to other members of our species that exceeds that to animals; hence the modern idea of speciesism is specious.
NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO LIBERTY FOR ANIMALS – MUST CONSIDER THE RIGHT IN TERMS OF THEIR UNIQUE NEEDS
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 98
It is not clear to me, however, these conclusions necessarily follow from the application of animal rights philosophy. Prohibiting both practices only becomes morally required if one adopts the view that the right to liberty should be granted to animals on the grounds that it is a good in itself. As Rachels points out, however, it only makes sense to grant rights in accordance with the harms that are likely to accrue if those rights were to be infringed. Thus, it is not sensible to grant to animals a right to vote or a right to worship since to deprive them of this right is not to harm them. Similarly, we should only grant to animals a right to liberty if to deprive them of it is to harm their interests. In the same way, as Regan and others have argued, taking a healthy animal’s life is wrong because it harms that animal’s interests, as a subject-of-a-life, in continuing to live. Taking the life an animal racked with pain which is untreatable, short of rendering it permanently unconscious, is in a different moral category (Regan describes it as preference respecting euthanasia) since in this case it is in the interests of that animal to be humanely destroyed because this is the only way we can satisfy its preference to be rid of pain. Incidentally, the widespread practice of euthanizing animals which are in pain and have little or no chance of recovery is arguably the only instance where the law upholds the interests of animals in a way which it does not for humans in the same circumstances.
No Moral Obligation to Animals
INTRINSIC VALUE JUSTIFICATION FOR MORAL RIGHTS FLAWED
Robert James Bidinotto, Director of Development and Special Projects@ theInstitute for Objectivist Studies. “Environmentalism or Individualism”. 2003 http://www.econot.com/page4.html
The basic premise of preservationism is that all of nature--except, of course, human nature--has "intrinsic value" in itself, and thus a "right" not to be affected by Man. But this premise, which is the moral core of modern environmentalism, is a colossal fraud.
The simple little question that punctures the balloon of intrinsic value is: Why? Why is the status quo of nature good in itself? No one has ever offered an intelligible answer.
To declare that a Northern spotted owl, a redwood tree, or the course of a river has "intrinsic" or "inherent value in itself," is to speak gibberish. There's no inherent "value" or "meaning" residing in nature, or anything else. "Value" presupposes a valuer, and some purpose. It's only in relation to some valuer and purpose that something can be said to "have value." Thus, there's no such thing as "intrinsic value." The concept is meaningless. There are only the moral values and meanings that are created and imposed upon an otherwise meaningless nature by a conceptual consciousness.
Animals, lacking any rational capacity, survive by adapting themselves to nature. Human beings survive only by utilizing reason to adapt the rest of nature to themselves. This means that even to subsist, Man must unavoidably use and disrupt animals and their habitats, transforming natural resources into food, clothing, shelter, and tools (capital). Yes, we too are part of nature; but our nature is that of a developer.
As the only entity on earth having both the conceptual ability to define "good" and "evil," and the power to choose between them, Man is the only natural source of moral values. The environment, then, acquires moral value and meaning only insofar as it's perceived, developed, used, and enjoyed by human beings. That's why it's morally appropriate to regard the rest of nature as our environment--as a bountiful palette and endless canvass for our creative works.
To Enlightenment thinkers, this was Man's power and his glory. To environmentalists, however, Man is the only thorn in an otherwise perfect Garden of Eden. But again--why? By the only moral standards there are--ours--human creativity is not a vice, but a virtue; our products are not evils, but--literally--"goods"; and the term "developer" is not an epithet, but a title of honor.
If we reject the idea of nature's intrinsic value, we may also reject its corollary: the notion that animals have inherent rights not to be bothered by people. Rights are moral principles that define the boundary lines necessary for peaceful interaction in society. Any intelligible theory of rights presupposes entities capable of defining and respecting moral boundary lines. But since animals are, by nature, unable to know, respect, or exercise rights, the principle of rights simply can't be applied to, or by, animals.
Practically, the notion of animal rights entails an absurd moral double standard. It declares that animals have the "inherent right" to survive as their nature demands, but that Man doesn't. It declares that the only entity capable of recognizing moral boundaries is to sacrifice his interests to entities that can't. Ultimately, it means that only animals have rights: since nature consists entirely of animals, their food, and their habitats, to recognize "animal rights," Man logically must cede to them the entire planet.
All animals may be equal in animal rights theory; but--as Orwell pointed out in Animal Farm--some animals are more equal than others.
This environmentalist double standard applies to humans not just in our relation to animals, but also in our relation to all of nature. If a hurricane erodes miles of seashores--well, that's nature for you; if a man bulldozes a beach to build his home, however, that's a desecration. If the Mount St. Helens eruption destroys hundreds of square miles of timber, that's natural; if a man clears a patch of that very same forest in order to raise his crops, that's a biological holocaust--and he's contributing to global warming, to boot. If a beaver builds a dam and floods a dry field, that's an "ecosystem"; if a developer builds a duck pond on the same dry field, that's an ecological atrocity, and the felon must be sent to the slammer.
IRRATIONAL TO ACT ON PURE “ANIMAL RIGHTS” BELIEFS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 65
I am sure that Singer would react the same way as I do to the dog-child example. He might consider it a weakness in himself if he were unable to act upon his philosophical beliefs. But he would be wrong; it would not be a weakness; it would be a sign of sanity. Just as philosophers who have embraced skepticism about the existence of the external world, or hold that science is just a “narrative” with no defensible claim to yield objective truth, do not put their money where their mouth is by refusing to jump out of the way of a truck bearing down on them, so philosophers who embrace weird ethical theories do not act on those theories even when they could do so without being punished. There are exceptions, but we call them insane.
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