Introduction Generally—What Does The Constitution Do?
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy
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| particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy”—Scalia
They just want to have the threshold question—nothing else Threshold Cases: Balancing Burdens/Benefits (Using the Modern Approach) South Carolina State Hwy Dept. v. Barnwell Bros Inc. Summary: SC passed a law limiting the weight and width of tractor trailers on their highways Holding: The benefits of regulating hwy safety outweigh burden of making truck comply Rule: When the thing claimed by the state is safety, cts are VERY deferential to their findings States legislatures are in the best position to know what is the best thing for safety Police power puts rock on the constitutional side of the test Southern Pacific v. Arizona Summary: AZ limited the train length for trains coming into AZ; cost a lot more money to the RR Holding: Although AZ stated “safety” as their purpose, the local problem was very minimal compared to the national burden of trains trying to stop and change lengths Reasoning/Balancing: National v. Local: This impaired uniformity and decreased national efficiency Police v. Commerce: Safety may have also decreased by having this statute b/c it required more stops/starts Direct v. Indirect: Direct impact on the free flow of commerce Facially Discriminatory Laws/Cases City of Philadelphia c. New Jersey Summary: NJ law prohibited out of staters to bring their trash to be disposed w/in the state Holding: Trash is an item of commerce and “whatever NJ’s ultimate purpose, it may NOT be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the state unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently” Can’t improve your environment at the expense of other states Rule: When you go out in an overt way and discriminate against other states, it violates the DCC Dissent: His is more about NJ’s serious health concerns than commerce (police power) C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown NY Summary: City passed a “flow control” ordinance that required all waste to go through the newly created city processing plant before it could leave the city Holding: Law is unconstitutional b/c it was facially discriminatory AND NY was trying to horde all of the business Purpose and effect was to horde business Rule: If the state/municipal law discriminates against out of staters AND instaters, it can still be discriminatory The fact that an ordinance harms instaters too, isn’t enough to save a discriminatory rule Hughes v. Oklahoma Summary: OK passed a law that provided no person could ship minnows for sale outside of the state; cited their reason as “conserving a state’s natural resource” Holding: The reason cited by the state, although facially impressive, is bogus and the real reason is protectionalism and propping up a state’s industry There is no embargo on instaters, just out of staters = discriminatory Facially Neutral Laws (Two types) Type 1: Disparate Impact/Purpose = Discriminatory (Discriminatory effect makes it unconst.) Hunt v. Washington State Apple Summary: NC passed a statute which required all close containers of apples to use the USDA branding—not Washington branding; WA had invested a lot of money and time to branding their product as superior; their branding was an industry standard/accpeted Holding: Although not facially discriminative (law said “all containers”) it was discriminatory in effect Rule: A facially neutral statute is discriminatory in effect IF it…. Increased costs for those that produce out of state apples Destroys WA competitive advantage It “insidiously advantages local producers” West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, Comm. Mass Summary: MA passed a pricing order on all milk (both in and out of state); MA receives 80% of milk out of state; the tax was paid by all, but was used to ONLY subsidize dairy farmers within the state Holding: Although it was facially neutral, it was unconst. b/c it only subsidizes instate diary producers at the expense of out of state producers Rule: A facially neutral statute is discriminatory if… Creates a political process that cannot prevent abuse Milk producers inside the state wouldn’t complain, but the ones outside the state had no recourse Discriminatory in purpose MA had a commission made to find out the problem and then seek a solution to boost dairy producers within the state Taxes and subsidies are tied in a direct way to a discriminatory purpose, it makes something constitutional on its face, become unconstitutional Flat taxes are do NOT violate the DCC—it has to be died to the discriminatory effect Even if done it two separate statutes, it may still be discriminatory Type 2: Disparate Impact/Purpose ≠ Discriminatory Exxon Crop. v Governor of Maryland Summary: Oil refiners could NOT have gas station in the state; all refiners were out of state; statute did NOT distinguish between in and out of state retailers; this seemed to violated the CC b/c it would only apply to out of staters since no instate refineries Rule: Consider if one party will “necessarily” win or given the competitive advantage Holding: Not discriminatory because… Did NOT create barriers from interstate independent dealers It only discriminated against one type of dealer No line was drawn between in and out of state producers No one will “necessarily” win (not necessarily giving a competitive advantage to the instaters) The instaters will most likely win, BUT current independent out of staters could also possibly win This was an industry based target—not a state based target (as in Hunt) It is possible that a Marylander someday could be subject to the rule—thus there is political recourse State of Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co Summary: Minn. statute forbids all retail sale of mile in plastic nonreturnable containers; must use paper; hoped to benefit the local pulp industry; Minn had no plastic industry so this would definitely benefit their local industries Rule: Consider who will necessarily win and if it targets an industry Holding: Not discriminatory because… “There is no reason to suspect that the gainers will be people from Minn. and the losers will be from out of state”—not certain “virtually all” out of staters lose Not necessarily certain that it would benefit only in-staters—it could benefit out of state pulp production too Just don’t want a situation where the instars necessarily win and out of staters necessarily lose Targeted an industry, not a state OK to if it just favors an industry predominately in your state, but still has a possibility of benefiting out of staters Balancing Test (Weighing Process) Generally (if discriminatory) The ct will use increased scrutiny It is “virtually a per se rule of invalidity”—C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown Two part test State must argue that the statute serves a “legitimate (important) local benefit that is non-protectionist in character”, AND Ct uses “legitimate”, but that does NOT mean rational basis review; rather, it must be of high “importance” that feeds into the states police power Should NOT be economic preservation State must show that there wasn’t some less burdensome/restrictive way of achieving the alternatives Analysis/Cases if law is deemed discriminatory Generally: Not necessarily a true balancing test—it is a big burden to overcome (you start out with a huge rock on one side—must prove least restrictive means) Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin Summary: Madison passed a law that makes it unlawful to sell any milk within the city that was NOT pasteurized within a radius of 5 miles of the city Rule: It must be the “least restrictive means” even if the purpose (protecting the health and safety of the people) is a important Look at necessity of the means—if it is absolutely “essential” to achieve the welfare goal the requirement is met Holding: Protecting the city from bad milk is a lofty safety goal, BUT they could have done it through less burdensome means—thus it is unconstitutional They could have used inspection regulation (less restrictive means) Maine v. Taylor (This is the ONLY case where a facially discriminative statute is constitutional) Summary: Maine passed a statute that prohibits the importation of live minnows; D owned a baitfish store and illegally imported some minnows Rule: If the benefit is great enough and the means fit, it is NOT unconstitutional Holding: The statute is NOT unconstitutional because Served an important local benefit—the local minnow population is very susceptible to parasites that come from other minnows There is NO less restrictive alternative—a ban from out of state (non-indigenous) minnows is the only way to protect against the harm Analysis/Cases if law is deemed non-discriminatory Generally: This is closer to a true balancing test—the presumption is much lighter (you start out with a much smaller rock on one side—balance burden on commerce v. state benefit) Challenger MUST prove that the burden is much worse than the benefit “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effect on interstate commerce is incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local putative benefits”-Loren Loren Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. Summary: AZ required that all cantaloupes grown in AZ must be packaged within the state and approved by the supervisor; facially, nothing is discriminatory; P lived on the border of AZ and CA and their closest packaging plant was in CA—40 miles away Rule: Must overcome the lighter presumption by a “clear showing of the burden” Holding: The statute is NOT constitutional The burden of building a $200,000 facility is greater than the statute’s benefit Bibb, Director of Public Safety v. Navajo Freight Lines Summary: Ill. passed a law requiring “contoured” mud-flaps on all semis; surrounding states required straight mud-flaps; not discriminatory b/c instate and out of staters had to comply with the law Rule: If it “unduly” burdens interstate and the benefit is small, it is not constitutional Holding: The court usually defers to states regarding safety regulations, but the statute “unduly” burdened interstate commerce more than it benefited the state’s safety Changing flaps costs time and money No real “safety” benefit Consolidated Freightways Corp of Delaware v. Kassel Summary: IA passed a law requiring semis to be less than 60 feet long; didn’t allow “twin” semis; P had to use more semis and trucks to transport material Rule: Benefit must be greater than the burden Holding: “The states safety interests has been found to be illusory, and its regulations impair significantly the federal interests in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law cannot be harmonized with the commerce clause” Burdens: Costs time and money to reroute, more chances for accidents Benefit: Safety of state is minimal and may decrease by increased traffic Dissent: This allows for judicial activism—every time there is a balancing test we invite judges to subject their own policy views into the law “The only valid state truck limit is one on which this ct has not been able to get its hands on” We should defer heavily to the states on safety questions—majority is NOT adequately doing that here Exceptions to the DCC Congressional Approval Rule: Congress’s plenary power over interstate commerce allows them to confer on states the ability to discriminate and this does NOT violate the DCC because the CC is no longer dormant (congress acted) This is one of the few areas where Congress can overrule the supreme court Western and Southern Life Insurance Co v. State Board of Equalization of CA Summary: CA had a retaliatory tax against states that taxed CA insurance companies; insurance companies from other states sued; congress passed an act allowing this Holding/Rule: In the exercise of this plenary authority, Congress may confer upon the states an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy Market Participation Doctrine Rule: When state is acting as a business (participant in the market) and NOT as a regulator, it is free to discriminate in interstate commerce—unfettered by the DCC Reason for rule: Main reasons for the DCC are NOT applicable when the state is acting as a market participant and NOT as a regulator Reeves Inc. v. Williams Summary: SD had a cement factory that it built in response to a cement shortage; another cement shortage hit after it was built and the factory sold to all instaters and withheld cement from out of staters until all the needs of the state were met Holding: SD was acting as a market participant and thus did NOT violate the DCC Reasoning: For the exception: Nothing in the constitution states that the DCC does NOT allow for this type of activity by the states State sovereignty matters—we care about the states making decisions w/op regard to federal control Underlying reasons for the DCC do not apply in this situation It is only fair to allow state factories, built by tax dollars from citizens, to benefit the citizens of the state first It is best to keep the judiciary out of the decisions of who the states have to sell their products too Against the exception: (Dissent) This is economic protectionism and this is why the A of C were disbanded and the states adopted the constitution Application of the DCC should depend on the nature of the government activity—should be limited to “traditional government areas” Problem: Where do we “draw the line”? Ct didn’t like this before in previous cases, why now? DCC purpose is to stop protectionism by state governments and it should NOT allow it now even though states are acting as market participants No clear distinctions on when the government is acting as a market participant as opposed to a regulator (where’s the line) South-Central Timber Development v. Comm. of Alaska Summary: Alaska opened up a lot of timber for sale from the state parks, but required that anyone who purchased the timber to have it processed in Alaska; P wanted to purchase logs, but used Japan to refine logs (if they refined them at all) Rule: The moment that the state regulates a party beyond the deal, it is NO longer a market participant and the DCC disallows the regulation/law Holding: Alaska is NOT acting as a market participant and thus it violates the DCC Reasoning: Different from Reeves because: Cement is a thing you make, but timber is a natural resource Trees are natural and NOT processed Reeves imposed a duty on themselves for the state, but Alaska is imposing a rule on trading partners AFTER the sale is complete Downstream regulation- When a state tries to affect parties beyond whom they contracted with, the DCC kicks in and stops the state regulation Dissent: The majority states they could have gotten around this by just selling to people they know will only process the timber in the state, but that is an “artificial distinction” that is “unduly formalistic” Privileges and Immunities Clause (PIC) Art. IV §2: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states” Protects out of staters from state discrimination Rule: If a state discriminates, they must: Have a “substantial reason” to justify the discrimination, AND State law is “closely related” to the justification
Incorporation and State Action Background: The framers thought that an enumeration of rights was unnecessary because they had created a government with limited powers and thus w/o the authority to violate basic rights. They were also concerned that the enumeration of some rights would imply that other rights were not protected Doctrine of Incorporation First 10 amendments = Bill of Rights These protect individuals against impositions by the federal government Say nothing textually about them apply to state governments States at the time had their own constitutions and could limit their government as they saw fit Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore (No application of bill of rights to the state governments) “These amendments (the 10) contain NO expression of an intention to apply them to the state governments” If the framers wanted them to apply to state governments, they could have easily have done so Civil war occurred, and people realize there was nothing restraining the states—so 13-15 were passed 14th amend, §1, gives us the incorporation clause – “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” This has been interpreted that states cannot deprive citizens of liberty and it is up to the court to see if the liberties being deprived are of the fundamental liberties that cannot be taken away (they pick and choose from a list—similar to the bill of rights) For a principle to be protected under the 14th amend, it must be a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” (Palko) Twining v. NJ Expressly opened the door to the SC applying provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states by finding them “incorporated in the DP clause of the 14th amendment” Directory: resource -> collection -> EA88E61A-F827-4590-985B-EC1F412EAE4E collection -> A chapter of the kappa beta delta international honor society collection -> Example of a Letter of Application for Candidacy for Business and Separate Accounting* Program Accreditation collection -> Northeastern Council of Business Schools & Programs (October 14-15, 2016) collection -> Defense of Investment Professionals: Securities Litigation in the finra arbitration Setting By collection -> Airborne Topographic Lidar EA88E61A-F827-4590-985B-EC1F412EAE4E -> Jurisdiction over the Parties or Their Property (jop) collection -> Riparian Water Boundaries Titles and Rights EA88E61A-F827-4590-985B-EC1F412EAE4E -> Five Juicy questions where the heck does property go upon death of decedent? Download 362.96 Kb. Share with your friends:
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