*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention


*General DA Answers* Democracy Promotion Does Not Undermine US Interests



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*General DA Answers*

Democracy Promotion Does Not Undermine US Interests


AT: REALIST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES MORE IMPORTANT THAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 439

Promoting democracy can never be the sole purpose of American foreign policy, and at times it will clearly recede as the US pursues urgent and seemingly competing national security concerns. But too often the US has traded short-term gains in stability or economic advantage at the price of long-term costs to its national interest. When autocrats like the Shah of Iran, Somoza in Nicaragua, Duvailier in Haiti, Mobutu in Zaire, and Siad Barrre in Somalia fell from power, they let chaos or anti-American revolutions in their wake. Pressing for open accountable, responsive, and legitimate government—in other words, democracy—is in the American national interest, even if the means, volume, and pace must vary across countries over time.
SUPPORTING AUTOCRATS DOES NOT SUPPORT LONG-TERM US INTERESTS

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 439

One of the attractions of democracy assistance is that it offers some scope for the US to square the difficult circle and have its relations with autocracies proceed on dual tracks when necessary. On one track, (the most visible), formal diplomatic ties and aid flows—at the extreme, the two billion dollars a year (more recently down to about $1.7 billion), that went to the authoritarian regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak-can sustain cooperative relations with autocrats the US may not like but judges it needs strategically. On the other track, democracy assistance can provide hope, training, and resources to pro-democracy forces in civil society and the political opposition, while American diplomats can monitor and protest the worst abuses and reaffirm American values. The problem with this approach, however, is that when the US perceives a strategic need to embrace a dictator, it gives the latter leverage. And since autocrats under challenge are locked in an existential struggle for survival—where failure could mean not simply retreat into plush retirement, but sudden death, humiliating exile, or imprisonment and prosecution for past crimes—they will fight furiously to remain in power.
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SHOULD BE A MAJOR US FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY FOR THE US

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 443



In an increasingly multipolar world, the United States must also work more often and more closely with other democracies—including the emerging-market democracies—to advance and assist democratic development. Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs argue that emerging democratic regional powers like Brazil, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey could “serve as powerful examples of the universal appeal of democracy,” countering the pull of nondemocratic models popularized by China and Russia. President Obama should “urge these rising democratic powers to join Western efforts to support democracy and human rights around the world.” Indeed, it should now be a major objective of US and European foreign policy to draw these rising democratic powers into a new era off emerging-market democracies remain suspicious of the motives of Western powers, wary of the interventionist approaches, and sensitive about issues of cautious steps. Carothers and Youngs advice: first, “emphasize low-visibility, sustained endeavors, not high-visibility, short-term impact gestures”; second, “keep an open mind with regard to different and potentially clashing approaches on international democracy support”; and third, “emphasize approaches on international democracy support”; and third, “emphasize nongovernmental rather than governmental approaches and links.”


Democracy Promotion Not Costly


DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DOES NOT COST TOO MUCH

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 422



There are, of course, possible real costs to the US of promoting democracy, including financial costs. But the entire budget for “core,” nonsecurity US international affairs—in essence, diplomacy and aid, outside of elevated contingency operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as all US support or international organizations like the UN—was only slightly over $50 billion in 2012. That is just 1.7 percent of the entire federal budget (far exceeded by the $671 billion requested for the Pentagon in the 2012 fiscal year), and total funding for all democracy and governance assistance programs (not including economic assistance) probably does not exceed $2 billion – considerably less than a tenth of a percent of the overall budget. In short, if a case is to be made for not promoting democracy, it is difficult to make on fiscal grounds.


*International/Other Actor CP Answers*



Not Competitive


US CAN CONDUCT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION THROUGH NGOS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 443-4

Finally, the US can gain a lot in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness by working to defend and advance democracy as often as possible through regional organizations, like NATO and the Organization of American States (OAS), through international organizations like the UN, and through broad multilateral networks like the Community of Democracies and the Open Government Partnership. Over the last two decades, the UN has emerged as a significant player in democracy promotion, assuming critical roles in assisting the organization of democratic elections and in helping to resolve violent conflict through democratic mechanisms. Today, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is one of the largest international providers of democratic governance assistance, with a budget of about $1.4 billion for that purpose in 2005, including support for about a third of the parliaments in the developing world. While the Community of Democracies has been mainly a symbolic and occasional gathering of states since its founding in 2000, it is now beginning to develop a more effective governing structure, a more robust voice for defending against assaults on democracy, and means (such as through cooperative democracy partnerships) to provide tangible forms of governance assistance to new and troubled democracies. Having as members of the CD Governing Council not just other established democracies, like Canada, Japan, and a number from Europe, but emerging democracies like India, Korea, Mongolia, Mexico, Chili, Mali, and South Africa, in itself sends a significant message about the growing global legitimacy of democracy.




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