Space Weaponization – 4 Week


Space Weaponization Bad – Russia/US War



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Space Weaponization Bad – Russia/US War



Space weaponization risks US-Russia war

Krepon, 04 [Michael; “Avoiding the Weaponizaiton of Space”; Article; November; http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Avoiding_the_Weaopnization_of_Space.pdf]
Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT(anti-satellite) weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush Administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The abric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush Administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.

This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood. Crafting a space assurance posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat, offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.

Worries about a surprise attack in space cannot be written off, but there are far easier, less traceable, and more painful ways for America’s enemies to engage in asymmetric warfare than by attacking US satellites. Weapons in space and weapons on Earth specifically designed to neutralize or destroy objects in space are being pursued for another reason as well: to help US armed forces win quickly and with a minimum of casualties. This rationale only makes sense if America’s adversaries will refrain from fighting back in space. If they return fire, however, US troops are likely to be punished rather than helped because of their greater reliance on satellites.



Similarly, the clear preference of US space warriors is to use nondestructive techniques that disorient, dazzle, or disable an adversary’s satellites without producing debris that could destroy the space shuttle, the international space station, and satellites. America’s weaker foes, however, have far less incentive to be so fastidious about debris in their approach to space warfare.States possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles could explode a nuclear weapon in space to wreak havoc on satellites.

To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage US or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of US and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space.
AND Russia will fight if they think we are launching weapons

THERESA HITCHENS 07 DIRECTOR THE WORLD SECURITY INSTITUTE’S CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/HitchensTestimony.pdf


Meanwhile, Russia, a potential U.S. military space competitor, has repeatedly expressed its concerns with the direction of U.S. military space plans. For example, Vitaly Davidov, deputy head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos, said of the new NSP: “This document can be seen as today as the first step toward a serious deepening of the military confrontation in space. … Now the Americans are saying they not only want to go to space but that they want to dictate to others who else is allowed to go there.”25 Indeed, in June 2005 – when media reports of the NSP review surfaced – Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov threatened that Russia would “take retaliatory steps” if any country were to deploy weapons in space.26
Extinction

Bostrom ‘2 (Nick, Dir. Future of Humanity Institute and Prof. Philosophy – Oxford U., Journal of Evolution and Technology, “Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards”, 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)
With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by "igniting" the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don't know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are. A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind's potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.



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