Posted: 17-08-2009 by: Thomas Ruttig

Rebuilding Local Administrations

The civilian administration has yet to be made fully functional in Malakand division and in South Waziristan. Tribes opposed to the Taliban are being mobilized to take care of local security and support the government’s efforts in establishing an administrative structure commensurate with tribal traditions. This may take time but is a very critical part of the operation. Several pro- government leaders opposed to the Taliban have been killed, which has been demoralizing for pro-government tribes and groups. Furthermore, there has been a large internal displacement of people during the military operations. From South Waziristan alone, nearly 300,000 persons were displaced and remain either in camps or as guests in adjoining settled areas. Hospitable conditions need to be created so these people will not fall prey to the machinations of the Taliban when they return. There is already considerable resentment among them that they were caught in the crossfire of the military and Taliban.

It is encouraging, however, that the fight against militancy is being pursued more enthusiastically now than it was during President Musharraf’s rule. With the support of the civilian government, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has shown the determination and will to seriously engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations according to the government’s priorities.

Conclusion

The government is currently unprepared to negotiate with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leadership. At this stage it aims at ruthlessly pursuing the leaders and their groups. However, it is important to understand that the TTP is a loose network of motley and disparate groups that have coalesced to leverage their impact but have little in common. In South Waziristan, the heartland of the resistance, the Taliban could be characterized as ideologically motivated. In North Waziristan the situation is similar. In Khyber Agency, however, criminals, smugglers and the drug mafia have worn the mantle of the Taliban to challenge the authority of the state.

In Khurram Agency sectarian groups are fighting for turf and in Orakzai and Bajaur a mix of ideology and criminality acts as an incentive for insurgency. These groups will continue to cause trouble for quite a while. However, if the government and the military remain steadfast and pursue the militant leaders and their groups vigorously according to a well-conceived plan involving both military and other elements of national power, there are good prospects for pacifying the area in two to three years. Much, of course, will depend on how the situation unfolds in Afghanistan and the extent of international support to Pakistan.

Notes:

The Asian Tigers – The New Face of the Punjabi Taliban

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 20

May 20, 2010 05:02 PM Age: 1 yrs

By: Arif Jamal

The emergence in North Waziristan of the Asian Tigers, a previously unknown jihadi group, has several messages for jihad watchers. Two of them are very important. First, the Punjabi Taliban are slowly but surely growing in strength and numbers. Second, their war is primarily against the state of Pakistan (read their former handlers) and may eventually surpass that of their Afghan comrades in intensity.

Although the exact identity of the Asian Tigers is not known, Pakistani intelligence agencies believe it is a front group for the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), headed by Ilyas Kashmiri (The News [Islamabad], May 1). The Asian Tigers’ first operation was to abduct Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan Air Force squadron leader who gained notoriety as a jihadist ideologue in the 1980s, and then execute him on April 30 in a dramatic manner, leaving his body with a note saying he was a CIA agent and all such others would be treated likewise (Dawn [Karachi], April 30).

Some time in March, Khalid Khawaja traveled to North Waziristan on an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-sponsored mission to cleanse the Pakistani Taliban of “bad Taliban.” Khawaja was accompanied by Brigadier Amir Sultan Tarar (a.k.a. Colonel Imam), Shah Abdul Aziz, a former mujahideen commander who became a member of Parliament under General Musharraf, and Mehmud al-Samarai, described by the Taliban as a former Iraqi intelligence agent but now believed to be involved in Saudi peace efforts in Afghanistan. The three pleaded with Taliban leaders Sirajuddin Haqqani, Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rehman to convince them to change their targets. According to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, “They tried to convince Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rahman Mahsud to stop attacking the Pakistan army and discussed a mechanism to target NATO supply lines only. They offered to help Hakimullah set up pockets in different parts of the country from where they could attack NATO supplies going to Afghanistan” (Asia Times, April 28).

The trio also appealed to the TTP to expel 14 senior Taliban commanders who were suspected by the ISI of being on the payroll of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence agency. Most of these 14 commanders are Punjabis (see The News, May 1 for the full list of names). A four-wheel drive vehicle belonging to Waliur Rehman which Khawaja used during this visit was hit a few days after Khawaja’s departure by a U.S. drone, though the attack failed to kill Waliur Rehman (Asia Times, April 28; Dawn, April 30).

Although the drone attack and other suspicious behavior noted by the militants may have prompted the Punjabi Taliban to take his life, the real reasons are to be found elsewhere. Khalid Khawaja remained loyal to the ISI even after his retirement and shared its vision of liberating Kashmir by using jihad as an instrument of defense policy as well as using the Afghan Taliban to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan against India. For Khawaja, like his mentors in the ISI, all those who were out of the ISI’s control were Indian agents. The Punjabi Taliban are irked by this policy and fail to understand why jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir is good but jihad against the Pakistan army, allied with the same infidel forces that occupy Afghanistan, is bad. Mohammad Omar, a spokesman for the Punjabi Taliban, told a Pakistani journalist that Khawaja was killed partly because he would call the Punjabi Taliban “terrorists” but refer to the Afghan Taliban as “mujahideen” (The News, May 2).

According to a TTP spokesman, during his visit to Waziristan Khawaja promised to return with others, and when he did, the Taliban were prepared to abduct and interrogate him. Khawaja returned on March 25 with Colonel Imam and Asad Qureshi, a Pakistani journalist with British citizenship whom the Asian Tigers accused of working for the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Before killing Khawaja and dumping his body on a roadside in Mir Ali, the Asian Tigers sent five video clips to selected media outlets which contained the “confessions” of the former ISI officers. The Urdu-language videos appear to have been heavily edited and include incomplete sentences. Khawaja in particular appears to be under duress and at times seems to be reading from notes on his lap.

In the videos, Khawaja confesses to having conspired with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F, a major Islamist political party) and Grand Mufti Maulana Rafi Usmani to bring down the radical Lal Masjid movement, named after the Islamabad mosque that acted as its headquarters. The military’s July 2007 siege of Lal Masjid marked the beginning of a new and especially violent wave of Islamist militancy in Pakistan. The second crime Khawaja confessed to was being an agent of both the ISI and the CIA. Khawaja also alleged in his “confession” that Harkat ul-Mujahideen commander Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Jaish-i-Mohammad founder Maulana Masood Azhar and Jaish-i-Mohammad commander Abdullah Shah Mazhar were ISI proxies. “Jihadi organizations like Laskhar-e-Taiba, al-Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat ul-Mujahideen etc. operate with the financial assistance of the Pakistani secret services and they are allowed to collect their funds inside Pakistan" (Asia Times, April 24).

The kidnapping operation of the Asian Tigers is shrouded in mystery. Only Colonel Imam and Asad Qureshi (who remain in their custody) may have the answer to the identity of the Asian Tigers. One report claimed senior Afghan commanders negotiating for the release of Colonel Imam (who is very close to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar) had suggested the Asian Tigers appeared to have the backing of someone powerful, as the group was moving freely through the region despite its small numbers (The News, May 1). If true, this would show that part of the military establishment in Pakistan has become radical and is siding with those who have rejected the official policy.

Haqqani Network Shifting from North Waziristan to Pakistan’s Kurram Agency

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 45

December 16, 2010 04:31 PM Age: 304 days

By: Arif Jamal

Members of the Haqqani Network

Residents in the Kurram Agency of tribal northwest Pakistan believe that the Pakistani military has once again postponed military operations in North Waziristan Agency after its plan to shift the so-called “moderate Taliban” (including the notorious Haqqani Network) was exposed and severely criticized by some elements of the Pakistani press in November. According to a Kurram Agency Shi’a leader, “the military seems to have put its plans to launch a military operation in the North Waziristan Agency on hold for now as it is no longer trying to shift their strategic assets from North Waziristan to Kurram Agency with the same vigor in anticipation of an operation in North Waziristan under US pressure. We are not sure if it is because of the criticism of this policy in the Pakistani press or the WikiLeaks revelations.” [1] The northern part of Kurram is dominated by Shi’a tribes (particularly the Bangash and Turi), while the southern half is dominated by Sunnis.

It is not only the press that has opposed the shift of Taliban fighters to new bases. When the local population in the Shalozan area of Kurram successfully resisted Taliban infiltration, there were reports of army gunships intervening to protect their “jihadist partners” (Daily Times [Lahore], November 4). There have been a number of recent attacks by gunmen in the Kurram Agency on members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including one in November that killed militant commander Hikmat Shah Khoedadkhel (Nawa-e Waqt [Rawalpindi], November 9; The News [Islamabad], November 8. For background information on the Shi’a-Taliban struggle for Kurram see Terrorism Monitor, April 17).

From the Pakistani military’s viewpoint, Kurram Agency is important for two reasons. First, this agency can become a new sanctuary for the pro-military Taliban, such as the Haqqani Network. However, the second reason is more important. The Kurram Agency has served the route to Afghanistan for the mujahideen since 1980. The Kurram Agency would have fallen long ago to Taliban militants, as have other tribal agencies, if it had not been for the courage of the local Shi’a population, which has been fighting bravely against the Taliban since 2007.

NATO targeted the Taliban sanctuaries in Kurram with helicopter strikes in September, which resulted in the death of some Pakistani soldiers and created a diplomatic storm between Pakistan and NATO nations. It is now clear that the Haqqani Network was using the village of Mata Sangar in Kurram to carry out attacks on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) posts in Khost, Afghanistan. Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani was reported to be in the area at the time of the NATO attack (Daily Times, November 4). Another local Shi’a leader in Kurram said that “the slowdown in moving more Taliban from North Waziristan and elsewhere to Kurram is temporary, no matter what the reasons are. They would soon resume this in view of the strategic importance of the Kurram Agency, particularly if or when the Americans withdraw from Afghanistan.” [2]

Officials and analysts in Islamabad believe that the postponement of the military operation in North Waziristan is more likely a reaction to the Wikileaks revelations of Pakistani support for the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups, than the press revelations of military support for a transfer of militants from North Waziristan to Kurram. According to a senior official:

"The Pakistani army cares little about the revelations in the press. The Wikileaks disclosures are more damaging to the army’s image than to the politicians’ images. Politicians are always under attack in Pakistan. However, it is the first time that the dirty linen of the Pakistan army has been washed in the open in such a way. They are very angry. The army will evaluate the impact of the Wikileaks and rethink its strategy before it acts in North Waziristan." [3]

The Parachinar-Thall road, the Kurram Agency’s link to Pakistan, has remained effectively closed to the Shi’a population of Kurram by Army-supported blockades by the local Sunni Taliban since the sectarian battles of 2007. In a recent statement, the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) announced that the Parachinar-Thall road had been opened for traffic. However, Sajid Hussain Turi, an MNA from Kurram Agency, said that the road still remains unsafe and only convoys with security can travel on the road (Dawn [Karachi] December 5). At the end of October, the Pakistani military announced its plans to close down the Parachinar-Gardez-Kabul road, the only other route out of the Kurram Agency. This virtually trapped the people of Kurram in their homeland with a pair of blockades (Daily Times, November 4). Some local analysts believe the closure of the remaining border crossings to Afghanistan is intended to compel the Shi’a tribes of Kurram to welcome the Haqqani Network. In return for allowing their presence, the Haqqanis would convince the TTP militants to allow Shi’a access to the road from Kurram to Peshawar (The News, December 12). A leading daily reported unsuccessful secret meetings in Islamabad between Haqqani Network commanders (including Qari Taj), TTP leaders (including Karim Mushtaq) and elders of the Shi’a tribes of Kurram Agency designed to reopen the Parachinar-Thall road, which would be used for the movement of TTP fighters as well as local Shi’as (Dawn, November 30).

Notes:

1. Interview with a Shi’a leader through a research assistant, Kurram Agency, December 3, 2010.

3. Interview with a Pakistani official through a research assistant, Islamabad, December 5, 2010.

The Khurasan Mujahideen Seek to Eliminate Espionage in Waziristan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 13

April 1, 2011 02:43 PM Age: 198 days

By: Zia Ur Rehman

Although Pakistani Taliban militants have killed hundreds of people accused of spying for the United States or Pakistan’s intelligence agencies over the past few years in the lawless tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, the incidents of such execution are on rise since the beginning of the year. The killings, some of which were carried out in brutal fashion and videotaped as a warning to would-be-spies, come as many important leaders of al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban militant groups have been killed in the escalated drone attacks in the region.

Local tribal elders believe that the recent rise in the incidence of such killings is a warning by the militants to the local population against facilitating the drone campaign in the tribal areas by providing intelligence information. [1] This was confirmed by the Pakistani military’s official version of U.S. attacks in the tribal region, which claimed that most of the people killed in drone attacks were hardcore al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and a fairly large number of them were of foreign origin. On March 9, Major General Ghayur Mehmood, who commands troops in North Waziristan, said in a briefing in Miramshah that between 2007 and 2011, 164 drone strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed. Of those casualties, 793 were locals and 171 were foreigners. General Mehmood claimed the latter included Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans, though proof of these assertions was not provided (Dawn [Karachi], March 9).

Because of drone attacks, the militants who once freely roamed markets have now receded to compounds. High-value targets move as many as three times a night, avoid funerals and trackable technology, and rely on motorbikes or their feet to move about. Most drone attacks are based on intelligence from sources on the ground and information from local citizens, said Brigadier (Retd.) Mehmud Shah, a former secretary of security for the tribal area (Central Asia Online, January 28).

The killings of important leaders of al-Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network and other militant groups have compelled the militants operating in North and South Waziristan to execute people suspected of spying and leave their bodies on the roadside with notes pinned to their chests branding them as "U.S. spies" and traitors. [2] The bodies are often mutilated and beheaded. In North Waziristan, corpses appear in fields and roadsides almost daily with a dark warning pinned to their tunic: “All U.S. spies will meet the same fate.”

The massive escalation in U.S. drone attacks in North and South Waziristan tribal agencies since the beginning of 2011 has also seen an unprecedented rise in assassinations of suspected spies:

• On February 5, four bodies of tribesmen were found in Karak district, pinned with notes accusing them of spying for Indian and Jewish intelligence agencies (The News [Karachi] February 6; Dawn [Karachi], February 6).

• On February 8, militants killed Afghan refugee Bakht Jan for allegedly spying for the United States in North Waziristan. His body was found on the Miramshah- Datta Khel road (Daily Times [Lahore], February 9).

• The bodies of two khasadars (paramilitary personnel) were found in a sack with a warning that anybody else accused of spying on the Taliban would meet the same fate (Central Asia Online, February 10).

• Four bullet-riddled bodies of unidentified persons were found in a deserted place in the Karak district on February 14. Letters recovered from the pockets of the bodies stated that those spying for Israel and India would meet the same fate (The News [Islamabad], February 15).

• On March 1, militants in North Waziristan Agency killed four tribesmen suspected of providing intelligence to U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies and dumped their bodies on a Miramshah roadside. Notes pinned on their chests read: “We killed them because they were spying for the U.S. Anyone who acts like this will face the same fate” (Dawn [Karachi], March 1).

• Four bodies of unidentified persons were found on March 21 in a deserted place in the Datta Khel region of North Waziristan. Notes found in their pockets described their alleged roles in the controversial March 17 drone attack in the region that killed 30 people (Dawn [Karachi], March 21).

• Militants are also reported to have killed more than 50 people in North and South Waziristan since the beginning of 2011, though these murders were not reported in the media because of a lack of media access and other factors. [4]

According to local tribal elders, in most cases militants execute so-called spies just to terrorize ordinary tribesmen (Central Asia Online, Jan 28). In some cases, the IMK’s militants are also known to put suicide vests on those accused of spying and detonate the vests in front of large crowds to demonstrate the power of the Taliban. An example of this method was found in the public execution of two men accused of being U.S. spies in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan last year (Reuters, May 21, 2010).

The organized vigilance of the IMK in hunting down suspected spies has left local tribesmen frightened and reluctant to provide vital intelligence to guide the United States. No senior al-Qaeda or TTP leaders have been killed in drone attacks in tribal areas since the beginning of 2011, which shows the growing number of executions has had a negative effect on U.S. intelligence collection in the tribal agencies.

Notes:

2. Author’s interview with a TTP associate and elders of the Wazir tribe.

3. Author’s interview with a TTP associate.

4. Author’s interview with a Bannu-based journalist.

Haqqani Network Growing Stronger at the Expense of the Tehrik-e-Taliban

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 31

August 4, 2011 05:34 PM Age: 73 days

By: Arif Jamal