Transportation Planning in the 21

The city bypass or “outer belt” is a highway concept that goes back to the 1950’s, expanding the original direct connectivity design of the interstate system. That concept is still employed, but not too often and not under the conditions discussed for the GC. We wondered what transportation experts are working on now; Chapter 4 discusses many of our findings--transportation ideas from prominent think tanks, ranging from Brookings to Pew to the Texas Transportation Institute. We found that the GC project is precisely what most experts consider wasteful and urge governments to avoid.

Brookings noted that politically-driven projects have already wasted hundreds of billions of dollars by building inefficient roads and diverting money to suboptimal investments in infrastructure. The USPIRG implores transportation planners to stop using “the erroneous traffic forecasts of the past” and use the reality of today’s demographics. The Heritage Foundation added that only 65% of the Highway Trust Fund goes to actually building roads, while the rest is diverted to special interests.

Rand Corporation found that economic activity is not a by-product of new highway construction. Rather, in 2011, they reported that, at the regional and local levels, highway construction merely tended to “relocate [existing] economic activity” from one place to another but did not permanently increase it. The EWG reported the same thing for the St Louis region, though on a broader scale in 2011. They found that $5.8 billion of government spending designed to induce new economic activity in local communities, including communities in the MetroEast, didn’t work.

Even the FWHA concluded that there is no cause-and-effect relationship between increased vehicle traffic and economic activity. The one-one relationship that seemed to spawn that myth disappeared in 2003. The FWHA engaged the Rand Corporation to look into the relationship. Rand concluded there is no causal relationship either way. We repeat: Dozens of studies indicate the only time new, permanent jobs are created for a community is when an existing business needs a new facility, and a new access to a new area, for the purpose of expanding its (usually manufacturing) business. At other times, the primary economic activity increase is merely from the temporary construction itself.

From these analyses, it would seem reasonable to find reasons other than “to stimulate economic development” to justify building new highways. The FWHA did precisely that and they published a series of papers—The Importance of “Purpose and Need” in Environmental Documents, The Role of FWHA Programs in Livability (Mar 2011), NEPA and Transportation Decision-Making, and Exploring the Relationship Between Travel Demand and Economic Growth (Dec 2012). Together, they discount economic benefits of highway construction and point toward identifying the community’s “need” for the facility, its intended “purpose”, and its design.

Today, those are the Federal criteria for planning—not “viability” or “feasibility,” which are no longer sufficient and not particularly relevant. It is time that the GC be judged against “purpose and need.”

Social and Cultural Trends

The USPIRG says current demographics should dictate transportation planning in the 21^st century. Even without that group’s counsel, the Department and District 8 would be well served to examine the demographics that pertain to the GC before deciding whether the GC and its corridor should be maintained. Allow us to mention a few of the most pertinent ones.

First, American society is aging. Older people drive less; they move to smaller homes, often out of the suburbs, reducing the demand for roads into them. There are 77 million baby boomers, so the impact will be significant for the next 15 years.

As a group, the 70 million millennials drive less, too. They stay in school longer, where driving is less frequent; they marry later in life and tend to prefer smaller homes in urban areas away from sprawl; they use social media and don’t engage each other as often in bars, restaurants, or other such places; they have the desire to do their part in protecting and enjoying the environment. Again, all these characteristics mean less demand for driving and highway infrastructure. Young adults have less fascination with the car than baby boomers; they understand its contribution to pollution and climate change. The International Transport Forum surmised these are among the reasons per capita car use among young adults is down, while use of public transportation is up.

Millennials are more committed to sustainability and building healthier places to live. The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) described one such fictitious community where mixed use neighborhoods exist, where green space is common, where the communities are walkable, and where dense clusters of homes are built. It’s probably no coincidence that both Belleville and O’Fallon have published comprehensive plans that lean toward this kind of future development. Such places have a lower need for roads, and an increased need for alternative transportation modes.

Work, play, and shopping are changing, too. More people are working from home each year; others are working fewer, sometimes longer, days at their workplace. Legislation is redefining the usual work week. Distant travel for vacations is giving way to stay-at-home vacations. Online shopping is replacing brick-and-mortar shopping. No longer is it just strip malls that are vacant; large malls are closing as well (two in the St Louis area in the last few years) while fewer new ones are being built. The addition of retail in Shiloh lessened the retail activity at St Clair Square; for the most part, retail jobs and sales tax revenue just moved around the county with no particular long-range benefit.

At the same time, the push for less dependence on fossil fuels strengthens; more workers walk/bike to work; and more communities plan for mixed-use and denser living with nearby green space.

The trend to rely less on the automobile is likely to continue well into the future; it will extend to more communities, as well. In September 2014, EWG sponsored a 10-person panel discussion on the future of St Louis transportation from now to 2045. Steve Smith, one modern-thinking millennial, predicted just such a downturn in demand for St Louis. Other professionals on the panel (elected officials, media, skilled tradesmen, minority representatives) predicted an increased reliance on public transport, like University City’s trolley, high-speed rail, new Metro stations, and added bus routes. Not one of the 10 panelists predicted the need for more roads to handle more traffic. Neither did the moderator.

This slow, steady, and significant shift in American culture is becoming ever more evident. Along with it comes the need to redirect the thinking on transportation infrastructure and planning. Our group, along with experts in numerous fields of study, call on elected officials, EWG, and state transportation planners to execute what they seem to be saying but not doing--adapt to today’s reality.

Outlook for the Midwest

As the nation grows toward 500 million people, some experts predict they will settle in megalopolises, large dense communities along the two oceans and Caribbean; in the Great Lakes where most of our fresh water is found; in the southeast and southwest. Others note the trend toward smaller metropolitan cities (up to 500,000). They note that people living in the suburbs, as well as people living in major cities, are migrating to these medium-sized cities. No expert on population trends sees the Midwest as a locale for significant population growth.

The housing market changed abruptly in 2008; Congress corrected the circumstances in the housing market that caused the economic crisis. So what is next for real estate? One economist, Dr A. C. Nelson, predicts that the demand for single family homes with large lots in the suburbs will drop from its peak of 79% of buyers in 2000 to 15% of buyers by the year 2030. He is not alone in this belief. In his documentary film, The End of Suburbia, Gregory Greene interviews 11 people about the rise (and fall) of American suburban living. Their focus was on oil prices and the role of the automobile, but we now know many other demographic factors are pushing people to a more urban style of living.

Some predict the trend for commercial real estate will be to redevelop old sites and buildings, ending the migration away from urban areas. That means modifying transportation infrastructure, but not a wholesale expansion of the system—and certainly not an all-encompassing expansion just to offer business executives a cornucopia of transportation alternatives to lure them away from other regions.

Perhaps no one has captured the local impact of the nation’s future growth pattern better than Dr. Jack Strauss, professor of economics at St Louis University: “If demographics determine destiny, the St Louis economy faces a long and difficult road ahead.”

Public Involvement and Regional Vision

Chapter 5 looks into the process of involving citizens in transportation planning, and the actual efforts of District 8 and the Department to do so. We discuss our meetings with their leaders and elected officials, our attempts to understand their motives for supporting the GC, and our efforts to change their minds. We tried to show the officials how canceling the GC project would be a substantial and convincing act of leadership, rather than one of concession or deference, citing the direction of the FWHA and the exhortations of scholars around the country.

Unable to tie the GC to the regional vision, we had trouble making a full case. In 2010, local officials engaged SIUE to study the MetroEast and outline a regional vision, presumably one that would stimulate broad-based action. In July 2010, their report, Vision 2020, Southwestern Illinois, was released. After canvassing government, civic, and business leaders, the authors’ conclusion—there was no consensus on what the MetroEast’s future might look like, so a regional vision is not possible!

They reported finding a “…widespread emphasis on retention of the existing…” conditions. Might we conclude, then, that those local officials’ vision is of “hope,” but “no change?”

The authors suggested that the sheer number of government entities, and the absence of any official interest in changing that condition, were the primary reasons for the lack of cooperation and lack of any common vision. As to economic development, they pointed out that “regional collaboration requires a shift in values from a ‘go it alone’ approach to one of cooperation. This is a significant challenge for Southwestern Illinois.” In the four years since the report went to three workforce investment boards, nothing has been done, either to create a consensus or to develop a vision for the region. So, the sad truth is that the only competition is among cities vying for each other’s businesses, and not among businesses vying for buyers’ dollars. EWG study on spending: CONFIRMED.

It is obvious that the GC project is not part of the MetroEast’s work toward meeting its leaders’ vision. We believe is just another favored building project that no one really needs but which fit into the “government business as usual” model the SIUE investigators revealed.

Illinois adopted the Context Sensitive Solutions (CSS) approach to planning in 2003; however, for all practical purposes, it is more of a document problem than an actual process. We cite several glaring examples to make that point, including the expansion of US51 and the Illiana Expressway.

Though the GC project predated CSS, we assessed the involvement of the public in the early part of the process and compared it to both CSS principles, and how public involvement was conducted and reported by the study groups.

At least 14 public meetings were held between 2001-2004; there were almost 3,000 attendees, most of whom were private citizens. There were over 100 special interests, as well. They include politicians, developers, utility and construction companies, insurance agents, etc. Following meetings in Troy, Belleville, and Columbia, comment forms were turned in by 338 unique individuals; another 406 unique comments were turned in by email, USPS, or phone.

Simply put, the study reports did not accurately depict public sentiment. We show that they are misleading, at best, and at worst, outright distortions intended to deceive the public on their neighbor’s support for the project.

Specifically, most people who failed to explicitly use the word “oppose” were considered as supportive (unless simply asking for a map or making a vague comment). Comments about being “skeptical,” comments by NIMBYs (e.g. “put it somewhere else”), comments stating the person was “not fully supportive” were all counted in the “SUPPORT” column. Other distortions arose because duplicate comments (people attending more than one session or turning in a comment form and then writing a letter, later) were not removed; and a write-in campaign by the Southern Illinois Builders Association, consisting of 27 letters was counted, while write-ins by opponents were not mentioned.

Of the 338 comment forms turned in at the meetings, the Department reported that 112 supported the project, 119 were opposed, and the rest were either too vague or simply asked for more information. When we read the forms, we removed elected officials, developers, and anonymous writers; reclassified NIMBYs as opponents; and removed all duplicates. Our tally had 45 citizens supporting the project and 119 opposed. More significantly, of the 406 write-in comments, 296 opposed and 61 supported the project, so the overall result is that 80% of lay people expressing an opinion opposed the project. It’s also worth noting that the opposition got stronger the longer the project was talked about.

Citizens for Smart Growth: Stop158 had a table outside the Belleville meeting on July 7, 2003. While only 3 people turned in opposition statements on Department comment forms, 35 signed our opposition petition. In the months that followed, we collected another 2,030 signatures. We also asked petitioners to “Have your Say” and received another 260 written comments, all of which reflected a strong opposition sentiment.

CSS was intended to influence projects like the GC; but what District 8 is doing to engage our group and other stakeholders since 2003 indicates that the effect is negligible. Even opposition by elected officials is ignored, while the District Engineer goes from place to place touting the GC’s importance and ignoring countervailing facts.

Concluding Remarks

There is plenty of waste in government spending. No longer confined to the Defense and Transportation Departments, where pork barrel projects are commonplace, it’s something that pervades all levels of government and all their functions. At the state level, we find projects such as the Reider Road interchange project, which seems to be based on one man’s flight of fancy—MidAmerica Airport—continue to be funded despite the absence of specific needs.

Times have changed dramatically since 1996; society and its needs will continue to change as millennials replace baby boomers. We have investigated this project objectively in light of the expected social changes, from assessment of its feasibility to its purported contribution to the development of the MetroEast over the next four generations. No objective and reasoned conclusion suggests that an outer belt will ever be “needed.”

It sometimes seems that being proactive is twisted, becoming an excuse for bad planning. Even when governments try to manage growth by forever maintaining a protected corridor, they tie citizens’ hands unnecessarily, with tangible, permanent, and significant costs to them and only a potential and insignificant benefit to the community. For the GC, the potential benefit is but 2% of the highway’s cost; that’s less than the cost of the extra 4 miles added after the Feasibility study was done, and likely less than an overrun should something go wrong.

To put it succinctly, the project should await the distant future. If our descendants decide it’s in their interest to build a bypass around Belleville, then it should be their decision to do it. It should not be ours today.

Since none of the goals or objectives for the project can be achieved; since national level guidance and transportation experts stress maintaining our infrastructure first; since the money spent will preclude substantial investment in other priorities meeting actual “needs;” since public sentiment is opposed to this project; and since it shouldn’t take a Phase I study to figure out that the no-build option is the best option for the region as a whole, we recommend that the GC project be cancelled and the protected corridor be eliminated subsequent to the 10-year review of the protected corridor, and pursuant to the 605 ILCS 5/4-510 and its legislative intent.

The modeling and data for the study was provided by the regional Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), East-West Gateway Council of Governments (EWG). The model used input data from 1996, likely projected from the 1990 US census data, with updates. The model output forecast conditions 25 years into the future to 2020, and that output became the foundation for the study’s analysis and conclusions.

Today, the projections from that model can be compared to actual data from 2010, 2012, and 2014—up to 19 years into the 25 year period and 24 years from the baseline census. The forecasts are so far off that both the Feasibility Study and the subsequent Corridor Protection Report are no longer reliable; unreliable, too, are the conclusions reached in them. One conclusion is that “the Southwestern Illinois region would benefit from a new 37-mile outer belt highway facility.” Yet, the benefit is never defined, merely presumed. With no definition, the benefits are not quantified, and thus there is no way to compare them to the cost of creating the benefits.

This chapter will analyze the Feasibility Study’s errors in detail. Using the GC’s three stated goals—transportation mobility, economic development, and environmental--and their stated objectives as the outline, we shall show why nearly every claim is false.

Central to the need for any new highway is a substantial increase in expected traffic. Without substantial growth in traffic volume, improvements to existing roadways will nearly always meet the need to control traffic and manage congestion. The GC Feasibility study concludes that increases in volume will be sufficient to justify system expansion. We believe that if the volume prediction fails, then the justification for the GC highway fails, as well. Our discussion will illustrate why the volume prediction is wrong.

There are four components that bear on volume and the need for system expansion—population growth, existing capacity, future travel needs, and safety/design considerations—only three of which are sufficiently addressed in the study. Our analysis will extend to the omission of future travel needs, as well.

Population Growth

The study cites an unknown source to claim population in the 3-county MetroEast would increase 11% from 545,000 in 1996 to 603,000 by 2020. The first 18 of those 24 years are now history. Assuming the same annual growth rate for another 6 years, the actual increase will be less than half the forecast—or 5%. But the baseline was, in reality, a low point in the region’s population, so the predicted increase is actually skewed. Had the study group used the 2000 census, which was available before these reports were published, the growth rates would have been lower, thus diminishing the report’s validity.

The MetroEast’s actual long-term annual growth rate (40-years from 1970 to 2010) is approximately 0.1%. Thus, a more appropriate estimate of the region’s population at 2020 would be 578,000. In fact, the US Census Bureau projects 578,254 people by 2020 and only 582,906 by 2030. That’s far below the study’s assumed growth.

More broadly, the US Census Bureau expects the statewide growth rate to be 0.25%--barely 1/4^th the national average, and still 2 ½ times southwest Illinois’ growth rate! The bureau prediction is for Illinois to remain in the bottom 25% of states for growth until at least 2030. In 2011, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Development even projected a net population loss for St Clair County between now and 2030 which continues the trend over the last decade or more. That is particularly important because 70% of the GC mileage runs through St Clair County. (The MPO has not published any data on growth in the last 6 years, so its prediction is not presented, here.) Finally, the University of Utah published a population projection to the year 2100 showing the same absence of growth (detailed in Chapter 4).

This year, census data continued to show a net migration out of the 3-county area, which included the brightest and youngest citizens. The “brain drain” so feared by planners is occurring in the MetroEast, as it is in the region at large.

While most government and all private sector experts agree that population growth will be negligible, it’s important to understand why they believe the 40-year trend will continue. Americans have been mobile for a number of years, and though most have some loyalty to the places they grew up, they are willing to leave them when conditions warrant. That’s still true among young adults, today—the so-called millennial generation.

The Pew Research Center, in its Dec 2008 Report on American Mobility, identified migration trends by state, and found that Illinois is in the middle when it comes to people moving out of their home state. In general, Midwesterners are the most rooted segment of the population, yet people from Illinois move out more than average for the region, as 41% of native-borne Illinoisans move out-of-state during their lifetimes. The report also shows that Illinois is NOT one of the places to which Americans from the other 49 states relocate. In fact, it ranks #44 of the 50 states as a target destination.

By 2014, even these poor migration statistics had worsened. Many suggest that the combination of high unemployment, a 67% increase in personal income taxes, political corruption that put two governors in prison, and a state pension mess that someone is going to pay forced people to leave. United Vans Lines, in its annual migration study, reported that more people were moving out of Illinois than any other state, except New Jersey.

There are 5 major reasons people move: To find/take new jobs, to find a comfortable retirement area, to enjoy the climate or nature’s environment, to enter an economic boom, to relocate from another country. The St Louis region has none of these draws to attract new citizens. The net outward migration proves other states are drawing people from Illinois and Missouri.

Since two of the reasons are job-related, it’s necessary to evaluate what businesses will do—in particular, big business where the jobs pay the best and offer the best opportunity for advancement. We expect big businesses, likewise, will move where the environment is best suited and will, consequently, avoid the St Louis and MetroEast regions.

Despite its claims, Illinois has a generally difficult business environment, while Missouri cannot seem to retain the big businesses it has. A number of major corporations and corporate headquarters have been lost to other cities (Southwestern Bell, Chrysler and GM plants, McDonnell-Douglas, Anheuser Busch, Boatman’s and Mercantile banks) and both states have trouble attracting new ones. At the same time, passenger airlines do not find the region particularly attractive. American closed its hub, TWA and Ozark went bankrupt, and three smaller airlines open and closed at MidAmerica Airport.

In part, the business climate should be blamed for the defections. The legal environment in Illinois is not friendly toward businesses; dominant trade unions keep labor costs above the national average; even after reform, unfavorable workers compensation laws make business operations more risky and costlier than in most states; the combination of 26 taxes on business makes them less competitive and lessens the likelihood that an Illinois-based business will be profitable. Indeed, many businesses only stay or enter the market because they can be exempted from some of the tax burden and/or be given a significant financial incentive. In other words, many businesses in Illinois may only be profitable if there’s a revenue stream from taxpayers who may or may not use the business’ products.

The region does have a lot to offer. There are major league baseball, football, and hockey teams; there’s a world class symphony; there are venues large and small the offer big name entertainers and local celebrities; there are hospitals that are among the best in the country; there are military bases and services for veterans; and there are highly rated family places—an arch, a zoo, botanical garden, museums, historical sites and parks.

Yet, for all that the region has to offer, people and businesses are still leaving. Clearly, these are not the things that draw people to a region.

Any conclusions about population growth, future economic development, and the consequent traffic needs must be viewed in light of the reality.

Another reason for people to move into an area is its weather and climate. The Midwest has four seasons. From the national perspective, the upper Midwest is in the hot summer continental climate zone (in the Koppen-Geiger system), while the deep south is in the hot subtropical climate. The St Louis region is along the border between the two zones and experiences the best/worst of both. Temperatures in the summer can be oppressively hot and humid, while winter temperatures are well below freezing. Precipitation is about 41” per year—above the continental average, but at the median level for all states. However, it seems the St Louis region suffers from the “heat island” of the city, which causes many storms to dry up before reaching the metropolitan area.

For the elderly, the climate is dangerous in both winter and summer; history shows that weather-related deaths among the elderly result from both the heat of some summer periods, and the cold of some winter periods. It’s certainly not a retirement destination because of its climate.

As for economic booms, the St Louis area has had no big ones, and only a few small ones. In the 1970’s a number of skyscrapers were added to the St Louis skyline, temporarily reenergizing the downtown. Over time, the new shopping areas built there were shut down, and the flagship, Famous Barr, not only closed its store but had to sell out to Macy’s. Each economic spurt was only a fleeting one.

There has been a plan to revitalize north St Louis, but the developer, Paul McKee, cannot get that going. His planned $8 Billion redevelopment in North St Louis has gone nowhere for more than a decade. Most think it never will.

New construction-related spurts have occurred, with BJC hospital undergoing improvements, the St Louis zoo expanding, and the Arch grounds being expanded. Calling these construction projects part of a “boom” would be wrong, though.

A boom is not limited to the construction industry, as occurred in Las Vegas. Energy, manufacturing, and other big industries create permanent economic expansions, yet, none of them have been attracted to this region. And the mini-booms that have occurred did not draw any new people to the area permanently.

New construction on the east side failed to create any permanent economic expansion, either. Billion dollar projects at Wood River and Lively Grove were too big to be handled solely by local workers, so temporary help moved in. However, when the jobs were done, the workers moved back, not making Illinois their permanent home. Multimillion hospital projects in O’Fallon and Shiloh will not result in a permanent migration to the region, either.

It’s important to note that all of the major corporate (economic) expansions—Enterprise, Panera Bread, Talx, and so on—have happened in Missouri and bypassed the MetroEast.

The most recent fifty years of evidence indicates no economic boom is in the region’s future.

Lastly, foreign-born immigration has not been particularly strong in the region. In June 2012 and again in July 2013, Dr. Jack Straus, St Louis University economics professor, reported that this region has less than one-fourth the number of immigrants as other comparable metropolitan regions. At 4.5% of the population, the region is currently last of the 20 areas studied. He also noted that those other regions experienced economic growth 40% faster than ours, a fact he attributes to the limited attraction of new immigrant residents to this area.

Dr Strauss reports that most foreign-borne immigrants in St Louis are Hispanic, followed by Indian, and Bosnian. Most arrived during the 1990’s, scattered throughout the region, and did not establish their own ethnic neighborhoods. But after 2000, immigration slowed, to the detriment of the local economy, according to Strauss. He noted that from 2001 to 2011, the region lost 45,000 jobs. In the past, immigrants would have closed that gap. Indeed, in other comparable metropolitan areas, immigrants caused a net gain of 2% of jobs, compared to our region’s loss of 3.5% of jobs, during that same period. That condition exists today on both sides of the river.

Dr Strauss’ conclusion sums up the economic troubles within the region rather succinctly: “If demographics determine destiny, the St Louis economy faces a long and difficult road ahead.”

It is evident that none of the five reasons people relocate have greatly affected the St Louis region, and the MetroEast, in particular.

Sprawl in the MetroEast

The St Louis region has been changing its land use for many years. The amount of land converted to urban use increased over 700% from 1950 to 2010. At the same time, population grew only 67%. That’s triple the national average for sprawl. There was a big spurt in expansion from 1990-2000 in Missouri and a matching spurt in Illinois from 2000-2010. EWG predicts that most new urban sprawl will occur in the northwest part of the region, where it has already pushed almost to Wentzville, but not very much in the MetroEast.

It seems the GC Feasibility Study used the experience of Missouri’s sprawl in the 90’s to forecast sprawl in the MetroEast. Because most of the sprawl occurred between 2000 and 2010, its land use projections were fairly representative. Here’s what happened in the early 2000’s, after the writing of the study:

In 2000, O’Fallon had approved expansions of 8 subdivisions and 2 business parks, totaling nearly 200 lots. In the following three years (just prior to publishing the Corridor Protection report), the city also approved more than 2,000 additional lots in 13 subdivisions. Over 1,000 building permits were issued during the same period, many of them in the study area.

Shiloh was aggressively pursuing annexation, expanding southwest to the Belleville city limits and northwest toward O’Fallon. From 1996 – 2000, enough developed county land was annexed and rezoned to residential that more than 2,500 people were added to the population. That appeared to be a 50% population increase, though only a few hundred people actually moved into the town. Among those 2,500 people were many displaced from Scott AFB. In concert with the joint-use expansion of the facility the DOD contributed $60 million to relocate not only the housing but also the schools that served dependents. The Air Force tore down most of its old housing first; those people moved off-base and into the nearby communities, Shiloh and O’Fallon receiving most of them.

Scott AFB and surrounding county land was altered to accommodate the new Metrolink station on the west and an airport expansion to the east. New housing was built on the south as Patriot’s Landing and on the east as Lincoln’s Landing. A new school was opened as were additional facilities, making the base ready to accommodate the new personnel arriving under a DOD realignment, pursuant to the recommendations of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s (BRAC) 2005 report.

Along IL15, IL177 and Greenmount Road, the city of Belleville has seen the development of 10 subdivisions with as many as 1,000 new lots, many of which have been built and occupied. In addition, the city has expanded because of the annexation of 3,000 additional acres since the Feasibility study was completed.

All this new activity comprised most of the sprawl predicted in the Feasibility Study. What has failed to materialize is the predicted increase in traffic that was to accompany the growth and which would justify system expansion in the study area.

There are five notable faults with the study’s case on how to achieve transportation mobility. They include the traffic count and congestion, the criteria established to assess alternatives, the capacity of existing roads, the connector’s effect on truck traffic, and the need for a multimodal study.

Table 1 shows the 8 road segments, totaling 36.93 miles, for routes deemed to be in the study area. The study projected 186,000 vehicles per day (vpd) using those roads by the year 2020. Data obtained from the Department had traffic counts along those segments at 94,100 vpd in 1996. The most recent traffic counts show only 104,800 vpd on those roads. That’s an 11% increase after 17 of the 25 years in the study. To reach the study’s 2020 projections, the growth rate would have to be 7 times the actual rate! Assuming steady growth, our 2020 study projections do not support any widening on the scale of a GC.

Apparently, overestimating (acting on worst case predictions?) volume has become standard practice over the years. The US Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG) noted the widespread use of erroneous traffic forecasts in the past. In their series, Transportation in Transition, the group challenged transportation planners to “stop pretending that future increases in driving are foreordained,” and suggested that planners seek reasonable forecasts that reflect the demographic realities of the present. In these changing times, predictions with errors indicated in the Feasibility Study should be considered useless.

It is worth noting that only a short segment of one N-S road, which is not even among the Feasibility study’s segments—that is, Greenmount Road—currently meets the listed criteria for widening to four lanes. St Clair County also considers traffic flow along the Frank Scott Parkway to warrant widening. We submit that such local improvements will forever be sufficient to handle future growth in traffic. It certainly has been the solution to traffic flow problems in the past.

Later in the Feasibility study process, the study area was reduced and the traffic projections were “refined,” using the same traffic model. The results were actually higher that the 186,000 vpd discussed above. Thus, the refinement drove the error larger!

In its Congestion Mitigation Handbook, EWG lists 40 different ways to mitigate congestion. Only two are to add capacity, and these are the last choices on the list. In part, that’s because expert studies, some detailed in Chapter 5, have shown that new roads create congestion more often than it cures it. We seem to have reached a point of diminishing returns in highway transportation; adding new roads, such as the 41-mile-long GC, would create little additional benefit for the citizen than local improvements, but at a much greater cost.

The Texas Transportation Institute’s latest Urban Mobility Report shows that cities which built enough new lane-miles to keep up with population growth showed no less congestion than those which failed to keep up with growth. Thus, adding capacity does not seem to be the best way to mitigate congestion.

The Victoria Transport Policy Institute, in its Feb 3, 2009 report, offered a possible explanation for this apparent paradox. They pointed out that added capacity creates induced travel, and congestion tends toward equilibrium. The generated traffic from new capacity not only increases the costs, but it also reduces and/or eliminates the expected benefit from expansion. Those who argue that generated traffic has only a minor impact, the report states, are using outdated data and inaccurate analysis methods. They cite two such studies (Cox and Pisarki, 2004, and Hartgen and Fields, 2006) as examples.

We know that the GC will result in generated traffic, because the report says it will. Consequently, any prediction of congestion mitigation has to be tempered, and any argument favoring the highway is diminished. Even if generated traffic were not the detriment it seems, this region’s long-term growth rate doesn’t justify system expansion.

New roads do encourage sprawl, though. Herbie Markwort, writing for Gateway Streets, reported that sprawl accounts for nearly 90% of the commute time in the St Louis region. So, adding new roads may actually increase commute time as people move farther from work, and still encounter congestion.

In the 12 years since the study was published, there has been sprawl from the St Louis region’s center into the study area. The increase in traffic which followed that sprawl has not caused widespread congestion. Congestion has been experienced at a number of intersections, but has not occurred along any arterials or collectors. Those intersections have been relieved with simple solutions—turn lanes, new signals, small-scale widening. Examples in the study area include intersections at US50/IL158, US40/Troy-O’Fallon Road, IL158/Seibert Rd, IL161/Carlyle Ave, a roundabout and turn lanes along IL158 south of Belleville.

In the general sense, the St Louis region has far less congestion than most other metropolitan areas. That’s because this metropolitan area already has more freeway lane miles per capita than every other major metropolitan area in the country.

Specifically, a 2009 study of FWHA and US Census Bureau data found that metropolitan St Louis had 10.7 lane-miles of freeway for each 10,000 people –highest of the US’s 25 largest cities and nearly double the 5.8 lane-miles average. Even combining the nation’s 483 urban and suburban areas, St Louis far exceeds the average of 9.9 lane-miles. St Clair County has almost 37.5 lane miles per 10,000 people, so we surmise county-wide congestion should be non-existent.

Some major roads in the MetroEast have had new lanes added recently, notably I-64 from IL157 to Greenmount Road, IL159 from Fairview Heights to Collinsville, and IL15 from Greenmount Rd to Freeburg. Yet, congestion along them did not exist beforehand. Expansions seemed to be preemptory, as was expansion of IL161 between Belleville and Fairview Heights 20 years ago. Volume never reached the expectation, and that highway still carries less traffic than 2-lane Lebanon Road between Belleville and Shiloh.

Finally, it’s important to remember that construction spending on one project means the opportunity to fund other transportation projects is lost.

The MetroEast’s portion of the Illinois 2015-2020 Highway Improvement Plan contains roughly 47 new lane-miles at a cost estimated to exceed $100 million; and the US67 reconstruction is programmed to cost $1.5 billion. That means it costs roughly $2.5 million to build one new lane-mile. By contrast, the weighted average to repave a lane is $300,000—ranging from $200,000 (local/state road) to $750,000 (interstate).

So, to add one new lane-mile diverts the money needed to fix 8 miles of existing lanes. That’s important because a 2011 study indicated that only 46% of Illinois roads were in good condition, and that it costs drivers an average $335 in extra maintenance to drive on roads that are not in good condition.

New roads, especially ones where the need and public benefit are wildly exaggerated, are expensive. We pay to build them, pay to maintain them, and pay repeatedly when they aren’t properly maintained.

One would think the study’s criteria to pick the best highway alternative might include an overall assessment of the choke points in traffic flow before deciding where and how to correct any identified problem. In addition to ignoring existing capacities, it seems to have ignored choke points, as well.

Instead, the study’s initial alternatives definition relied entirely upon the “desires” of the stakeholders, all of whom were government officials, to fix every problem with a single highway solution. Some stakeholders were elected officials, but others were in the business of building roads. In the minds of these stakeholders, the alternatives to assess were not different transportation alternatives, but rather different locations for a 4-lane divided highway.

Rather than finding the best solution for a particular transportation problem and then advising elected officials of the smartest way to solve it, the District 8 transportation officials considered their job to be figuring out how to get the politicians’ preferred transportation project done. Other alternatives, such as no-build, improvements to existing facilities, widening existing roads, or re-signaling intersections, were categorically excluded without study.

The desire of the stakeholders was duly cited in the report a number of times: “an interstate-like facility with restricted access” and one that was “high speed.” “At minimum, should be a 4-lane highway with at grade intersections…” Of the 13 corridors considered, each “assumed a four-lane, limited access highway…” Even the opening of Chapter 6, Conclusions and Recommendations, begins “The purpose of this study was to examine the feasibility of building a new four-lane, limited access ‘outer-belt’ highway…”

The alternatives analysis considered 13 alternative routes for the desired 4-lane highway; which kind of interchange alternative would be best at the two ends (IL3 in Columbia and I-55 in Troy); and whether some or all of the interchanges could be replaced with intersections. The latter choice was dismissed because it had the least capacity and slowest traffic speed. In a twist of irony, the St Clair County Comprehensive Plan rejects the GC as a transportation corridor, because that’s “bad for development” even though more development would occur if there were intersections.

Where other road improvements were considered, they were viewed only insofar as they “would complement a proposed new outer belt facility.” The option to use existing IL-158 and other roads was “examined,” but there were no further comments about it! Not one of the “desired” choices, it was simply ignored.

The rest of the consultant’s effort merely put the pre-determined conclusions into a written document. In other words, the SMG bought the conclusion they wanted.

By the admission of the SMG, there is already an “extensive network of roadways” in southwest Illinois. In that extensive network are 5 federal roads, 4 state roads running N-S, 5 state roads running E-W, and an outer belt in the study area. There are also a number of additional local arterials and collectors.

One would expect that an analysis of the existing capacity of the road segments would be part of the study on the need for a new facility. However, the study did not address that issue.

We asked the District 8 staff about the existing capacities of those segments. Candace Sauermann answered for the Engineer at our 2010 meeting by saying that it was too difficult to know.

We believe that the capacity of roads in Illinois is known. At some point before they were built, that information entered into the design. Before moving this project forward, these data ought to be compared to reasonable projections. Even if the data is not known, the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual, published by the Transportation Resource Board, provides objective means to calculate such values.

Our estimate of capacity does not consider the design hourly volume (DHV). The standard is to use the 30^th busiest hour throughout the year to judge the design requirements (out of the 8760 possible hours). In that way, the design will be for rush hour capacity. Other states seem to use a Level D level of service for this design, meaning they are willing to accept some congestion during the peak driving hours. A Roads and Maritime Services report, Apportionment of Cost, published in December 2008 shows at that level 2-lane roads can have a DHV of 810, while 4-lane undivided roads can reach 1710 vehicles.

However, the Feasibility study seems to have chosen the Level C criteria--stable flow level of service. If correct, this is the third way in which the stated need for the highway was inflated. Because of the spurt in residential construction and sprawl that occurred prior to 2010 and its impact on volume, we estimate that it may take as many as 80 more years before the traffic volume reaches the study’s projection. (A more detailed discussion of this assertion can be found in Chapter 3, the Corridor Protection Report analysis. That study contains 11 different road segments, but the conclusions are generally the same.)

Our interpretation of Level C level-of-service (free flow at 45mph, etc), and inferred from material contained in the Highway Capacity Manual, indicates to us that the 8 segments may have as much as a 500,000 vpd capacity.

Anecdotally, it appears the segments are able to handle the volumes projected under either the build or no-build options. The very fact that population near the corridor is approaching the 2020 forecast with no congestion testifies to the sufficiency of the existing network.

Effect on truck traffic

One of the overall study criteria was to direct through truck traffic away from the new highway. Normally, outer beltways are constructed so as to enable through traffic to speed past populated areas, but the SMG wanted through trucks to avoid the GC. That’s a curious objective as St Clair County’s Comprehensive Plan foresees a warehousing district, and O’Fallon’s Comprehensive Plan includes a warehouse operation very near the GC in the Mid-America Commerce Center.

We suggest that long-haul truckers will stay off the GC, because there are already sufficient and more-direct routes in the county for through trucking. Those facilities include I-255 (to MO and AR), I-70 (to KS and points west) across the new Mississippi River bridge, I-64 (no through traffic destinations), and I-44 (to OK and TX). We note that none is currently congested by trucking, with the exception of the I44/55 ramp from I-64’s Poplar St Bridge. That’s where new capacity actually is needed. Truck traffic counts along those facilities in 2014 are still relatively low; a new highway will not help them at all.

This contradiction is highlighted by the model output. The Executive Summary points out that fully 57% of traffic on the proposed GC will either start or end the trip outside of the region. The model also predicted that the highway will not carry local traffic, suggesting that it will not materially ease perceived congestion on other local roads. If so, one must question the GC purpose in the first place!

Another of the objectives for this goal was to have a multimodal study. However, the Feasibility study did not satisfactorily address multimodal alternatives. This may be because the importance of multimodal transportation was not important at the time, or because it was not considered important to the project. The report simply outlined the multimodal network and deferred the issue to the Corridor Protection study; however, that report assessed only the alternatives deemed appropriate in the Feasibility study. That deflection effectively killed any rigorous assessment of multimodal nodes for the GC project.

Thus, there is no description of how that network would support commuters, freight traffic, through automobile traffic, local trips for pleasure/personal needs, etc. or how the GC would fit into a multimodal plan. Again, it suggests the issue before the consultant was not a transportation problem to be solved, but rather a road construction project that was to be pursued.

One comment in the Feasibility Study report does stands out, however. It noted that MidAmerica airport could serve as a multimodal point if it develops as expected. We know that it did not.

To be fair, there was already an indication that multimodal solutions do not apply in every case. The Brookings Institute reported that 91% of workers used a car to get to work around the year 2000. The study group would not have realized that was the peak in automobile commuter travel, and likely expected the upward trend to continue. We now know that using a car to get to work has been declining since 2000, and that walking, biking, and public transit are now used more often (albeit still a quite small percentage of workers for each, though). The trend ought to be considered in this review, instead of merely relying on the erroneous data contained in the Feasibility Study.

The University of Illinois’ Center for Transportation studied the importance of available multimodal transportation (rail, airports, and water) for Illinois truckers. Less than 25% of shippers said any of them were important to their business; and less than 50% said that warehousing and distribution centers were important.

The multimodal perspective could have been omitted because it weakens the argument for building a new facility. If travelers were provided more transportation choices, some of them would opt for those alternative modes. That would reduce the projected burden on the highway, and diminish the importance of the GC.

It is still important that the GC project be evaluated in a multimodal context. Good highway design, the public’s transportation needs, and Illinois’ statutory requirements dictate that approach.

Perhaps trends in travel and auto use were not part of the study’s discussion of socio-economic data because they were expected to continue linearly upward; and the reality that such trends might reverse was not even considered as possibilities. Yet, the study group’s omission of the possibility allowed false conclusions to be drawn.

Since 2004, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) throughout the country has steadily decreased. That trend is true for Illinois, and for each of the 3 counties, as well. St Clair County residents drove nearly 65 million fewer miles in 2012 (the most recent data available) than they did in 2004; despite a near 20% increase in Monroe County’s population, the miles driven are virtually the same over the 9-year period. The trend toward less car travel is predicted to continue; Chapter 5 discusses the reasons.

The factors that influence driving include drivers’ ages, the price of fuel (after it reaches $4.00 per gallon), household composition, and labor force participation. A 2008 report from EWG shows the MetroEast’s demographics point to less vehicle travel. (NOTE: The Feasibility Study was conducted before the 2008 recession and the lingering high unemployment in this region, which remains well over the national average.)

In its Feasibility Study Final Report, Jan 2002, one of the four claims supporting the goal of improving transportation mobility is to “ensure safe transportation.” The associated Corridor Protection Report implied that the GC would “reduce the number and severity of traffic-related crashes.” We believe the presumption upon which this claim was made is that simply that freeways are the safest type of roads, and that traffic would be removed from less safe roads onto the GC; ergo, safety is improved!

Intuitively, it would seem that adding more high-speed roadway would reduce safety, not improve it. After all, there would be more road miles and more opportunity for accidents; that is exactly what the analysis of both Department and national safety data shows.

The reality is that improving traffic safety is a very complicated issue, and one which has had the attention of politicians, transportation officials, and insurance industry for decades. It is still one of the most discussed topics regarding highways even though it is less about the road than it is about other factors—most notably, the driver.

For the study group to base their analysis on the single, least relevant parameter signals the weakness of their claim and the depth of their investigation.

We reached four relevant conclusions from an objective assessment of the facts and circumstances:

1. Any traffic safety improvements to our roads can be made without a NEPA study

Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), para 771.117, any project that has safety as its primary objective is categorically excluded from the evaluation process. Therefore, any number of road improvement projects that would fix perceived safety deficiencies can be handled without building this highway. In other words, using safety as justification for a new highway is a weak one at best, as it diverts money away from safety-related projects. More likely, this justification in the report is mere rhetoric that is designed to gain support for the project.

2. Factors other than the type of roadway more significantly influence accident rates.

For discussion purposes, we shall assume that the safety objective is legitimate. Then, one must assess whether the report’s claims regarding safety are valid. The following discussion shows they are not.

Freeways are called the safest kind of road because the fatality rate per mile driven is much lower on them. Yet, that statistic is misleading for a number of reasons.

First, it’s not the sole statistic available to judge whether one class of roads is safer than another. There are many more miles of local roads compared to freeway roads. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, there were 5.7 million miles of local roads and only 0.3 million miles of freeways, nationwide, as of the end of 2012. That only 61% of fatalities occurred on non-interstate roads, rather than 95%, could be interpreted to mean rural roads are safer because the fatality rate, based on fatalities per road mile, is much lower.

To definitively ascertain which road is safer means one needs to review all of the factors which contribute to accidents. Speeding is the #2 cause. We note that speeding is not how far beyond the limit one is traveling, but how far beyond the road conditions’ limits one is traveling.

Howard Berkes, writing for National Public Radio in 2009, hinted at the fact that speeding is more common on local roads than freeways, but Bennet Langlotz, a lawyer and engineer writing for the National Motorists Association, gave more definitive proof. After raising the speed limit from 55 to 70 mph, 36 states found that average speed on freeways increased only 2 mph, while the fatality rate was virtually unchanged. Langlotz’ data shows that speeding is down only because the limit was raised and not because drivers speeded up. Drivers did not really change their way of driving on freeways.

That freeways are safer is suggested by another statistic: There are more deaths in accidents at speeds of 55-60 mph than at any other speed—higher or lower—speeds which are more often driven on collectors, arterials and local roads than freeways.

In spite of the data implying that freeways are safer, there is abundant evidence that such an assertion misses the big picture, and is really irrelevant.

Besides speed, there are many other factors contributing to accidents, including the condition of the driver (under the influence (#3), sleepy, distracted (#1), careless, and so on); the weather (#4) and condition of the road surface (wet, icy, foggy, presence of potholes, lack of markings, etc.); and the condition of the vehicle (brakes (#1 for trucks), tires, windshield wipers, etc.). Nearly all of these factors are independent of the type of road, suggesting that both freeways and local roads are unsafe if the driver acts in an unsafe manner.

Most experts agree that the driver’s condition is more important to the issue of traffic safety than is the road type. Indeed, automobile design is also more pertinent to traffic safety than is the type of road being driven. We found that statistical analysis may be indicative of a safety problem, but by itself, fails to explain the cause and effect of fatal accidents, precisely because it doesn’t account for driver behavior.

Fatalities occur more often on rural roads because that’s where there is more risky driving--teen joy riding, people headed home from the bar or a party, and driver complacency because of familiarity with local roads. Berkes noted drivers on rural roads also use seat belts less, more often have been drinking, and drive proportionally faster (i.e., higher over the posted speed limit) than people on urban roads. He noted that people who are seriously injured take longer to get the needed medical attention that could save their lives.

In 2014, the Minnesota DOT reported further on driver attitudes. They found that drivers on rural roads are twice as likely to feel relaxed, and thus take more risks than drivers on urban freeways. That rate increases to 5:1 for rural residents, who report familiarity with the road and its traffic as one of the reasons for their comfort level. Because they feel relaxed, drivers on rural roads see no problem using a cell phone, eating, or drinking a non-alcoholic beverage while driving. Perhaps, that’s why the insurance industry notes that 50% of all accidents occur less than 5 miles from home.

On the other hand, drivers using freeways are commuting to work, going on vacation with the family, or driving for business. Risky driving is, thus, much more limited. One might argue that such drivers do get distracted or sleepy, and cause accidents, but the number of those cases is too few to alter the general conclusion.

The USDOT and Census Bureau collect and report numerous data on traffic fatalities, as does the state of Illinois. Most statistical data on safety pertain to speeding, impaired driving, age of the driver, vehicle type, and seat belt usage. As other experts have written, these are the most relevant variables and the ones that public safety policy should address. Rural vs. urban driving is included as a separate statistic (both rural and urban categories include freeways, arterials, and local roads), but little data is published anywhere on local road vs. freeway fatalities.

What does that mean for the MetroEast? The latest available crash data for St Clair County (through 2008), which already has higher crash and fatality rates than Madison and Monroe counties, shows 7,454 crashes and 35 fatalities each year on its 2,800+/- miles of roadways. During that period, annual average miles driven in the county was 2.8 billion for a rate of 1.25 fatalities per 100 million miles driven. That’s near the statewide and national averages. Like them, the county’s trend has been downward, but not because new roads have been added, but because of relevant spending to mitigate the other factors that cause accidents.

It’s been shown that crashes result from both driving too fast and driving too slowly. Not surprisingly, young drivers (the too fast crowd) and old drivers (the too slow crowd) have higher accident and death rates than the average driver. And guess what? The median age of the population in the MetroEast is going up, as baby boomers age and young adults move away in search of better job opportunities.

In 1990, the median age in St Clair County was 34; by 2010, it was already 38, and that trend is expected to continue. At the same time, the number of people in their teens has remained relatively constant. They were 24% of the MetroEast’s population in 2000, and are not expected to drop to 22% until 2020. So, there will be more and more drivers in the dangerous age ranges—not the ones we want to put on a high-speed limited access highway and expect safety to improve.

Our conclusion: It doesn’t matter that much what kind or road is being driven; safety is more about the driver. So, adding more miles of road will increase the number of accidents and fatalities.

3. High-speed roadways increase the severity of accidents.

It is well established that the rate of fatalities in accidents increases as speed increases. The severity of a crash depends of how much energy must be dissipated during the elapsed time of the collision between two objects. It is proportional not to the speed differential between them, but to the square of the speed differential! Thus, there is twice the impact of a 60mph crash into a stationary object (like a bridge abutment) as one at 40 mph, and 10 times the 60 mph impact as one at 20 mph. Clearly, high-speed collisions produce much more energy and are much more severe.

Surprisingly, a head on collision on a secondary road, where two equally-weighted cars are each moving at 35 mph, is less severe than a single vehicle accident on a freeway where the driver hits an immovable object at 60 mph! That fact alone indicates that the head-on collision which does not occur too often on freeways, isn’t the worst kind of accident.

In both cases, each vehicle’s damage is proportional to the square of the speed difference. In the second case, each vehicle sustains damage as though it hit an immovable object while moving at 35mph. The energy is divided equally between both vehicles. (HOWEVER, if all the energy were transferred to one vehicle, then the damage to it would be proportional to the square of the closing speed of 70 mph. The other vehicle would sustain no damage. Such a transfer could occur when two dissimilar vehicles collide, like a rear-ender between tractor-trailer and compact car.)

High vehicle speeds are known to influence crashes in other ways, as well. A high speed increases the distance the driver will travel upon detecting trouble; it reduces the effectiveness of the vehicle’s safety features; and it reduces the effectiveness of safety designed into the roadway (guardrails, crash barriers/attenuators, curvature, surface conditions, etc.). Moreover, fatalities, serious injuries, and high-dollar property damage result more often from high speed accidents (freeways), when compared to accidents at slower-speeds (local roads).

There is one related issue pertaining to speed. Context Sensitive Solutions (CSS), discussed in Chapter 5, recognizes that designing highways for the maximum speed can be detrimental to other community transportation needs. AASHTO said in 2006 that through stakeholder cooperation, finding a target speed for a given facility which best meets social and economic needs of the residents is the proper approach to designing transportation solutions. So, when the Feasibility study says there will be a 0.4% increase in overall road speeds in the study area, that is not necessarily a good thing.

4. Building the GC will increase accidents and fatalities in the corridor and region.

The Feasibility Study was conducted in the late 1990’s, using information that dated from the period 1995-2000. At the time, there was a steady increase in the number of miles people traveled on highways. The national trend was mirrored in both Illinois and the MetroEast. In Illinois, the growth rate was 2% per year. During that same period, the number of registered vehicles also increased by 2%, nationally.

However, something changed after 2000. The growth rate of miles driven slowed, so that by 2004, people were driving less. In Illinois, that trend is still downward; in the MetroEast, it dropped until 2008 and then flattened out. The growth rate of the number of vehicles on the road also slowed—by almost 50% in the ten years 2000-2010. Immediately, we can conclude that the study group’s assumption that increased driving would result in less safe roads was erroneous. The crash data bears this out, as there are fewer crashes and fewer deaths each year.

Today, there are roughly 1,000,000 miles per day driven on the 11 roads cited in the GC’s Corridor Protection Report. Given 2011 crash data for St Clair County, statistically there should be 1,085 crashes and 6 fatalities per year on these roads. Yet, using the study report’s estimates of traffic volume on those roads and their choice of determining a safe road, their projections should be much higher than that. Instead, there would be 1,700 crashes and 10 fatalities on those roads if the GC were built! If we used the 1995-2000 crash data available to the study group, the disparity would be higher still.

The claim that the GC freeway would “reduce the number…of crashes…” as well as the “severity” of those crashes is just rhetoric and contradicted by objective analysis. The severity of accidents on those roads will be worse, as well.

The report states that vehicle speed will increase 0.4% across the metropolitan area if the highway is built. If the average increase is .4% for all roads, we know that it will be much higher for some of those roads, and perhaps even reach the 55-60 mph category where most fatalities occur. The combination of increased speed, planned increased volume, and more risky drivers sounds like the recipe for reduced traffic safety—all other things being equal. Yet, the authors state that safety will improve!

In summary, we believe that the single claim that freeways are the safest type of road misses the point. It doesn’t mean that high speed, limited access roads are safer, but that drivers limit risky behaviors to other low-speed, low volume roads. And it means that the GC will neither ensure transportation safety nor reduce accidents and deaths.
The Goal of Economic Development

Rand Corporation’s David Bloom, a Harvard economist, made it clear in his “Population Matters” report: Economic growth must have population growth. In fact, his writing suggests that everything else is minor in comparison. And since we know now that there will be no significant population growth in the MetroEast, there will be no significant new economic growth, either.

That fact is generally ignored by planners even today, because it minimizes the relevance of projects by getting trivial results. We have already shown how far off the Feasibility Study projections are for population growth. We now extend that to the prospects for economic growth. Chapter 4 extends the analysis from the Feasibility Study’s projections to the more general consensus of the country’s economic future with current writings of the experts.

There are a number of assertions about the economic benefit of the GC which contradict other assertions, are themselves proven falsehoods, or defy common sense.

The very first objective for the economic development goal is to “assist economic development goals of Madison, St Clair, and Monroe counties.” However, the GC design does not further any of them, in truth. Roughly 70% of the highway’s mileage cuts through St Clair County, so a large portion of that assistance will go there. The newest version of the county’s Comprehensive Plan, adopted Sep 26, 2011, however, lists seven economic goals for the county. Ignoring the connector corridor altogether, the county’s intent is to develop the Kaskaskia basin, the Mississippi River ports, and the American Bottoms. One of the goals is “attracting transportation and distribution businesses,” and to “direct [them] to the American Bottoms.” That’s consistent with their preference for keeping trucks off the GC .

The county plan’s goes so far as to state that the county does not want the connector to be a transportation corridor at all, because that’s “bad for development.” However, as a limited access facility, it is a transportation corridor. Without intersections, residential development, in particular, will be impeded.

Less than 5 miles of the GC corridor ( approximately 10%) would be built in Madison County. Tying in to I-55/70 outside of Troy, it affects little except farmland and natural features, where it will split a number of long-established family farms and cross a couple of small streams. Because of its insignificant role, Madison County’s 2020 Land Use and Resource Management Plan has no references to the GC; neither does its Long-Range Transportation Plan, which focuses on other corridors. Even the county’s I-55 Corridor Plan ignores the connector’s new interchange on I-55.

The original plan was to take the GC through the city of Columbia, but citizens/political pressure caused the Department to add 4 miles to the plan and circle around the city from the south before connecting to I-255. So, now the GC plan includes about 8 miles (20%) of the highway in Monroe County. We could not find a published Comprehensive Plan, or a Long-Range Transportation Plan, per se. However, the city of Columbia has published one.

It contains the goal of managed growth and the planned infrastructure for each of the city’s districts. For the three districts in which the GC would be built—the Central (industrial, commercial), the Southview, and the I-255 corridor—there is no mention of any need or plan for a new highway. The Comprehensive Plan, written and adopted in 2005, contains no references to the GC. This lack of interest reflects the very strong opposition sentiment expressed at all four of the public hearings held there in 2001, 2003, and 2004.

The evidence from the three counties shows that the Feasibility Study’s authors are wrong when they claim that the GC will assist the counties’ economic development goals.

Facilitate Goods Movement

A second of the stated objectives of the economic development goal is to “facilitate goods movement.” This creates a clear contradiction within the report. The greatest movement of goods is by truck, but as we have already pointed out, an objective is to limit access by trucks. Other movement of goods is by water, but there are no accesses nearby, nor are any new accesses planned. That’s likely to remain the situation, because Illinois just put its money into expansion of America’s Central Port and a new Decatur Midwest Inland Port.

Rail offers some potential, even though many rail lines in the study area have been closed. Three active lines exist along I-64 in O’Fallon (Baltimore and Ohio), where development is hoped to occur even without a GC, near the Metrolink station and Scott AFB (L and N Railroad), and Near IL15 in SE Belleville (Illinois Central). Whether rail lines any offer potential for stopping or carrying goods to ventures along the GC is questionable.

Which leaves air freight at MidAmerica Airport. Years of effort have shown that growth in that sector is especially weak. Most consultants say that growth in air freight is going to remain weak, because of the high cost. The most optimistic forecast is from the FAA, who predict a 3% growth rate. Even the international handling of perishables, which have very short shelf lives requiring air freight, has failed to develop, as county officials had hoped. If it does, I-64 remains the better option for moving the goods by vehicle to local markets—the GC goes in the wrong direction for that.

One might argue that the trucks allowed on the GC are going to carry goods to new businesses, industries, and residents in the study area, far from I-64. However, that only holds if they develop; evidence shows that if you build it, they do not necessarily come to it. And when they do come, you better take good care of it since it’ll be a long time after you built it when they get there!

Access to Labor Pools

The study claims that “economic development occurs with increased total output...resulting from an increase in the supply of labor…” Apparently, the study group’s economic theory is that the more people there are to work, the more work gets done. Not only is it well documented that theory doesn’t hold, but the economic conditions of the last 6 years also anecdotally illustrate the fallacy. Since the supply of labor does not dictate economic activity, access to labor pools is irrelevant to economic development and having a new highway to access them is equally irrelevant.

It may be more relevant that high unemployment makes it possible for new businesses to find labor, but that is independent of a GC highway to move them.

Perpetuate the Myth; Chapter 5

Because the goal of economic development is such an important one, we devote much of Chapter 5, Current Expert Thinking in Transportation, on the subject.

The last of the three goals of the GC highway is to “enhance the environment.” After reading the study’s discussion on environmental impacts, one would more appropriately, and equally unfairly, describe the goal as “not totally destroying the environment.” The phrase chosen by the study group to describe the complete set of environmental effects was “no fatal flaws.” That is to say, they determined that every environmental obstacle that was found could be taken care of—one way or another.

It is equally interesting to consider the options available to the state, and the Department, in mitigating the environmental effects. They range from “taking” an organisms’ species at one extreme, to relocating or replacing destroyed item with another item of equal “value;” value in this context is used in the general sense. For example, if a cemetery is in the highway’s right-of-way, the solution is to relocate the people entombed there to another cemetery. If someone’s homestead is in the way, then buying it at fair market value (determined by the state) is sufficient remedy for all the disruption and inconvenience to the owner.

The study also contains several environmental objectives, including improving air quality, and preserving the area’s natural resources. One has to question the rhetoric, because the study never says how building a highway does either one. As it did when addressing multimodal transportation options, the study defers the discussion to a future study.

We believe it’s reasonable to assume that any construction project will alter the environment--whatever the project and no matter its scope. And it’s reasonable to assume that small projects will have small effects while big ones will have big effects. This $500 million project will have major environmental consequences. It’s somewhat telling that the GC Feasibility study lists so many potential impacts but fails to ever use the word “adverse” to describe any of them, as if every effect will be an enhancement.

Indeed, there are so many environmental factors at play in this project that the study groups them into two categories—natural resources and human development.

Air quality is one of the natural resources threatened by construction of the GC. The working theory is that adding another highway will redistribute traffic so that congestion will diminish. That, in turn, will reduce the amount of time autos emit pollutants, and therefore air quality will improve.

But the theory has serious flaws, not the least of which is reliance on hope and not on reality. The reality is that routes from which traffic will be drawn presently have little, if any, congestion. Over the last year, we have traveled the routes listed in the Feasibility study a number of times and at different hours, finding that the only time traffic slowed was during poor weather. Volume did not appear to have affected the flow even during morning/evening rush hours. Each one we surveyed had traffic stopped only for signals, and only for a single cycle.

There’s also the matter of the 68% increase in traffic that the study predicted in the study. Such an increase may well have created new congestion, but the actual increase is closer to 6% and no new congestion has been noted. But, if the increase had been 68%, the extra cars/trucks on the highway would suggest an increase in emissions and a decrease in air quality whether congestion arose or not. A new highway would merely serve to redistribute the increased pollution, but not eliminate it altogether.

Frankly, the new Mississippi River Bridge will do more to enhance air quality than will the GC, as actual congestion leading onto the Poplar Street Bridge is abated, though not eliminated.

Finally, adding more highway miles adds to the number of locations that high concentrations of pollutants will be found. Assertions about the substantially higher health risks from air pollution along highways have been made for at least 10 years, with the Sierra Club’s 2004 release of its Highway Health Hazards report, Tufts University’s Big Road Blues report in 2012, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 2013 report, Residential Proximity to Major Highways—United States 2000.

Because of the dispersal patterns of the various pollutants, especially fine and ultrafine particulates both of which are sourced from vehicles, people near highways are exposed to a much greater health risk. Unlike the fine (PM2.5) particles, ultrafine particles do not disperse readily, so they are the most dangerous to people living and working near roadways. Researchers at Tufts University learned that ultrafine particles are notably bad for heart health, not just respiratory health.

As 10% of the population lives within 300 yards of a highway, it could be a significant health problem for the US. Consequently, the USEPA released a new rule to try to verify and quantify the experts’ assertions. Up to 100 cities nationwide will now monitor pollutants near highways.

In May 2014, California released its first findings from its air quality monitoring stations along interstate I-5. The data was collected pursuant to those new USEPA rules. The results were not surprising. NO2 levels were 60% higher than for the region as a whole. Other pollutants were thought to be higher as well—up to 10 times higher for some. The preliminary results seemed to validate the assertions in the literature.

The St Louis region already fails the Federal standards for both particulates and ozone. New standards for air quality will go into effect next year. The region is not expected to meet these new standards even if Dynegy and other energy producers follow through with plans to improve their plants’ emissions.

The solution to St Louis and the MetroEast’s poor air quality is not going to come from energy companies alone. Auto emissions are a big contributor regionally. Adding another highway, even if it adds no new traffic, will not remove these hazards from the air we breathe. It’s more likely that encouraging traffic to sprawl to new areas will only exacerbate the problem. In addition, the loss of vegetation from up to 2,400 acres of land that will be consumed by the construction has not even been considered. It will have an impact, too—an adverse one!

Also on the study list is the quality of water. Of the 13 creeks that the road will traverse, the study specifically mentions the Silver Creek watershed which will be significantly disrupted by the project. The study also mentions the added runoff problem presented by both construction and operation of the highway, and notes that “The potential for adverse effects from operation and maintenance of this proposed highway are supported by a number of studies.” One of them was done by The Ozark Underground Laboratory, in Protem, Missouri. In a letter to the study group, Senior Geologist Philip Moss warned that the GC threatens groundwater, particularly the system for the Stemler Cave Nature Preserve. He also reminded the group that Illinois law states that nature preserve groundwater shall not be degraded, which construction of the GC will do.

The proposed highway is over 41 miles long. If built as intended (4-lane divided with frontage roads), it will add roughly 700 acres of new pavement—the equivalent of 39 new Super Walmart parking lots—with an annual runoff from that much pavement of an astounding 750 million gallons of water per year!

But air and water are not the only potentially adverse effects. There are the sinkhole plain, undermining, the Stemler woods and caves, and “unique plant and animal species” to contend with. That’s not to say that there’s an endangered species or a species that is thought to be extinct which would delay or cancel the project, but the possibility exists in spite of the “no fatal flaws” claim.

The provision which allows for the “taking” of a species is contained in the Department’s BDE Procedure Memorandum 31-03. Consequently, one must again question the claim of “enhancing the environment” if an option is to kill off that living thing that gets in the way.

That ought to clear it up! Existing studies already claim the potential is for “adverse effects,” not “beneficial effects,” which the GC Feasibility study group would have everyone believe.

The human development factors include items of historical significance (cemeteries, evidence of prior civilizations, etc.), displacement of churches, preservation of prime farmland, and the location of schools, public buildings, and hospitals. Does anyone truly believe there will be no adverse impact on any of these?

The Department wants to both preserve farmland and take thousands of acres of farmland out of production for the right-of-way. These are clearly mutually exclusive actions. And, these actions have a profound effect on the farmers whose land would be taken, sometimes splitting a farm into two parts that would be separated by a 400-foot, impenetrable barrier. Money, alone, does not remove that adversity.

Take the case of the Knobeloch family farm in Belleville. Some of their land was taken to build MidAmerica airport in the 1990’s. Although they sued because the amount offered did not adequately compensate the family for the loss, the St Clair County courts found the county’s “offer,” pursuant to an eminent domain taking, was sufficient. Now, the farmers’ land is again jeopardized by the GC project. Some of the family land is inside the corridor, making it subject to oversight by the state. For the “easement” claimed by the Department over their land through the corridor protection process, the Knobeloch’s received no compensation-- only the continued threat that more of their land will be taken from them over their objection.

We do not believe the overstated benefits from building the Belleville bypass is worth the environmental sacrifices that must ultimately be made. It is quite wrong to assert the highway would somehow enhance, or even preserve, the conditions we now have. Farm families would be put out of business, rural areas would be paved over, air quality would not improve, and ground water would gather much more runoff, even as farm chemical pollution is reduced. On balance, this project is bad for the environment.

In our opinion, putting more money and effort into implementing Illinois’ Public Act 095-0665 which effectively implements national “Complete Streets” policy, would be a better approach to enhancing the MetroEast’s environment than constructing a one-dimensional highway.

A Feasibility Study is intended to assess whether “a proposed highway improvement warrants further study.” CSS is intended to involve all the community’s stakeholders in that assessment. The practice of CSS, promulgated by the FWHA, was formally adopted by Illinois in 2003. Though the Feasibility Study was completed before the enactment of law, there were ample indications that CSS principles ought to have been followed by the SMG.

The theory behind CSS had been evolving since the late 1980’s, and was essentially put into effect with the passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991. The subsequent transportation law, Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21^st Century (TEA-21) passed in 1997, strengthened the requirements for public involvement, but stopped short of the CSS requirement to involve citizens in the decision-making process. Following Maryland’s “Thinking Beyond the Pavement” conference in 1998 (at which we believe the Department had a representative), CSS principles were developed; one of them was open, honest, early and continuous communication with ALL stakeholders.

Even if we are wrong in this belief, the Department should end its use of the Feasibility study, if only because it violates so many of the CSS principles. In particular, the study ignores the most fundamental principle that Illinois officials are to “start with an understanding of the project’s intended purpose,” not just its feasibility and viability.

Citizens for Smart Growth: Stop158 would point to one of the stated basic principles of CSS as being among the missing steps in the GC study. It is the FWHA’s idea that planning is approaching “a transportation problem to be solved, not as a solution to be sold.” The Department’s Detailed Guidelines for Practice requires planners to go to stakeholders with a “clean slate,” and to solicit “ideas on possible solutions, and in some cases, input on what the problems are.” That principle was not followed by the SMG.

In that sense, the GC Feasibility study project falls short, too. The SMG met with various other stakeholders--numerous individuals and citizen groups, but none of the individuals or citizen group participated in the study effort.

Why does that matter? Two reasons. One of the foundations of CSS is that stakeholders include “residents and landowners near a project.” We see these stakeholders as among the most important because it is they who are expected to sacrifice what they have for the good of the community. They fully expect their sacrifice to be worth it; we do too. Those people must also participate in the decision-making process. As will be demonstrated below, the concerns of those discounted stakeholders in letters, emails, and face-to-face, were dismissed by the study group and District 8 officials managing the project.

Secondly, CSS in Illinois is designed “to strike a balance between safety, mobility, community needs, and the environment.” We showed that safety is not preserved with a new high-speed highway; mobility is not materially affected; the environment is adversely affected; and most significantly, the community needs for an expanded transportation system are never addressed.

Back in 1999-2000, EWG used a travel demand model, known as MINUTP, developed by Citilabs. They provided it to the Parsons Brinckerstaff consultants for use in the Feasibility study. At the time, EWG was one of only six large MPOs using that model; most others were using a more advanced TRANPLAN model. Neither model, however, was considered state-of-the-art, because newer models, such as integrated land use models and activity-based models, had been developed and were nearly ready for fielding.

Simple land-use models to be used in conjunction with traffic demand models were available, but EWG did not use any of them for its work. At the time, they were designed to run apart from travel demand models, even though it was well known that there was a cause-effect relationship between the two parameters. Although the GC study group could not get access to such a model from EWG, neither did they make any effort to find or run one to supplement the travel demand model.

MINUTP was one of a number of models using a four-step process—trip generation, trip distribution, modal choice and trip assignment. One of the problems with such a model is that errors introduced in the first step are enlarged in each subsequent step according to the variable’s use in the equation (multiples, exponential, etc.). To counter that problem, users are supposed to validate output at each step to maintain control over the output; and to gather more extensive and more accurate input data. There was apparently no attempt to do that in the original Feasibility study process. There was a refinement following the first iteration, but that was only to redefine the study area.

There were other problems with the traffic demand models, too. They include a failure to input needed data (such as impedance, or the difficulty making trips between two points); they assume that past relationships are fixed over time; they ignore land use changes which result; they don’t consider trips with multiple stops; they are insensitive to other modes of travel; and sometimes lack validation following each step. They also did not allow for inclusion of environmental goals, cost-benefit analyses, social justice considerations, or reliability checks. In other words, even when the input data was complete and accurate, the output had to be viewed cautiously.

Daniel Goldfarb, the Transportation Planning Manager for a Virginia civil engineering firm, after studying model output for the I-495 corridor around Washington, DC, wrote that the travel demand model’s “raw model output is not reliable enough to be used directly for highway design, operational analysis, nor alternative or economic evaluations. The travel demand model is a tool that is just part of the forecasting process…not a turn-key operation…[or]…applied without the application of engineering judgment.” Between the Feasibility study group and the Corridor Protection study group, it appears that Mr Goldfarb’s advice was not heeded.

The step-wise modeling approach had been developed in the 1950’s - 1960’s and the versions in use at the beginning of the GC study had been in place for over 20 years. The MINUTP was very near the end of its useful live when it was used for this study; it is now obsolete. Shortly after the Corridor Protection Report was released in 2005, EWG scrapped that model in favor of the Land use Evolution and impact Assessment Model (LEAM), a land-use model owned by the University of Illinois, and run at its research park. Users access the model via internet connection; input data is loaded and the model is run online.

It was tested in 2010 by the state of Maryland, which found it worked fairly well when integrated with their economic and transportation models. However, they concluded that it needed more calibration before being used in corridor analysis.

The projections used to justify the GC are flawed in two ways. The model input was skewed, and/ or key input variables were missing; and the model itself was severely limited in its application. In our opinion, it was used in a fashion for which it was not designed and in spite of cautionary advice from various knowledgeable sources.

Today, there are far more reliable and comprehensive models that not only predict traffic demand, but assist in decision-making by predicting land use and presenting design options, as well.

Chapter 5 of the Feasibility Study makes two important points which were largely ignored as the study proceeded: involvement must include the community (i.e., its citizens) throughout the project, and without it, the project lacks legitimacy.

We suspect that community involvement was for show, and that only one of the citizens’ comments (to relocate the GC south of the Pines subdivision) was ever seriously considered. In addition, the discussion and conclusions covering public involvement are misleading. Here are the facts:

There were at least four public hearings on the Feasibility Study, the first of which was at Southwestern Illinois Community College, where 121 people attended. The report stated that “there is generally strong support from community residents” after that hearing. However, that conclusion is not warranted from the 7 comment forms that were turned in by the residents. In reality only one resident supported the project for a favorable rate of 14%--hardly strong support. There were 4 additional forms completed by non-residents. They included one from an engineering firm (Kuhlman Design Group), one from a developer, one from a newspaper reporter for the News-Democrat, and one from a Millstadt village councilman. Comments turned in later by St Clair County were also supportive. Only by counting these non-residents could the study group conclude the response favorable.

The second hearing was held in Columbia, where 241 people attended. The report stated that support was “mixed.” Again, a thorough analysis of the residents’ comments show that’s not the case here, either. A total of 30 comment forms were turned in. Of the 25 residents commenting, 20 were opposed—for an 80% disapproval rate. Four residents were supportive (though none lived near the corridor), and 1 was non-committal and wanted more information. The other 5 forms came from the Columbia Planning Commissioner, the Mayor, the township supervisor, the Illinois-American Water Co., and a real estate agent. All favored the project.

The third and final meeting was held in Troy, where 119 people attended. The report stated there was “strong resistance” to the project. The opponents’ concerns were over the sprawl that it would create and the farmland it would destroy. There were 25 comment forms from residents; 15 were opposed in principle, 4 said to take the road somewhere else, 4 were non-committal, and 2 favored the project. That’s a rate of opposition of 76%. In his comments, one of the 2 favoring the project offered to sell his vacant ground for $19,900 per acre. (We have to question the sincerity of the support from this person.) The 6 non-residents favoring the project included the mayor of Shiloh, the Jarvis Township supervisor, a member representing the Madison County Board, a member representing the Monroe County Board, a developer, and a business owner.

In the years since these meetings, we have collected 2,065 signatures of people who oppose this project. Not included among them are a couple of elected officials who are openly opposed, as well as some who will not openly state their opposition (but who would do nothing to encourage it, either). Our overall assessment is that the citizens of the MetroEast are strongly opposed to the GC project. That is the conclusion the consultant should have reported to the study group.

Despite the assertion that District 8 would be “listening…to…concerns,” there has been only a bit of listening and little action based on citizen concerns.

We have met 3 times with the Secretary, 5 times with the District Engineer, and numerous other times with local elected officials. Yet, the positions taken by Department personnel and two or three politicians have not changed. The current position of the Secretary is that the project is “viable.” We do not believe viability is enough to carry a project that could reach the $1 billon price.

For more than 10 years, Citizens for Smart Growth—Stop158 has been working toward the cancellation of this project in order to arrive at the reasonable outcome MetroEast citizens today, and in the future, deserve. We shall persevere.

In 1967, Illinois approved legislation that created the concept of protecting future land as transportation corridors. The concept had been around a long time; in 1909, the City of Chicago identified one such corridor in its “Plan of Chicago,” a forerunner of the Comprehensive Plans that cities adopt today.

The working theory is that by preventing improvements along select stretches of land, the state will save money, be better able to protect the environment, and avoid future social difficulties when the time comes to build a road on that land. The theory is sensible and sounds like good forward-looking planning, but there are some implicit assumptions that weaken the argument. We shall examine some of them in this chapter.

The Corridor Protection Report for the GC project was researched and written by the engaged consultant, MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, with input from the Department’s District 8 engineers, and three other engineering firms in the area. The basis of their work was the previously published Feasibility Study. They obtained new input from local officials, organizations, and then current publications. The model and some of the model input data was provided by EWG, the regional Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). Population data from the 2000 census was added to the analysis; the group looked back only as far as 1980, omitting older data which would have provided the long-term trend and would have generated different, more conservative results.

The study forecast conditions 25 years into the future to 2025—five years later than the Feasibility Study. As before, the projections can be compared to actual data from 2010, 2012, and 2014—more than halfway into the 25 year period. The forecasts have been shown to be substantially incorrect; even this updated Corridor Protection Report no longer reliably reflects future conditions. Thus, decision-makers cannot rely on the conclusions reached in the report.

This chapter will analyze the Corridor Protection Report’s errors in detail. Following the format of the report, we shall examine both the unsupported assertions and the inaccurate projections in light of both new information and information that was available, but ignored, at the time of the study.