Posted: 17-08-2009 by: Thomas Ruttig

“I also want to take part in the jihad, be like a mujahid, live like a mujahid, love like a mujahid, and feel like a mujahid. However, my problem is that I am committing too many sins. Can I take part in the jihad despite all these sins, even if I do not manage to stay away from sins? Or do I have to first be free of sin?” (As-Sahab, September 20).

This was followed days later by a third German-language video, this time entitled “O Allah, I Love You (2),” which more pointedly threatened Germany once again (al-Fajr Media Center, September 24).

Bekkay Harrach’s star has ascended rapidly in jihadist circles. A figure who was once relatively unknown outside security circles, he has rapidly moved to become the face of what might be called the German jihad – a catch-all term that best describes the active phenomenon of young German Muslims who choose to go to the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to train alongside either al-Qaeda or affiliated groups like the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The depth of the problem was reinforced by the tale of a group from Bonn (including six German citizens) who left Germany with their families to join the jihad in Waziristan. They were arrested on the border and allegedly beaten by Pakistani police (Der Spiegel, September 21). Reports indicate that they remain in detention there.

Harrach was born in Morocco to a family that moved to Germany in 1981 when he was 3 or 4 years old. Once in the country, he spent most of his time in Bonn, where he was apparently active in social circles around the King Fahd Academy, an alleged local hotbed of extremism (Der Spiegel, January 27). He attended a night-school in his 20s in Bonn, where he was studying to be an engineer. He ultimately elected to attend a university at the nearby Koblenz Institute for Technology, where he studied laser technology and business mathematics (Bild, April 22, 2009). However, his studies were regularly interrupted by trips abroad to seek glory in the fields of jihad, including a trip to the West Bank in 2003. Upon his return, blood was found on his belongings and it is believed he was injured in a skirmish with Israeli troops. He is also believed to have traveled twice to post-Saddam Iraq and may even have spent time in a Syrian jail (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, September 22). While on return from one of these trips to Iraq (where he claimed he was on a “humanitarian mission”) he was stopped by Germany’s security services, who attempted to recruit him (Der Spiegel, January 27).

In 2004, he gave up on his studies and took on a role at the local Muhadshirin Mosque in Bonn where he preached in a lively and extreme fashion. Towards the end of 2006, Harrach was introduced to Aleem Nasir, a German-Pakistani “gemstone dealer” who was recently incarcerated for being an al-Qaeda facilitator. It is believed that the man who introduced them was Omer Ozdemir, a German of Turkish heritage who is currently on trial with another man on charges of belonging to al-Qaeda and helping procure funds and equipment for the group (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 14).

Nasir gave Harrach a formal letter providing him with an introduction to an al-Qaeda training camp before Harrach headed off to Waziristan through Iran in early 2007, leaving behind a pregnant wife. Once in Pakistan, he rapidly established himself as a bright light amongst the ranks of foreign fighters there, apparently being trained by master al-Qaeda bomb-maker Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and operating under the protection of the Haqqani network (Der Spiegel, January 27).

However, it is likely Harrach’s role as a connection to the German-speaking world that has made him so important within the networks based in Pakistan. German is increasingly used in al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-affiliate video releases – in particular those from the IMU and the IJU. The latter group was apparently behind the “Sauerland Cell” plot to attack American targets in Germany (see Terrorism Focus, January 28, 2009; November 8, 2007). Descriptions from those who knew him portrayed Harrach as a personable chap, recalled by acquaintances who knew him in Bonn as not bearing the outward appearance of an extremist yet capable of persuading his wife, a German convert to Islam, to leave the comfort of Bonn to join him with their young child in the less accommodating badlands of Waziristan (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, September 22; Spiegel, January 27).

Whatever his actual role in al-Qaeda, his messages to his adopted land have put German authorities on the highest alert. Armed police patrol major airports and rail stations and security forces detained two men “of Arabic origin” in Munich after a judge approved their preventive detention until the Bavarian city’s Oktoberfest beer festival is over. Increased security at the event led one German news source to say “Oktoberfest has been transformed from a beer festival into a beer fortress” (Spiegel, September 29). One of the men detained was in contact with Harrach, while the other apparently knew him through a relative (Spiegel, September 28). Police previously arrested a young Turkish man in Stuttgart for allegedly posting one of Harrach’s videos online (Hurriyet, September 25).

It is the specificity of the threat that has alarmed watchers. While earlier official alerts have been sent out to German companies operating abroad (especially in North Africa), the focus on Germany and the specific timeline hinted in this new set of videos has officials particularly alarmed. The numbers being leaked to the press are equally disturbing - German officials say they are concerned about some 180 individuals who “have received or intend to receive paramilitary training.” About 80 of these individuals have returned to Germany but only 15 are in custody (Spiegel, September 28). Whether Harrach is able to draw from this pool to live up to his threat of giving Germany a “rude awakening” seems unclear, but it is certain that he was able to force the issue of Germany’s military role in Afghanistan onto the political agenda.

Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 36

November 25, 2009 12:21 PM Age: 2 yrs

By: Wahidullah Mohammad

Northern Afghanistan, a secure and stable area until last spring, is now an insecure and fearful place. Although Taliban and al-Qaeda activities have been limited mostly to southern Afghanistan over the past eight years, the Taliban were able to expand their terrorist activities to central Afghanistan and since spring 2009, the insurgents have focused their efforts on the most secure place in the country, expanding their terrorist activities to northern Afghanistan.

The expansion of Taliban activities to northern Afghanistan shows that the terrorist networks are getting stronger day to day, causing fear in ordinary Afghans. Taliban attacks on Afghan and international forces are frequently reported from Kunduz and some other northern provinces. Kunduz was the main stronghold of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan during the course of their rule, until 2001. Throughout this period the Taliban organized their raids in other northern provinces from Kunduz. This may be the reason that the insurgents once again want to use this province as a center for organizing terrorist attacks in the northern provinces.

The Taliban Return to Kunduz

The chief of police in Kunduz province, General Abdul Razaq, says the Taliban selected Kunduz as a center for their activities in northern Afghanistan because Kunduz was their stronghold in Afghanistan and they already had some old friends in this province. Though they were dispersed after the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban wants to reorganize them and use their power to make northern Afghanistan insecure. [1]

According to General Abdul Razaq, the Taliban came to northern Afghanistan while NATO and Afghan forces carried out operations against the insurgents in southern Afghanistan. With the Pakistani government conducting an offensive against the terrorists in southern Waziristan at the same time, the Taliban had no place to hide along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Taliban therefore came to northern Afghanistan to expand their activities and switch Afghan and NATO attention from the south to the north.

General Abdul Razaq says Afghan and NATO forces have strengthened their military operations against the insurgents in northern Afghanistan and reduced their terrorist activities. According to the General, an ongoing, three-month-long offensive by NATO and Afghan forces has killed most of the terrorists. Others have been arrested while some have again fled to the southern provinces or Pakistan. “We were able to scatter the insurgents from northern Afghanistan. More than 200 terrorists were killed. A number of them were arrested and some of them fled back to other places. Now the security situation is getting better, only in some of remote areas of some districts we still have some insurgency problems which will be solved soon” said General Abdul Razaq.

Northern Afghanistan has borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. According to Afghan security officials and analysts most of the terrorists in northern Afghanistan belong to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the network of Taliban leader Jalaludin Haqqani (who has strong connections with al-Qaeda) or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e- Islami Afghanistan (Afghanistan Islamic Party), the biggest and most influential mujahideen party during the war against the Soviet Union.. According to General Abdul Razaq, natives of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Chechnya are present among Taliban in northern Afghanistan and are always on the frontline of battles with Afghan and NATO forces.

A Lack of Political Will?

Fatima Aziz is a female member of Afghan Parliament from Kunduz province. She blames the government for the insecurity in northern Afghanistan and says that in the beginning, Taliban activities were very limited in northern Afghanistan but the government did not care to keep the Taliban from reaching the northern provinces. “The government could very easily keep the terrorists from reaching the north of the country but they did not. They let the insurgents become very strong and when they made Kunduz and other northern provinces insecure the government and ISAF conducted military operations against them.” [2]

General Abdul Razaq denies charges the government did not take serious steps to counter insurgency in the north, saying that the security forces always used all their facilities to counter insurgency and ensure security for people. According to General Abdul Razaq, terrorism is a regional problem and needs a regional solution, adding, “By the assistance of local people we were able to destroy all those terrorist groups that were active in the north of the country and we exterminated all their plans.”

The Deputy Director of the counterterrorism department at the Ministry of the Interior, Sayed Anwar Ahmadi, agrees with General Abdul Razaq and says that most of the insurgent groups have been destroyed in northern provinces. “Fortunately, due to the last military operations the insurgents are now too weak.” [3]

According to Ahmadi, the Taliban have some forces in northern Kunduz and Baghlan provinces as well as some districts of Faryab province. Ahmadi says that the Taliban is trying to expand their terrorist activities to the north to enable them to attack NATO supply convoys coming through Central Asia and northern Afghanistan.

Cold Weather or Counter-Insurgency Operations?

The security situation is improved in the northern provinces nowadays, but according to Fatima Aziz, the situation improved because the insurgents left the area and went to Pakistan and the southern provinces due to cold weather in the north. She says that the situation will get worse if the insurgents return next spring.

Deputy Director of counterterrorism Sayed Anwar Ahmadi says that before the weather became cold they conducted an offensive against the insurgents and the Taliban fled the area. “The security personnel are always ready to defeat the insurgents. We were never heedless about the insurgency…Cold weather also can be a natural reason for the improving security situation in the north, but [the Taliban] became very weak and had no alternative but to leave the area.”

According to Ahmadi, the insurgents in the north are organizing attacks in small groups against security forces. “There are 15 to 20 groups of insurgents in each province, like Kunduz, Baghlan and some bordering districts of Faryab province. Each group has around twenty people. Besides the networks of Hekmatyar, Tahir Yuldash and Juma Namangani, they have [a] very close connection with the Quetta and Peshawar councils of Taliban in Pakistan.” [4]

Threatening NATO Supply Lines

Political analyst and member of the Afghan Parliament from Kunduz, Moeen Marastyal, sees the NATO decision to ship supplies from Central Asia through Tajikistan to Afghanistan as the main reason for the Taliban presence in northern Afghanistan. [5] Marastyal says that the Taliban want to expand their network first to northern Afghanistan and then to Central Asia where the Uzbek and Tajik Taliban are already active. “By reaching northern Afghanistan they can easily attack NATO supply convoys. Besides reaching their targets in the north they also want to expand their network to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” said Marastyal, who claims that local people played a major role in removing terrorists from the northern provinces.

Kunduz province was the first in northern Afghanistan to be captured by Taliban after they seized Kabul in 1996. It remained a Taliban stronghold until October 2001, when U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan and the Taliban regime collapsed. Kunduz was the last province to be cleared of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. Kunduz was a strategic province in northern Afghanistan for the Taliban regime and could again become a place for insurgents to organize their attacks in the north.

Afghan journalist and political analyst Mohammad Qasim Akhgar says that NATO supply convoys from Central Asia through northern Afghanistan are one of the reasons for the Taliban presence in the north. [6] According to Akhgar, there are some countries that want to make Afghanistan insecure and are helping the Taliban to expand their presence to the north of Afghanistan and then to Central Asian nations. Akhgar did not name any of the countries that are helping the insurgents to reach their targets in the north except Pakistan. “Regretfully there are some countries like Pakistan that are helping the Taliban make Afghanistan insecure. Besides foreign countries, there are some people in the Afghan government who also help the Taliban,” said Akhgar.

According to Akhgar the insurgency cannot be solved simply by conducting military operations. “The Afghan insurgency problem needs an economic, political, cultural and military solution. It cannot be solved only by military operations. In Afghanistan the overall situation needs to be changed and become better.”

Notes:

1. Author’s interview with Kunduz chief of police General Abdul Razaq, November 16, 2009

2009

4. Tahir Yuldash was reported killed by a drone attack in August 2009. Juma Namangani was killed by an airstrike in Afghanistan in late 2001. Both were leaders of the IMU.

5. Author’s interview with Kunduz MP Moeen Marastyal, November 17, 2009

6. Author’s interview with political analyst Mohammad Qasim Akhgar, November 17, 2009

Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 5

February 4, 2010 03:28 PM Age: 2 yrs

By: Lieutenant General Talat Masood

Pakistani military during an offensive in South Waziristan

The United States has been pressuring Pakistan for several months to extend its counterinsurgency operations to North Waziristan. The U.S. perspective is that strong militant entities, especially the Haqqani group, the Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmaytar and Taliban forces under Hafiz Gul Bahadur are using the safe haven of North Waziristan to conduct raids on American, NATO and Afghan troops. Pakistan is resisting the immediate expansion of the conflict due to several factors, one of which is that Islamabad feels its military is already overcommitted in South Waziristan, Swat and Malakand and needs time to consolidate the gains it has achieved in these places before undertaking any further operations. More than 150,000 military and paramilitary forces are currently deployed in the tribal agencies and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in order to clear pockets of resistance, prevent the recurrence of militant attacks, and hold the territory that has been cleared until it stabilizes. The military has claimed the capture and killing of hundreds of militants during the operations, but the Taliban’s top leadership and many hard-core militants managed to escape in thickly forested areas or flee to adjoining tribal agencies. Conditions in Bajaur and Momand remain fairly volatile and clashes between security forces and militants are frequently reported. Remote areas of South Waziristan close to the border with North Waziristan continue to provide sanctuary to the Taliban and other militant entities that are now the target of U.S. drones.

Prioritizing North Waziristan

In the current operational environment, North Waziristan is not an immediate priority for Pakistan’s army. The militant entities in this area are not hostile toward Pakistan. It is generally believed that there is a tacit understanding that the Pakistan Army will not launch an operation if the tribes and militant groups stay neutral while operations against the Mahsud tribes and stabilization efforts continue in South Waziristan. The militant groups have not kept entirely to their undertaking and have given refuge to both al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders of South Waziristan. Another factor inhibiting a future offensive is the possibility of all the tribes uniting against the Pakistan Army in the event it launched an operation in North Waziristan. This would bring the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban closer, posing a formidable threat to regional security. The Taliban in North Waziristan number anywhere from 10,000 to 12,000 fighters and they have the advantage of local terrain that is very inhospitable to forces from other parts of the country. The local Taliban in North Waziristan have support from a cross-section of people. Those who oppose them fear retaliation as the government’s writ is practically non-existent in the region.

North Waziristan has been a victim of gross neglect by successive governments. Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan anti-communist jihad, the subsequent abandonment of the region by the United States and the international community and finally the impact of the events of 9/11 have totally destroyed the social, tribal and administrative structure of the area, encouraging the Taliban to fill the vacuum. They are in fact running a parallel administration, providing justice in accordance with their harsh interpretation of Islam and maintaining security by imposing ruthless measures. The Haqqani Network and other groups have militias of 3,000 to 4,000 fighters and could draw more from the adjoining provinces of Afghanistan if Islamabad launches a military operation. Militants fleeing from South Waziristan and other parts of the tribal agencies have also sought refuge in the area.

Islamabad does not want to antagonize the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups residing in North Waziristan, knowing that it will have to deal with them once American and NATO forces leave. The new U.S. strategy on Afghanistan already envisages a withdrawal of forces commencing in 18 months and there is talk of bringing the reconcilable Taliban to the negotiating table. The other Coalition contributors have no intention to remain in Afghanistan any longer than necessary. In such unpredictable conditions, Pakistan would like to keep its options open and watch closely how U.S. policy and the military situation evolve.

The Indian Equation

The Indian factor is crucial to the strategic calculus Pakistan uses in formulating policy on Afghanistan and the Taliban. With tensions high since the Mumbai terrorist attack and several provocative statements by Indian military and political leaders, Pakistan finds it difficult to relocate its forces from its eastern Indian border west to the Afghanistan border. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ statement in New Delhi that India’s patience would be exhausted in the event of another terrorist attack on India by jihadi groups has given additional reason to be more circumspect in shifting forces (The Hindu, January 20).

A further inhibiting factor in the extension of military operation in North Waziristan is the danger that it could trigger a fresh wave of suicide attacks in many parts of Pakistan, as was experienced during military operations in Swat and more recently in South Waziristan. The high human and financial cost is another important consideration. Pakistan has lost more than 2,000 men from its security forces and thousands of civilians in its fight against militants. The financial cost of insurgency is already taking its toll, with the defense budget exceeding the allocated amount by over 35 % while demands for more money, weapons and equipment are rising. It is estimated that Pakistan has suffered a loss of nearly $28 billion for being a front line state in the fight against militants. [1] When U.S. assistance is withheld due to bureaucratic hurdles it compounds Pakistan’s ongoing financial crisis.

A recent statement by Army spokesperson General Athar Abbas made it clear that the army has no intention of launching a major military operation for the next six to twelve months as it is already over-committed and busy consolidating its position in the areas of Swat, Malakand and South Waziristan (Dawn [Karachi], January 22). This must have come as a rude shock to the U.S. military commanders who have been pressing Pakistan’s military to expand its area of operations to North Waziristan. The United States wants Pakistan’s army to take on the Haqqani Network, which has close ties to Arab militants and is alleged to be involved in a number of deadly suicide attacks, including the recent suicide bombing of the CIA station in Khost province by a Jordanian triple agent (see Terrorism Monitor, January 28).

The Need for Stabilization and Consolidation

The absence of a military operation in the near future means that the frequency of drone attacks on North Waziristan will continue or even intensify. It gives rise to considerable local resentment and sharpens anti-American sentiment while presenting a moral and political dilemma for the government, notwithstanding its tactical advantage.

There is no doubt that operations in Swat, Malakand and South Waziristan have been largely successful, but there are pockets of these areas still in the hands of the militants, though the leadership has fled into other tribal agencies, principally North Waziristan, Orakzai and Momand.

It is estimated that there are roughly 100 hard-core al-Qaeda operatives and about 2,000 auxiliary members and supporters. In the frontier region, Uzbeks constitute the largest group among al-Qaeda’s foreign mujahideen, with Arabs, Uighurs, Tajiks and a few individuals from African countries constituting the rest. Nearly a dozen of the mainly Arab hard-core al-Qaeda have been killed or captured in the last few months.