*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention



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EU No Better Solvency


ARAB WORLD SUSPICIOUS OF EU DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS AS WELL AS THE US

Julia Chocair-Vizoso, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 272

U.S. rhetoric since 2002 has accorded new prominence to political and economic reform and democratization as policy goals in the Middle East. Though more understated, the European Union’s Barcelona Process has been promoting similar transformation in the Arab countries of the Mediterranean basin for over ten years. Most Arab citizens are deeply skeptical of outside actors. They are unconvinced of the EU policy’s effectiveness and indeed often are unaware of its existence altogether. They believe that the new U.S. democracy and freedom rhetoric was simply a cover for the old U.S. policy of imposing its choices on the Arab world. The concomitance of new rhetoric and preparations for invading Iraq is a major reason for this skepticism. Democracy promotion in this view is simply an excuse for the United States to forcefully remove regimes it does not like. In the years following the invasion of Iraq, U.S. human rights violations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere further undermined the United States’ image of a democracy promoter.

EU Doesn’t Pursue Democracy Promotion in the Mideast


DEMOCRACY PROMOTION HAS NOT BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE EU

Richard Youngs, Researcher FRIDE, 2005, [Fundacion par alas Relaciones Inernacionales y el Diaolgo Exterior], Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 230-1

Most notably, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, or Barcelona Process) created in 1995 formally enshrined a commitment to foster “political pluralism” in the Maghreb and Mashreq states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, along with Israel and the Palestinian Authority). Formal dialogue on political reform commenced, new trade agreements incorporated sanction-triggering democracy clauses, and an EU democracy assistance budget was created for the region. In practice, European strategy, even in this part of the Middle East, was cautious during the late 1990s. Little coercive pressure for political change was exerted, as the EU adhered to a philosophy of gradualism that relied on notions of soft power, peer pressure, persuasion, and cooperative partnership. European governments were highly indulgent of limited signs of progress, for example, in Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco. No systematic dialogue was developed on democracy with Islamist opposition forces, and there was little correlation between aid flows and states’ respective degrees of political openness. Egypt remained by far the largest recipient of European aid. Even in these EMP states, where the EU established a wide-ranging and firmly institutionalized partnership, democracy remained well down the list of priorities, with significantly more resources devoted to economic reform, drug eradication, the environment, and population control.
EU DOESN’T EXPLICITLY SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH AID PROGRAMS

Richard Youngs, Researcher FRIDE, 2005, [Fundacion par alas Relaciones Inernacionales y el Diaolgo Exterior], Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 238



An express desire to avoid the language of “democracy promotion” is often apparent. German aims are defined as “the transformation of particular sectors,” rather than democratization. The United Kingdom’s new Arab reform strategy targets “the rule of law” rather than democracy. In discussions on the EU’s new security strategy, a commanding majority of member states insisted on objectives in the Middle East being defined as an increase in “pluralism,” not democracy. One European diplomat responsible for devising his government’s new Middle East reform policy suggests that a “neutral cove” has been sought for gaining access to influence the broad direction of political change in the region, admonishing what he judges to be the United States’ fixation with the end result of regime change. Another policy maker likens the European approach to reform to “crossing the stream by feeling the stones on the riverbed.”

*World Bank CP Answers*




World Bank Prohibited from Democracy Assistance


WORLD BANK MANDATE PROHIBITS INVOLVEMENT WITH RECIPIENT COUNTRY POLITICS

Wil Hout, Associate Professor World Development in the Hague, 2007, The Politics of Aid Selectivity: good governance criteria in World Bank, US and Dutch development assistance, p. 25

From the outset, the World Bank has acknowledged its own limitations in implementing policies on governance. One major limit to World Bank activities was felt to derive from the Bank’s mandate:

The Bank cannot be influenced by the political character of a member; it cannot interfere in the partisan politics of the member; it must not act on behalf of donor countries in influencing the member’s political orientation or behavior; it cannot be influenced in its decisions by political factors that do not have a preponderant economic effect; and its staff should not build their judgments on the possible reaction of a particular Bank member or members.” (World Bank 1991: 3)



The World Bank’s original concern with governance was chiefly its implication for proper development management. For this reason, the Bank’s interpretation had a primarily technocratic overtone. The Bank defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development,” yet limited its concern to “the rules and institutions which create a predictable and transparent framework for the conduct of public and private business and to accountability for economic and financial performance” (World Bank 1991: 1).




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