Sustaining Trade Reform: Institutional Lessons from Argentina and Peru
Download 245.88 Kb.
|
7.REFERENCESAcemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Crown Publishers. Anderson, Kym, John Cockburn, and Will Martin. 2010. “Introduction and Summary,” in Kym Anderson, John Cockburn, and Will Martin, Editors, Agricultural Price Distortions, Inequality, and Poverty, World Bank. Available as an ebook at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1272467194981/Ag_Price_Distortions_Inequality_Poverty_0310.pdf. Anderson, K. and S. Negel. 2012. “Trade Barrier Volatility and Agricultural Price Stabilization,” World Development, 40(1): 36-48. Australian Productivity Commission. 2003. From industry assistance to productivity: 30 years of ‘the Commission’, Productivity Commission, Canberra. Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 2010. The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice, Annual Reviews of Economics, vol. 2, 223-256. Banks, Gary. 2011. “Economics, economists and public policy in Australia,” Opening address to the 40th Australian Conference of Economists Symposium, Does Australian public policy get the economics it deserves? 14 July 2011, Shine Dome, Canberra. Edited version, as published in Agenda, vol.18, no. 3, Dec. 2011, 21-29. Available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/114234/20110714-economics.pdf. Barsky, O. and M. Davila. 2008. La rebelión del campo: Historia del conflicto agrario argentino, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana. Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy, Chicago, Aldine. Bolsa de Comercio de Córdoba. 2010. El Balance 2010 de la Economía Argentina, http://www.bolsacba.com.ar/investigaciones/balance-de-la-economia. Bown, Chad. 2011. The Great Recession and Import Protection, CEPR and The World Bank publication. http://www.cepr.org/pubs/books/CEPR/great_recession_web.pdf. Clarin. 2011. Se aceleró en Agosto la salida de capitales, September 10, p. 30.
De Souza Ferreira Filho, J. and C. de Freitas Vian. 2011. Policy Responses to the 2007-2008 Food Price Swing and the Impact on Domestic Prices, manuscript for FAO. Economist Intelligence Unit. 2012. The Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under stress, www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011. Finger, J. Michael. 2012. “Flexibilities, rules, and trade remedies in the GATT/WTO system,” chapter 19 in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton, and Robert M. Stern (eds.) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization. Finger, J. Michael and J. Nogués. 2006. Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin America Trade Liberalization, Palgrave Mc Millan. Friedman, Milton. 1953. “The methodology of positive economics,” in Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 3-34. Garcia Perez, Alan. 2011. Contra el temor económico. Creer en el Perú, Lima: Planeta. Gerchunoff, P. and P. Fajgelbaum. 2006. Porque Argentina no fue como Australia? Editorial Siglo XXI. Haddad, Mona and Ben Shepherd. 2011. Managing Openness: Trade and outward-oriented growth after the crisis. (eds.), World Bank publication. Hamilton, Walton H. 1963. “Institution,” in Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds., Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan 1963, volume 8, 84-89. Henderson, David. 1986. Innocence and Design: The Influence of Economic Ideas on Policy, Blackwell. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1998. “The Approach of Institutional Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI (1), March, 166-192. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2003. “Introduction,” in Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Recent Developments in Institutional Economics, (ed.), Edward Elgar, p. xi-xxix. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2003. Recent Developments in Institutional Economics, (ed.), 2003. Hudec, Robert H. 1987. Developing country in the GATT legal system, London: Gower, for the Trade Policy Research Center. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Sean Lowry. 2012. US Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief Number PB12-9 April. IERAL. 2011. “Empleos formales: el sector público aportó 1 de cada 4 nuevos puestos en el último quinquenio,” Instituto de Estudios Económicos sobre la realidad Argentina y Latinoamericana, Informe de Coyuntura, September 1 (www. ieral.com). IMF. 2011. World Economic Outlook, IMF publication, September. IPC. 2011. “What is the role of trade in reducing price volatility,” Remarks of Charlotte Hebebrand from the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC) at the IFPRI Seminar on June 2, 2011 on: “Informing the G-20 Agenda: Actions to address food price volatility”. Jara, Alejandro. 2006. “Comment” on the rear cover of J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués, (English edition) Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire, Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank. (Spanish edition) Salvaguardias y Antidumping en la liberalización de América Latina: Combatiendo el fuego con fuego, Siglo XXI. Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krueger, Anne O. 2003. “Maintaining the Momentum: Emerging Market Policy Reform in 2004,” Keynote Address at the Asia Society Conference: Investing Across Emerging Markets 2004 New York, November 20, 2003. Accessed 30 Dec., 2011 at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/112003.htm. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed.). University of Chicago Press. La Nación. 2011. John Deere instalará una planta de tractores y cosechadoras en el país, September 26, page 3. Lakoff George. 2006. “Simple Framing: An introduction to framing and its uses in politics,” Rockridge Institute. Available at http://integral-options.blogspot.com/2009/04/simple-framing-by-george-lakoff.html. Accessed April 30, 2012.
Levy, Brian. 2011. “The Politics of Development,” World Bank Development Outreach, April, 59-63. Levy, Brian. 2011. “The Politics of Development,” World Bank Development Outreach, April, 59-63. Llach, J. 2002. “La Industria: 1945-1983,” Nueva Historia de la Nación Argentina, Academia Nacional de la Historia, Editorial Planeta. Lowenthal, Abraham F. 2011. “Disaggregating Latin America: Diverse Trajectories, Emerging Clusters and their Implications,” Brookings Research and Commentary, 01 November, 2011, The Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/1101_latin_america_lowenthal.aspx. Lowi, T. 1964. “American Business and Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory,” World Politics 16, 347-382. McCarthy, Nigel. 2000. “Alf Rattigan and the journalists: advocacy journalism and agenda setting in the Australian tariff debate 1963-1971,” Australian Journalism Review, 22(2): 88-102. Moore, M. 2011. “Argentina: There and Back Again,” in C. Bown (op. cit.). Nelson, Richard R. and Bhaven N. Sampat. 2001. “Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping Economic Performance,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 44 (1): 31-54. Nogués, Julio J. 2011. Agro y Industria: del centenario al bicentenario, Cuidad Argentina y Hispania Libros. Nogués, J. 2011a. Agricultural Export Barriers and Domestic Prices: Argentina during the Last Decade, mimeo, prepared for FAO and available from the author. Nogués, J. and E. Baracat. 2006. “Political economy of anti-dumping and safeguards in Argentina,” in J. Finger and J. Nogués (op. cit.). Nogués, J and A. Porto. 2007. Evaluación de impactos económicos y sociales de políticas públicas en la cadena agroindustrial, Foro de la Cadena Agroindustrial. http://www.foroagroindustrial.org.ar/pdf/final_home_old.pdf. North, Douglas C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge U. Press. North, Douglas C. 1991. “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), Winter, 97-112. OECD, WTO and UNCTAD. 2011. Report on the G-20 Measures (mid October 2010 to April 2011). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/46/47955250.pdf. Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven: Yale University Press. Perry, G. 2003. Can Fiscal rules help reduce volatility in Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank staff working paper, No. 3080. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/07/26/000094946_03071704235094/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Rudd, Kevin Michael. 2008. Address to Heads of Agencies and Members of the Senior Executive Service, Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra. The statement is quoted by Gary Banks, p. 248, in Banks, Gary. 2010. An Economy-wide View: Speeches on Structural Reform, Australian Government, Productivity Commission. Rutherford, Malcolm. 2001. “Institutional Economics: Then and Now,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3), Summer, 173-194. Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, Prentice Hall; republished in 1963 by Archon Books, Hamden CN. Sturzenegger, A. and M. Salazni. 2007. Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Argentina, Agricultural Distortions Paper No. 11, Banco Mundial: Washington, DC. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1146153362267/Argentina_1207.pdf. Turner, Jonathan. 1997. The Institutional Order, New York: Longman. Veblen, Thorstein. 1915. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An economic study of institutions, New York and London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Webb, Richard, Josefina Camminati and Raúl León Thorne. 2006. (English edition) “Antidumping Mechanisms and Safeguards in Peru,” chapter 8 in J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués, Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire, 247-277; (Spanish edition) “Mecanismos Antidumping y Salvaguardias en el Perú,” en J. Michael Finger y Julio J. Nogués, Salvaguardias y Antidumping en la liberalización de América Latina: Combatiendo el fuego con fuego, Siglo XXI, 383-426. Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. The New Institutional Economic: Taking Stock,” Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII, (3), September, 595-613. Witt, Ulrich. 2008. “What is specific about evolutionary economics?” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 18(5): 547-575. World Bank. 2009. Country Partnership Strategy for the Argentine Republic for the Period 2010-2012, May 6, at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/06/02/000350881_20090602151341/Rendered/PDF/484760CAS0Addendum0Box. World Bank. 2010. Enterprise Surveys: Argentina, World Bank. http://espanol.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/2010/argentina#regulations-and-taxes--sin-subgrupos. World Trade Organization. 2007. Trade Policy Review: Argentina, WT/TPR/S/176/Rev.1. World Trade Organization. 2011. Committee on Import Licensing Procedures: Minutes of the Meeting held on October 4. http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+G%FCLIC%FCM%FC%2A+%29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FG%2FLIC%2FM34%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=G%2FLIC%2FM%2F34. World Trade Organization. 2012a. “Argentina's Import Restricting Policies and Practices: Joint Statement by Australia, The European Union, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey and The United States,” G/C/W/667, 4 April 2012. World Trade Organization. 2012b. “Statement by Argentina on Agenda Item 5 of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods on 30 March 2012: Argentina's Import Restricting Policies and 1 Banks (2011, p. 21). 2 This was one of the key findings of Finger and Nogués’ study (2006) of Latin American trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. We were not however the first to observe this pattern. Bela Balassa, in his path-breaking study (1971) of trade policy in developing countries, observed that: The existing system of protection in many developing countries can be described as the historical result of actions taken at different times and for different reasons. These actions have been in response to the particular circumstances of the situation, and have often been conditioned by the demands of special interest groups. (xv). 3 This is not to say that reform leaders saw the role of international organizations solely as a template for changing domestic policy management structures. They also saw international organizations as endorsements that would have influence in domestic politics – and here perhaps more the World Bank and the IMF than the GATT/WTO, particularly as the Bank and the Fund augmented their endorsements with money. It still follows that for the reforms to stick they would have to be – in ways taken up in this study – “institutionalized.” 4 Compare Douglass North (1990, p. 111), “There is nothing the matter with the rational actor paradigm that could not be cured by a healthy awareness of the complexity of human motivation and the problems that arise from information processing. 5 John R. Commons, one of the first practitioners of institutional economics in the US, emphasized this point; Rutherford (2001) provides an introduction to the work of earlier institutional economists. 6 North (1990 and 1991) elaborates this point. 7 Hodgson (1998 and 2003) elaborates this point. 8 Finger (2012) posits that the trade remedy process in the United States is evolving toward one in which importer interests have significant weight. 9 The Economist Intelligence Unit's "Democracy Index" ranks 167 countries; from Norway, at the top with an index value of 9.8, to North Korea, with an index value of 1.1. The United States ranks 19th, subject countries here, Argentina and Peru, rank 51st and 56th, respectively. However, the index values for Argentina and Peru differ from the value for the United States by less than the United States lags Norway. 10 When these reforms were put in place all of the countries except Mexico were already GATT contracting parties and hence had already accepted the international law obligations implicit in those rules. 11 Indeed, WTO rules on use of trade remedies provided less of a legal barrier against new protection that some of the reform leaders had hoped. Protection seekers, armed with briefs from Washington and Brussels experts, presented a solid argument that they were being denied protection that US and EC experience showed was acceptable under WTO rules. 12 North (1990, p. 40) refers to empirical work that suggests trade-offs among the various elements, i.e., the lower the price of one – of ideas, ideologies, convictions, or interests in terms of another – the more that one will weigh in decisions. 13 Henderson (1986, p. 10) also describes this phenomenon as “economic policy without economics.” 14 Williamson (2000) provides a useful taxonomy of levels of social structure and discussion of where “economics” tends to locate itself. 15 Knight (1992, p. 15) 16 We refer to the Agreements on Safeguards, on Subsidies and Countervailing measures and on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (the antidumping agreement). 17 Thus, as one can distinguish, analytically, between the formal and informal sectors of the economy, one can distinguish between the formal and the informal sectors of government. 18 The plan had been minimally implemented. 19 In Peru, the Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF) is responsible for developing the overall objectives economic policy and for guiding the execution of those policies. 20 Webb, Camminati and León Thorne (2006) provide a description of INDECOPI’s structure and functioning as well as of antidumping and safeguard procedures. 21 Here, the contribution of investigative journalism in trade liberalization likely has been under appreciated. Analyses of Australian liberalization often cite information brought forward by journalists, but we have found only one attempt to analyze the role they played; McCarthy (2000). 22 “Tariff changes,” likewise classified for the table as “formal” procedures, may not be made through formal processes. Dantas (2012) explained that neither Argentina nor Brazil have established participatory procedures for the tariff flexibilities they have frequently introduced in Mercosur. GTA does not identify which tariff changes are changes of MFN rates or of preferential rates. 23 Baracat, et al (fothcoming) provide many other examples. 24 Costs of this order to create jobs through trade protection are not unusual. Hufbauer and Lowry (2012) estimate, for example, that application by the United States of additional tariffs on imports of automobile and truck tires from China saved perhaps 1,200 jobs at a cost of US$900,000 per year per job. 25 Update 09 November 2012. Argentina has subsequently accepted requests from Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States to join these consultations. In August 2012 Mexico, Japan and the United States submitted separate requests for consultations. Submission of such additional requests is frequently a part of such consultations; it serves not to open separate consultations but to introduce additional legal points or concerns into the ongoing consultations. 26 The reform government in Argentina in the 1990s shared such an attitude. 27 The quote is from Argentina’s “Country Partnership Strategy” with the World Bank. World Bank 2009, Annex 1, page 6. 28 A “frame” refers to a conceptual structure involved with thinking. As a part of machine translation, identifying the “frame” inside which a sentence has meaning is an integral part of interpreting the meaning of the sentence. Take, for example, the sentence, ‘I am in the red.” If the “frame” is motor racing, the sentence is likely about a tachometer reading, indicating that too much is being demanded of an engine. If, on the other hand, the “frame” is business performance, the sentence is likely about a business doing badly. Unless a computer recognizes the frame of a passage being translated, it will not be able to distinguish between such alternative meanings of the sentence. Lakoff 2004 provides an introduction to this analysis. 29 Thomas Kuhn 1996 posits a similar stickiness in the shift from one scientific “paradigm” to another. Rather than the advancement of science being a continuous accumulation of concept and evidence, Kuhn sees that advancement as jumps from one paradigm to another, the acceptance of a new paradigm being something of a leap of faith to a new way of looking of things that eventually demonstrates itself to be productive. Such a shift, his analysis implies, has social (status) implications among scientists and these implications – as well as scientific evidence – influence the shifts. 30 A diehard might cite Milton Friedman to the effect that the accuracy of this assumption need not discredit the theory: “Viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to ‘explain.’” (Friedman, 1953, p. 8) See also the following footnote. 31 So much for the predictive power of the political economy of trade policy. 32 The first formal complaint under the WTO DSU in the “bananas dispute,” (over the EU import regime for bananas) was submitted in 1995. According to the WTO Secretariat’s classification system, the dispute has involved six different “cases” and as of the Secretariat’s most recent report, 24 February 2010, was still under way. 33 This paragraph generalizes in particular on the experiences analyzed in the recent compilation by Haddad and Shephard (2011). They include case studies of seven individual countries (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico) plus regional analyses for Latin American and for Sub-Saharan Africa. 34 A referee’s comment on an earlier application of institutional economics to trade policy suggests an attitude that would be particularly unhelpful: The paper could also be improved by acknowledging that there are sometimes good economic rationales for certain types of trade protection but that it is their abuse by policymakers (again acting in their own self-interest) that is the problem. Based on this interpretation, the conversation would begin by telling country officials that they were abusing good economic rationales for their own benefit. It would likely end there as well. 35 Anderson, Cockburn and Martin (2012) provide a summary of and references to an extensive research output on the impact of trade protection on poverty. Even in the rural sector many lower income people, including farmers, purchase rather than produce a good deal of their food. The impact of protection on them as consumers often outweighs its impact on them as producers. 36 Levy (2011, p. 60) takes this up this point, voiced from the inverse perspective as “a country’s economic, social and political institutions cannot be re-engineered from scratch.” 37 Finger (2012). 38 De Bièvre and Eckhardt (2010). The general evolution of administrative law in the EU is taken up by Kelemen (2011). Kelemen argues that EU process is becoming more adversarial, but at the same time quite different from the way things are done in the United States. Directory: INTRANETTRADE -> Resources Resources -> A note on the Japanese Trade Policy and Economic Development Secrets behind an Economic Miracle Download 245.88 Kb. Share with your friends:
|